v.
Texas Office of the Attorney General and Texas Department of Information Resources
ACCEPTED 15-25-00138-CV FIFTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS AUSTIN, TEXAS 11/17/2025 2:50 PM CHRISTOPHER A. PRINE No. 15-25-00138-cv CLERK _____________________________ FILED IN In the Court of Appeals 15th COURT OF APPEALS AUSTIN, TEXAS for the Fifteenth Judicial District 11/17/2025 2:50:12 PM Austin, Texas CHRISTOPHER A. PRINE ______________________________ Clerk
SHAMAR D. BRADLEY, Appellant, v. TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF INFORMATION RESOURCES, Appellees. ______________________________
On Appeal from the 261st Judicial District Court of Travis County, Texas Honorable Sherine Thomas, Judge Presiding ______________________________ BRIEF OF APPELLEE ______________________________ KEN PAXTON Denver Burris Attorney General Texas Bar No. 24138940 Assistant Attorneys General Brent Webster General Litigation Division First Assistant Attorney General P.O. Box 12548, Capitol Station Austin, Texas 78711-2548 Austin Kinghorn Phone (512) 463-2120 Deputy Attorney General for Fax (512) 320-0667 Civil Litigation Kimberly Gdula Division Chief, General Litigation Division
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE ORAL ARGUMENT NOT REQUESTED
-i-
IDENTITY OF PARTIES AND COUNSEL
Pursuant to Rule 38.1(a) of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure, Appellees herein provide this Court with the following list of parties and the names and addresses of all trial and appellate counsel: Shamar D. Bradley Plaintiff-Appellant Texas Department of Information Resources Defendant-Appellee
- ii - TABLE OF CONTENTS Identity Of Parties And Counsel ..................................................................................................... ii Table Of Contents .......................................................................................................................... iii Index Of Authorities ...................................................................................................................... iv Statement Of The Case .................................................................................................................. vi Statement Regarding Oral Argument............................................................................................ vii Issues Presented ........................................................................................................................... viii Statement Of Facts .......................................................................................................................... 1 Summary Of Argument................................................................................................................... 3 Standard Of Review ........................................................................................................................ 3 Argument ........................................................................................................................................ 4 A. Appellant does not have a probable right to the relief sought. ........................................... 4 Appellant brings criminal claims for: abuse of official capacity (C.R. 74); copyright infringement (C.R. 75); abuse of official capacity (C.R. 75); official oppression (C.R. 75); tampering with physical evidence (C.R. 76); tampering with governmental record (C.R. 76); obstruction and retaliation (C.R. 76); obstruction and retaliation (C.R. 77); abuse of official capacity (C.R. 77—79). Appellant brings a single tort claim for theft against Appellee. (C.R. 77) Appellant also brings causes of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code § 104.002(a)(2) in his Amended Petition, but those claims were not present in his Original Petition, the live petition at the time this appeal was initiated. (C.R. 882).
[*1]Appellant filed his Motion for Injunctive Relief on June 26, 2025, the denial of which being the catalyst for this appeal. Plaintiff’s Motion does not appear in the record and is attached to this Brief as an Appendix. In his Motion, Appellant argued that he is entitled to injunctive relief in the form of a temporary injunction because he is in danger of Appellee causing him to be arrested for not returning his work laptop to Appellee following the termination of his employment. (Appellant’s Motion for Injunctive Relief at p. 45—46). Appellant’s whistleblower claim against Appellee in his previous lawsuit was dismissed for want of jurisdiction at the trial court level.
[*2]Appellant did not present a whistleblower claim in his Original Petition, which was the live petition at the time of this appeal.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Appellant is not entitled to a temporary injunction and the trial court’s order should be affirmed. Appellant does not have a probable right to the relief he seeks because he either does not have standing to bring his claims, or his claims are barred by Appellee’s sovereign immunity. Appellant is not in danger of suffering a probable, imminent, or irreparable injury without a temporary injunction. For those reasons, the trial court’s order should be affirmed and Appellant’s appeal dismissed.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Appellate courts review the grant or denial of a temporary injunction by an abuse of discretion standard. Walling v. Metcalfe, 863 S.W.2d 56, 58 (Tex. 1993). "A temporary injunction's purpose is to preserve the status quo of the litigation's subject matter pending a trial on the merits." Butnaru v. Ford Motor Co., 84 S.W.3d 198, 204 (Tex. 2002). A temporary injunction is an extraordinary remedy and does not issue as a matter of right. Id. To obtain a temporary injunction, the applicant must plead and prove three specific elements: (1) a cause of action against the defendant; (2) a probable right to the relief sought; and (3) a probable, imminent, and irreparable injury in the interim. Id. “An injury is irreparable if the injured party cannot be adequately compensated in damages or if the damages cannot be measured by any certain pecuniary standard.” Id. (citing Canteen Corp. v. Republic of Tex. Props., Inc., 773 S.W.2d 398, 401 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1989, no writ).
[*3]ARGUMENT
Appellant fails to show his entitlement to such an extraordinary remedy as a temporary injunction. He is unable to show that he has a probable right to the relief sought, or that he is in danger of suffering a probable, imminent, and irreparable injury without such extraordinary relief. For that reason, his appeal should fail.
A. Appellant does not have a probable right to the relief sought. Appellant does not have a probable right to the relief sought because Appellant’s claims should be dismissed on jurisdictional grounds. Appellant does not provide a waiver of sovereign immunity that would abrogate Appellee’s sovereign immunity.
[*4]1. None of Appellant’s claims against Appellee are viable. a. Whistleblower claim
As a threshold matter, Appellant does not present a whistleblower claim in his Original Petition, and any argument he makes in support of receiving injunctive relief for such a claim is outside the scope of this appeal.
Res judicata, or claims preclusion, prevents the re-litigation of a claim or cause of action that has been finally adjudicated, as well as related matters that, with the use of diligence, should have been litigated in the prior suit. Gracia v. RC Cola-7-Up Bottling Co., 667 S.W.2d 517, 519 (Tex. 1984). When a plaintiff's claims are dismissed with prejudice, the doctrine of res judicata prohibits the plaintiff from reasserting his claims against that defendant in a later suit. see Mossler v. Shields, 818 S.W.2d 752, 754 (Tex. 1991) (holding that dismissal with prejudice functions as final determination on merits); see also Williams v. TDCJ-Inst. Div., 176 S.W.3d 590, 594 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2005, pet. denied) (holding that dismissal with prejudice has full res judicata and collateral estoppel effect).
Appellant seeks reversal of an order denying his Motion for Injunctive Relief. In his Motion, Appellant seeks injunctive relief on a whistleblower claim that was dismissed with prejudice in a previous lawsuit against Appellee. (Appellant’s Motion at p. 23). Even if Appellant had presented a whistleblower claim in his Original Petition, that claim would be barred by res judicata because the claim was fully adjudicated in a prior suit. Appellant’s request should be denied and the trial court’s order should be affirmed. b. Criminal claims
[*5]Appellant’s Motion seemingly only seeks injunctive relief on his previously dismissed whistleblower claim, which is not present in his Original Petition, the live petition for purposes of this appeal. (Appellant’s Motion). To the extent Appellant may seek injunctive relief for any criminal claims in his petition, that attempt should fail and the trial court’s order should be affirmed.
Texas does not recognize causes of action brought under the Penal Code. Aguilar v. Chastain, 923 S.W.2d 740, 745 (Tex.App.—Tyler 1996, writ denied). Because Texas does not recognize causes of action brought under the Penal Code, Appellant does not have standing with respect to any of his claims against Appellee. As such, Appellant may not receive injunctive relief with respect to any of the criminal claims he brings against Appellee. Accordingly, the trial court’s order should be affirmed.
[*6]c. Claims outside the scope of this appeal
Appellee’s Brief argues for injunctive relief under causes of action absent in his Original Petition, which was the live petition when this appeal was initiated. Appellant attempts to receive injunctive relief for a claim brought under the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act (Appellant’s Brief at p. 52), a tortious interference with a contract claim (Id.), a libel claim (Id. at p. 54), a whistleblower claim (Id. at p. 58), a “free speech retaliation” claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Id. at p. 72), and claims for violation and deprivation of due process, due course of law, and equal protection under the Texas Constitution (Id. at p. 77). These claims were not present in Appellant’s live petition at the time of appeal, nor are they present in the Motion he is asking this Court to grant. (C.R. 3—85); (Appellant’s Motion). Appellant should not be awarded any relief based on claims that are outside the scope of this appeal. The trial court’s order should be affirmed.
