Florida v. Casal, 462 U.S. 637 (1983). · Go Syfert
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Florida v. Casal, 462 U.S. 637 (1983). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
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cited 2× by 2 distinct cases, last quoted 1984 · …despite the liberality of modern rules of pleading, a complaint still must contain either direct or inferential allegations respecting all the material elements necessary to sustain a recovery under some viable legal theory. ⚠ not in text
113 citation events (5 in the last 25 years) across 30 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Transnor (Bermuda) Ltd. v. BP North America Petroleum (nysd, 1990-04-18)
Treatment trajectory · 1983 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1983 2004 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 17 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (quoted) Transnor (Bermuda) Ltd. v. BP North America Petroleum
S.D.N.Y. · 1990 · signal: cf. · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence low
solemnized covenants to conspire are difficult to come by ...
examined Cited as authority (quoted) Sutliff, Incorporated v. Donovan Companies, Inc.
7th Cir. · 1984 · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence low
despite the liberality of modern rules of pleading, a complaint still must contain either direct or inferential allegations respecting all the material elements necessary to sustain a recovery under some viable legal theory.
examined Cited as authority (quoted) Sutliff, Inc. v. Donovan Companies, Inc.
7th Cir. · 1984 · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence low
despite the liberality of modern rules of pleading, a complaint still must contain either direct or inferential allegations respecting all the material elements necessary to sustain a recovery under some viable legal theory.
examined Cited as authority (rule) Autran v. State (10×) also: Cited "see"
Tex. Crim. App. · 1994 · signal: cf. · confidence medium
Cf. Casal, 462 U.S. at 637-39 , 103 S.Ct. at 3100-02 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
examined Cited as authority (rule) Batson v. Kentucky (4×)
SCOTUS · 1986 · confidence medium
J.) (expressing view on merits even though writ was dismissed as improvidently granted because state-court judgment rested on adequate and independent state grounds); Florida v. Casal, 462 U. S. 637, 639 (1983) (BURGER, C.
discussed Cited "see" Federal Deposit Insurance v. Harrington
N.D. Tex. · 1994 · signal: see · confidence high
See In re Plywood Antitrust Litig., 655 F.2d 627, 641 (5th Cir.1981) (“Despite the liberality of modern rules of pleading, a complaint still must contain either direct or inferential allegations respecting all the material elements necessary to sustain a recovery under some viable legal theory.”), cert. dism’d, 462 U.S. 1125 , 103 S.Ct. 3100 , 77 L.Ed.2d 1358 (1983); Orange Nat’l Bank v. Bank of La., 382 F.2d 945, 949 (5th Cir.1967) (“[S]terile allegations [do not] suffice to save [a complaint] from a motion to dismiss.”); Delgado v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 727 F.Supp. 24, 27 (D…
discussed Cited "see" Barnes v. Colonial Life & Accident Insurance
N.D. Tex. · 1993 · signal: see · confidence high
See In re Plywood Antitrust Litig., 655 F.2d 627, 641 (5th Cir.1981) (“Despite the liberality of modern rules of pleading, a complaint still must contain either direct or inferential allegations respecting all the material elements necessary to sustain a recovery....”), cert. dism’d, 462 U.S. 1125 , 103 S.Ct. 3100 , 77 L.Ed.2d 1358 (1983).
discussed Cited "see" In re Domestic Air Transportation Antitrust Litigation
N.D. Ga. · 1993 · signal: accord · confidence high
Distribs: v. Itek Corp., 717 F.2d 1560,1579 (11th Cir.1983) (“Once an antitrust violation and its causal relation to plaintiffs injury have been established, the burden of proving the amount of damages is much less severe”); accord In re Plywood Antitrust Litig., 655 F.2d 627, 635 (5th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1125 , 103 S.Ct. 3100 , 77 L.Ed.2d 1358 (1983).
discussed Cited "see" Gloria W. Walker v. South Central Bell Telephone Company
5th Cir. · 1990 · signal: see · confidence high
