2026 IL App (1st) 200462-C No. 1-20-0462 SIXTH DIVISION January 23, 2026

IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS FIRST DISTRICT ______________________________________________________________________________ THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of Plaintiff-Appellee, Cook County. ) v. ) No. 91 CR 22152 ) No. 91 CR 22460 GEORGE ANDERSON, ) Honorable Defendant-Appellant. ) William H. Hooks, ) Judge, presiding. JUSTICE PUCINSKI delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion. Justice Hyman concurred in the judgment and opinion. Justice Lavin dissented, with opinion. OPINION ¶1 Defendant-appellant George Anderson submitted a claim to the Illinois Torture Inquiry and Relief Commission (TIRC) under the Illinois Torture Inquiry and Relief Commission Act (Act) (775 ILCS 40/1 et seq. (West 2018)), alleging that his convictions in two underlying cases resulted from his torture by Chicago police in August 1991, over the course of 30 hours in No. 1-20-0462 police custody. He alleged that the two inculpatory statements he signed were coerced, and he sought suppression of those statements and new trials. ¶2 The TIRC found sufficient evidence of torture to refer the matter to the circuit court for judicial review. The trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing over the course of four years, at which it heard testimony from numerous witnesses and considered voluminous “pattern and practice” evidence of prior allegations against the detectives who interrogated defendant. In its posthearing decision, the trial court credited the accused detectives, determined that none of the pattern and practice evidence was relevant, and found that defendant fabricated his claims of police torture. The court thus denied defendant any relief. ¶3 This court issued an opinion in March 2023 (People v. Anderson, 2023 IL App (1st) 200462), in which we reversed the trial court judgment, after applying the burden-shifting inquiry described for evidentiary hearings under the Act in People v. Wilson, 2019 IL App (1st) 181486, overruled by People v. Fair, 2024 IL 128373). Pursuant to Wilson, we found that defendant met his initial burden to show that the result of the suppression hearing would likely have been different in light of the new pattern and practice evidence, after which the burden shifted to the State to prove that the statements were voluntary. In concluding that the State did not meet that burden, we found that the trial court’s factual findings in favor of the State were against the manifest weight of the evidence. We thus reversed and remanded for new trials without use of the inculpatory statements. ¶4 In March 2024, our supreme court issued a supervisory order directing us to vacate our prior judgment and to reconsider this matter in light of Fair, 2024 IL 128373, which rejected Wilson’s use of the burden-shifting inquiry in an evidentiary hearing under the Act. Id. ¶ 79. Fair clarified that the circuit court is to determine “whether a petitioner has shown by a

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No. 1-20-0462 preponderance of the evidence that (1) torture occurred and (2) resulted in a confession that was (3) used to obtain a conviction” and that the “manifestly erroneous” standard of review

applies to its decision. Id. ¶¶ 79-80. We subsequently vacated our March 2023 judgment and reconsidered this matter in light of Fair. In June 2024, we issued an opinion concluding that

although the trial court identified the correct inquiry regarding defendant’s burden of proof, the trial court’s decision to deny relief was manifestly erroneous. Accordingly, we reversed and remanded for new trials, at which defendant’s inculpatory statements will be excluded.

The June 2024 opinion further specified that a different judge (or judges) should preside over subsequent trial proceedings.

¶5 In November 2025, our supreme court issued a supervisory order directing us to vacate the portion of our June 2024 opinion directing that the case be assigned to a new judge on remand.

Our supreme court ordered us to reconsider that directive in light of People v. Class, 2025 IL

129695. Having done so, we do not find sufficient basis to remand sua sponte to a different trial judge.

¶6 I. BACKGROUND

¶7 A. The Underlying Crimes

¶8 This appeal concerns two separate cases, case No. 91 CR 22152 (the Miles case) and case

No. 91 CR 22460 (the Miggins case), which arose from separate shootings in 1991.

¶9 In June 1991, 14-year-old Kathryn Miles was killed, and three others were wounded in a shooting. Defendant (along with codefendant Jerome Johnson) was charged in the Miles case with counts of first degree murder and other offenses.

¶ 10 In August 1991, 11-year-old Jeremiah Miggins was killed by a stray bullet during a shootout between rival gang members. Two men, Anthony Wilson and Steven Crosby, suffered

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No. 1-20-0462 gunshot wounds in that incident. Defendant, Johnson, and Michael Sutton were charged with murder, attempted murder, and aggravated battery with a firearm in the Miggins case. ^[1]

¶ 11 B. Defendant’s Inculpatory Statements

¶ 12 On August 21, 1991, defendant was arrested by Chicago police and brought to the Area 3

station, where he was interrogated regarding the Miggins shooting. At 7:45 a.m. on August 22, 1991, defendant signed a statement in the presence of Detective Michael Kill and an assistant state’s attorney (ASA), Joseph Brent. In that statement, defendant admitted that he drove

Johnson to and from the scene of the shooting.

¶ 13 Other detectives interrogated defendant regarding the Miles shooting. In the evening of August 22 (after being in police custody for over 30 hours), defendant signed a separate statement regarding Miles’s shooting that was handwritten by another assistant state’s attorney, Brian Grossman.

¶ 14 C. Motion to Suppress Hearing

¶ 15 Defendant moved to suppress his written statements in both the Miles and Miggins cases, on the ground that he was tortured by police. On January 24, 1994, the trial court (Honorable

Joseph Urso) held a suppression hearing.

¶ 16 1. Defendant’s Suppression Hearing Testimony

¶ 17 Defendant testified that on the afternoon of August 21, 1991, he and Sutton were pulled over by police. In the late evening, he was taken to 39th Place and California Avenue, where he was brought to a room and handcuffed by his left hand to a wall. Kill attempted to question him and “ignored” his request for an attorney. Kill left after defendant refused to answer his

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No. 1-20-0462 questions. About an hour later, Kill and another officer returned and asked if he was “ready to talk.” Defendant again requested an attorney. Kill then “kicked the handcuffs that was on my left hand to the wall,” which was painful. Defendant also testified that the other officer (whom he did not name) used his hands to hit defendant twice in the face. Kill came back alone after

45 minutes and asked if he was “ready to talk.” Defendant repeated that he wanted an attorney, and Kill left again.

¶ 18 Kill returned with a state’s attorney, later identified as Brent. Defendant said he wanted an attorney, but Brent “didn’t say anything.” Defendant refused to answer their questions and was again left handcuffed to the wall. When Kill and Brent returned and urged defendant to “tell them what happened” in the Miggins shooting, defendant still did not talk, so he was left alone again. When they returned yet again, defendant answered their questions. At that point, Kill and Brent told him they would speak to Johnson and return.

¶ 19 Kill later took defendant to another room, where Brent questioned him and wrote out a statement. Defendant was shown the statement, but he could not read it because Kill was

“moving the pages” too quickly. Kill told defendant where to sign the document, but the statement was not read to him before he signed it. Defendant had not slept or eaten from his arrest to when he signed the Miggins statement.

¶ 20 After he signed the Miggins statement, he was taken to a new room with lockers, where he was left handcuffed to the radiator. Around two hours later, two different detectives (later identified as James O’Brien and Joseph Stehlik) asked him about a separate incident.

Defendant said he wanted an attorney, but they did not respond. When defendant refused to

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No. 1-20-0462 answer questions, he was taken back to the locker room, where they handcuffed his hands above his head. ^[2] He was left in that room for about two hours.

¶ 21 When O’Brien and Stelick returned and asked him about the Miles shooting, defendant said he did not know what they were talking about. O’Brien slapped defendant in the face.

Stehlik brought out a “rubber hose or pipe.” O’Brien placed a book on defendant’s left side, then used the pipe to hit him through the book five or six times. They left him “hanging” there.

¶ 22 About an hour later, he was taken to another room, where he was cuffed to a radiator. The room became very cold. O’Brien and Stehlik returned a number of times, but defendant declined to speak with them.

¶ 23 Stehlik later returned to the room with an ASA (later identified as Grossman). When defendant he said he wanted a lawyer, Grossman did not respond, and defendant was left alone in the room. Defendant recalled that Stehlik and Grossman repeatedly asked if he was ready to talk but left him in the room (still handcuffed) when he declined.

¶ 24 Eventually, Stehlik brought defendant to a room where Grossman was waiting with “a paper written out sitting on the desk.” Stehlik asked him to sign the paper. Defendant was not

given a chance to review the statement, and he was not told its contents. At Stehlik’s direction, defendant signed the document and initialed it on several pages. He did so because he “was tired of being in that freezing room.” Defendant had not eaten or slept.

¶ 25 On cross-examination with respect to Miggins’s statement, defendant answered negatively when asked if Detective Kenneth Boudreau struck him. He acknowledged he signed and 200467

No. 1-20-0462 initialed the statement at several points, including where it stated that he had not been threatened. He maintained that he did not know that was included in the statement.

¶ 26 On cross-examination regarding the Miles statement, defendant recalled O’Brien put the book on defendant’s side “and hit me with the rubber thing on my left side, but he hit the book.” Defendant was taken to the room with air conditioning and left there for about “seven hours.” He maintained that he never told Grossman anything about the Miles shooting and that the statement “was already written” when Grossman presented it to him.

¶ 27 2. Detectives’ Testimony at the Motion to Suppress Hearing

¶ 28 Detective Kill testified that he and his partner, Detective John Halloran, investigated the Miggins shooting. At approximately 10 p.m. on August 21, 1991, Kill and Halloran

interviewed defendant. Kill said that he unhandcuffed defendant from a ring on the wall and that, to his knowledge, defendant was not handcuffed after that point.

¶ 29 Kill read defendant Miranda warnings (see Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)), and defendant said he understood them and wished to answer questions. After a 30-minute conversation, Kill and Halloran left the room. Kill returned at about 2:15 a.m. with Brent, who

also gave Miranda warnings. After a conversation of 25 to 30 minutes, Kill left with Brent and defendant still in the room.

¶ 30 At about 7:45 a.m., Kill brought defendant to a room with a desk. At that time, the prior conversation “was reduced to writing” by Brent, and defendant signed the statement and initialed corrections.

¶ 31 Kill denied that Boudreau was present for either the 2:15 a.m. or 7:45 a.m. conversations.

Kill denied he or any other detective ever kicked or slapped defendant. Kill said it was

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“impossible” for defendant to have been cuffed with his hands above his head. Kill said defendant was given food from McDonald’s before his statement was reduced to writing.

¶ 32 Kill acknowledged that, on the same night, he was also interviewing codefendants Johnson and Sutton regarding the Miggins shooting. Kill denied that he referenced Johnson’s statements when he spoke to defendant. Kill specifically denied ever telling defendant that they knew he was not the shooter or telling him that he would “die in Joliet” if he did not talk.

¶ 33 Kenneth Boudreau testified he was Kill’s partner and was at Area 3 on the night of defendant’s arrest. Boudreau helped interview other witnesses for the Miggins shooting investigation but denied he was present for any interviews with defendant. Boudreau recalled that he bought food for the arrestees sometime in the early morning, but he denied any other contact with defendant.

¶ 34 Detective Joseph Stehlik testified that on August 22, 1991, he interviewed defendant in connection with Miles’s June 1991 shooting. Stehlik and his partner, James O’Brien, brought defendant to an interview room around 1:15 p.m. Defendant indicated he understood his

Miranda rights and agreed to speak with them.

¶ 35 Stehlik was present when ASA Grossman spoke with defendant around 5 p.m. and again at around 7 p.m. At approximately 8:30 p.m., Grossman took defendant’s handwritten statement and reviewed it with defendant. Defendant signed each page of the statement, as did

Stehlik and Grossman. Stehlik denied that defendant ever complained of abuse by any detective. He specifically denied that O’Brien hit the defendant in the ribs.

¶ 36 O’Brien testified he and Stehlik interviewed defendant around 1:15 p.m. and they spoke for about 30 minutes. O’Brien stated that he did not participate in any other interview of 200469

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defendant. O’Brien denied that he struck defendant or that he saw anyone else kick, slap, or punch defendant. He never saw defendant handcuffed on that day.

¶ 37 Grossman testified that, in connection with the Miles shooting investigation, he went to the station on August 22, 1991. With Stehlik and O’Brien present, Grossman advised defendant of his Miranda rights, after which they had a conversation. Later that evening, Grossman had a second conversation with defendant, again with the detectives present. After that conversation, Grossman asked defendant if he wanted to keep his statement as an oral statement, if he wanted Grossman to reduce it to writing, or if he wanted to have a court reporter take his statement. Defendant indicated he wanted a handwritten statement.

¶ 38 Around 8:30 p.m., Grossman met with defendant outside the presence of detectives.

Grossman asked defendant if he needed anything and asked how he had been treated.

Defendant said he did not need anything and that “he’s been treated fine.” Defendant never told Grossman that anyone had hit him or that he was left in a cold room.

¶ 39 Grossman took defendant’s handwritten statement with Stehlik present. Grossman presented defendant with printed Miranda warnings, which defendant read and signed to indicate his understanding. ^[3] Grossman then questioned defendant and wrote out a statement, 200470

No. 1-20-0462 which he reviewed with defendant. Defendant signed at the bottom of each page and initialed corrections. Within the statement, defendant acknowledged that he had been treated well.

¶ 40 Brent testified that as of August 1991, he was an ASA. He met with defendant and Kill

around 2:15 a.m. on August 22, 1992. After Brent advised defendant of his Miranda rights, they spoke for about half an hour with Kill present. When Kill left, Brent asked defendant how he was treated. Defendant said he was treated “fine” and had no complaints.

¶ 41 Defendant asked Brent to write down his statement. At about 7:45 a.m., Brent met with

defendant with Kill present. Brent asked defendant to read and sign a preprinted statement of his Miranda rights, and defendant complied. With Kill present, Brent wrote down what

defendant told him. Brent went over the statement with defendant, who made a number of corrections. Defendant signed every page of the statement.

¶ 42 3. Ruling on Motion to Suppress

¶ 43 The trial court denied the motion to suppress, finding that defendant was advised of his

Miranda rights and that he never asked for an attorney. The court found that defendant was not

“physically coerced” and that the statements were not the product of psychological or mental coercion.

¶ 44 D. Defendant’s Guilty Plea in the Miles Case

¶ 45 In May 1994, defendant pleaded guilty in the Miles case to first degree murder and three counts of attempted first degree murder. As part of the factual basis, the State noted that

Buschauer, 2022 IL App (1st) 192472 (finding waiver memorialized by signed waiver form was valid, despite the fact that suspect did not know that police had already obtained warrant for his arrest). We encourage the use of such additional documentation to better ensure that a defendant’s waiver of his Miranda rights is voluntary, knowing, and intelligent. See People v. Braggs, 209 Ill. 2d 492, 515 (2003) (“A valid waiver of Miranda rights must be knowingly and intelligently made.”). - 10 - No. 1-20-0462 defendant gave inculpatory oral and written statements. The court sentenced defendant to 40 years for murder and concurrent sentences of 20 years on each of the attempted murder counts. ¶ 46 E. Defendant’s Testimony at the Trial of the Miggins Case ¶ 47 In the Miggins case, the State proceeded to trial on charges of felony murder, attempted murder of Anthony Wilson and Steven Crosby, and aggravated battery with a firearm. Defendant testified at his bench trial in November 1994. He recalled that on the date of the shooting, Eric Clark told him and Johnson that Clark was driving Johnson’s “Delta 88” vehicle when Clark was shot at by someone named Lamont. Johnson asked defendant to help him retrieve the Delta 88 vehicle. Defendant drove them to the area in a Chevrolet, where they saw the Delta 88 in an alley. When Johnson exited the Chevrolet, defendant saw that Johnson had a gun. Defendant heard shots and saw Johnson shoot at “Mike.” Johnson ran back to the Chevrolet, and defendant drove them away as Mike shot at them. Defendant testified the only reason he went to the scene was to help find Johnson’s vehicle. ¶ 48 On cross-examination, defendant acknowledged that he spoke to ASA Brent and signed a statement on August 22, 1991. The following exchange ensued: “Q. Now, let me ask you at the end of that statement *** you told the state’s attorney in there you had been treated well by the police and the assistant state’s attorney, right? A. Yes. Q. That was true, right? A. Yes. - 11 - No. 1-20-0462 Q. You also stated that you weren’t made any promises in return for the statement nor you weren’t threatened in any way. You told that to the state’s attorney? A. Yes. Q. That was true, right? A. Yes. Q. You told the state’s attorney you were offered both food and water and they were, brought food from McDonald’s, right? A. Yes. Q. That was true? A. Some of it. Q. Some of it. A. Yes. Q. You told the state’s attorney that you were free from the effects of drugs and alcohol, that was true? A. Yes. Q. So you weren’t treated badly by the police? A. No.” ¶ 49 The trial court found defendant guilty of first degree murder, attempted first degree murder, and aggravated battery with a firearm. The court sentenced defendant to natural life for first degree murder, as well as 25 years for attempted first degree murder. ¶ 50 F. Direct Appeal of the Miggins Conviction - 12 - No. 1-20-0462 ¶ 51 On direct appeal in the Miggins case, we affirmed over defendant’s contention that the State failed to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Anderson, 277 Ill. App. 3d 1100 (1996) (table) (unpublished order under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 23). ¶ 52 G. Prior Collateral Proceedings ¶ 53 Defendant filed four unsuccessful petitions, which are summarized in the May 2010 opinion affirming dismissal of his fourth postconviction petition. People v. Anderson, 401 Ill. App. 3d 134 (2010). In June 2010, defendant filed a pro se motion to vacate the murder conviction in the Miggins case. On May 20, 2013, this court affirmed the dismissal of that petition on res judicata grounds. People v. Anderson, 2013 IL App (1st) 111059-U. ¶ 54 On March 2, 2011, defendant filed a “Combined Petition for Relief Under the Post- Conviction Hearing Act and for Relief From Judgment under Section 2-1401 of the Code of Civil Procedure,” which corresponded to both the Miles and Miggins cases. ^[4] See 725 ILCS 5/122-1 et seq. (West 2010); 735 ILCS 5/2-1401 (West 2010). On the same date, he filed a “Motion for Leave to File a Successive Petition for Post-Conviction Relief.” Defendant’s March 2011 filings largely consisted of claims of police torture. With respect to the Miggins case, defendant additionally asserted a claim of actual innocence premised on a new eyewitness affidavit from Bertrum Anderson, as well as the State’s failure to disclose evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). ¶ 55 On November 23, 2011, the trial court entered an order in the Miles case that dismissed the section 2-1401 petition but advanced the postconviction petition for second stage proceedings. The court stated it was doing so only because it was unable to locate the file for the Miles case

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Defendant commenced this appeal on February 10, 2020, by filing a notice of appeal from the January 16, 2020, order. However, in light of the trial court’s amended order in March 2020, this court allowed defendant leave to file an amended notice of appeal that challenged the trial court’s amended order. At oral argument, defendant’s counsel confirmed that the March 2020 amended order is the focus of this appeal.