2. Sovereign immunity deprives this Court of jurisdiction.
A suit against the State or its agencies is barred by sovereign immunity absent clear and unambiguous legislative consent, and sovereign immunity deprives a trial court of subject matter jurisdiction. Tex. Dept. of Parks and Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 224-225 (Tex. 2004); Tex. Dep’t. of Transp. v. Miller, 8 S.W.3d 636, 638 (Tex. 1999). Sovereign immunity bars a suit against the State unless the legislature expressly consents to the suit. Texas Nat. Res. Conservation Comm’n. v. IT-Davy, 74 S.W.3d 849, 853 (Tex. 2002). Unless the plaintiff pleads a viable claim, sovereign immunity is retained for government defendants. See Andrade v. NAACP of Austin, 345 S.W.3d 1, 11 (Tex. 2011).
[*7]Appellant brings a theft claim against Appellee. (C.R. 77). Theft is an intentional tort, and the Texas Tort Claims Act does not waive immunity for intentional torts. SEE TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 101.057 (2). Accordingly, Appellee’s sovereign immunity bars this claim. Because sovereign immunity bars this claim, Appellee is unable to show that he has a probable right to the relief sought, and his request for a temporary injunction should be denied. The trial court’s order should be affirmed.
B. Plaintiff is not in danger of suffering a probable, imminent, and irreparable injury.
For purposes of a temporary injunction, an injury is irreparable if the injured party cannot be adequately compensated in monetary damages or if the damages cannot be measured by any certain pecuniary standard. Butnaru,
84 S.W.3d at 204. The party applying for a temporary injunction has the burden of production, which is the burden of offering some evidence that establishes a probable right to recover and a probable interim injury. See Wyly v. Preservation Dallas, 165 S.W.3d 460, 465 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2005, no pet.). If an applicant does not discharge his burden, he is not entitled to such extraordinary relief. Id.
[*8]Appellant asks this Court to reverse the order by the trial court denying Appellant injunctive relief in the form of reinstatement with Appellee. (Appellant’s Brief at p. 98). Appellant claims his request is a “statutory injunction” governed by Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code § 65.011. (Id. at p. 40—41). Appellant did not argue for an injunction under this statute in his Motion and only mentions it in passing once. (Appellant’s Motion at p. 47). Importantly, section 65.011(3) provides that an applicant may be entitled to an injunction, if the applicant can show they would receive an injunction “under the principles of equity”. SEE TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 65.011(3). Texas Appellate Courts have held that section 65.011(3) “does not supersede the common law’s irreparable harm or injury requirement”. Devon Energy Prod. Co., L.P. v. McCarver, No. 10-15-00002-CV, 2015 Tex. App. LEXIS 8241, at *4 (Tex. App. Aug. [6], 2015). Indeed, the “default rule” is that “the rules of equity control the granting of temporary-injunctive relief unless a particular statute provides otherwise.” Cardinal Health Staffing Network v. Bowen, 106 S.W.3d 220, 235 (Tex. App.—Houston 2003). Appellant’s assertion that § 65.011(3) “does not include the equitable requirement of irreparable injury and inadequate legal remedy” is incorrect. (Appellant’s Brief at p. 41).
[*9]Appellant’s Brief does not argue he is in danger of an irreparable, imminent harm because it falsely assumes that is not a requirement for injunctive relief. Even if Appellant correctly applied the law in his Brief, he would be unable to obtain injunctive relief because he has not indicated the irreparable injury he is in danger of suffering without preservation of the status quo. Appellant is currently not employed by Appellee; the injunction Appellant seeks does nothing to preserve this status quo and would actually change the current position of the parties. Simply put, no equitable or legal justifications exist for this Court to overturn the trial court’s correct decision.
Further, Appellant’s Motion for Injunctive Relief argues that he “fears for his safety” after Appellee asked Appellant to return the work computer that was provided to him when Appellee hired Appellant. (Appellant’s Motion at p. 46). Appellant also claimed in his Motion, in a paragraph under the heading “STATEMENT OF IMMEDIATE AND IRREPARABLE HARM,” - 10 - that he has a protected interest in “his good name, honor, integrity, reputation, and employment which will be irreparably harmed” without the Court’s intervention. (Id.) (emphasis added). Appellant’s clear recitation of an element of injunctive relief, and his lackluster attempt to argue such a point, conflict with his claim in his Brief that § 65.011(3) “does not include the equitable requirement of irreparable injury”. (Appellant’s Brief at p. 41).