See In re Plywood Antitrust Litigation, 655 F.2d 627, 641 (5th Cir. Unit A 1981), cert. granted, 456 U.S. 971 , 102 S.Ct. 2232 , 72 L.Ed.2d 844 (1982), cert. dismissed, 462 U.S. 1125 , 103 S.Ct. 3100 , 77 L.Ed.2d 1358 (1983) and Arthur H.
cited Cited "see" Rosefielde v. Falcon Jet Corp.
D.N.J. · 1988 · signal: see · confidence high
See In re Plywood Antitrust Litigation, 655 F.2d 627, 634 (5th Cir.1981), cert. dismissed 462 U.S. 1125 , 103 S.Ct. 3100 , 77 L.Ed.2d 1358 (1983).
discussed Cited "see" Garshman v. Universal Resources Holding, Inc.
D.N.J. · 1986 · signal: see · confidence high
Sutliff, Inc. v. Donovan Co., 727 F.2d 648 , 654 (7th Cir.1984); see In Re Plywood Antitrust Litigation, 655 F.2d 627, 641-42 (5th Cir.1981), ce rt. dismissed, 462 U.S. 1125 , 103 S.Ct. 3100 , 77 L.Ed.2d 1358 (1983).
cited Cited "see, e.g." Rockbit Industries U.S.A., Inc. v. Baker Hughes, Inc.
S.D. Tex. · 1991 · signal: see also · confidence low
See Elliott v. Foufas, 867 F.2d 877 (5th Cir.1989); see also In re Plywood Antitrust Litig., 655 F.2d 627 (5th Cir.1981), cert. dismissed, 462 U.S. 1125 , 103 S.Ct. 3100 , 77 L.Ed.2d 1358 (1983).
examined Cited "see, e.g." Frank Mars v. The Honorable Marvin U. Mounts (3×)
11th Cir. · 1990 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See, e.g., Florida v. Casal, 462 U.S. 637 , 103 S.Ct. 3100 , 77 L.Ed.2d 277 (1983) (per curiam) {certiorari improvidently granted where suppression of evidence rested on independent and adequate state grounds).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Gentile v. County of Suffolk
E.D.N.Y · 1990 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also In re Plywood Antitrust Litigation, 655 F.2d 627, 637 (5th Cir.1981) (district judge “carefully and extensively edited” findings “to eliminate any possible prejudice to defendants”), cer t. dismissed, 462 U.S. 1125 , 103 S.Ct. 3100 , 77 L.Ed.2d 1358 (1983).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Rainey v. Beech Aircraft Corp.
11th Cir. · 1987 · signal: see also · confidence low
Another way the trial court can safeguard the rights of the party against whose interest the report is being introduced is to comment on the weight of the evidence, id., and to issue an instruction cautioning the jurors against substituting the investigator’s judgment for their own, id.; see also In re Plywood Antitrust Litig., 655 F.2d 627, 637 (5th Cir. Unit A Sept.1981), cert. dismissed, 462 U.S. 1125 , 103 S.Ct. 3100 , 77 L.Ed.2d 1358 (1983); Cohen v. General Motors Corp., 534 F.Supp. 509 , 512 n. 3 (W.D.Mo.1982).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." John C. Rainey, Individually and as Personal Representative of the Estate of Barbara A. Rainey v. Beech Aircraft Corporation, Beech Aerospace Services, Inc., and Pratt and Whitney Aircraft of Canada, Ltd., Rondi M. Knowlton, Individually and as Personnel Representative of the Estate of Donald Bruce Knowlton v. Beech Aircraft Corporation, Beech Aerospace Services, Inc., and Pratt and Whitney Aircraft of Canada, Ltd.
11th Cir. · 1987 · signal: see also · confidence low
Another way the trial court can safeguard the rights of the party against whose interest the report is being introduced is to comment on the weight of the evidence, id., and to issue an instruction cautioning the jurors against substituting the investigator's judgment for their own, id.; see also In re Plywood Antitrust Litig., 655 F.2d 627, 637 (5th Cir. Unit A Sept.1981), cert. dismissed, 462 U.S. 1125 , 103 S.Ct. 3100 , 77 L.Ed.2d 1358 (1983); Cohen v. General Motors Corp., 534 F.Supp. 509 , 512 n. 3 (W.D.Mo.1982).
cited Cited "see, e.g." Northwestern Fruit Co. v. A. Levy & J. Zentner Co.
E.D. Cal. · 1986 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also, In re Plywood Antitrust Litigation, 655 F.2d 627 (5th Cir.1981), cert. dismissed, 462 U.S. 1125 , 103 S.Ct. 3100 , 77 L.Ed.2d 1358 (1983) 17.
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
FLORIDA
v.
CASAL Et Al.
81-2318.
Supreme Court of the United States.
Jun 17, 1983.
462 U.S. 637
Carolyn M. Snurkowski, Assistant Attorney General of Florida, argued the cause for petitioner. With her on the briefs was Jim Smith, Attorney General., Arthur F. McCormick argued the cause and filed a brief for respondents.
Burger.
Cited by 20 opinions  |  Published
2 passages pin-cited by 3 cases
Pinpoint authority: bottom 92%
Citer courts: Seventh Circuit (2) · S.D. New York (1)