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¶ 137 The court further found that defendant elected to give a statement and that Brent wrote down what defendant stated in Kill’s presence. The court found that there “were not multiple

detectives in the room” and that Kill “was not hovering over” defendant when he gave the statement. The court also made findings that Kill did not tell Brent what to include in the statement and that Brent reviewed the statement with defendant.

¶ 138 The court found “no credible evidence” that Kill, Boudreau, or Halloran punched, hit, or kicked defendant in connection with the Miggins case. The court emphasized its finding that the Miggins statement was voluntary, not coerced.

¶ 139 The court similarly found no abuse or coercion with respect to the Miles statement. The court specifically found “no credible evidence” that defendant “was hung by handcuffs from the top of a locker,” that he was forced to stay in a cold room, or that O’Brien or Stehlik struck a phone book held to his side. The court credited Grossman’s testimony that he advised defendant of his Miranda rights, that defendant did not ask for an attorney, and that defendant said he was treated well by the police. The court also credited Dr. Schact’s testimony that defendant’s UPJ obstruction was congenital and not caused by trauma.

¶ 140 In separate subsection, titled “George Anderson’s Judicial Admissions,” the court noted that, at the trial of the Miggins case, defendant agreed that he told Brent that he was treated well by the police and was not threatened. The court emphasized that, when defendant was asked “So you weren’t treated badly by the police,” he answered “No.”

¶ 141 2. The Trial Court’s Pattern and Practice Findings

¶ 142 The trial court’s decision made additional findings in which it discounted all of the evidence that the accused detectives abused other individuals. The court rejected Ivan Smith’s

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While this appeal was pending, we granted the motion of “Persons Concerned About the Illinois Criminal Justice System” to file a brief amicus curiae pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 345(a) (eff. Sept. 20, 2010).

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No. 1-20-0462 section II.B. In so doing, we find that the trial court erred in ruling that none of the voluminous pattern and practice evidence was relevant (see infra sections II.C-I) and that its factual findings were against the manifest weight of the evidence. See infra section II.J. We also reject

the State’s claims that relief was independently barred by defendant’s plea in the Miles case or by his prior testimony in the Miggins case. See infra sections II.K-L. We again conclude that defendant is entitled to suppression of the statements and new trials. However, pursuant to our supreme court’s November 2025 supervisory order and People v. Class, 2025 IL 129695, we find there is insufficient basis to require that a new trial judge preside over subsequent proceedings on remand.

¶ 161 A. The Act and Governing Standard at an Evidentiary Hearing

¶ 162 The Act “establishes an extraordinary procedure to investigate and determine factual

claims of torture.” 775 ILCS 40/10 (West 2018). Our supreme court has recognized the “history of police torture in Chicago that led to the legislative creation of the Act and its remedial purposes to identify victims and ameliorate the effects of those practices.” Fair, 2024

IL 128373, ¶ 88 (citing 775 ILCS 40/10 (West 2018)).

¶ 163 The TIRC consists of eight voting members (775 ILCS 40/20(a) (West 2018)), who

conduct inquiries into claims of torture and make “recommendations to the trial court at the completion of each inquiry” (id. § 35(5)). After hearing evidence, if a majority of TIRC

members “conclude by a preponderance of the evidence that there is sufficient evidence of torture to merit judicial review,” the case is referred to the chief judge of the circuit court of Cook County. Id. § 45(c). Following a TIRC referral, the circuit court is to conduct an

evidentiary hearing, at which it “may receive proof by affidavits, depositions, oral testimony, or other evidence.” Id. § 50(a).

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¶ 164 The Act broadly describes the relief that may be granted after such hearing:

“[I]f the court finds in favor of the petitioner, it shall enter an

appropriate order with respect to the judgment or sentence in the former proceedings and such supplementary orders as to rearraignment, retrial, custody, bail or discharge, or for such relief as may be granted under a petition for a certificate of innocence, as may be necessary and proper.” Id.

Our supreme court has thus recognized that “Section 50 allows circuit courts to afford

successful petitioners essentially unlimited remedies *** including orders for retrial, discharge, or to issue a certificate of innocence.” Fair, 2024 IL 128373, ¶ 68; see also id. ¶ 79

(“the Act provides the court with wide-ranging authority to craft an appropriate remedy to root out and ameliorate the effects of the tortured confession”).

¶ 165 Consistent with Fair’s recognition that the Act affords “essentially unlimited remedies” to ameliorate the effects of a tortured confession (id.), this court is empowered to order suppression of a statement upon retrial, instead of merely remanding for a new suppression hearing. See Wilson, 2019 IL App (1st) 181486, ¶¶ 48-50 (overruled on other grounds by

Fair). 10 This is consistent with the remedial goals of the Act as well as judicial economy. See id. ¶ 50.

¶ 166 The record in this case reflects that the evidentiary hearing in this case functioned as a simultaneous suppression hearing. Indeed, defendant explicitly sought outright suppression of 200471

Our supreme court in Fair expressly overruled Wilson with respect to the inquiry to be applied by the circuit court after a TIRC referral. 2024 IL 128373, ¶ 79. But Fair does not purport to limit the type of remedy available to a successful petitioner.

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the custodial statements, rather merely seeking a new suppression hearing. Moreover, as the parties have acknowledged, the evidence considered at the evidentiary hearing is the very same evidence that would be considered upon any new suppression hearing.

¶ 167 We turn to address the proper inquiry to be applied by the circuit court, which has been clarified by Fair. In Fair, the circuit court held a hearing upon a TIRC referral but denied petitioner relief, finding he “ ‘failed to prove sufficient evidence of torture to meet his burden.’ ” 2024 IL 128373, ¶ 45. Before the supreme court, the parties disputed “the burdens of proof and production and with whom they rest in an evidentiary hearing following a

Commission referral for judicial review.” Id. ¶ 58. The Fair petitioner argued that

“he was first required to make an initial showing that newly discovered evidence likely

would have altered the result of a suppression hearing, the State then had the burden of proving a prima facie case of voluntariness, and finally, petitioner had a burden to prove the statements were involuntary by a preponderance of the evidence.” Id. (citing

Wilson, 2019 IL App (1st) 181486, ¶¶ 51-53).