Appellant’s Motion for Injunctive Relief, the denial of which is the issue on appeal, and his appellate Brief, ostensibly in support of said Motion, contradict each other on whether Appellant is supposed to prove irreparable harm at all. Appellant’s Brief does not even attempt to argue that he needs protection from an irreparable harm. Accordingly, the decision of the trial court should be affirmed.
PRAYER
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should dismiss Appellant’s appeal and affirm the trial court’s order. Appellant does not attempt to argue for the granting of his Motion for Injunctive Relief and instead argues for claims outside the scope of this appeal. Appellant has not established his entitlement r d rd tion and ining • 1g w uld u]t in rforman . · ( ) ( , n. tio nal favor- i • cal p nd official a y or influ- • r ff th r ult e on. c r pri al for th tion I mploye reas n bly ny l le. 11 • n r u. wn , an abn l.llti s tUl to public h ( ) In a • • •• • r- lnfro. (1 with -.-.----., ion 2302(a (2) ( ) of this ti h uth ri y h • • includin ,he. "(2) an h hich i nots tit:v action ' . • ·s nt • • h • principl .
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p (29 ..c. 791) • or " ( • ) on th b • a.rital r polit,i l Oiliation prohibit d on w, rul uJ ·on; 74 of 159 App. 000075 Copy from re:SearchTX
Exhibit G2 - HB3893, Proposed Revision to TWA, 06MAR2025, Page 2 (ilJ 2 of 6 H. B . No . 3893 including termination , demotion , suspension , harassment , blacklisting , pay reduction , or other forms of discrimination .
3. Protected Disclosure - A good faith communication
regarding misconduct reported to a supervisor , compliance officer , oversight body , law enforcement , or an elected official .
SECTION 4 . SCOPE OF COVERAGE .
This Act applies to :
1. Public Sector Employees - State , county , municipal , and law enforcement personnel .
2. Private Sector Employees - Emp l oyees of bus i nesses and nonprofit organizations operating in Texas .
3. Contractors and Volunteers Individuals performing services for an employer under contract or as unpaid personnel.
SECTION 5 . PROHIBITED RETALIATION .
(a) No employer , agency , or organization may engage in retaliation against a whistleb l ower . (b) Retaliation includes , but is not limited to :
1. Termination , suspension , or demotion ; 2. Pay reduction or denia l of benefits ;
3. Workplace harassment or the creation of a hostile work environment ;
4. Blacklisting or any act that harms future employme n t opportunities . (c) Employers violating this provision may be subject to
criminal liability under Texas Penal Code § 39 . 06 (Misuse of Official Information) and civil liabi l ity under Chapter 554 , Texas 75 of 159 App. 000076 Copy from re:SearchTX
Exhibit G3 - HB3893, Proposed Revision to TWA, 06MAR2025, Page 3 il.D. lSV • .J07.J IIJ 3 of 6 Government Code (Whist leblower Protect ion Act) .
SECTION 6 . WHISTLEBLOWER PROTECTIONS .
(a) Confidentiality : Whistleblower identities sha l l remain confidential unless disclosure is required by law .
(b) Remedies for Reta l iation :
1. Reinstatement to the same or equivalent position ;
2. Compensation for lost wages , benefits , and emotional distress;
3. Punitive damages and reimbursement of legal fees .
SECT I ON 7 . MANDATORY REPORTING REQUIREMENTS .
(a) All employers in Texas shall establish :
1. Internal procedures for whistleblower disclosures;
2. Mandatory notification of employee rights under this Act ;
3. Supervisor and HR personnel training on handling whistleblower complaints .
SECTION 8 . TEXAS WHISTLE BLOWER OVERSIGHT COMMISSION
(TWOC) .
(a) The Texas Whistleblower Oversight Commission (TWOC) is hereby established as an independent body to :
1. Receive , investigate , and mediate whistleblower complaints;
2. Recommend penalties for retaliatory actions ;
3. Require annual reports from organizations detailing whistleblower disclosures and remedial actions taken .
SECTION 9 . TRANSPARENCY IN PUBLIC ENTITIES .
