UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MARIO ALEJANDRO BULA No. 2:25-cv-03719-DAD-CKD ARMENTA, 12 Plaintiff, 13 ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION v. FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER 14 STEVE GORDON, (Doc. No. 5) 15 Defendant.

This matter is before the court on plaintiff’s ex parte motion for a temporary restraining order. (Doc. No. 2.) For the reasons explained below, the court will deny plaintiff’s motion for a temporary restraining order. BACKGROUND On December 29, 2025, plaintiff Mario Alejandro Bula Armenta proceeding pro se initiated this civil rights action against defendant Steve Gordon. (Doc. No. 1.) In his complaint, plaintiff alleges the following. Plaintiff currently possesses a California commercial driver’s license which he uses in connection with his current employment. (Id. at 3.) On November 6, 2025, plaintiff received written notice from the California Department of Motor Vehicles (“DMV”) that this license would be cancelled within sixty days unless he provided proof of either his United States citizenship or his lawful permanent resident status. (Id.) Defendant Gordon is asserted by plaintiff to be the current director of the DMV. (Id. at 1.) On November 20, 2025, plaintiff went to a DMV office in Sacramento and was informed that he was required to show citizenship or lawful permanent residency to challenge this pending cancellation of his California driver’s license. (Id. at 3.) On this basis, plaintiff asserts a single cause of action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against defendant Gordon alleging that he has not been provided with requisite procedural due process in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. (Id. at 4.) On December 29, 2025, plaintiff filed the pending motion for temporary restraining order. (Doc. No. 5.) In that motion, plaintiff requests that the court enjoin defendant from cancelling his commercial driver’s license until a hearing can be held. (Id. at 2.) On December 29, 2025, the court directed plaintiff to immediately serve defendant with a copy of the complaint, motion for temporary restraining order and accompanying papers, and the court’s order directing such service. (Doc. No. 6.) The court further directed plaintiff to provide proof of that service. (Id.) The court set a briefing schedule requiring that defendant file a written opposition no later than 5:00 PM on January 2, 2026. (Doc. No. 6.) On December 30, 2025, plaintiff filed a declaration by a process server indicating that an officer at the DMV who was authorized to accept service was served with the summons and complaint in this action. (Doc. No. 7.) However, plaintiff did not file proof of service regarding his motion for temporary restraining order or the court’s order setting a briefing schedule with respect to that motion. To date, defendant has not appeared in this action and has not filed an opposition to the pending motion for temporary restraining order. LEGAL STANDARD The standard governing the issuing of a temporary restraining order is “substantially identical” to the standard for issuing a preliminary injunction. See Stuhlbarg Int’l Sales Co. v. John D. Brush & Co., 240 F.3d 832, 839 n.7 (9th Cir. 2001). “The proper legal standard for preliminary injunctive relief requires a party to demonstrate ‘that he is likely to succeed on the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest.’” Stormans, Inc. v. Selecky, 586 F.3d 1109, 1127 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008)); see also Ctr. for Food Safety v. Vilsack, 636 F.3d 1166, 1172 (9th Cir. 2011) (“After Winter, ‘plaintiffs must establish that irreparable harm is likely, not just possible, in order to obtain a preliminary injunction.’”); Am. Trucking Ass’ns v. City of Los Angeles, 559 F.3d 1046, 1052 (9th Cir. 2009). A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must make a showing on all four of these prongs. All. for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127, 1135 (9th Cir. 2011). The Ninth Circuit has also held that “[a] preliminary injunction is appropriate when a plaintiff demonstrates . . . that serious questions going to the merits were raised and the balance of hardships tips sharply in the plaintiff’s favor.” Id. at 1134–35 (quoting Lands Council v. McNair, 537 F.3d 981, 987 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc)).1 The party seeking the injunction bears the burden of proving these elements. Klein v. City of San Clemente, 584 F.3d 1196, 1201 (9th Cir. 2009); see also Caribbean Marine Servs. Co. v. Baldrige, 844 F.2d 668, 674 (9th Cir. 1988) (citation omitted) (“A plaintiff must do more than merely allege imminent harm sufficient to establish standing; a plaintiff must demonstrate immediate threatened injury as a prerequisite to preliminary injunctive relief.”). Finally, an injunction is “an extraordinary remedy that may only be awarded upon a clear showing that the plaintiff is entitled to such relief.” Winter, 555 U.S. at 22. DISCUSSION Plaintiff argues that he is likely to succeed on the merits of his procedural due process claim because defendant has “deprived him of a protected property interest without . . . notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard.” (Doc. No. 5 at 1.) Plaintiff’s argument in this regard is unclear. First, as noted above, plaintiff alleges that the DMV has not yet cancelled his commercial driver’s license. (Doc. No. 1 at 3.) Second, plaintiff alleges that he was provided with notice of the intended future cancellation of his commercial driver’s license and has attached what appears to be that letter to his complaint. (Id. at 3, 9.) The court construes plaintiff’s

1 The Ninth Circuit has found that this “serious question” version of the circuit’s sliding scale approach survives “when applied as part of the four-element Winter test.” All. for the Wild 26 Rockies, 632 F.3d at 1134. “That is, ‘serious questions going to the merits’ and a balance of 27 hardships that tips sharply towards the plaintiff can support issuance of a preliminary injunction, so long as the plaintiff also shows that there is a likelihood of irreparable injury and that the 28 injunction is in the public interest.” Id. at 1135. contention as arguing that due process requires that he be provided with a hearing prior to cancellation of his driver’s license. California Vehicle Code § 13800 authorizes the DMV to “conduct an investigation to determine whether the privilege of any person to operate a motor vehicle should be suspended or revoked . . . upon a showing by its records . . . [t]hat any ground exists for which a license might be refused.” Cal. Veh. Code § 13800. California Vehicle Code § 12801.5 provides that the DMV “shall require an applicant for an original driver’s license or identification card to submit satisfactory proof of California residency and that the applicant’s presence in the United States is authorized under federal law.” Cal. Veh. Code § 12801.5. Accordingly, a California state appellate court has held that “persons whose presence in the United States is not authorized by federal law are not entitled to such documents[.]” Lauderbach v. Zolin, 35 Cal. App. 4th 578, 585 (1995). Plaintiff’s allegations and the letter from the DMV attached to his complaint support his claim that the DMV is proposing cancellation of his commercial driver’s license for failure to provide legal presence documents. (Doc. No. 1 at 3, 9.) California Vehicle Code § 13950 mandates notice and opportunity to be heard procedures for the revocation of a driver’s license: Whenever the department determines upon investigation or re- examination that any of the grounds for re-examination are true, or 18 that the safety of the person investigated or re-examined or other persons upon the highways requires such action, and it proposes to 19 revoke or suspect the driving privilege of the person or proposes to impose terms of probation on his driving privilege, notice and an opportunity to be heard shall be given before taking the action. Cal. Veh. Code § 13950. When “the department has given notice, or has taken or proposes to take action under Section . . . 13950 . . . , the person receiving the notice or subject to the action may, within 10 days, demand a hearing which shall be granted[.]” Cal. Veh. Code § 14100(a). “These provisions of state law satisfy the due process rights of drivers subject to suspension or revocation . . . . The U.S. Supreme Court has expressly held that due process does not require an administrative hearing prior to revocation of driving privileges.” Schneider v. Sutter Amador Hosp., No. 2:14-cv-00804-GEB-AC, 2014 WL 5473545, at[*11] (E.D. Cal. Oct. 28, 2014) (citing Dixon v. Love, 431 U.S. 105, 107 (1977)), report and recommendation adopted, 2014 WL 13065162 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 20, 2014), aff’d, 621 F. App’x 480 (9th Cir. 2015); see also Barone v. Dep’t of Motor Vehicles, No. 3:23-cv-00858-WHO, 2024 WL 333887, at *5–6 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 29, 2024) (discussing the California Vehicle Code’s notice and hearing processes and holding that “the California statutes provide sufficient due process via a post-suspension hearing process”). Here, plaintiff does not appear to contest that the November 6, 2025 letter put him on notice of the DMV’s proposed revocation of his license. Instead, plaintiff argues only that the DMV was required to provide him with a pre-suspension hearing. As the cases above describe, there is no general constitutional requirement for greater process prior to suspension “[i]n light of the notice and opportunity be heard” provided by the California Vehicle Code. Schneider, 2014 WL 5473545, at[*12] . Moreover, plaintiff does not allege that he requested a hearing within ten days as authorized under California Vehicle Code § 14100. Rather, plaintiff alleges that he went to the DMV without evidence of legal presence documents fourteen days after receiving notice. (Doc. No. 1 at 3.) “Failure to respond to a notice given under this chapter within 10 days is a waiver of the right to a hearing, and the department may take action without a hearing or may . . . reopen the question, [or] take evidence.” Cal. Veh. Code § 14103. To the extent then that plaintiff is arguing that he should have been provided with the opportunity to request a hearing beyond ten days, the California Vehicle Code already provides that additional process. Barone v. Dep’t of Motor Vehicles, No. 23-cv-00858-WHO, 2024 WL 4529336, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 17, 2024) (finding no due process violation where the plaintiff could have requested a late hearing pursuant to California Vehicle Code § 14103), but failed to do so. The court therefore rejects plaintiff’s argument that the California Vehicle Code has not provided sufficient process prior to the suspension of his commercial driver’s license. Accordingly, the court concludes that plaintiff has not shown that he is likely to succeed on the merits of his procedural due process claim. Because the court concludes that plaintiff has not raised serious questions going to the merits of his claim, the court need not consider the other Winter factors. Disney Enters., Inc. v. VidAngel, Inc., 869 F.3d 848, 856 (9th Cir. 2017) (“Likelihood of success on the merits is the most important Winter factor; if a movant fails to meet this threshold inquiry, the court need not ///// 1 | consider the other facts in the absence of serious questions going to the merits.”) (internal 2 | quotation marks and citations omitted). 3 For the reasons explained above, plaintiff's motion for temporary restraining order (Doc. 4 | No. 5) is DENIED. 5 IT IS SO ORDERED. ° | Dated: _ January 5, 2026 Dake A. 2, oyel 7 DALE A. DROZD 3 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE