v.
Wa State Medical Commission
Filed Washington State Court of Appeals Division Two
February 10, 2026
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON DIVISION II RAJNINDER K. JUTLA, MD, No. 60086-2-II Appellant, v. UNPUBLISHED OPINION WASHINGTON MEDICAL COMMISSION, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, Respondent. VELJACIC, J. — Rajninder Jutla seeks judicial review of the Washington Medical Commission’s (Commission) decision to revoke her medical license. Jutla argues the Commission erred in delaying to provide the administrative record. She alleges the health law judge (HLJ) erred in conducting the hearing virtually. Further, she argues the Commission erred in relying on the Acumen Assessment instead of her expert witnesses and erred in denying her motion for reconsideration.[1], 2 Because Jutla fails to comply with RAP 10.3(a)(6) or otherwise waives her arguments, we affirm.
[*2]60086-2-II
In February 2022, Jutla waived a hearing on the amended charges and entered into an
agreed order with the Commission. This corrected stipulated findings of fact, conclusions of law, and agreed order stated that the order “should be construed as an Alford plea, wherein [Jutla] does
not admit to the Amended Statement of Charges, but acknowledges that at a hearing before the Commission the State of Washington would present sufficient evidence to prevail on the charges.”
AR at 512. The order concluded that Jutla “committed unprofessional conduct in violation of RCW18.130.180(1), (7), (9), (13), and (22),” which provided grounds for imposing sanctions against Jutla. AR at 516.
Based on this, the parties agreed Jutla would complete a compliance orientation, her license would be placed under additional oversight, and she would “undergo a multidisciplinary forensic assessment by Acumen Assessments (Acumen) to determine whether [Jutla] is fit to practice as a physician.” AR at 517. The order stated that “[i]f [Jutla] is found to be unfit to practice, [Jutla] shall undertake all treatment recommendations necessary to rehabilitate her practice. . . . Any treatment or professional monitoring recommendations made as a result of this assessment may be
incorporated, into an Amended Agreed Order in this case.” AR at 517. The order also stated, “[Jutla] acknowledges that she will not be allowed to dispute the reports or recommendations by
ACUMEN or third-party evaluators.” AR at 518. In addressing possible sanctions based on the recommendation of the assessment, the order stated, “[t]he Commission does not know without the assistance of the evaluation whether or how [Jutla] can be rehabilitated to practice in a manner that protects the public.” AR at 520.
[*3]60086-2-II
II. ACUMEN ASSESSMENT
On February 8-10, Jutla was evaluated at Acumen by a panel of five licensed psychologists
and one board certified consulting psychiatrist. In addition to clinical interviews with the panel, Jutla took standardized tests that measured mental and emotional functioning, personality style, perception, and emotional regulation.
After assessing Jutla, the panel concluded Jutla had a “personality-based pathology” that was “consistent with a Narcissistic Personality Disorder” as well as “Antisocial and Histrionic
Personality Traits.” AR at 549, 552. The panel concluded that “Jutla’s lengthy history of complaints of unprofessional conduct, concerning interactions with regulatory authorities, and association with disreputable endeavors can be attributed to this character pathology.” AR at 552.
The panel also concluded that Jutla’s prognosis for remediation was poor based on the “relatively
immutable nature of such personality pathology and its related denial of ethical culpability in the conduct being investigated and potentially prosecuted.” AR at 552.
Accordingly, the panel opined that Jutla was “unfit to practice medicine with reasonable
skill and safety.” AR at 552. The panel recommended that Jutla disengage from the practice of medicine and refrain from practice until she be “deemed ethically and technically fit to practice medicine with reasonable skill, safety, and fully informed and accountable regulatory compliance.” AR at 552. The panel recommended that in order to be deemed fit to practice, Jutla would need to “demonstrate consistent adherence” to several professional qualities, including honesty, trustworthiness, truthfulness, integrity, love, kindness, prudence, humility, open- mindedness, an ability to respond to rules and regulations in a dignified manner, and an ability to
“internalize a sense of duty, moral priority, and good character through actual deeds.” AR at 553-
54.
