2026 IL 130585

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS (Docket No. 130585) THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. ANZANO P. CHAMBLISS, Appellee. Opinion filed January 23, 2026. JUSTICE THEIS delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion. Justices Overstreet, Holder White, Cunningham, and Rochford concurred in the judgment and opinion. Justice O’Brien dissented, with opinion, joined by Chief Justice Neville. OPINION ¶1 The central issue in this case is whether the trial court’s failure to conduct a “prompt preliminary hearing to establish probable cause” as required by article VI, section 7, of the 1970 Illinois Constitution was reviewable as second-prong plain error, after defendant Anzano P. Chambliss failed to object and demand such a hearing at any time before his trial at which he was convicted of aggravated battery beyond a reasonable doubt. The appellate court held that the error was second- prong plain error and reversed the defendant’s convictions. 2024 IL App (5th) 220492. For the reasons that follow, we reverse the judgment of the appellate court. ¶2 BACKGROUND ¶3 On October 5, 2021, Trevor Pullum and Chris Cates, employees at Pinckneyville Correctional Facility, were driving home from work when they saw the defendant beat Emily Barnes and Carolyn Spell outside a convenience store in DuQuoin. Pullum and Cates stopped their vehicles, then stopped the attack. Shortly thereafter, DuQuoin Police Department Chief Steve Ingram and Officer Reid Bastien arrived at the scene and spoke with Barnes and Spell. The defendant was arrested. ¶4 Three days later, on October 8, 2021, the defendant was charged by information with three counts of aggravated battery, a Class 3 felony. 720 ILCS 5/12-3.05(a)(1), (c) (West 2020). On October 14, the Perry County circuit court spoke on the record with defense counsel via telephone. The court noted that the prosecutor was not present but that “we have an agreement with regard to how to proceed.” The court asked defense counsel if he represented the defendant in an unrelated misdemeanor case where a fitness evaluation had been ordered. Defense counsel answered affirmatively, adding that he had experience with the defendant. According to defense counsel, there had been “questions” about the defendant’s fitness in the past. Defense counsel believed that it would be appropriate to seek a fitness evaluation in this case, as well. ¶5 The trial court asked defense counsel if he would agree to postpone the defendant’s arraignment and preliminary hearing because the fitness evaluation would “push off” the necessity of such a hearing. Defense counsel agreed that “it would be appropriate to delay the arraignment at this time since an in-person or even a video appearance wouldn’t be possible or practical.” Defense counsel acceded that the fitness evaluation would cause a delay in “setting the prelim.” Defense counsel assured the trial court that he and the prosecutor were “on the same page.” According to defense counsel, “nothing that was said today isn’t anything that he and I didn’t already discuss yesterday as far as me seeking a fitness

130586 evaluation that very well could cause a delay into the arraignment and then in turn the preliminary hearing.”

¶6 The trial court entered a written order appointing Dr. James Peterson to evaluate the defendant and to submit a report about his fitness for trial. The court scheduled a fitness hearing for October 28, 2021. That month, the defendant sent several letters to the trial court, one of which objected to the fitness evaluation and mentioned his right to remain silent. Dr. Peterson also sent a letter to the court, explaining that the defendant refused to speak to him, so he could not submit a report about the defendant’s fitness.

¶7 On October 28, 2021, the parties appeared in court. Defense counsel waived “formal reading of the charges,” and the trial court entered a not guilty plea for the defendant. The trial court acknowledged Dr. Peterson’s letter, which stated that the defendant chose not to participate in the fitness evaluation. The trial court also acknowledged the defendant’s letters and concluded that they raised fitness “in the Court’s mind.” Defense counsel informed the court that he had met with the defendant, who expressed “an unwillingness to meet with Dr. Peterson alone outside the presence of counsel.” The defendant insisted that he would only speak to Dr. Peterson in open court. The trial court stated that Dr. Peterson would not conduct the fitness evaluation in the courtroom and informed the defendant that a fitness evaluation would be ordered.

¶8 The defendant disrupted the hearing, and he was removed from the courtroom. The trial court discussed scheduling another status hearing on the fitness evaluation with the prosecutor and defense counsel. A written order from October 28 ordered another fitness evaluation by Dr. Peterson and set “the fitness hearing date” for December 9, 2021.

