v.
the State of Texas
Concurrence
NUMBER 13-25-00445-CR
COURT OF APPEALS
THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG
JARVIS LAMAR BOOKER, Appellant, v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee.
ON APPEAL FROM THE 25TH DISTRICT COURT OF LAVACA COUNTY, TEXAS
CONCURRING MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Chief Justice Tijerina and Justices Peña and West Concurring Memorandum Opinion by Justice West
I agree with the majority and write separately to further address the issues raised by appellant.
Appellant first argues that Section 547.613(a)(1) does not proscribe objects that hang from the rearview mirror. See TEX. TRANSP. CODE § 547.613(a)(1). Appellant asserts that the air freshener was not directly attached to the windshield because it was hung from the rearview mirror. Relevant here, the statute proscribes any “object or material that is placed on or attached to the windshield.” Id. Neither the parties nor this court have found any cases interpreting whether “placed on or attached” requires direct placement
or attachment or includes indirect placement or attachment. Courts construe the Transportation Code as follows: “Words and phrases shall be read in context and construed according to the rules of grammar and common usage . . . . [unless they] have acquired a technical or particular meaning . . . .” TEX. GOV’T CODE § 311.011; TEX. TRANSP.
CODE § 1.002 (providing the Transportation Code is construed in accordance with the provisions of Chapter 311 of the Government Code); see also Douglass v. State, No. 03-
20-00134-CR, 2022 WL 548275, at *4 (Tex. App.—Austin Feb. 24, 2022, no pet.) (mem.
op., not designated for publication). “Attached” is defined as “joined, connected, or bound.” Attached, Collins English Dictionary, https://www.collinsdictionary.com/us/dictionary/english/attached (last visited May 21, 2026). Notably, there is no language in the statute limiting its application to objects or materials that are directly “joined, connected, or bound” to the windshield. Accordingly, the Legislature appears to have proscribed all objects or material that are joined, connected, or bound to the windshield—both directly and indirectly. And while the statute expressly provides an exemption permitting “a rearview mirror,” the “a” indicates an exemption for a singular object. See TEX. TRANSP. CODE § 547.613(b)(4) (emphasis added). The statute does not exempt “a rearview mirror [and things hanging
therefrom].” See id. Additionally, interpreting the statute to allow objects to “obstruct[] or reduce[] the operator’s clear view” as long as they are not directly attached to the windshield would be illogical and contrary to the purpose of the prohibition.
Regardless of the proper interpretation of Section 547.613(a)(1), the inquiry determining the outcome in this case is not how we should construe the statute. Rather, the inquiry is whether Officer Simpkins’s understanding of Section 547.613(a)(1) was an objectively reasonable understanding of the statute. See Heien v. North Carolina, 574
[*2]U.S. 54, 66, 68 (2014); Daniel v. State, 683 S.W.3d 777, 781 (Tex. Crim. App. 2024).
Reasonable suspicion is supported even where an officer operates under an objectively reasonable mistake of law. Heien, 574 U.S. at 61. The United States Supreme Court held that where a North Carolina statute required only one rear stop light, a nearby provision created confusion by “requir[ing] that ‘all originally equipped rear lamps’ be functional,” and because no North Carolina Court previously construed the provision, an officer had reasonable suspicion to believe that one faulty break light was a violation of state law. Id. at 59, 68. Accordingly, evidence of cocaine emanating from the stop was not suppressed.
Id. at 60, 68.
Similarly, in Daniel v. State, Daniel sought to suppress evidence of intoxication after a traffic stop. 683 S.W.3d at 778. An officer stopped Daniel for violating Section
545.060(a) of the Transportation Code which provides: “An operator on a roadway divided into two or more clearly marked lanes for traffic: (1) shall drive as nearly as practical entirely within a single lane; and (2) may not move from the lane unless that movement
can be made safely.” Id. at 779 (quoting TEX. TRANSP. CODE § 545.060). At the time of the stop, Texas Courts of Appeal issued conflicting decisions as to whether the statute involved a single offense or the two subsections defined separate offenses, and an opinion joined by four judges of Court of Criminal Appeals provided the statute defined
two separately actionable offenses. Daniel, 683 S.W.3d at 779–80; see Leming v. State, 493 S.W.3d 552, 559 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016). The officer stopped Daniel in 2017 only for violation of subsection one. Daniel, 683 S.W.3d at 778. It was not until 2022 that the Court of Criminal Appeals settled the matter by holding the statute defined only a single offense.
[*3]Id. at 780–81; see State v. Hardin, 664 S.W.3d 867, 876 (Tex. Crim. App. 2022).
Accordingly, the officer in Daniel had reasonable suspicion to stop Daniel because his
mistake of law was “entirely reasonable in view of the nuanced statutory language and conflicting caselaw from [the Court of Criminal Appeals] and the intermediate courts of appeal.” 683 S.W.3d at 783.
Given the foregoing law, Officer Simpkins’s understanding that the statute proscribed items attached to the windshield indirectly was objectively reasonable in light of the statutory text and lack of cases interpreting the statute.
Second, appellant appears to suggest that an air freshener could not have
“obstructed the driver’s clear view.” Such an argument is premised on a mischaracterization of the statute at issue. The statute proscribes any “object or material
that is placed on or attached to the windshield . . . and that obstructs or reduces the operator’s clear view.” TEX. TRANSP. CODE § 547.613(a)(1) (emphasis added). The statute does not specify a degree of visibility reduction required for a violation to occur. This is a proactive statute that is intended to prevent hazardous driving conditions or habits on public roads. While obstruction of view caused by an air freshener may appear de minimis, obstructed views create a hazard relative to the degree view is reduced. Much like posted speed limits, the danger presented increases commensurate with the degree of violation. Nevertheless, a traffic stop based on excessive speed constitutes reasonable suspicion, regardless of whether the violation is for one mile or thirty miles per hour over
the posted speed limit. See id. § 545.352(a) (providing that “[a] speed in excess of the limits established . . . is prima facie evidence that the speed is not reasonable and prudent and that the speed is unlawful”).
[*4]Third, appellant relied on Ford v. State to assert that Officer Simpkins merely provided conclusory statements that appellant violated Section 547.613(a)(1). See 158
S.W.3d 488, 493 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). However, in Ford, an officer’s statements were conclusory where he stated that he pulled Ford over for “following too close.” See id.; TEX.
TRANSP. CODE § 545.062(a) (statute governing following distance). Ford should have provided facts (such the distance between vehicles, speed, and highway conditions) supporting how he arrived at the conclusion that a “following too close” violation occurred.
See TEX. TRANSP. CODE § 545.062(a). Otherwise, an officer would only have to say he thought a legal violation occurred, and there would be no means by which a court could
determine whether such thought was based on reasonable suspicion or not. See Ford, 158 S.W.3d at 493. Ford has no application to the present case. Here, Officer Simpkins
did not merely say he pulled appellant over for an obstruction or reduction in the operator’s clear view. See TEX. TRANSP. CODE § 547.613(a)(1). He provided specific facts: he observed an air freshener swinging from side to side during dusky conditions while
appellant was driving well below the posted speed limit. Given the statute’s language and the context of Officer Simpkins’s observances, I agree with the majority that an officer could have had a reasonable suspicion that the air freshener reduced appellant’s clear view under § 547.613(a)(1).
JON WEST Justice
Do not publish. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).
Delivered and filed on the 4th day of June, 2026.
[*5]Lead Opinion
COURT OF APPEALS
THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG
JARVIS LAMAR BOOKER, Appellant,
v.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee.
ON APPEAL FROM THE 25TH DISTRICT COURT
OF LAVACA COUNTY, TEXAS
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Chief Justice Tijerina and Justices Peña and West Memorandum Opinion by Chief Justice Tijerina
Appellant Jarvis Lamar Booker was convicted of the felony offense of possession with intent to deliver a controlled substance in an amount greater than or equal to four grams but less than two hundred grams, and the trial court sentenced him to twenty-five
years’ imprisonment. See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 481.1123(d). By his sole issue, Booker argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress because there was no reasonable articulable suspicion to perform a traffic stop. We affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
On May 28, 2025, the trial court heard Booker’s motion to suppress. Patrol Officer
Justin Simpkins testified that he was working patrol on August 27, 2024, with the Lavaca
County Sheriff’s Office. Officer Simpkins stated that he was parked “parallel, observing
[passing] traffic.” When Booker passed in front of his patrol unit, Booker began “rubbing his face, blocking his face from [Simpkins’s] view.” Officer Simpkins stated this “gesture,” led him to believe that his “presence inflicted an amount of stress on [Booker] that is a gross deviation from that of the general motoring public.” Thus, Officer Simpkins was prompted to investigate further, and he began to follow Booker’s vehicle.
