Leight v. Berkman, 483 So. 2d 476 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986). · Go Syfert
Search
Leight v. Berkman, 483 So. 2d 476 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
11 citation events (5 in the last 25 years) across 2 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: VAN VORGUE v. Rankin (fla, 2010-04-01)
Top citers, strongest first. 5 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (rule) VAN VORGUE v. Rankin
Fla. · 2010 · confidence medium
The Third District stated that “an injunction cannot be used to restrain the use of a party’s unrestricted assets prior to the conclusion of an action at law.” Id. (citing Konover, 511 So.2d at 706 ; Leight v. Berkman, 483 So.2d 476, 477 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986); Supreme Serv.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Pianeta Miami, Inc. v. Lieberman
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2006 · confidence medium
Konover, 511 So.2d at 706 ; Leight v. Berkman, 483 So.2d 476, 477 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986) (citations omitted); Supreme Serv.
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Credo LLC v. Speyside Investments Corp.
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2018 · signal: see also · confidence medium
The rule has been specifically applied, as on general principles it must be, to an action like this one for the recovery of unsegregated earnest money, and is unequivocally not affected by the claim that recovery upon any subsequently-entered judgment may be made difficult by the dissipation or unreachability of the debtor’s assets. 511 So. 2d 705, 706 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987) (internal citations omitted); see also Leight v. Berkman, 483 So. 2d 476, 477 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986) (citations omitted) (“The law is unequivocally established that an injunction against the disposition of a defendant’s asse…
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Sammie Investments v. Strategica Capital Associates
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2018 · signal: see also · confidence medium
The rule has been specifically applied, as on general principles it must be, to an action like this one for the recovery of unsegregated earnest money, and is unequivocally not affected by the claim that recovery upon any subsequently-entered judgment may be made difficult by the dissipation or unreachability of the debtor's assets. 511 So. 2d 705, 706 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987) (internal citations omitted); see also Leight v. Berkman, 483 So. 2d 476, 477 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986) (citations omitted) (“The law is unequivocally established that an injunction against the disposition of a defendant’s assets…
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Barbouti v. Lysandrou
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1990 · signal: see also · confidence low
See Acquafredda v. Messina, 408 So.2d 828 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982); see also Leight v. Berkman, 483 So.2d 476 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986); Konover Realty Assocs. v. Mladen, 511 So.2d 705 , 706 n. 5 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Lewis Lawrence LEIGHT, Appellant,
v.
Jason BERKMAN and Barbara Berkman, Appellees.
85-2880.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
Feb 11, 1986.
483 So. 2d 476
Schwartz, C.J., and Baskin and Jorgenson.
Cited by 7 opinions  |  Published

Michael Tarre, Coral Gables, for appellant.

Dubbin & Berkman, Evan J. Langbein, Miami, for appellees.

Before SCHWARTZ, C.J., and BASKIN and JORGENSON, JJ.

SCHWARTZ, Chief Judge.

Claiming that he had burglarized and stolen property from their home, the Berkmans sued Leight for compensatory and treble damages, for conversion and under the civil theft statute. During the pendency of the litigation, the trial court, on the plaintiffs' motion, enjoined the City of Miami Beach Police Department from releasing to Leight property it had seized from his premises under a search warrant. Since it is conceded that any specific items owned by the Berkmans have been returned to them, the sole asserted justification for the order was to preserve assets from which they may "collect the judgment" sought in the primary action. We reverse with directions to dissolve the injunction.

[*477] The law is unequivocally established that an injunction against the disposition of a defendant's assets simply may not be granted upon the ground that their preservation is required to satisfy a subsequent money judgment.[1]Stewart v. Manget, 132 Fla. 498, 181 So. 370 (1938); Stading v. Equilease Corp., 471 So.2d 1379 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985); Ciabotti v. Milo, 432 So.2d 792 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983); Supreme Service Station Corp. v. Telecredit Service Center, Inc., 424 So.2d 844 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982); Oxford International Bank and Trust, Ltd. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 374 So.2d 54 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979), cert. dismissed, 383 So.2d 1199 (Fla. 1980). The appellees argue that they are innocent victims of the defendant and that he is a convicted, imprisoned thief who likely stole the property in question from others who are not parties to the suit. None of these factors, however emotionally appealing, can justify a departure from our duty to apply neutral and settled principles of law to all who come before us.

Reversed with directions.

1 Attachment, as authorized by Section 76.01, et. seq., Fla. Stat. (1983), provides the obvious remedy for the potential harm the plaintiffs allegedly fear. That procedure, however, involves a set of statutory burdens, including posting a bond for at least twice the claimed debt, § 76.12, which the plaintiffs have not satisfied.