PER CURIAM:

Jean Elie Louisil petitions for review of the Board of Immi- gration Appeals’ (“BIA”) final order affirming the immigration judge’s (“IJ”) denial of his applications for asylum under Immigra- tion and Nationality Act (“INA”) § 208(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a), with- holding of removal under INA § 241(b)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3), and relief under the United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punish- ment (“CAT”), 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c). He argues that the BIA erred in finding that he did not establish a nexus between feared persecu- tion and a protected ground and that his resettlement from Haiti to Chile before entering the United States barred his application for asylum. He further argues that cumulative error warranted rever- sal. Additionally, he argues that the IJ deprived him of due process and a fair hearing by objecting to his counsel’s line of questioning. The government responds by moving for summary affirmance. Summary disposition is appropriate either where time is of the essence, such as “situations where important public policy is- sues are involved or those where rights delayed are rights denied,” or where “the position of one of the parties is clearly right as a mat- ter of law so that there can be no substantial question as to the out- come of the case, or where . . . the appeal is frivolous.” Groendyke Transp., Inc. v. Davis, 406 F.2d 1158, 1162 (5th Cir. 1969).

We only review the BIA’s decision, except to the extent the BIA expressly adopts the IJ’s decision. Jeune v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 810 F.3d 792, 799 (11th Cir. 2016), overruled in part on other grounds by, Santos-Zacaria v. Garland, 598 U.S. 411, 419-23 & n.2 (2023). Where the BIA explicitly agrees with the IJ’s reasoning, we will also review the IJ’s decision to that extent. Id. We review constitutional challenges, including alleged due process violations, de novo. Lapaix v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 605 F.3d 1138, 1143 (11th Cir. 2010). When the BIA concludes that a noncitizen has waived an is- sue by failing to raise it on appeal, we may review whether the BIA abused its discretion in finding the issue waived. Id. at 1144-45; see also Clement v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 75 F.4th 1193, 1198, 1200 (11th Cir. 2023) (concluding that when the BIA deems an appeal to it to be voluntarily withdrawn, we have jurisdiction to determine whether the BIA correctly deemed the appeal withdrawn if the petitioner raises the issue before us). A noncitizen who fails to argue an issue in their brief on ap- peal, or “makes only a passing reference” to it, abandons it. Ruga v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 757 F.3d 1193, 1196 (11th Cir. 2014); Kazemzadeh v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 577 F.3d 1341, 1352 (11th Cir. 2009). To preserve an argument, a party “must specifically and clearly identify a claim in its brief, for instance by devoting a discrete section of its argu- ment to that claim.” Zhu v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 703 F.3d 1303, 1316 n.3 (11th Cir. 2013) (quotation marks omitted, alteration adopted). Ad- ditionally, “[a]s a general rule courts and agencies are not required to make findings on issues the decision of which is unnecessary to the results they reach.” INS v. Bagamasbad, 429 U.S. 24, 25 (1976). To be eligible for asylum, an applicant must meet the INA’s definition of a refugee. INA § 208(b)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1). The INA defines a “refugee” as a person outside their country of nation- ality “who is unable or unwilling to return to, and is unable or un- willing to avail himself or herself of the protection of, that country because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on ac- count of” a protected ground, including political opinion or mem- bership in a particular social group. INA § 101(a)(42)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A). An applicant must establish a nexus between the feared persecution and a protected ground, demonstrating that one of the enumerated grounds “was or will be at least one central rea- son for persecuting” him. INA § 208(b)(1)(B)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i). Additionally, as part of the burden of establish- ing asylum eligibility, an applicant “must show not only past perse- cution or a well-founded fear of future persecution, but also that she is unable to avail herself of the protection of her home coun- try.” Lopez v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 504 F.3d 1341, 1345 (11th Cir. 2007). An applicant’s “failure to report persecution to local government authorities generally is fatal to any asylum claim” unless the appli- cant convincingly shows that those authorities would have been unable or unwilling to protect the applicant. Id. An applicant is not eligible for asylum if he or she was “firmly resettled in another country prior to arriving in the United States.” INA § 208(b)(2)(A)(vi), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2)(A)(vi).

A non-citizen is eligible for withholding of removal if he shows that, upon return to his country, he more likely than not will be persecuted there due to a protected ground, such as his mem- bership in a particular social group. INA § 241(b)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3). If an applicant cannot meet the well-founded fear standard of asylum, he generally will not be eligible for withhold- ing of removal. Kazemzadeh, 577 F.3d at 1352. To be eligible for CAT relief, an applicant must show that she more likely than not will be tortured if removed to the proposed country of removal. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(2); Reyes-Sanchez v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 369 F.3d 1239, 1242 (11th Cir. 2004). Individuals in deportation proceedings are entitled to due process of law under the Fifth Amendment. Lapaix, 605 F.3d at 1143. Due process requires that noncitizens are given notice and an opportunity to be heard in removal proceedings. Id. “To estab- lish due process violations in removal proceedings, aliens must show that they were deprived of liberty without due process of law, and that the asserted errors caused them substantial preju- dice.” Lonyem v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 352 F.3d 1338, 1341-42 (11th Cir. 2003). “To show substantial prejudice, an alien must demonstrate that, in the absence of the alleged violations, the outcome of the proceeding would have been different.” Lapaix, 605 F.3d at 1143. However, the “failure to receive relief that is purely discretionary in nature does not amount to a deprivation of a liberty interest.” Tang v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 578 F.3d 1270, 1275 (11th Cir. 2009) (quoting Scheerer v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 513 F.3d 1244, 1253 (11th Cir. 2008)).

The INA states that the IJ shall, among other things, “receive evidence[] and interrogate, examine, and cross-examine” the noncitizen and any witnesses during removal proceedings. INA § 240(b)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(1). And the relevant regulations contain similar language and further state that “immigration judges shall exercise their independent judgment and discretion and may take any action consistent with their authorities under the Act and regulations that is appropriate and necessary for the disposition” of cases before them. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.10(b). Here, Louisil’s brief only challenges the BIA’s denial of his asylum claim and includes no argument about the BIA’s holding that his claim for CAT relief was waived on appeal. Additionally, Louisil’s brief includes no argument that the BIA erred in affirming the denial of his claim for withholding of removal. As a result, Lou- isil has abandoned his withholding of removal and CAT claims. Summary affirmance is warranted because the govern- ment’s position is clearly correct as a matter of law such that there is no substantial question as to the outcome of the case. Groendyke Transp., Inc., 406 F.2d at 1162. The BIA found that Louisil waived any challenge to the IJ’s determination that he failed to establish that the Haitian government was unable or unwilling to help him. This waiver finding was dispositive of his asylum claim. Louisil’s only argument to us relevant to this issue is his inaccurate claim that he discussed Haitian police incapacity in his BIA brief, as he did not address Haitian police in his BIA brief. Therefore, Louisil has failed to show that the BIA abused its discretion in its waiver deter- mination. This determination was dispositive, so we need not con- sider Louisil’s arguments challenging the BIA’s nexus finding, firm- resettlement finding, or cumulative error. In addition, the government is clearly correct as a matter of law that the BIA correctly found that Louisil failed to show that his due process rights were violated because he has not shown that he was deprived of liberty without due process of law or that any error caused him substantial prejudice. The IJ was clearly within his broad authority to object to Louisil’s counsel’s irrelevant question about Louisil’s current job in the United States. The IJ once asking whether the government objected following a question about the gang in Chile was not biased advocacy for the government. And even if the IJ erred, neither error substantially prejudiced Louisil because he was not prevented from addressing any relevant issues to his application and the objected-to questions were irrelevant to the dispositive issue of whether the Haitian government was una- ble or unwilling to help him. Accordingly, we GRANT the government’s motion for sum- mary affirmance. See Groendyke Transp., Inc., 406 F.2d at 1162. PETITION DENIED.