Officer Simpkins testified that he was immediately behind Booker’s vehicle traveling northbound. Through Booker’s rearview window, Officer Simpkins observed what he believed to be an “air freshener hanging from the rearview mirror, swinging back and forth.” Prior to making this traffic stop, Officer Simpkins understood the Texas
Transportation Code to prohibit anything “affixed to a windshield, not including the rearview [mirror], but attached to the rearview [mirror], that may possibly impair the driver’s view.” Additionally, Officer Simpkin testified that he had been taught that a small
3x5 inch obstruction creates a larger visual impairment at 100 feet, and “can obstruct the driver’s view to pedestrians or vehicles.” As he followed Booker, Officer Simpkins observed Booker “to be traveling below, well below, the posted speed limit, something that is, again, a gross deviation of that of the general motoring public.”
Officer Simpkins decided to conduct a traffic stop based on Booker’s violation of the Texas Transportation Code. As he made contact with Booker, Officer Simpkins observed the air freshener hanging from the dash. Booker “only rolled his window down approximately two to three inches,” which according to Officer Simpkins “has always been in an effort to conceal odor with inside the vehicle.” Officer Simpkins detected an odor of marijuana emanating from within the vehicle. Officer Simpkins then asked Booker to exit the vehicle and escorted him to his patrol unit to issue the warning and conduct a records check.
[*2]Officer Simpkins described Booker as jovial, compliant, and nonconfrontational.
When Officer Simpkins questioned whether Booker had marijuana in the vehicle, Booker denied having illegal drugs. Officer Simpkins explained he detected an odor of marijuana
in the vehicle, and Booker advised that his stepson may have possibly left marijuana in the vehicle. Officer Simpkins then conducted a search of Booker’s vehicle. The search revealed a “block-like shaped cookie,” which tested positive for cocaine, “more of th[e]
same rock-like substance in the center console, individually packaged,” and two bags “of large amounts” of marijuana. Booker had over $5,300 in cash on his person.
Officer Simpkins’s dashboard camera and body worn camera videos were admitted into evidence, which confirmed the testimony. The trial court denied the motion to suppress. Booker pleaded guilty to the offense, and this appeal followed.
II. MOTION TO SUPPRESS
By his sole issue, Booker argues the trial court erred in denying the motion to suppress because Officer Booker lacked reasonable suspicion to conduct a traffic stop.
A. Standard of Review
We review a trial court’s denial of a motion to suppress for an abuse of discretion under a bifurcated standard of review. Brodnex v. State, 485 S.W.3d 432, 436 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2016) (citing Valtierra v. State, 310 S.W.3d 442, 447–48 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010));
see Crain v. State, 315 S.W.3d 43, 48 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). We view the evidence in light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling, and we assume the trial court made findings consistent with its ruling and that are supported by the record. Furr v. State, 499 S.W.3d
[*3]872, 877 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016). “We give almost total deference to the trial court’s determination of historical facts and review de novo the trial court’s application of law to facts not turning on credibility and demeanor.” Ford v. State, 158 S.W.3d 488, 493 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2005). We will only reverse a trial court’s ruling if it is arbitrary, unreasonable, or outside the zone of reasonable disagreement. State v. Cortez, 543 S.W.3d 198, 203
(Tex. Crim. App. 2018).
B. Reasonable Suspicion
A warrantless traffic stop must be justified by reasonable suspicion. State v. Hardin, 664 S.W.3d 867, 872 (Tex. Crim. App. 2022). “[R]easonable suspicion exists where the officer has ‘specific articulable facts that, when combined with rational inferences from those facts, would lead him to reasonably suspect that a particular person has engaged or is (or soon will be) engaging in criminal activity.’” Brodnex, 485 S.W.3d at 437 (quoting Garcia v. State, 43 S.W.3d 527, 530 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001)). “When
making a determination of reasonable suspicion, we consider the totality of the circumstances.” Hardin, 664 S.W.3d at 872. This means we “must look at all of the facts together to make the reasonable suspicion determination; facts that do not show
reasonable suspicion in isolation may do so when combined with other facts.” Loesch v. State, 958 S.W.2d 830, 832 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). There is no requirement that the facts giving rise to a detaining officer’s reasonable suspicion “must show that the detainee has committed, is committing, or is about to commit, a particular and distinctively identifiable penal offense.” Derichsweiler v. State, 348 S.W.3d 906, 916 (Tex. Crim. App.
2011). Instead, the “articulable facts must show that some activity out of the ordinary has occurred, some suggestion to connect the detainee to the unusual activity, and some indication that the unusual activity is related to crime.” Id. (citation modified). “[T]he detaining officer need not be personally aware of every fact that objectively supports a
[*4]reasonable suspicion to detain; rather, ‘the cumulative information known to the cooperating officers at the time of the stop is to be considered in determining whether reasonable suspicion exists.’” Id. at 914 (internal footnote omitted). But “the officer must
have more than an inarticulable hunch or mere good-faith suspicion that a crime was in progress.” Brodnex, 485 S.W.3d at 437.
Under Texas Transportation Code section 547.613(a), it is a misdemeanor for a
“person operat[ing] a motor vehicle [to have] an object or material that is placed on or attached to the windshield . . . that obstructs or reduces the operator’s clear view.” TEX.
TRANSP. CODE § 547.613(a)(1).
C. Discussion
Appellant argues that there “is no Texas law that clearly proscribes hanging air freshener from the rearview mirror” and that rearview mirrors are specifically excepted from the Texas Transportation Code. See id. § 547.613(b). Appellant further argues that there “is no evidence in the record that the paper air freshener obstructed the driver’s clear view, and thus, there was no reasonable suspicion” that Booker was committing a crime. Despite Officer Simpkins’s testimony describing the visual impairment caused by the hanging air freshener and similar sized obstructions, Booker seems to suggest that because there was no evidence his view was actually obstructed, there can be no reasonable suspicion. However, regarding reasonable suspicion, “[t]he State does not have to establish with absolute certainty that a crime occurred.” Abney v. State, 394
S.W.3d 542, 548 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013); see also Aguilar v. State, No. 03-11-00133-CR, 2012 WL 677505, at *4 (Tex. App.—Austin Mar. 2, 2012, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (“There is no requirement that a traffic regulation must be violated in order for an officer to have sufficient reasonable suspicion to justify a traffic stop.”). “[T]hat an officer must personally witness facts giving rise to criminal activity, is against the great weight of authority.” Brother v. State, 166 S.W.3d 255, 258–59 (Tex.
[*5]Crim. App. 2005).
In this case, the State was required to show that Officer Simpkins had reasonable suspicion to stop Booker based on the suspected violation of section 547.613: that an object or material was placed on or attached to the windshield that obstructed or reduced his clear view. As stated in Rittingger:
In determining whether Trooper Francis had reasonable suspicion to stop Merida based on a suspected violation of . . . § 547.613(a), the court assesses whether Trooper Francis had a basis for his belief that justified the stop; the question whether Merida’s view was actually obstructed or reduced by the GPS holder does not control whether Trooper Francis had a reasonable suspicion that the GPS holder was positioned in a way that violated § 547.613(a).
United States v. Morales Rittingger, No. 2:16-CR-053-D(2), 2017 WL 367491, at *6 (N.D.
Tex. Jan. 25, 2017). Thus, we only assess whether Officer Simpkins had a basis for his belief that justified the stop: whether he had a reasonable suspicion that an object was positioned in a way that violated section 547.613(a). See id. Officer Simpkins testified that he observed Booker attempt to obscure his face when he passed Officer Simpkins; he
observed “an obstruction” “hanging from Booker’s rearview mirror, swinging back and forth,” which could have presented “a hazard to other motorists” or Booker himself; at the time Officer Simpkins did not know it was an air freshener only that “it was something affixed”; and that Booker was driving “well below” the speed limit, which was a “gross deviation” from the general public. This evidence, including the video from his dashboard camera, measured from an objective standard, supports the conclusion that there existed at least a reasonable suspicion that Booker was driving with an object attached to the windshield that obstructed his view, justifying the stop. See TEX. TRANSP. CODE
[*6]§ 547.613(a)(1). Requiring evidence with certainty that a violation occurred, as Booker suggests, would raise the standard for reasonable suspicion far above probable cause.
See id.; Abney, 394 S.W.3d at 548; see also Azzam v. State, No. 13-22-00370-CR, 2023
WL 5624094, at *3 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg Aug. 31, 2023, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (noting that an officer only needs reasonable suspicion for a traffic stop, which “requires only some minimal level of justification for the stop”).
Accordingly, we cannot conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in denying the motion to suppress. We overrule Booker’s sole issue.
III. CONCLUSION
We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
JAIME TIJERINA Chief Justice
Concurring Memorandum Opinion by Justice Jon West.
Do not publish. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).
Delivered and filed on the 4th day of June, 2026.
[*7]