Lead Opinion

Per Curiam.

The writ is dismissed as improvidently granted, it appearing that the judgment of the court below rested on independent and adequate state grounds.

Concurrence

Chief Justice Burger,

concurring.

The Court today concludes that the Florida Supreme Court relied on independent and adequate state grounds when it affirmed the suppression of over 100 pounds of marihuana discovered aboard a fishing vessel — the evidence upon which respondents’ convictions for possession and importation of marihuana were based. The Florida Supreme Court did not expressly declare that its holding rested on state grounds, and the principal state case cited for the probable-cause standard, Florida v. Smith, 233 So. 2d 396 (1970), is based entirely upon this Court’s interpretation of the Fourth Amendment of the Federal Constitution. I write not to challenge today’s determination that the state court relied on independent and adequate state grounds, however, but rather to emphasize that this Court has decided that Florida law, and not federal law or any decision of this Court, is responsible for the untoward result in this case.

[*638] The two bases of state law upon which the Florida Supreme Court appears to have relied are Art. I, § 12, of the State Constitution and Fla. Stat. §371.58 (1977), currently codified at Fla. Stat. §327.56 (1981). Article I, § 12, of the Florida Constitution is similar to the Fourth Amendment of the Federal Constitution. I question that anything in the language of either the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution or Art. I, § 12, of the Florida Constitution required suppression of the drugs as evidence. However, the Florida Supreme Court apparently concluded that state law required suppression of the evidence, independent of the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution.

The people of Florida have since shown acute awareness of the means to prevent such inconsistent interpretations of the two constitutional provisions. In the general election of November 2, 1982, the people of Florida amended Art. I, § 12, of the State Constitution. That section now provides:

“This right shall be construed in conformity with the 4th Amendment to the United States Constitution, as interpreted by the United States Supreme Court. Articles or information obtained in violation of this right shall not be admissible in evidence if such articles or information would be inadmissible under decisions of the United States Supreme Court construing the 4th Amendment to the United States Constitution.”

As amended, that section ensures that the Florida courts will no longer be able to rely on the State Constitution to suppress evidence that would be admissible under the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States.

In requiring suppression of the evidence, the Florida Supreme Court also may have been relying upon Fla. Stat. §371.58 (1977), currently codified at Fla. Stat. §327.56 (1981). That statute permits a state marine patrol officer to board a vessel for a safety inspection only if there is consent[*639] or probable cause to believe a crime is being committed.* The Florida Legislature enacted that statute, and the people of Florida and their representatives have full responsibility for the burden it places on the State’s law enforcement officers.

With our dual system of state and federal laws, administered by parallel state and federal courts, different standards may arise in various areas. But when state courts interpret state law to require more than the Federal Constitution requires, the citizens of the state must be aware that they have the power to amend state law to ensure rational law enforcement. The people of Florida have now done so with respect to Art. I, § 12, of the State Constitution; they have it within their power to do so with respect to Fla. Stat. § 327.56 (1981).

In contrast, 19 U. S. C. § 1581(a) provides: “Any officer of the customs may at any time go on board of any vessel... at any place in the United States or within the customs waters . . . and examine, inspect, and search the vessel. . . and every part thereof. ...” See United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, ante, p. 579.