[*4]60086-2-II
III. ADDITIONAL CHARGES AND PREHEARING CONFERENCE
Based on this assessment, in July 2022, the Commission issued a statement of charges alleging Jutla was “unable to practice with reasonable skill and safety pursuant to RCW
18.130.170(1).” AR at 7. Also in July, the Commission obtained an ex parte order summarily suspending Jutla’s license to practice as a physician and surgeon.
In December, at a telephonic prehearing conference, the HLJ stated that the hearing would
“be conducted by video conference. I’ll be emailing the parties with a link to join the hearing. It will be on Microsoft Teams Meeting format.” AR at 1293. Jutla confirmed her e-mail address and made no objection regarding the intended format of the hearing. After this prehearing conference, the HLJ issued an order that also confirmed that the hearing would be conducted via video conference.
In January 2023, at the beginning of the hearing, the HLJ asked, “Are the parties ready to proceed with the hearing today? . . . I’m just checking in to see if the hearing is a go, basically.”
AR at 625. Jutla responded, “Yeah.” AR at 625. The HLJ also stated the following:
[T]his is a videoconference, and some of us may be new to participating in a hearing in this format. If you experience any technical difficulties that interfere with your ability to participate in the hearing and you’re required for this hearing, bring it to my attention, if you can. And if you get disconnected from the hearing, please attempt to rejoin. If we notice that anybody has disconnected, we will pause the proceedings until they can get back online.
AR at 626-27.
IV. ADMINISTRATIVE HEARING
Dr. Michael Seely, who was the lead evaluator of the panel that assessed Jutla at Acumen, testified at the hearing. Dr. Seely testified that the panel concluded Jutla met eight of the nine criteria indicating she had narcissistic personality disorder. Regarding the panel’s opinion that
Jutla had a poor prognosis for remediation, Seely stated that “[i]t would take a significant amount 60086-2-II of work and a very intensive process to make any kind of change, and that change would have to start with an acceptance of responsibility for the problems that someone is facing.” AR at 757-58.
[*5]Seely also stated that the panel “did not see anything during the evaluation that would indicate that
[Jutla] was open to change. Denial of problems featured very prominently. And I’m not seeing anything since the evaluation of Dr. Jutla that would indicate that anything is different at the present.” AR at 758.
Jutla’s witness, John M. Greene, M.D., testified that, after a four-hour examination, he concluded Jutla did not suffer from narcissistic personality disorder. James Bramson, PsyD. also concluded that, based on the testing data, Jutla did not suffer from narcissistic personality disorder.
V. COMMISSION’S FINAL ORDER
In July 2023, the Commission found Seely, Greene, and Bramson to all be credible, but
gave more weight to Seely’s testimony based on his credentials, presentation, and the fact that the panel at Acumen had more thorough background information on Jutla. The Commission found
Jutla not credible and that “[h]er testimony and behavior over the course of the hearing showed traits outlined in the Acumen report.” AR at 445. The Commission found that
[Jutla] has a demonstrated history of not following rules, including not complying with Medical Board and Commission orders. [Jutla] makes excuses and blames external forces for her lack of compliance, and she lacks self-reflection and accountability. As a result, the Commission finds there is no rehabilitation plan that will ensure [Jutla] is able to regain the ability to practice with reasonable skill and safety.
AR at 445-46. The Commission concluded that it was proven by clear and convincing evidence that Jutla could not practice with reasonable skill and safety and could never regain the ability to do so. The Commission permanently revoked Jutla’s license to practice as a physician and surgeon in Washington.
[*6]60086-2-II
Jutla filed a petition for reconsideration, asking the Commission to reconsider its decision
in light of a fitness for duty evaluation conducted by the University of California, San Diego, PACE Program that “contradict[ed] . . . the key evidence presented through the Acumen evaluation.” AR at 4557. The Commission denied Jutla’s petition because she failed to show any
“specific errors of fact or law” that would warrant granting reconsideration. AR at 472.