¶9 On November 9, 2021, the defendant sent another letter to the trial court, stating that he had not been arraigned, contesting the merits of the State’s case, and accusing the trial court of stalling. The defendant insisted that he had never requested representation and that his mental illness did not justify the delay in his case.

¶ 10 On December 9, 2021, the parties appeared in court. Defense counsel told the trial court that he visited the defendant in jail when Dr. Peterson attempted another

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fitness evaluation. The defendant refused to speak to Dr. Peterson, even in the presence of counsel. Defense counsel also told the court that the defendant had asked him to withdraw from the case. The trial court noted that the defendant was charged with three felonies, so “until we resolve the fitness issue, the court is not inclined to address any issues with regard to an attorney.” The defendant informed the court that he was “disabled” without further elaboration. At the close of the hearing, the judge announced that she had been reassigned and that a new judge would preside over this case beginning with the next court date.

¶ 11 On January 13, 2022, the defendant and defense counsel appeared in court, and the prosecutor appeared via telephone, before the new judge. Defense counsel told the trial court that the defendant still refused to participate in the fitness evaluation. The court stated that the defendant would have one more opportunity for a fitness evaluation with a new expert. The court advised the defendant that, if the expert’s report indicated that he was fit for trial, that would be the fastest way to “get on” with the case.

¶ 12 The defendant stated that he had been in jail without bond since his October 2021 arrest and insisted that he was fit for trial. The defendant again refused to participate in a fitness evaluation. The trial court appointed Dr. Daniel Cuneo to conduct an evaluation. At the end of the hearing, defense counsel noted that the fitness statute was silent about the defendant’s speedy trial rights and that the parties had not proceeded with a preliminary hearing because the fitness issue remained unresolved.

¶ 13 Throughout March and early April 2022, the defendant corresponded frequently with the trial court.

¶ 14 On April 6, 2022, Dr. Cuneo filed a report concluding that defendant was fit for trial. The following week, on April 14, the parties appeared in court. The defendant stipulated to the report, stating he had been fit all along. The trial court found defendant fit. The court next addressed defense counsel’s pending motion to withdraw. The defendant insisted that he wanted defense counsel “out, months ago.” The court admonished the defendant as required by Illinois Supreme Court Rule 401(a) (eff. July 1, 1984). The court listed the charged offenses and the possible penalties, informed the defendant that he had the right to appointed counsel, and explained the difficulties of self-representation. The defendant

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confirmed that he understood his rights and the consequences of his decision to proceed pro se. The trial court found defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to counsel and permitted defense counsel to withdraw.

¶ 15 The defendant then announced, “I was never arraigned. I never got no bond or nothing.” The trial court arraigned him and set bond at $50,000, per the prosecutor’s recommendation. The defendant asked for a jury trial “next month.” After a heated exchange with the trial court, the defendant disrupted the hearing, and he was removed from the courtroom. The court set a pretrial hearing for May 13, 2022, and the jury trial for May 26 and 27. The court summarized:

“Okay, and I think we have everything covered. He was arraigned. There is a stipulation as to fitness. [Defense counsel] has been allowed to withdraw. We have set the pre-trial date and the jury trial date. For the record, the Court had [the defendant] removed because he was being disruptive to the proceedings. So we will give [the defendant] a copy of this order.”

Neither the prosecutor nor the trial court mentioned a preliminary hearing.

¶ 16 At some point, the pretrial hearing was moved to May 17, 2022. On that date, the parties appeared in court. The prosecutor stated that he would abandon count I and file an amended information asserting that the offenses in counts II and III occurred on a public way or in a public place of accommodation. The defendant reiterated that he “never had no bond within 48 hours.” The prosecutor produced an October 28, 2021, order from the previous judge that stated, “By telephone call with Perry County Jail, bond was set in this matter on October 7th, 2021 in the amount of $75,000.” 1 The trial court and the defendant discussed aspects of his case, and the court advised the defendant that any fact questions would be resolved by the jury.

¶ 17 The jury trial began on May 26, 2022. The State’s case-in-chief included five witnesses.

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¶ 18 Officer Bastien testified that he was working on the day of the attack, and he responded to a dispatch about an incident near a convenience store. Officer Bastien and Chief Ingram arrived there at the same time. Bastien saw two correctional officers and the defendant standing on the lawn of an adjacent funeral home. According to Bastien, the correctional officers stated that the defendant had “beaten up two women.” Chief Ingram informed Officer Bastien that one of the women had “a swollen eye, a red eye.” Bastien placed the defendant in the back of his patrol car and obtained statements from the two women, the two correctional officers, and an eyewitness who had called the police.

¶ 19 The defendant’s cross-examination was short, and it yielded no exculpatory evidence.

¶ 20 Emily Barnes testified that she was a longtime DuQuoin resident and she lived with her mother. On the day of the attack, she was walking to the convenience store to retrieve money from an automated teller machine, when she saw Carolyn Spell. Barnes and Spell were acquainted because Barnes had worked with Spell’s father for several years. Spell’s father was hospitalized at the time, and Barnes asked Spell about his health. At that point, the defendant approached the two women. Barnes then described her interaction with the defendant:

“He was irate. He was, how can I put it, he was not respectful. He came up there. He said he was going to go to jail. And I asked him why are you going to jail? You know, you come up talking to us, he was already, you could smell the liquor on him. So, you know, I was just trying to ease him on his way. *** Can you just go on, you know, can you just leave us alone and go on. He wouldn’t. He kept on, he kept on. So I kept talking to my friend, you know, try to ignore him, try to block him out ***. So I was finishing talking to my friend. He got behind me. He started calling us names. I tried to tell him, sir, can you just leave us alone. *** Go on your way. He did not. The next thing I know he spit on me. I went to block. The next thing I got cold-cocked.

***

He hit me full fist on the right side and kept hitting me. The next thing you know I felt my body and him knocking me down. He still was on top of me punching me. So I was defending myself so I fought back. Being a woman, I

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am terrified. This is a big man on top of me. I am terrified. I didn’t know if he was going to kill me. I didn’t know what was going to happen.”

¶ 21 According to Barnes, Spell came to her assistance. Spell grabbed the defendant and yanked him off Barnes, “and that’s when the people on the streets seen him and the two prison guards came to help get him off of me.” The police arrived. Barnes spoke to Chief Ingram and gave him a written statement. Barnes testified that she did nothing to provoke the defendant. She was injured on the right side of her face, her finger, and her side. She received medical treatment at the local hospital. Barnes stated that her injuries were “very painful.”

¶ 22 The defendant’s cross-examination was short and argumentative, and it yielded no exculpatory evidence.

¶ 23 Carolyn Spell testified that she had lived and worked in DuQuoin for some time. On the day of the attack, she was riding her bicycle after work, heading to the convenience store, when the defendant asked to speak to her. When asked if she knew the defendant, Spell answered that she had “just seen him around.” Spell described their conversation:

“He asked me how I was doing and I said I am doing fine, that I was kind of depressed because my dad was in the hospital for Covid and I started talking to him about that and he just like I guess he just got mad. I don’t understand why he got mad about it and everything. ***

***

*** Miss Emily [Barnes] was standing right there *** and she was like why is he yelling at you for? And I was like I don’t know. He just called me over there and asked me how I was doing and I was talking to him about the situation with my dad and he just started screaming and yelling at me.”

¶ 24 Spell testified that she and Barnes talked about Spell’s father’s health, when the defendant approached them.

“And he comes, he walks up there and me and her was talking and he was trying to say something and she was like go on about your business, we are trying to have a conversation. She asked him about three or four times and he started

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calling us bitches and hoes ***. *** [B]efore I knew it he was in Miss Emily’s face and before I knew it, he punched her.”

¶ 25 Spell was surprised by the defendant’s attack. She testified that he hit Barnes and that Barnes retaliated. According to Spell, “they ended up falling on the ground and he is on top of her and he was waylaying her.” After Spell pulled the defendant away from Barnes, he stood and approached her. Spell stated, “He hit me. I fell. I scraped my knee, scraped up my elbow, messed up my toe because my toe went backwards.” The defendant spit at Barnes. The police arrived, and Spell gave a written statement consistent with her testimony. She did not seek medical attention for her injuries.

¶ 26 The defendant’s cross-examination was long, argumentative, and largely irrelevant, and it yielded no exculpatory evidence.