All Texas government agencies , including constables ' 76 of 159 App. 000077 Copy from re:SearchTX
Exhibit G4 - HB3893, Proposed Revision to TWA, 06MAR2025, Page 4 ID 4of 6 H. B . No . 3893 offices , shall :
(a) Submit quarterly budget reports disclosing funding allocations for specialized units ;
(b) Include whistleblower reports and resolutions for public review under the Texas Public Information Act (Chapter 552 , Texas Government Code) .
SECTION 10 . LAW ENFORCEMENT ACCOUNTABILITY .
(a) No law enforceme n t agency , including constables ' precincts , may hire an officer previously dismissed for :
1. Official misconduct under Texas Penal Code§ 39 . 02 (Abuse of Official Capacity) ;
2. Civil rights violations under Texas Penal Code § 39 . 03 (Official Oppression) .
(b) Agencies must conduct thorough background checks and periodic personnel reviews of all officers.
SECTION 11 . LEGAL RECOURSE FOR WHISTLEBLOWERS . (a) Whistleblowers may file civil l awsuits against employers within three ( 3) years of retaliatory actions .
(b) Lawsuits may include : 1. Compensation for economic and emotional damages ;
2. Recovery of lega l fees and punitive damages ;
3. Injunctive relief restoring employment or benefits .
SECTION 12 . AMENDMENTS TO TEXAS WH I STLEBLOWER ACT . (a) Expansion of Protections:
1. Extends whistleblower protections to private - sector employees ; 77 of 159 App. 000078 Copy from re:SearchTX
Exhibit G5 - HB3893, Proposed Revision to TWA, 06MAR2025, Page 5 I[] 5 of 6 H. B . No . 3893 2. I ncludes explicit safeguards for reporting constitutional and civil rights violations ; 3. Aligns Texas laws with federal whistleblower protections under the Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act (WPEA) . SECTION 13 . PENALTIES FOR RETALIATION. (a) Civil Penalties : Employers guilty of retaliation may face : 1. Fines up to $500 , 000 per violation ; 2. Compensatory damages for affected whistleblowers . (b) Criminal Penalties:
3. Any employer obstructing a whistleblower disclosure may be charged under Texas Penal Code § 36 . 06 (Obstruction or Retaliation) and face imprisonment. SECTION 14 . ESTABLISHMENT OF WHISTLE BLOWER SUPPORT FUND . (a) A state - funded program shall provide : 1. Financial assistance for whistleblowers facing legal proceedings ; 2. Counseling services for whistleblowers and their families . SECTION 15 . ENFORCEMENT . (a) The Texas Attorney General ' s Office shall oversee enforcement of this Act ; (b) The Texas Whistleblower Oversight Commission (TWOC) shall monitor compliance and publish an annual report to the Texas Legislature. SECTION 16 . EFFECTIVE DATE .
78 of 159 App. 000079 Copy from re:SearchTX
Exhibit G6 - HB3893, Proposed Revision to TWA, 06MAR2025, Page 6 H. B . No . 3893 1 This Act shall take effect on January 1 , 2025 . 2 SECTION 17 . SEVERABILITY . 3 If any provision of this Act is held invalid , the remainder of 4 the Act shall not be affected and shall continue in full force and 5 effect .
79 of 159 App. 000080 Copy from re:SearchTX
Exhibit H - OAG Whistleblower Sign 121 of 159 App. 000122 Copy from re:SearchTX
Exhibit M7 - Email from Court Administrator’s Office, 03JAN2025 Gmail shamar bradley <[email protected]> 127 of 159 App. 000128 Copy from re:SearchTX
Exhibit M13 - Email to Court Administrator’s Office, 30JAN2025 - 2 From: shamar bradley <[email protected]> Sent: Thursday, January 30, 2025 12:14 PM To: tc.civildistrictannounce <TC [email protected]> Subject: [CAUTION EXTERNAL] Re: Hearing announcement - D-1-GN-24- 009408 139 of 159 App. 000140 Copy from re:SearchTX
Exhibit N3 - Brickman V. OAG Final Order, 04APR2025, Page 3
Whistleblower Act occurred. Each of the Plaintiffs filed suit not later than the 90 1h day after the date on which the violations of the Texas Whistleblower Act occurred. Each of the Plaintiffs presented evidence establishing the damages awarded in this Judgment.