VI. JUDICIAL REVIEW
In September, Jutla filed a petition for judicial review in the Thurston County Superior court. On October 20, the trial court ordered the Commission/Department of Health to prepare and transmit the underlying administrative record from the agency to the superior court without assigning fees or costs to Jutla. As of January 2024, the agency still had not provided the administrative record.
On January 27, Jutla’s counsel withdrew “upon the advice of ethics counsel” and “under applicable ethics rules.”5 AR at 115.
In June, the trial court certified Jutla’s case to this court for direct review pursuant to RCW
34.05.518.
[*7]60086-2-II
ANALYSIS
I. COMMISSION’S DELAY IN PROVIDING ADMINISTRATIVE RECORD
Jutla argues the Commission erred in intentionally delaying in providing the complete agency record,6 which prejudiced her because her counsel had to withdraw during the delay.
Because Jutla points to no authority suggesting she is entitled to affirmative relief based on an agency’s delay in providing the administrative record, we disagree.
A. Legal Principles
RCW 34.05.566(1) provides that “[w]ithin thirty days after service of the petition for judicial review, or within further time allowed by the court or by other provision of law, the agency shall transmit to the court the original or a certified copy of the agency record for judicial review of the agency action.”
An agency’s responsibility to transmit the agency record to the court within 30 days is illustrated in Stevens v. Dep't of Health, Nursing Care Quality Assurance Comm'n, 30 Wn. App.
2d 434, 435, 545 P.3d 380 (2024). There, the Department of Health, Nursing Care Quality
Assurance Commission (Department) suspended Stevens’s nursing license for unprofessional
conduct. Id. at 435. Stevens petitioned for judicial review, and the Department moved for dismissal for want of prosecution which the trial court granted. Id. at 438. On appeal, this court held that dismissal was improper because the Department was responsible for the delay in 60086-2-II
[*8]Stevens’s petition for judicial review being heard because the Department itself failed to timely provide the administrative record. Id. at 446-48, 450.
B. Analysis
Here, the Commission failed to comply with RCW 34.05.566(1) in providing the agency record within 30 days of service of the petition for judicial review. The cause of the delay is unclear from the record, however, Jutla provides no argument or evidence to support her claim that the Commission’s delay was intentional. Further, it is unclear when the record was actually provided.
Jutla relies on Stevens for the proposition that the Commission’s delay in providing a transcript to the court resulted in “the case for prosecution against the [p]laintiff [being]
dismissed.” Br. of Appellant at 15. But Jutla’s reliance is misplaced. As explained above, in Stevens, the court held that the Department could not benefit from its own delay in failing to timely provide the administrative record by then seeking dismissal of the petitioner’s claim based on a
lack of prosecution. Stevens, 30 Wn. App. 2d at 446-48, 450. That is not the case here, as the Commission is not seeking dismissal based on any delay it caused.
Despite the Commission’s failure to comply with RCW 34.05.566(1) in providing the agency record within 30 days of service of the petition for judicial review, Jutla provides no authority suggesting that she is therefore entitled to affirmative relief from the Commission’s
decision to revoke her license. “Where no authorities are cited in support of a proposition, the court is not required to search out authorities, but may assume that counsel, after diligent search, has found none.” DeHeer v. Seattle Post-Intelligencer, 60 Wn.2d 122, 126, 372 P.2d 193 (1962).
[*9]60086-2-II
II. VIRTUAL HEARING
Jutla argues the HLJ erred in conducting the hearing virtually. We disagree.
A. Legal Principles
In adjudicative proceedings under the Administrative Procedure Act, RCW 34.05.449(3) provides that, at the discretion of the presiding officer, and “where the rights of the parties will not be prejudiced thereby, all or part of the hearing may be conducted by telephone, television, or other electronic means.”