¶ 27 Trevor Pullum, one of the correctional officers, testified that he was driving home from work on the day of the attack, when he saw a Black man hit a Black woman with a closed fist and a White woman who tried to intervene with a closed fist. The Black man was the defendant. Pullum testified that he stopped, exited his vehicle, and “just tried to get between this fellow and the women.” His coworker, Chris Cates, also stopped and exited his vehicle. Both Pullum and Cates were in their uniforms. Neither of them touched the defendant, and the police arrived instantly. They both gave written statements to the police.

¶ 28 The defendant’s cross-examination was short, and it yielded no exculpatory evidence. The defendant stated, “I am saying the whole incident didn’t happen. You are saying this for out of no reason it stopped because you showed up.” Pullum nodded. When the defendant asked if Pullum knew why the attack happened, he said, “No. All I witnessed was you hitting two women.”

¶ 29 Chief Ingram testified that he and Officer Bastien arrived at the scene of the incident at roughly the same time. Ingram spoke to Barnes, who had a swollen and bloodshot eye. She said that he had been battered by the defendant. Ingram then walked over to Bastien, who was with the defendant. The defendant said, “look at the video” and “get the video.” According to Ingram, the defendant was highly intoxicated and fairly agitated.

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¶ 30 Chief Ingram testified that he went to the convenience store to ask the clerk if the store had a surveillance camera that might have captured the incident. The clerk informed him that the store did have a camera, but it was not pointed in the direction of the incident. Ingram checked with the other surrounding businesses, but none of them had a video recording of the incident. The prosecutor then played the footage from Officer Bastien’s body camera. According to Ingram, the footage began when Officer Bastien arrived at the scene and ended when the defendant was taken to the Perry County Jail. ^[2]

¶ 31 The defendant’s cross-examination was short and argumentative, and it yielded no exculpatory evidence. Chief Ingram acknowledged that he did not see the beginning of the incident. Relying on nonexistent video recordings, the defendant insisted that, “if you watch the video you would see I am not the aggressor.” Ingram agreed that the body camera footage showed the defendant saying “I never did nothing to them” and “they are attacking me.”

¶ 32 The defendant’s case in rebuttal included three witnesses.

¶ 33 Barnes testified that she did not say anything derogatory to the defendant on the day of the attack. The defendant stated that Barnes and her mother attacked him, but Barnes testified, “My mother was not there when he assaulted me. It was just me and Carolyn [Spell].”

¶ 34 Spell testified that she did not hear Barnes say anything derogatory to the defendant. The defendant stated that Spell “said that I attacked Emily [Barnes] for nothing.” Spell stated, “I know this, you guys were arguing and she was asking you to get up out of her space and she asked you several times to leave us alone and you guys was screaming and yelling at each other and you punched her.” The defendant again stated, “And you are saying just for nothing I did this.” And Spell again stated, “I don’t know why you did it. All I know is she asked you more than once to get up out of her face and asked you to leave and you guys started screaming and yelling and you punched her.” Spell conceded that, before the attack, the defendant had never disrespected her.

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¶ 35 The defendant testified by narrative. He stated that he was diagnosed with a mental illness. According to the defendant, the two women “tried to say I suck dick and all of that.” In response, the defendant cursed back at Barnes, which led to her striking him. The defendant noted that incident stopped without any intervention from the correctional officers or the police. He stated, “Where would be the logic if I am the one being the aggressor, there is no need to stop unless somebody actually stopped me.” He added that, after Spell grabbed him, the incident “instamatically stopped because no man or nobody said they physically stopped this. It just, it just stopped. So where is the logic in that?” On that point, the defendant rested.

¶ 36 The parties gave closing arguments. The prosecutor’s presentation was succinct. He simply told the jury that the State had offered enough evidence to prove that the defendant caused bodily harm to Barnes and Spell and that he did so on a public way or in a public place of accommodation.

¶ 37 The defendant’s presentation was succinct, as well. The defendant told the jury that “there is no logic in me to strike nobody for nothing.” The defendant also told the jury that he was armed with a knife at the time of the attack. He continued, “If I am a nut, I would have pulled out a knife and started stabbing you if I am a nut and hurt somebody for nothing. *** So if I am a nut, hitting somebody, attacking somebody for nothing, most people they are going to stab you up. So, you know, I will just let you look at the truth.”