Because reinstatement, a form of mandatory relief available under the Texas
Whistleblower Act, is not feasible, Plaintiffs are entitled to an award of the value of such reinstatement, commonly referred to as "front pay." 2
OAG by and through its counsel of record elected not to dispute the Plaintiffs' lawsuit as to any issue, including any issue of fact in this case as to the claim or damages. Moreover, OAG
won the right to avoid discovery in this case by certifying to the Supreme Court of Texas that "the agency does not contest liability, damages, or reasonable attorneys' fees." On attorney's fees, OAG represented to the Supreme Court that it "agreed not to contest the figures offered by
Plaintiffs." Having achieved the relief it sought, OAG is now estopped from contesting liability, damages, or the attorney's fees figures that Plaintiffs' counsel have testified are reasonable and necessary. See Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211 , 227, n. 8 (2000) (Judicial estoppel protects the integrity of the judicial system and "generally prevents a party from prevailing in one phase of a case on an argument and then relying on a contradictory argument to prevail in another phase.");
Fleming v. Wilson, 694 S. W.3d 186, 192 (Tex. 2024) (quoting Pegram for application of judicial estoppel if the successful representation arose "in another phase" of the same case).
Independent of judicial estoppel, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have proved liability, damages, and reasonable and necessary attorney' s fees by a preponderance of the evidence.
Because the Office of the Attorney General violated the Texas Whistleblower Act by firing and 2 See TEX. GOVT. CODE §554.003(b)(I); see also Pollardv. £.!. DuPont Nemours & Co., 532 U.S. 843-853 (2001); City ofHouston v. Livingston, 221 S.W.3d 204, 231-233 (Tex. App. -Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, no pet.); Giles v. Gen. £lee. Co., 245 F.3d 474, 489 n. 27 (5th Cir. 200 I); and Wal mart Stores, Inc. v. Davis, 979 S.W.2d 30, 45 (Tex. App. - Austin 1998, pet. denied).
140 of 159 App. 000141 Copy from re:SearchTX
Exhibit N4 - Brickman V. OAG Final Order, 04APR2025, Page 4 otherwise retaliating against the Plaintiffs for in good faith reporting violations of law by Ken
Paxton and OAG, the Court hereby renders judgment for Plaintiffs. Accordingly, the Court
ORDERS that Plaintiffs recover the following from the Office of the Attorney General:
As to Plaintiff James Blake Brickman, Compensation for wages lost during the period of termination in the amount of $65,770.82;
Compensatory damages for emotional pain, suffering inconvenience, mental anguish, loss of enjoyment of life in the amount of $250,000.00;
Prejudgment interest on the above damages awarded at the rate of7.5% from November 12, 2020, until the date of this judgment in the amount of $102,906.69
Attorneys' fees in the amount of $842.269.00 3;
Court costs in the amount of $2,420.66; and Post-judgment interest on all of the above at the rate of 7.5%, compounded annually, from the date this judgment is rendered until all amounts are paid in full.
As to Plaintiff David Maxwell, Compensation for wages lost during the period of termination in the amount of $871,249.83 ;
Compensatory damages for emotional pain, suffering inconvenience, mental anguish, loss of enjoyment of life in the amount of $250,000.00·
Prejudgment interest on the above damages awarded at the rate of 7.5% from November 12, 2020, until the date of this judgment in the amount of $365,404.57;
In lieu of reinstatement, front pay, from the date of trial through the remainder of the Attorney General's current term in the amount of $392.916.59·
Attorneys' fees in the amount of $336,708.00; and 3 Plaintiff Brickman' s attorney ' s fees are comprised of: $465,705 from Tom Nesbitt; $345,995 from the firm of Cain & Skamulis; and $30,569 from the firm ofScanes Yelverton & Talbert.
141 of 159 App. 000142 Copy from re:SearchTX
Exhibit O1 - DIR Project Manager III Job Announcement, 28APR2025, Page 1 [[] 1 of 7 Travel:
[*40]Occasional
Work Location:
Central / Austin, Texas 78756
Web site: