Union Processing Corp. v. Atkin Et Al., 465 U.S. 1038 (1984). · Go Syfert
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Union Processing Corp. v. Atkin Et Al., 465 U.S. 1038 (1984). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
183 citation events (8 in the last 25 years) across 39 distinct courts.
Negative lean: DC  ·  Positive lean: 9th, 8th, 6th, 3rd, 4th
Strongest positive: McNeil v. United States (ohnd, 1999-10-22) · Strongest negative: James T. Martin, Jr. v. D.C. Metropolitan Police Department, Richard Xander, James T. Martin, Jr. v. D.C. Metropolitan Police Department, Richard Xander (cadc, 1987-05-08)
Treatment trajectory · 1984 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1984 2005 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 37 distinct citers. How cited ↗
cited Cited "but see" James T. Martin, Jr. v. D.C. Metropolitan Police Department, Richard Xander, James T. Martin, Jr. v. D.C. Metropolitan Police Department, Richard Xander
D.C. Cir. · 1987 · signal: but see · confidence high
But see Ellsberg v. Mitchell, 709 F.2d 51, 66-69 (D.C.Cir.1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1038 , 104 S.Ct. 1316 , 79 L.Ed.2d 712 (1984) (placing burden on defendant).
cited Cited "but see" Martin v. D.C. Metropolitan Police Department
D.C. Cir. · 1987 · signal: but see · confidence high
But see Ellsberg v. Mitchell, 709 F.2d 51, 66-69 (D.C.Cir.1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1038 , 104 S.Ct. 1316 , 79 L.Ed.2d 712 (1984) (placing burden on defendant).
cited Cited "see" McNeil v. United States
N.D. Ohio · 1999 · signal: see · confidence high
See Bryan v. United States, 721 F.2d 572, 577 (6th Cir.1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1038 , 104 S.Ct. 1315 , 79 L.Ed.2d 711 (1984).
cited Cited "see" Allen v. United States
N.D. Ohio · 1999 · signal: see · confidence high
See Bryan v. United States, 721 F.2d 572, 577 (6th Cir.1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1038 , 104 S.Ct. 1315 , 79 L.Ed.2d 711 (1984).
discussed Cited "see" Hook v. State of Ariz.
D. Ariz. · 1995 · signal: see · confidence high
See Halderman v. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp., 673 F.2d 628 , 637 (3d Cir.1982), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1038 , 104 S.Ct. 1315 , 79 L.Ed.2d 712 (1984). 22 Rather, an order by a court with subject matter and personal jurisdiction must be obeyed by the parties until reversed by orderly and proper proceedings, “without regard for even the constitutionality of the Act under which the order was issued.” United States v. United Mine Workers of Am., 330 U.S. 258, 293 , 67 S.Ct. 677, 695 , 91 L.Ed. 884 (1947).
cited Cited "see" Carl Green v. United States
6th Cir. · 1995 · signal: see · confidence high
See Bryan v. United States, 721 F.2d 572, 577 (6th Cir.1983), ce rt. denied, 465 U.S. 1038 , 104 S.Ct. 1315 , 79 L.Ed.2d 711 (1984).
discussed Cited "see" Harris v. City of Philadelphia
3rd Cir. · 1995 · signal: see · confidence high
See Halderman v. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp., 673 F.2d 628 , 638 (3d Cir.1982) (in banc), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1038 , 104 S.Ct. 1315 , 79 L.Ed.2d 712 (1984); see also Newman v. Graddick, 740 F.2d 1513 (11th Cir.1984).
discussed Cited "see" Harris v. City of Philadelphia
3rd Cir. · 1995 · signal: see · confidence high
See Halderman v. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp., 673 F.2d 628 , 638 (3d Cir.1982) (in banc), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1038 , 104 S.Ct. 1315 , 79 L.Ed.2d 712 (1984); see also Newman v. Graddick, 740 F.2d 1513 (11th Cir.1984).
discussed Cited "see" Harris v. City of Philadelphia
3rd Cir. · 1994 · signal: see · confidence high
See Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hosp., 673 F.2d 628 , 637-39 (3d Cir.1982) (in banc ) (declining to address a defense to a civil contempt citation that had not first been presented to the district court through a motion under Rule 60(b)), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1038 , 104 S.Ct. 1315 , 79 L.Ed.2d 712 (1984). 28 Although we would have the undisputed discretion to view the City's failure to raise these issues in the district court as a waiver, a practice this court generally follows, in light of the strong public interest in the subject matter of these decrees, we will not do so in this…
discussed Cited "see" Harris v. City of Philadelphia
3rd Cir. · 1994 · signal: see · confidence high
See Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hosp., 673 F.2d 628 , 637-39 (3d Cir.1982) (in banc) (declining to address a defense to a civil contempt citation that had not first been presented to the district court through a motion under Rule 60(b)), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1038 , 104 S.Ct. 1315 , 79 L.Ed.2d 712 (1984).
cited Cited "see" Bentzlin v. Hughes Aircraft Co.
C.D. Cal. · 1993 · signal: see · confidence high
See Ellsberg v. Mitchell, 709 F.2d 51, 65 (D.C.Cir.1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1038 , 104 S.Ct. 1316 , 79 L.Ed.2d 712 (1984).
cited Cited "see" United States v. Cher Jerry Lee
9th Cir. · 1992 · signal: see · confidence high
See United States v. Rhodes, 713 F.2d 463, 475 (9th Cir.1983), certs. denied, 464 U.S. 1012 (1983), 465 U.S. 1038 (1984).
discussed Cited "see" Clyde Eugene Yant v. United States
9th Cir. · 1992 · signal: see · confidence high
See United States v. Rhodes, 713 F.2d 463, 470-71 (9th Cir.1983) (upholding the propriety of an instruction similar to the one involved in the case at bar), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1012 (1983), and 465 U.S. 1038 (1984).
cited Cited "see" Zuckerbraun v. General Dynamics Corp.
2d Cir. · 1991 · signal: see · confidence high
See Ellsberg v. Mitchell, 709 F.2d 51, 65 (D.C.Cir.1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1038 , 104 S.Ct. 1316 , 79 L.Ed.2d 712 (1984).
discussed Cited "see" Zuckerbraun v. General Dynamics Corporation
2d Cir. · 1991 · signal: see · confidence high
See Ellsberg v. Mitchell, 709 F.2d 51, 65 (D.C.Cir.1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1038 , 104 S.Ct. 1316 , 79 L.Ed.2d 712 (1984). 8 A court before which the privilege is asserted must assess the validity of the claim of privilege, satisfying itself that there is a reasonable danger that disclosure of the particular facts in litigation will jeopardize national security.
discussed Cited "see" Flick v. Borg-Warner Corporation
3rd Cir. · 1990 · signal: see · confidence high
See Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hosp., 673 F.2d 628 , 639 (3d Cir.1982) (in banc) (citing Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 120 , 96 S.Ct. 2868, 2877 , 49 L.Ed.2d 826 (1976)), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1038 , 104 S.Ct. 1315 , 79 L.Ed.2d 712 (1984); East Coast Tender Serv., Inc. v. Robert F. Winzinger, Inc., 759 F.2d 280 , 284 (3d Cir.1985).
discussed Cited "see" Flick v. Borg-Warner Corp.
3rd Cir. · 1989 · signal: see · confidence high
See Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hosp., 673 F.2d 628 , 639 (3d Cir.1982) (in banc) (citing Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 120 , 96 S.Ct. 2868, 2877 , 49 L.Ed.2d 826 (1976)), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1038 , 104 S.Ct. 1315 , 79 L.Ed.2d 712 (1984); East Coast Tender Serv., Inc. v. Robert F. Winzinger, Inc., 759 F.2d 280 , 284 (3d Cir.1985).
discussed Cited "see" Innotron Diagnostics v. Abbott Laboratories
9th Cir. · 1989 · signal: see · confidence high
See Foremost Pro Color, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 703 F.2d 534, 543 (9th Cir.1983) ("Because the conduct Foremost alleged in support of its section 1 tying claim is not anticompetitive, it is of no assistance to Foremost's efforts to state a claim for monopolization or attempted monopolization ..."), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1038 (1984).
cited Cited "see" United States v. Brad Dong Lee, James Young Lee
9th Cir. · 1988 · signal: see · confidence high
See United States v. Rhodes, 713 F.2d 463, 467 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1012 , 104 S.Ct. 535 , 78 L.Ed.2d 715 (1983), 465 U.S. 1038 , 104 S.Ct. 1314 , 79 L.Ed.2d 711 (1984).
discussed Cited "see" Boise Cascade Corporation v. Federal Trade Commission (2×)
D.C. Cir. · 1988 · signal: see · confidence high
See, for example, Foremost Pro Color, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 703 F.2d 534 (9th Cir.1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1038 , 104 S.Ct. 1315 , 79 L.Ed.2d 712 (1984).
discussed Cited "see" Thermice Corporation v. Vistron Corporation, Standard Oil Chemical Company (Formerly Vistron Corporation) (2×)
3rd Cir. · 1987 · signal: see · confidence high
See generally Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hospital, 673 F.2d 628, 636 (3d Cir.1982) (in banc), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1038 , 104 S.Ct. 1315 , 79 L.Ed.2d 712 (1984); Latrobe Steel Co. v. United Steelworkers, 545 F.2d 1336, 1340 (3d Cir.1976); Cromaglass Corporation v. Ferm, 500 F.2d 601, 604 (3d Cir.1974) (in banc).
discussed Cited "see" Souza v. Estate of Bishop
9th Cir. · 1987 · signal: see · confidence high
See Foremost Pro Color, 703 F.2d 534 , 545-46 (9th Cir.1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1038 , 104 S.Ct. 1315 , 79 L.Ed.2d 712 (1984). 4 United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 110 F.Supp. 295 (D.Mass.1953), aff'd per curiam, 347 U.S. 521 , 74 S.Ct. 699 , 98 L.Ed. 910 (1954), is not to the contrary.
discussed Cited "see" Souza v. Estate of Bishop
9th Cir. · 1987 · signal: see · confidence high
See Foremost Pro Color, 703 F.2d 534 , 545-46 (9th Cir.1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1038 , 104 S.Ct. 1315 , 79 L.Ed.2d 712 (1984). 4 19 United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 110 F.Supp. 295 (D.Mass.1953), aff'd per curiam, 347 U.S. 521 , 74 S.Ct. 699 , 98 L.Ed. 910 (1954), is not to the contrary.
discussed Cited "see" William Arcamuzi v. Continental Air Lines, Inc.
9th Cir. · 1987 · signal: see · confidence high
See Holt v. Continental Group, Inc., 708 F.2d 87, 91 (2d Cir.1983) (chilling effect caused by retaliatory discharge for exercise of Title VII rights may constitute irreparable injury), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1038 , 104 S.Ct. 1316 , 79 L.Ed.2d 712 (1984). 14 Similarly, the RLA statutorily protects the right of association and expression in union activities from interference by employers.
discussed Cited "see" Arcamuzi v. Continental Air Lines, Inc.
9th Cir. · 1987 · signal: see · confidence high
See Holt v. Continental Group, Inc., 708 F.2d 87, 91 (2d Cir.1983) (chilling effect caused by retaliatory discharge for exercise of Title VII rights may constitute irreparable injury), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1038 , 104 S.Ct. 1316 , 79 L.Ed.2d 712 (1984).
discussed Cited "see" United States v. Jerry Miller
6th Cir. · 1986 · signal: see · confidence high
See United States v. Fleming, 594 F.2d 598, 609 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 931 , 99 S.Ct. 2863 , 61 L.Ed.2d 299 (1979). 2 While we have never addressed the propriety of punishment under the third clause of subsection (e) in the escape context when the defendant has been previously *792 convicted under subsections (a) or (d), 3 we have held that the “clear import of the Supreme Court’s holding in Prince was that a person should not be punished twice for a single unlawful transaction.” Bryan v. United States, 721 F.2d 572, 574 (6th Cir.1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1038 , 104 S.Ct.…
discussed Cited "see" Fitzgerald v. Penthouse International, Ltd.
4th Cir. · 1985 · signal: accord · confidence high
Where there is a strong showing of necessity, the claim of privilege should not be lightly accepted, but even the most compelling necessity cannot overcome the claim of privilege if the court is ultimately satisfied that military secrets are at stake. 13 Id. at 11 , 73 S.Ct. at 533-34 ; accord Ellsberg v. Mitchell, 709 F.2d 51 , 59 nn. 37-38 (D.C.Cir.1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1038 , 104 S.Ct. 1316 , 79 L.Ed.2d 712 (1984).
cited Cited "see" Fitzgerald v. Penthouse International Ltd.
4th Cir. · 1985 · signal: accord · confidence high
Id. at 11 , 73 S.Ct. at 533-34 ; accord Ellsberg v. Mitchell, 709 F.2d 51 , 59 nn. 37-38 (D.C.Cir.1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1038 , 104 S.Ct. 1316 , 79 L.Ed.2d 712 (1984).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." United States v. Nicholson
E.D. Va. · 1997 · signal: see also · confidence low
Circuit rejected argument that FISA violates Fifth and Sixth Amendments); Spanjol, 720 F.Supp. at 58 ; United States v. Ott, 637 F.Supp. 62 (E.D.Cal.1986), aff'd, 827 F.2d 473 (9th Cir.1987); In the Matter of Kevork, 634 F.Supp. at 1010 ; Hovsepian, 1985 WL 5970 at *2; Falvey, 540 F.Supp. at 1312-13 ; see also Ellsberg v. Mitchell, 709 F.2d 51 , 66 n. 66 (D.C.Cir.1983), cert. denied, sub nom Russo v. Mitchell, 465 U.S. 1038 , 104 S.Ct. 1316 , 79 L.Ed.2d 712 (1984) (noting that FISA had theretofore survived all constitutional challenges). 8 .
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Don Williams, AKA Donald Williams v. I.B. Fischer Nevada I.B. Fischer Properties, Inc. Ira Fischbein Foodmaker, Inc.
9th Cir. · 1993 · signal: see also · confidence low
We need go no farther in guessing the argument because “a § 1 claim insufficient to withstand summary judgment cannot be used as the sole basis for a § 2 claim.” Thomsen, 680 F.2d at 1267; see also Foremost Pro Color Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 703 F.2d 534, 543 (9th Cir.1983) (because conduct alleged in support of section 1 claim not anticompetitive, it “is of no assistance” in attempt to state section 2 claim), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1038 , 104 S.Ct. 1315 , 79 L.Ed.2d 712 (1984).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Francis George Hinkleman v. Shell Oil Company (2×)
4th Cir. · 1992 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See, e.g., Foremost Pro Color, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 703 F.2d 534, 546 (9th Cir.1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1038 , 104 S.Ct. 1315 , 79 L.Ed.2d 712 (1984); see also 16 C.F.R. § 240.7 (1991); Kintner § 27.6.
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Thomas J. Kline, Inc. v. Lorillard, Inc. (2×)
4th Cir. · 1989 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See, e.g., Foremost Pro Color, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 703 F.2d 534, 547-48 (9th Cir.1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1038 , 104 S.Ct. 1315 , 79 L.Ed.2d 712 (1984) (dismissing plaintiff’s § 13(a) claim); Cemar v. Nissan Motor Corp., 678 F.Supp. 1091, 1100-01 (D.Del.1988) (dismissing claim against defendants); O’Connell v. Citrus Bowl, Inc., 99 F.R.D. 117 (E.D.N.Y. 1983) (although conceding possibility of § 13(a) liability, court denied motion to cer tify plaintiff class); L.S.
discussed Cited "see, e.g." United States v. Samuel Loring Morison, the Washington Post Cbs, Inc., Amici Curiae
4th Cir. · 1988 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also Ellsberg v. Mitchell, 709 F.2d 51, 59 (D.C.Cir.1983) cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1038 , 104 S.Ct. 1316 , 79 L.Ed.2d 712 (1984), in which the issue arose whether certain material dealing with intelligence operations met the test of "relating to national defense" and whether as such it was protected as a state secret.
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Oahu Gas Service, Inc. v. Pacific Resources Inc., Gasco, Inc.
9th Cir. · 1988 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See, e.g., Foremost Pro Color, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 703 F.2d 534, 545 (9th Cir.1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1038 , 104 S.Ct. 1315 , 79 L.Ed.2d 712 (1984); California Computer Products v. I.B.M.
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Oahu Gas Service, Inc. v. Pacific Resources Inc., Gasco, Inc.
9th Cir. · 1987 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See, e.g., Foremost Pro Color, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 703 F.2d 534, 545 (9th Cir.1983), cert, denied, 465 U.S. 1038 , 104 S.Ct. 1315 , 79 L.Ed.2d 712 (1984); California Computer Products v. I.B.M.
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Marvin L. Fishman and Illinois Basketball, Inc. v. Estate of Arthur M. Wirtz, and Illinois Basketball, Inc. v. Estate of Arthur M. Wirtz (2×)
7th Cir. · 1987 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also, e.g., Foremost Pro Color, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 703 F.2d 534, 542-46 (9th Cir.1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1038 , 104 S.Ct. 1315 , 79 L.Ed.2d 712 (1984) (a monopolist need not make essential technology available to a would-be competitor and need not articulate a good reason for withholding the technology). 202 There is, of course, another possibility: that a market with two firms is not a natural monopoly.
cited Cited "see, e.g." Dairy King, Inc. v. Kraft, Inc.
D. Maryland · 1986 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See, e.g., Foremost Pro-Color, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak, 703 F.2d 534 (9th Cir.1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1038 , 104 S.Ct. 1315 , 79 L.Ed.2d 712 .
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Union Processing Corporation
v.
Morris Atkin
83-723.
Supreme Court of the United States.
Feb 21, 1984.
465 U.S. 1038
White, Powell.
Published
Reporter's Syllabus — editorial summary, not part of the Court's opinion

On petition for writ of certiorari to the Court of Appeals of New York.

The petition for writ of certiorari is denied.

Justice WHITE, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE, and Justice POWELL join, dissenting.

Lead Opinion

Ct. App. N. Y. Certiorari denied.

Dissent

[*1039] Justice White, with whom The Chief Justice and Justice Powell join,

dissenting.

Petitioner, Union Processing Corp. (Union), operates a scrap-metal business in Auburn, N. Y. Respondents, Morris, Sol, and Samuel Atkin (Atkins), are in the same business in Rochester. Both Union and Atkins purchase and process scrap metal and then sell the processed metal to steel mills and foundries. In 1974, Union and Atkins independently decided to establish metal-shredding operations in Rochester. Steel mills prefer shredded metal because shredding allows the separation of ferrous and nonferrous scrap, yielding a cleaner grade of scrap. When Union learned that Atkins had entered into a purchase contract for a shredder, it initiated negotiations to ensure that there would be only one shredding operation in Rochester. The parties agreed that there were not enough raw materials in the area to support two shredding operations. Ultimately, they agreed that Atkins would assign the purchase contract to Union in return for 2% of Union’s gross sales for the next seven years. Within two years, Union ceased making payments under the contract.

Atkins brought suit in October 1978 for payments due under the contract. Union argued that the contract was unenforceable because part of the consideration for the contract consisted of an oral promise by Atkins not to operate a shredder in the Rochester area. Such an agreement, Union contended, violates §1 of the Sherman Act, 26 Stat. 209, as amended, 15 U. S. C. § 1.

The trial court found that the oral agreement not to compete was indeed a part of the contract. It concluded that since the agreement constituted a horizontal division of territories, it was a per se violation of the Sherman Act.

On appeal, the Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court rejected Union’s contention that since the contract constituted a horizontal division of markets it was per se illegal under § 1 of the Sherman Act. 90 App. Div. 2d 332, 457 N. Y. S. 2d 152 (1982). The court reasoned that the rule of per se illegality is applicable only if the entire geographic market is divided. It found that the relevant geographic market in this case consisted of the entire area in which steel mills purchase the end product produced by the shredder. Because only the Rochester area was allocated, the court concluded that a rule-of-reason analysis was appropriate. Using that analysis, the court found the impact of the agreement on competition to be minimal because Atkins could operate a[*1040] shredder anywhere in the relevant geographic market outside of Rochester.

In a one-paragraph memorandum, the New York Court of Appeals affirmed. 59 N. Y. 2d 919, 453 N. E. 2d 522 (1983). Apparently it realized that the market that was divided was the market in which raw materials were purchased, rather than the market in which shredded scrap was sold, for it stated: “Additionally we observe that there is no evidentiary support in the record for any finding that the scrap metals/raw materials market (as distinguished from the shredded scrap/products market) was limited to the Rochester area to which the agreement of the parties related.” Id., at 921, 453 N. E. 2d, at 523.

Union then petitioned for a writ of certiorari from this Court, arguing that the state courts misconceived the meaning of our opinions dealing with horizontal division of markets. Such market divisions, Union correctly argues, have consistently been deemed per se illegal.

Our cases make clear the error of the New York courts. As we said in United States v. Topco Associates, Inc., 405 U. S. 596, 608 (1972): “One of the classic examples of a per se violation of § 1 is an agreement between competitors at the same level of the market structure to allocate territories in order to minimize competition.” We have time and again “rejected the notion that naked restraints of trade are to be tolerated because they are well intended or because they are allegedly developed to increase competition.” Id., at 610.

Under the view of the courts below, the per se rule is not to be applied to cases involving horizontal division of markets so long as the parties leave some residual zone in which they still compete; that is, the rule does not govern cases in which the entire market is not allocated. Apparently, if two companies in some national market agreed that one would not compete in New York and the other would not compete in California, the per se rule would not apply if they continued to compete in the other 48 States. Not surprisingly, the courts cited no decision of this Court in support of that position.

I assume that the Court has denied this petition because it has “bigger fish to fry,” rather than because it views the decision below as correct. However, because a substantial federal question has been decided in a manner that apparently conflicts with the applicable decisions of this Court, I would grant the petition[*1041] for a writ of certiorari. Indeed, the decision is a candidate for summary reversal.