¶ 38 The trial court instructed the jury, and its deliberations began at 3:30 p.m. Ten minutes later at 3:40 p.m., the jury reached a verdict, finding the defendant guilty on both counts of aggravated battery.

¶ 39 On July 14, 2022, the parties appeared in court for the sentencing hearing. The trial court denied the defendant’s oral request for a new trial and sentenced him to concurrent four-year terms of imprisonment. The defendant appealed his convictions and sentences.

¶ 40 The appellate court reversed the defendant’s conviction. 2024 IL App (5th) 220492. The appellate court framed the issue as one of first impression because the defendant was afforded neither a preliminary hearing nor a grand jury indictment, as mandated by the Illinois Constitution. Id. ¶ 10. The court noted that the defendant

- 10 - did not raise the issue before trial and did not file a posttrial motion, so he had forfeited review of that issue. Id. ¶¶ 10-11. The court then discussed the plain error doctrine, “which allows a reviewing court to consider unpreserved claims of error in specific circumstances.” Id. ¶ 11 (citing People v. Thompson, 238 Ill. 2d 598, 613 (2010)). After reciting the two prongs of the plain error doctrine, the appellate court focused on the second, observing that this court “has equated second prong plain error with structural error.” Id. ¶ 12 (citing People v. Glasper, 234 Ill. 2d 173, 197-98 (2009)). ¶ 41 The appellate court then changed direction from second-prong plain error to “the rationale for, and the foundational requirement of, a probable cause determination in criminal cases by a preliminary hearing or a grand jury indictment.” Id. ¶ 13. Quoting a student-written note about federal criminal procedure published in the Yale Law Journal more than 50 years ago, the appellate court stated that the primary function of a preliminary hearing is actually two-fold: to determine whether there is sufficient indication that a crime has been committed by the defendant to justify further detention and to screen out weak and unsubstantiated cases. Id. (citing Note, The Function of the Preliminary Hearing in Federal Pretrial Procedure, 83 Yale L.J. 771, 772 (1974)). Quoting a 1967 work by New York University law professor Delmar Karlen titled Anglo-American Criminal Justice, the court rephrased the function of a preliminary hearing as an independent check on the initial decision of the police or the prosecution to proceed. Id. (citing Delmar Karlen, Anglo-American Criminal Justice 145 (1967)). ¶ 42 Turning to Illinois law, the appellate court stated that our constitution unequivocally provides the right to a prompt preliminary hearing or a grand jury indictment to a defendant charged with a felony. Id. ¶ 16 (citing Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 7). Additionally, section 109-3(a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Code) requires the trial court to “ ‘hold the defendant to answer to the court having jurisdiction of the offense if from the evidence it appears there is probable cause to believe an offense has been committed by the defendant *** if the offense is a felony.’ ” Id. (quoting 725 ILCS 5/109-3(a) (West 2020)). And section 109- 3.1(b) of the Code provides that, if the defendant is not indicted, a hearing under section 109-3 must occur within 30 days of the defendant’s arrest. Id. (citing 725 ILCS 5/109-3.1(b) (West 2020)). According to the appellate court, “the State’s probable cause foundation is outlined for the defendant.” Id. ¶ 17. - 11 - ¶ 43 The appellate court found “additional guidance on these constitutional and legislative requirements” in Illinois caselaw (id. ¶18), including People v. Howell, 60 Ill. 2d 117, 120 (1975), which held that a 65-day delay in providing a preliminary hearing to the defendant constituted a serious deprivation of a constitutional right. The appellate court also discussed People v. Kirkley, 60 Ill. App. 3d 746, 750 (1978), which held that a 176-day delay in providing a preliminary hearing to the defendants constituted a “flagrant *** violation” of the constitutional right to a prompt preliminary hearing that necessitated reversal of their defendants’ convictions. 2024 IL App (5th) 220492, ¶ 19. The appellate court found that the facts of this case were “more egregious than the facts in Kirkley.” Id. ¶ 44 The appellate court pivoted back to the “next” question: whether the error in not indicting the defendant or conducting a preliminary hearing was “structural” in nature, necessitating reversal. Id. ¶ 23. An error is typically designated as structural only if it necessarily renders a criminal trial “ ‘fundamentally unfair or unreliable in determining guilt or innocence.’ ” Id. (quoting People v. Averett, 237 Ill. 2d 1, 12-13 (2010)). The appellate court held that “the failure to conduct either a preliminary hearing or return a bill of indictment must be included in that limited class of cases recognized as structural error.” Id. ¶ 25. ¶ 45 Rather than remanding for further proceedings, the appellate court reversed the defendant’s convictions outright. Id. ¶ 26. The appellate court concluded that granting a probable cause hearing to the defendant after his constitutional rights had already been violated would be “ ‘ludicrous.’ ” Id. (quoting Kirkley, 60 Ill. App. 3d at 750). ¶ 46 This court allowed the State’s petition for leave to appeal. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 315(a) (eff. Dec. 7, 2023). ¶ 47 ANALYSIS ¶ 48 Initially, we must address some preliminary matters. ¶ 49 The State argues that the defendant waived his claim that the trial court erred by not conducting a preliminary hearing under section 109-3 (725 ILCS 5/109-3 (West 2020)) of the Code because the defendant never filed a motion to dismiss - 12 - under section 114-1(a)(11) of the Code (id. § 114-1(a)(11)). According to the State, the defendant’s waiver of the statutory right to a preliminary hearing constituted a waiver of the constitutional right to a preliminary hearing. The State asserts that the constitutional right is only enforceable through the statute. ¶ 50 The appellate court never considered that argument for one simple reason. The State did not raise the issue of waiver before the appellate court. Where the appellate court reverses the judgment of the trial court and the appellee in the appellate court brings the case to this court as the appellant, that party may raise any issues properly presented by the record in support of the trial court’s judgment, even if those issues were not raised before the appellate court. People v. Gray, 2024 IL 127815, ¶ 19 (citing People v. Artis, 232 Ill. 2d 156, 164 (2009)). That is precisely what happened in this case. The State’s position, however, is incorrect. ¶ 51 Section 109-3 of the Code, “Preliminary examination,” provides: “(a) The judge shall hold the defendant to answer to the court having jurisdiction of the offense if from the evidence it appears there is probable cause to believe an offense has been committed by the defendant, as provided in Section 109-3.1 of this Code, if the offense is a felony. *** (e) During preliminary hearing or examination the defendant may move *** for dismissal of the charge pursuant to Section 114-1 of this Act or for other reasons.” 725 ILCS 5/109-3(a), (e) (West 2020). Section 109-3.1(b) of the Code provides, “Every person in custody in this State for the alleged commission of a felony shall receive either a preliminary examination as provided in Section 109-3 or an indictment by Grand Jury as provided in Section 111-2, within 30 days from the date he or she was taken into custody.” Id. § 109- 3.1(b). ¶ 52 Section 114-1 of the Code provides: “(a) Upon the written motion of the defendant made prior to trial before or after a plea has been entered the court may dismiss the indictment, information or complaint upon any of the following grounds: - 13 - *** (11) The requirements of Section 109-3.1 have not been complied with. (b) The court shall require any motion to dismiss to be filed within a reasonable time after the defendant has been arraigned. Any motion not filed within such time or an extension thereof shall not be considered by the court and the grounds therefor *** are waived.” Id. § 114-1(a)(11), (b). ¶ 53 Read together, the meaning of those statutes is clear. Under sections 109-3(a) and 109-3.1(b), a defendant charged by information with a felony has a statutory right to a preliminary hearing within 30 days of arrest. Under sections 109-3(e) and 114-1(a)(11), the defendant may file a motion to dismiss the information during the preliminary hearing, if the trial court did not conduct a preliminary hearing within those 30 days or for other reasons. Under section 114-1(b), if the defendant’s motion is untimely, the trial court will not consider it, and the defendant waives any argument regarding the 30-day period. ¶ 54 Thus, the defendant may have waived an argument that the trial court violated section 109-3.1(a), but the defendant did not waive an argument that the trial court violated section 109-3. And the defendant certainly did not waive an argument that the trial court violated article I, section 7, of the Illinois Constitution. ¶ 55 The State further argues that the defendant invited or acquiesced to the trial court’s failure to conduct a preliminary hearing. According to the State, defense counsel agreed to postpone the hearing until the issue of the defendant’s fitness was resolved. Once the defendant was found fit, defense counsel withdrew, and the defendant proceeded pro se, immediately demanding a trial. ¶ 56 Again, the State’s position is incorrect. Under article I, section 7, of our constitution, a person charged with a felony must be “given a prompt preliminary hearing to establish probable cause.” Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 7; see 725 ILCS 5/109-3(a) (West 2020) (“[t]he judge shall hold the defendant to answer to the court *** if from the evidence it appears there is probable cause”); 725 ILCS 5/109- 3.1(b) (West 2020) (“[e]very person in custody *** shall receive *** a preliminary examination”). The responsibility for providing such a hearing lies with the trial court, and the defendant did not ask the court to shirk that responsibility. The - 14 - defendant’s disruptive behavior may have distracted the court, but that behavior did not obviate the constitutional requirement of a preliminary hearing. We turn to the merits. ¶ 57 The issue before us—whether the trial court’s failure to provide a prompt preliminary hearing to the defendant constituted second-prong plain error—is a question of law, and our review of the appellate court’s judgment is de novo. People v. Moon, 2022 IL 125959, ¶ 25. ¶ 58 Generally, a defendant forfeits review of any error in proceedings before the trial court, if the defendant does not object to the error and raise the error in a posttrial motion. People v. Sebby, 2017 IL 119445, ¶ 48. That forfeiture principle encourages the defendant to raise errors when they happen, allowing the court to correct them and disallowing the defendant from obtaining a reversal through inaction. People v. Herron, 215 Ill. 2d 167, 175 (2005); see People v. Ford, 19 Ill. 2d 466, 478-79 (1960) (“An accused may not sit idly by and allow irregular proceedings to occur without objection and afterwards seek to reverse his conviction by reason of those same irregularities.”). ¶ 59 Here, while defense counsel and the trial court alluded to a preliminary hearing at a few hearings, neither defense counsel nor the defendant himself ever objected to proceedings without such a hearing. Further, the defendant never filed a posttrial motion, so he never raised the lack of preliminary hearing after his trial. The defendant’s concern, once he chose to represent himself, was his arraignment and his bond. The defendant forfeited review of the preliminary hearing issue. ¶ 60 Illinois Supreme Court Rule 615(a) (eff. Jan. ^[1], 1967), however, provides an important exception to the forfeiture principle. Rule 615(a) provides: “Any error, defect, irregularity, or variance which does not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded. Plain errors or defects affecting substantial rights may be noticed although they were not brought to the attention of the trial court.” Id. Stated differently, reviewing courts must disregard insubstantial errors, if they were not raised properly in the trial court, but may consider substantial errors, or what have become known as plain errors, even though they were not raised properly in the trial court. - 15 - ¶ 61 A reviewing court exercises discretion in excusing a defendant’s procedural default. Sebby, 2017 IL 119445, ¶ 48. We have identified two instances when it is appropriate to do so: (1) when “a clear or obvious error occurred and the evidence is so closely balanced that the error alone threatened to tip the scales of justice against the defendant, regardless of the seriousness of the error,” or (2) when “a clear or obvious error occurred and that error is so serious that it affected the fairness of the defendant’s trial and challenged the integrity of the judicial process, regardless of the closeness of the evidence.” People v. Piatkowski, 225 Ill. 2d 551, 565 (2007). In both instances, the burden of persuasion remains with the defendant. Herron, 215 Ill. 2d at 186-87. ¶ 62 The initial analytical step under either prong of the plain error doctrine is determining whether there was a clear or obvious error before the trial court. Piatkowski, 225 Ill. 2d at 565. ¶ 63 Article I, section 7, of the Illinois Constitution provides: “No person shall be held to answer for a crime punishable by death or by imprisonment in the penitentiary unless either the initial charge has been brought by indictment of a grand jury or the person has been given a prompt preliminary hearing to establish probable cause.” Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 7. 3 There is no dispute that the defendant did not receive a prompt preliminary hearing, as required by article I, section 7. In fact, he received no preliminary hearing. A clear or obvious error occurred. ¶ 64 The defendant does not contend that the evidence against him was closely balanced, so we need not discuss whether the error satisfied the first prong of the plain error doctrine. The defendant does contend that the trial court’s error in failing to provide a preliminary hearing was serious enough to deprive him of a fair trial. We turn to our jurisprudence regarding second-prong plain error. ¶ 65 Where the defendant claims second-prong plain error, a reviewing court must decide whether the defendant has shown that the error was so serious it affected the