The State argued that the plain language of the Act required courts to determine whether the petitioner has proved a torture claim by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. ¶ 59.

¶ 168 After analyzing provisions of the Act and appellate court case law, our supreme court held:

“Ultimately, we conclude that the plain language of the Act requires the circuit court to determine whether a petitioner has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that (1) torture occurred and (2) resulted in a confession that was (3) used to obtain a conviction, not to assess the voluntariness of statements or other constitutional claims that can be raised in a postconviction petition.

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To the extent a court answers these questions in the affirmative, the Act provides the court with wide-ranging authority to craft an

appropriate remedy to root out and ameliorate the effects of the tortured confession. We thus overrule Wilson, 2019 IL App (1st)

181486, ¶ 52, which adopted a contrary standard.” Id. ¶ 79.

¶ 169 Elsewhere in Fair, our supreme court instructed that in applying this inquiry, the circuit court is to consider the totality of the circumstances and the Act’s remedial purpose:

“A court analyzing whether a petitioner has shown torture

occurred by a preponderance of the evidence must consider the totality of the circumstances, including any alleged violations that would not necessarily qualify as torture if viewed alone. We emphasize that police treatment of a petitioner must be sufficiently extreme to qualify as torture under the Act, but this threshold can be satisfied by a combination of different kinds of acts and omissions— including alleged mental as well as physical abuse—that

cumulatively constitutes torture. When engaging in this inquiry, courts should be mindful of the history of police torture in Chicago that led to the legislature’s creation of the Act and its remedial purposes to identify victims and ameliorate the effects of those practices by ‘establish[ing] an extraordinary procedure to investigate and determine factual claims of torture.’ 775 ILCS 40/10

(West 2018).” Id. ¶ 88.

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The court did state that the “settlement or resolution or disposition of the Anthony Jakes case” was irrelevant because “Jakes was a minor and alleges action taken by officer dissimilar to the case at bar.” Yet at no other point did the court discuss whether there was similarity between any of the prior allegations of abuse and defendant’s allegations.

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the book with a stick. Clearly, this testimony was similar enough to be relevant under the standard in Jackson, 2021 IL 124818, ¶ 34. Yet, the trial court simply did not believe Ivan

Smith, stating: “Contrary to Ivan Smith’s testimony, Ivan Smith was not physically abused by either Detective O’Brien or Detective Stehlik.” Thus, rather than assess the relevance of Ivan

Smith’s testimony, the court made a factual finding that Ivan Smith’s claim was incredible.

This was improper.

¶ 188 We have similar concerns with the trial court’s stated reason for disregarding Martin Reeves’s testimony. The court emphasized that Reeves did not testify that Kill physically abused him, but only that Kill stood by while other officers abused Reeves. The court then indicated that it found Reeves’s testimony irrelevant because it did not believe defendant’s testimony that Kill abused him:

“Martin Reeves is not a pattern and practice witness for petitioner because Reeves did not accuse Michael Kill of physically abusing him in any way. To the extent that he testified that Michael Kill stood by while he was abused by other police officers, there is no credible testimony that Michael Kill was present when George

Anderson claims he was abused.” (Emphasis added.)

Thus, the court apparently found Reeves’s testimony irrelevant simply because the court disbelieved defendant. 12

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We recognize the possibility that this sentence in the trial court’s decision meant to refer to Reeves instead of “George Anderson,” i.e., that the court concluded there was no credible testimony that Kill was present when Reeves claims he was abused. Yet that line of reasoning would also be flawed because it would reflect that the court decided Reeves was not credible instead of assessing whether his allegations were similar enough to be relevant as pattern and practice evidence.

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¶ 189 Although Reeves did not accuse Kill of actually beating him, that did not render Reeves’s

testimony irrelevant; it was enough that Kill participated in coercing Reeves. See People v. Harris, 2021 IL App (1st) 182172, ¶ 50 (in deciding whether pattern and practice evidence would have affected the outcome of the suppression hearing, the court considers “whether any of the officers who interrogated defendant may have participated in systemic interrogation abuse” (citing Patterson, 192 Ill. 2d at 144-45)). Indeed, evidence of an officer’s “silent acceptance” of torture committed by other officers is still relevant. People v. Whirl, 2015 IL

App (1st) 111483, ¶ 103 (“even if the new evidence established only that Pienta stood by and did nothing while other officers committed acts of torture and abuse, silent acceptance is still

relevant to the issue of whether Pienta’s credibility may have been impeached as a result of this evidence”). Here, Reeves testified that Kill worked with other officers who threatened him and physically coerced his false confession. Indeed, Reeves testified that Kill handed him a statement and told him that if he signed it, he could eat and go home. This is not dissimilar from defendant’s testimony that Kill pressured him into signing a false statement. Reeves’s testimony was clearly relevant to showing Kill’s pattern of participation in systematic abuse.

The court abused its discretion in declining to find either Ivan Smith’s or Reeves’s testimony relevant.

¶ 190 E. The Court Erred in Disregarding Claims That Were Not Sustained by OPS

¶ 191 The trial court also abused its discretion when it relied on OPS determinations to disregard certain complaints of abuse as irrelevant. The trial court noted that numerous complaints were deemed unfounded or “not sustained” by OPS. These included complaints against O’Brien by

Samhan Ali, Glen Dixon, Maurice Lane, Luis Martinez, David Torrentt Jr., and Gregory

Logan; Bobby Spencer’s complaint against Kill; Andre Altman and Eric Jackson’s complaint

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against O’Brien and Stehlik; Emmett White’s complaint against O’Brien and Halloran; and Marcus and Joseph Jackson’s complaint against Halloran and Boudreau. The trial court similarly noted that the Independent Police Review Authority (IPRA) did not sustain Stanley

Gardner’s complaint that O’Brien, Halloran, and other officers beat Gardner and left him in a cold room.

¶ 192 Whether a prior allegation was deemed unfounded by OPS does not indicate whether it has

“sufficient similarity” to defendant’s alleged abuse, which is the pertinent relevance inquiry.

Jackson, 2021 IL 124818, ¶ 34 (citing Patterson, 192 Ill. 2d at 144-45). We are aware of no

authority that allows the trial court to deem prior allegations irrelevant on this basis. In fact, our court has relied on such pattern and practice evidence. See Tyler, 2015 IL App (1st) 123470

(finding defendant was entitled to third-stage evidentiary hearing on claim of coerced

confession under Post-Conviction Hearing Act). The Tyler decision summarized many prior claims of abuse, noting that three of those claimants’ cases (those of Eric Johnson, Sandy

Curtis, and Emmett Smith) were closed by OPS. See id. ¶¶ 67, 70-71. Nevertheless, Tyler subsequently referred to those three claimants in discussing the evidence of systemic abuse that, if presented at trial, could have reasonably undermined the detectives’ credibility. Id.

¶¶ 170, 172-73, 186.

¶ 193 We also find persuasive a recent unpublished decision regarding an evidentiary hearing on

a claim under the Act alleging abuse by Boudreau, Halloran, and O’Brien. People v. Smith, 2022 IL App (1st) 201256-U. Similar to this case, the Smith defendant submitted numerous

exhibits relating to allegations of abuse by the same officers. Id. ¶ 79. The trial court found the evidence unpersuasive because, inter alia, “many of the claims included in defendant’s evidence resulted in losing efforts for those claimants, or were simply civil complaints that had

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(at least as of yet) not resulted in a finding of abuse by Boudreau, Halloran, or O’Brien.” Id.

¶ 83.

¶ 194 This court in Smith held that the trial court “improperly weighed” such evidence:

“Generally, the court discounted much of defendant’s evidence because none of the defendants in cases presented achieved a specific finding from a court on the merits that they were abused by

the subject detectives. However, neither the circuit court nor the State has cited to any authority that a previous judicial determination

of torture is required. We reject the existence of such a requirement, as it does not appear in the language of the Act and would make it exceedingly difficult for a defendant to obtain relief. This result would be impossible to square with the Act’s extraordinary remedial purposes.” Id. ¶ 98.

Similarly, we see no reason why the relevance of a prior allegation depends on any OPS determination.

¶ 195 Although the State insists the trial court properly considered whether OPS sustained prior allegations of abuse, it does not cite any Act decisions in support. The State refers us to People v. Porter-Boens, 2013 IL App (1st) 111074, which affirmed a ruling that quashed a defendant’s subpoena for prior complaints against the arresting officer. The State points out Porter-Boens’s statement: “The trial court may properly exclude evidence of prior allegations of misconduct involving different officers if the prior allegation is factually dissimilar to the officer’s conduct in the pending case, and if the officer did not receive discipline from his department.”

(Emphasis added.) Id. ¶ 17. The State also refers to the decision’s statement that allegations of - 46 -

No. 1-20-0462 misconduct, “without evidence the officer was disciplined, are not admissible as impeachment.” Id. ¶ 20. However, Porter-Boens is not a TIRC action and did not involve any claim of a coerced confession. In any event, that decision makes clear that the primary inquiry

in deciding the relevance of prior allegations is whether they are “factually dissimilar to the officer’s conduct in the pending case.” Id. ¶ 17. Clearly, the similarity of past allegations of police misconduct does not depend on whether the officer was ever disciplined.

¶ 196 In short, the pertinent relevance inquiry is one of similarity, which did not depend on how

OPS handled a prior complaint. Thus, the court erred insofar as it deemed pattern and practice evidence irrelevant based on OPS’s treatment of past claims of police coercion.

¶ 197 F. The Trial Court Erred in Crediting Police Officer Denials to Determine That Prior Claims of Abuse Were Irrelevant

¶ 198 For similar reasons, the trial court also erred to the extent it found prior claims of abuse

irrelevant because it believed the officers’ evidentiary hearing testimony denying the prior instances of abuse. The court’s decision reflects that it consistently made credibility

determinations to find that the alleged abuse did not happen, in the course of finding the claimant’s allegations irrelevant. Among other examples, the trial court

(1) found “O’Brien did not abuse” either Tyrone Reyna or Oscar Gomez, citing

O’Brien’s denials in this proceeding;

(2) found a “lack of evidence” or “insufficient evidence” that Boudreau abused Jerry

Gillespie, Peter Williams, Harold Hill, or Joseph Jackson, citing Boudreau’s denials;

(3) found “John Halloran never physically abused Clayborn Smith,” citing Halloran’s testimony in this hearing; and 200475

Moreover, we note there are now many documented complaints of Halloran abusing detainees within the same time period. See Smith, 2022 IL App (1st) 201256-U, ¶ 99 (noting the “sheer number of allegations” against Halloran, Boudreau, and O’Brien, including that “at least eight defendants were later exonerated, acquitted, awarded a certificate of innocence, or had their charges dropped even though some combination of Boudreau, Halloran, or O’Brien allegedly extracted a confession from them using torture”).

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No. 1-20-0462 abused its discretion in disregarding past claims against Halloran merely because he was not explicitly named in the initial motion to suppress. The prior claims against Halloran were clearly relevant and supported defendant’s allegations.

¶ 208 I. The Trial Court Erred in Disregarding Any Prior Allegations Against Boudreau Based on Defendant’s Motion to Suppress Testimony

¶ 209 We similarly agree with defendant that the court erred in disregarding any evidence of past abuse allegations against Boudreau. The court indicated its belief that such evidence was irrelevant because defendant testified at the 1994 motion to suppress hearing that Boudreau did not hit him. Again, it would not be surprising if defendant did not have a clear

understanding at that time as to which officer committed each specific act. See id. In any event, defendant accused Boudreau of striking him in his TIRC affidavit and his subsequent evidentiary hearing testimony. 15 And there is no factual dispute that Boudreau was working with Kill and Halloran on August 21, 1992. Simply put, defendant’s TIRC claim accused

Boudreau of working with Kill and Halloran to coerce defendant’s confession. In turn, prior allegations that Boudreau participated in similar coercion are relevant to show a pattern of such conduct. See Tyler, 2015 IL App (1st) 123470, ¶ 181 (“Since the vast majority of the cases presented by defendant involve allegations of police misconduct by two or more detectives, it is crucial to consider the claims of a systemic pattern of abuse in the context of several officers

working together to obtain a false confession in the case at bar.”); see also People v. Galvan, 2019 IL App (1st) 170150, ¶ 68 (in assessing pattern and practice evidence, “the questions are

200476

abused him, evidence regarding Boudreau’s prior conduct would still be relevant. As previously mentioned, even an officer’s “silent acceptance” of torture committed by other officers is still relevant. Whirl, 2015 IL App (1st) 111483, ¶ 103.

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(1) whether any of the officers who interrogated petitioner may have participated in systematic and methodical interrogation abuse and (2) whether those officers’ credibility at petitioner’s suppression hearing or at trial might have been impeached as a result”). Accordingly, the court erred in disregarding the ample pattern and practice evidence implicating Boudreau.

¶ 210 In sum, the various reasons given by the trial court to disregard pattern and practice evidence were improper. Accordingly, the court abused its discretion when it found there was no relevant pattern and practice evidence.

¶ 211 We have thus concluded that the circuit court erred in disregarding the pattern and practice evidence. That evidence should have factored into its ultimate assessment of whether defendant showed that torture resulted in his confessions and convictions. See Fair, 2024 IL 128373, ¶ 79.

¶ 212 J. The Trial Court’s Decision Was Manifestly Erroneous

¶ 213 We have now determined that the trial court abused its discretion in rejecting the pattern and practice evidence as irrelevant and that relief was not otherwise barred by the defendant’s

guilty plea in the Miles case or his prior testimony in the Miggins case. We now turn to the propriety of the trial court’s findings in the course of denying defendant relief. Specifically, the trial court found defendant failed to show that he was tortured, disregarding all of the pattern and practice evidence and finding defendant lacked credibility.

¶ 214 We again recognize that the deferential “manifestly erroneous” standard of review applies.

Fair, 2024 IL 128373, ¶ 80. A decision is manifestly erroneous where it contains an error that is clearly evident, plain, and indisputable. Id. We also reiterate Fair’s instruction that courts applying the Act “should weigh the totality of the circumstances” “in light of the remedial purpose and relevant history behind the Act.” Id. ¶ 87.

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¶ 215 The extensive record in this case showed a pattern of police torture by the detectives who interrogated defendant combined with defendant’s longstanding consistent allegations that

police torture (over the course of 30 hours) led to his inculpatory statements. Nevertheless, the trial court decided not to consider any of defendant’s evidence and found him to be untruthful, all while accepting the officers’ denials of misconduct. Accordingly, we conclude the trial court’s finding that defendant failed to meet his burden was manifestly erroneous.

¶ 216 Defendant presented ample relevant pattern and practice evidence, including numerous prior complaints against the detectives he now accuses of abusing him to coerce his statements in the Miles and Miggins cases. This is certainly true with respect to his claim that O’Brien and Stehlik coerced the Miggins statement. As the TIRC recognized, O’Brien has been subject to approximately 50 claims of coercion, many of which were documented in defendant’s

submissions to the trial court. Among those claims is that of Ivan Smith, who testified at the evidentiary hearing that O’Brien and Stehlik struck him with a phonebook in a virtually identical manner to what defendant has consistently alleged since his motion to suppress.

Clearly, this evidence significantly undermined O’Brien and Stehlik’s testimony denying their mistreatment of defendant while interrogating him about the Miggins case. Yet, the court wholly discounted that important pattern and practice evidence.

¶ 217 The same is true with respect to the ample pattern and practice evidence offered regarding

the detectives who allegedly coerced defendant’s statement about the Miles shooting: Kill, Boudreau, and Halloran. As the TIRC’s decision noted, Kill has been named in about 40 complaints of coercion, Halloran in more than 50, and Boudreau “is notorious for having obtained confessions in cases where the individual was in jail at the time of the offense to which he confessed, cases which were later undermined by DNA evidence, and more than a

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dozen cases where charges were dropped or the individual was acquitted at trial.” Many of those prior complaints are described in the pattern and practice evidence, including claims by

Harold Hill, Dan Young, Nick Escamilla, Tyrone Reyna, Peter Williams, Clayborn Smith, and Oscar Gomez that they were abused by Halloran and Boudreau. 16 The pattern and practice evidence also shows several other individuals alleged abuse by Boudreau, either individually or in concert with Kill, including Imari Clemons, Jesse Clemons, Damoni Clemons, Johnny

Plummer, and Anthony Jakes, whose conviction was vacated in 2018. See Sarah Schulte, Two

Men Wrongly Imprisoned as Teens Have Convictions Vacated, ABC 7 Chicago (Apr. 30, 2018), https://abc7chicago.com/wrongly-convicted-convictions-vacated-murder-conviction-

chicago-exoneration/3410907/ [https://perma.cc/RTH7-TD49]. And Reeves testified at the evidentiary hearing how Kill pressured him to sign a false confession in a similar manner that defendant alleged with respect to the Miles statement.

¶ 218 We note that evidence regarding several of the same claimants was also relied upon by

Clayborn Smith in connection with his TIRC claim alleging abuse by Boudreau, Halloran, and O’Brien. See Smith, 2022 IL App (1st) 201256-U, ¶ 79. In that case, this court remanded for a new suppression hearing after finding that Smith “produced sufficient evidence of a pattern

[of] physical abuse by the detectives in question,” observing it would be “difficult to imag[ine] a scenario in which the detectives’ testimony is not viewed in a new light given the numerous torture allegations made by other defendants, which was not available at the time of the original

200478

We note that although the trial court had the ability to observe testifying witnesses first-hand, much of the evidence in this case consisted of documents detailing the extensive pattern and practice of abusive tactics by detectives who interrogated defendant. Unlike live testimony, our appellate court can certainly evaluate that documentary evidence just as accurately as the trial court. The trial court’s decision to ignore that evidence weighs heavily against affirming its decision, regardless of its ability to observe the demeanor of live witnesses.

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No. 1-20-0462 credibility is substantially (if not completely) undermined by the plethora of similar allegations against them from the same time period. As discussed, defendant submitted voluminous evidence establishing that the accused officers engaged in a pattern and practice of coercing confessions using techniques similar to, if not identical to, what defendant has consistently alleged. Under the totality of the record, we conclude it was manifestly erroneous for the trial court not to find that defendant had proved that police torture resulted in the confessions that led to his two underlying convictions.

¶ 221 Before we discuss the appropriate remedy, we briefly address the State’s arguments that defendant was independently barred from relief due to (1) his plea in the Miles case or (2) his prior testimony in connection with the Miggins case. Neither contention has merit.

¶ 222 K. Defendant’s Plea in the Miles Case Did Not Waive Relief Under the Act

¶ 223 In its brief, the State contended that defendant’s guilty plea in the Miles case “waived” his claim for postconviction relief under the Act, citing case law holding that a voluntary guilty

plea waives all nonjurisdictional errors. See, e.g., People v. Anderson, 375 Ill. App. 3d 121, 133 (2006) (finding waiver of police coercion claim in successive postconviction petition);

People v. Peeples, 155 Ill. 2d 422, 491 (1993) (guilty plea underlying prior convictions barred defendant from challenging the State’s use of his confession to those prior crimes as aggravating evidence at his sentencing hearing).

¶ 224 At oral argument, however, the State conceded that this argument is unavailing in light of our decision in People v. Johnson, 2022 IL App (1st) 201371, in which we held that Jerome

Johnson’s plea in the Miles case did not waive his claim under the Act. We emphasized that waiver of a statutory right must be “ ‘voluntary, knowing, and intelligent’ ” and with a “ ‘full awareness of both the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision

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No. 1-20-0462 to abandon it.’ ” Id. ¶ 89 (quoting People v. Lesley, 2018 IL 122100, ¶¶ 50-51). We reasoned that Johnson “could not possibly have had a ‘full awareness’ that he was abandoning any right under the [Act when he pleaded guilty in 1992, for the simple reason that the [Act] was not yet enacted at that time.” Id. Our decision in Johnson applies here with equal force. As the Act was not yet in effect at the time of defendant’s plea in the Miles case, that plea “could not have constituted ‘an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right’ to seek relief under the [Act].” Id. ¶ 99 (quoting Lesley, 2018 IL 122100, ¶ 36).

¶ 225 L. Defendant’s Prior Testimony Was Not a “Judicial Admission”

¶ 226 We next address the State’s contention that defendant made “judicial admissions” in prior testimony concerning the Miggins case that preclude him from obtaining relief. The State avers

there are two such instances. First, the State emphasizes defendant’s cross-examination in the Miggins case, in which he gave the following one-word responses to the State’s questions:

“Q. Now, let me ask you at the end of that statement *** you

told the state’s attorney in there you had been treated well by the police and the assistant state’s attorney, right?

A. Yes.

Q. That was true, right?

A. Yes.

Q. You also stated that you weren’t made any promises in return for the statement nor you weren’t threatened in any way.

You told that to the state’s attorney?

A. Yes.

Q. That was true, right?

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A. Yes.

Q. You told the state’s attorney you were offered both food and water and they were, brought food from McDonald’s, right?

A. Yes.

Q. That was true?

A. Some of it.

Q. Some of it.

A. Yes.

Q. You told the state’s attorney that you were free from the effects of drugs and alcohol, that was true?

A. Yes.

Q. So you weren’t treated badly by the police?

A. No.”

¶ 227 The State posits that defendant’s responses constituted a “clear and unequivocal judicial admission” that he was “treated well by the police.” The State suggests that, in light of this testimony, defendant cannot now claim that he was mistreated.

¶ 228 Separately, the State argues that defendant’s testimony at the 1994 motion to suppress

hearing was a “clear and unequivocal admission that Detective Boudreau never hit him.” The State refers to the following exchange:

“Q. Now, the other detective that testified here, Detective

Boudreau, Detective [Kill’s] partner, you testified that he also kicked you and slapped you with his hands on your face?

A. No, ma’am.

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Q. He never hit you?

A. No, ma’am.”

¶ 229 The State refers us to a number of civil, non-Act cases concerning judicial admissions, primarily In re Estate of Rennick, 181 Ill. 2d 395 (1998). Rennick explains that “[o]rdinary evidentiary admissions may be contradicted or explained” but these “should be distinguished from judicial admissions, which conclusively bind a party.” Id. at 406. Our supreme court proceeded to explain: “Judicial admissions are defined as deliberate, clear, unequivocal statements by a party about a concrete fact within that party’s knowledge. [Citation.] Where made, a judicial admission may not be contradicted in a motion for summary judgment

[citation] or at trial [citation].” Id. at 406-07.

¶ 230 This court has also cautioned that “[t]he doctrine of judicial admissions requires thoughtful study for its application so that justice not be done on the strength of a chance statement made by a nervous party.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) North Shore Community Bank & Trust

Co. v. Sheffield Wellington LLC, 2014 IL App (1st) 123784, ¶ 115. Because the doctrine is not intended to penalize “confusion or an honest mistake,” a judicial admission will be found only if “the party making the statement had no reasonable possibility of being mistaken.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. ¶ 126.

¶ 231 We are not persuaded by the State’s reliance on the judicial admission doctrine.

Significantly, the State cites no precedent suggesting that prior testimony from a criminal proceeding has ever been construed as a binding judicial admission. Thus, there is no support for the suggestion that defendant’s prior testimony could ever qualify as a judicial admission.

Further, the State does not cite any case finding that a judicial admission can operate to bar a claim for relief under the Act. This is not surprising, since the Act “establishes an extraordinary

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No. 1-20-0462 procedure to investigate and determine factual claims of torture.” (Emphasis added.) 775 ILCS

40/10 (West 2018).

¶ 232 Moreover, even assuming that the concept of judicial admissions could apply, we would not be convinced that the two cited portions of defendant’s testimony would qualify. First, we

cannot say defendant’s one-word answers to the State’s line of cross-examination at the Miggins trial were unequivocal statements that defendant was treated well by police. This is especially so, given defendant’s explanation at the evidentiary hearing that he was surprised by this line of cross-examination, since he and his trial counsel had decided not to discuss his abuse by police. Defendant’s explanation was consistent with the testimony of his former trial counsel, Judge O’Hara, who acknowledged that he told defendant they would “not go into” his allegations of police abuse at trial.

¶ 233 With respect to defendant’s testimony at the 1994 motion to suppress that Boudreau did

not hit him, we emphasize that a judicial admission should not be found if it could be the product of mistake or confusion. North Shore Community Bank & Trust Co., 2014 IL App (1st)

123784, ¶ 126. Given the circumstances of the 1991 interrogation (which lasted 30 hours and involved numerous officers), there is a reasonable likelihood that the cited testimony regarding

Boudreau was the product of understandable confusion or mistake on defendant’s part. See

Gibson, 2018 IL App (1st) 162177, ¶ 121 (explaining it would not be surprising if a coerced

defendant was “never sure, to begin with, exactly who threw which punch, slap, or kick in what order”). We thus reject the State’s contention that the prior testimony operated as a binding judicial admission.

¶ 234 M. The Proper Remedy Is Remand for New Trials