Carrie Lloyd v. DSCYF TPR (Del. 2026). · Go Syfert
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Carrie Lloyd
v.
DSCYF TPR
276, 2025.
Supreme Court of Delaware.
Feb 27, 2026.
Published

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

CARRIE LLOYD,1 § § No. 276, 2025 Respondent Below, Appellant, § § Court Below–the Family Court v. § of the State of Delaware § DEPARTMENT OF SERVICES § File Nos. 24-04-01TN FOR CHILDREN, YOUTH, AND § CN12-03528 THEIR FAMILIES, § § Petition Nos. 24-07645 Petitioner Below, Appellee. § 23-04196 §

Submitted: January 28, 2026 Decided: February 27, 2026 Before VALIHURA, LEGROW, and GRIFFITHS, Justices.

ORDER

After careful consideration of the parties’ briefs and the record on appeal, it appears to the Court that: and, even if she had, they are not persuasive.[5] We therefore affirm the Family Court’s holding regarding Mother’s failure to plan.

[*2][*3]

hearing.[7] Neither the State nor Office of the Child Advocate (“OCA”) were served with the guardianship petition.8 the late-filed guardianship petition.[11] Delaware law requires that the Family Court issue a decision on a petition to terminate parental rights within thirty days from the final hearing.12 For a guardianship petition, the court must hold a hearing and then issue its decision within forty-five days.[13] Additionally, when a non-relative has filed the guardianship petition, the Department of Services for Children, Youth, and their Families must assess the proposed guardian and then prepare and submit a report to the court at least one week before the guardianship hearing.14 Here, to consider the guardianship petition, the Family Court would have needed to stay the final termination hearing, conduct the statutory guardianship process, and then reschedule the final termination hearing. Because the non-relative waited until five days before the final termination hearing to file her guardianship petition—despite having two months between the initial and final termination hearings—we conclude that the court did not exceed its discretion in refusing to consider the petition.

[*4][*5]

NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Family Court is AFFIRMED.

BY THE COURT:

/s/ N. Christopher Griffiths Justice

[*6]
1 The Court previously assigned a pseudonym to Appellant under Supreme Court Rule 7(d). relative’s guardianship petition for one of her children before terminating her parental rights. We address each argument in turn below.
2 Mother’s Corrected Opening Br. 13-21 (Oct. 23, 2025) [hereinafter “Opening Br.”]. 3 See Opening Br., Ex. A (Upon a Petition for Termination & Transfer of Parental Rights dated June 2, 2025, at 22) (relying on Powell v. Division of Family Services, which found the relevant inquiry not whether the mother “substantially completed” her case plan, but whether the “conditions that led to the child’s placement . . . continue to exist” (citing Powell v. Div. of Fam. Servs., 12 A.3d 1155, 2011 WL 252950, at *2 (Del. 2011) (TABLE) (citation omitted))). 4 Opening Br. 19 (claiming – in one sentence under a different argument’s section heading – that “professional testimony” was required for the court to find that the children were harmed by Mother’s continuous denial of the father’s abuse of Mother and the children). Mother did not file a reply brief in this matter.
3 Under her second argument on appeal, Mother asserts that the court was required to consider a non-relative’s guardianship petition for J.R. before terminating her parental rights. The termination hearing spanned two days. The court held the first hearing on February 27, 2025, and the final hearing on May 2, 2025.6 The non-relative filed the petition five business days before the final
4 We hold that Mother waived her second argument by not presenting a substantive argument on appeal.9 Mother does not assert a legal basis for this argument, nor does she explain how the court abused its discretion in refusing to consider a petition not properly before it. Without explanation, Mother cites to Clark v. Division of Family Services and Ralston v. DSCYF.10 We conclude that these two cases are not relevant here.
5 But even if Mother had made a substantive argument, it would not prevail. The Family Court acted within its discretion when it decided to not consider
7 See 13 Del. C. § 2302(16) (“‘Relative’ means any sibling, grandparent, uncle, aunt, first cousin, first cousin once removed, great-grandparent, grandaunt or granduncle, half sibling, stepparent, stepsibling, step-aunt or step-uncle, or step-grandparent of the child who is the subject of a guardianship petition.”). 8 A982 (TPR Hr’g Tr. dated May 2, 2025, at 107:1–12 [hereinafter “May TPR Tr.”]). 9 In re COVID-Related Restrictions on Religious Servs., 326 A.3d 626, 643 (Del. 2024) (“Nowhere in their opening brief do Appellants either identify or present an argument on the issue . . . in the manner that is required by the Rules of this Court. ‘This Court has held that the appealing party’s opening brief must fully state the grounds for appeal, as well as the arguments and supporting authorities on each issue or claim of reversible error.’ ‘[C]asual mention of an issue in a brief is cursory treatment insufficient to preserve the issue on appeal.’” (quoting Kost v. Kozakiewicz, 1 F.3d 176, 182 (3d Cir. 1993) (other citations omitted))). 10 Opening Br. 23–24 (citing Clark v. Div. of Fam. Servs., 975 A.2d 813, 821 (Del. 2009) (requiring the Family Court to implicitly consider a guardianship petition in its best-interests-of-the-child analysis when family members had voluntarily stayed their guardianship petition pending the court’s decision on termination of parental rights), and Ralston v. DSCYF, 308 A.3d 159–62 (Del. 2023) (holding that the father’s due process rights were not violated when the court refused to hear a guardianship petition before terminating his parental rights)).
11 Americas Mining Corp. v. Theriault, 51 A.3d 1213, 1238 (Del. 2012) (“Trial judges are vested with the discretion to resolve scheduling matters and to control their own docket.”). 12
13 Del. C. §§ 2324A(a), 2354.