B. Analysis
Here, the HLJ stated at the prehearing conference that the hearing would be conducted by video conference, and Jutla made no objection. Jutla attended the hearing virtually and stated
“[y]eah” when asked if she was ready to proceed. AR at 625. Because Jutla agreed to continue with the hearing virtually, she waives her argument that it was erroneous for the hearing to be
conducted in that format.[7] Despite any technical difficulties that may have occurred during the hearing, Jutla points to nothing in the record that suggests her rights were prejudiced by the virtual setting or that she was unable to effectively participate.
Jutla relies on a blog post and Massachusetts case, for which she provides no citation, to argue that virtual hearings result in negative outcomes. Even if that were true, this does not change
the fact that Jutla agreed to participate in the virtual hearing and never lodged an objection to the hearing being conducted virtually. Accordingly, she failed to preserve her claimed error. See RAP 60086-2-II
[*10]2.5(a) (providing that “[t]he appellate court may refuse to review any claim of error which was not raised in the trial court”).
III. REMAINING ARGUMENTS ABANDONED DUE TO INADEQUATE BRIEFING
In her opening brief, Jutla also alleges the Commission’s decision to revoke her license
based on her diagnosed personality disorder was cruel and unusual punishment which violated the First and Eighth amendments of the United States Constitution. In her reply brief, she argues that the Commission’s decision violated her Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. She summarily asserts that these rights were violated but provides no argument or authority to support these claims. As our Supreme Court has explained, “‘naked castings into the constitutional sea are not sufficient to command judicial consideration and discussion.’” In re Pers. Restraint of Rhem, 188
Wn.2d 321, 328, 394 P.3d 367 (2017) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting In re Pers.
Restraint of Williams, 111 Wn.2d 353, 365, 759 P.2d 436 (1988)). Accordingly, we do not address these claims.
Jutla also alleges the Commission erred in relying on the Acumen Assessment instead of her expert witnesses and erred in denying her motion for reconsideration. For the reasons set forth below, we decline to consider these arguments.
A. Legal Principles
Generally, appellate courts “decide a case only on the basis of issues set forth by the parties
in their briefs.” RAP 12.1. The Rules of Appellate Procedure govern briefs filed in this court, and they dictate requirements regarding the contents of a party’s submission. RAP 10.3 (explaining the contents required in a brief). In the “argument” section of an opening brief, a party should include “citations to legal authority and references to relevant parts of the record.” RAP 10.3(a)(6).
[*11]60086-2-II
We will not consider assignments of error in an opening brief that are unsupported by sufficient argument and citation to authority. See Cowiche Canyon Conservancy v. Bosley, 118
Wn.2d 801, 809, 828 P.2d 549 (1992); Holland v. City of Tacoma, 90 Wn. App. 533, 538, 954
P.2d 290 (1998) (“Passing treatment of an issue or lack of reasoned argument is insufficient to merit judicial consideration.”).
B. Analysis
Jutla fails to support her arguments with sufficient legal authority and citation to the record.
In Jutla’s opening brief, the argument section pertaining to the Commission’s reliance on the Acumen Assessment and the HLJ’s denial of her motion for reconsideration contain three citations to the record in 13 pages.[8] Further, she cites no legal authority to support these arguments.
Because Jutla fails to comply with RAP 10.3(a)(6), these arguments are abandoned on appeal.9
IV. ATTORNEY FEES
In Jutla’s opening brief, she requests attorney fees and costs. RAP 18.1 allows for an award of attorney fees if authorized by applicable law. Jutla, however, provides no applicable law showing she is entitled to reimbursement for attorney fees or costs. 10 Accordingly, we deny her request for attorney fees and costs.
[*12]60086-2-II
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, we affirm.
A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed in the Washington Appellate Reports but will be filed for public record in accordance with RCW
2.06.040, it is so ordered.
Veljacic, J. We concur: Cruser, C.J. Price, J.
[*13]