State v. Rhoden, 448 So. 2d 1013 (Fla. 1984). · Go Syfert
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State v. Rhoden, 448 So. 2d 1013 (Fla. 1984). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
“the primary purpose of the contemporaneous objection rule is to ensure that objections are made when the recollections of witnesses are freshest and not years later in a subsequent trial or a postconviction relief proceeding.”
237 citation events (6 in the last 25 years) across 3 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: State v. Montague (fla, 1996-10-31)
Treatment trajectory · 1984 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1984 2005 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 50 distinct citers. How cited ↗
examined Cited as authority (verbatim quote) State v. Montague
Fla. · 1996 · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
the primary purpose of the contemporaneous objection rule is to ensure that objections are made when the recollections of witnesses are freshest and not years later in a subsequent trial or a postconviction relief proceeding.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Lawrence Andrew Ingram v. Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections
11th Cir. · 2018 · confidence medium
The purpose of this “contemporaneous objection rule” is “to give trial judges an opportunity to address objections made by counsel in trial proceedings and correct errors.” State v. Rhoden, 448 So. 2d 1013, 1016 (Fla. 1984), rev’d on other grounds by Cargle v. State, 770 So. 2d 1151 , 1152–54 (Fla. 2000).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Smith v. State (2×)
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2016 · confidence medium
Under Florida law, juveniles are granted “the right to be treated differently from adults,” Troutman v. State, 630 So.2d 528, 531 (Fla. 1993) 7 (quoting State v. Rhoden, 448 So.2d 1013, 1016 (Fla. 1984)), but the right is granted “only to the extent provided by our legislature.” State v. Cain, 381 So.2d 1361, 1363 (Fla. 1980).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Maddox v. State
Fla. · 2000 · confidence medium
For example, in State v. Rhoden, 448 So.2d 1013, 1016 (Fla.1984), we acknowledged the State's argument that the unpreserved sentencing error could not be addressed because it did not constitute fundamental error, but then corrected the error without specifically requiring that the error be fundamental.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Maddox v. State
Fla. · 2000 · confidence medium
For example, in State v. Rhoden, 448 So.2d 1013, 1016 (Fla.1984), we acknowledged the State’s argument that the unpreserved sentencing error could not be addressed because it did not constitute fundamental error, but then corrected the error without specifically requiring that the error be fundamental.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Williams v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2000 · confidence medium
By the passage of the juvenile justice statutory scheme in Chapter 985, the legislature has granted to "juveniles the right to be treated differently from adults." State v. Rhoden, 448 So.2d 1013, 1016 (Fla.1984).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Thomas v. State
Fla. · 1998 · confidence medium
Where counsel affirmatively consents to separation [of the jury during deliberations] or where no objection is made ... the issue will be considered waived."). [4] See State v. Lucas, 645 So.2d 425, 427 (Fla.1994)(recognizing exception to the fundamental error doctrine "where defense counsel affirmatively agreed to or requested the incomplete instruction"); State v. Rhoden, 448 So.2d 1013, 1016 (Fla.1984) ("The [contemporaneous objection] rule prohibits trial counsel from deliberately allowing known errors to go uncorrected as a defense tactic and as a hedge to provide a defendant with a secon…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Howard v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1998 · confidence medium
See State v. Montague, 682 So.2d 1085, 1088 (Fla.1996); Davis v. State, 661 So.2d 1193, 1197 (Fla.1995); Taylor v. State, 601 So.2d 540, 541-2 (Fla.1992); State v. Rhoden, 448 So.2d 1013, 1016 (Fla.1984). [2] The only exception is when the failure to award credit results in a sentence that exceeds the statutory maximum.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Coffee v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1997 · confidence medium
The contemporaneous objection rule is "intended to give trial judges an opportunity to address objections made by counsel in trial proceedings and correct errors." State v. Rhoden, 448 So.2d 1013, 1016 (Fla.1984).
cited Cited as authority (rule) MC v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1997 · confidence medium
Norman v. State, 676 So.2d 7, 9-10 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996) (citing State v. Rhoden, 448 So.2d 1013, 1016 (Fla. 1984)).
cited Cited as authority (rule) M.C. v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1996 · confidence medium
Norman v. State, 676 So.2d 7, 9-10 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996)(citing State v. Rhoden, 448 So.2d 1013, 1016 (Fla.1984)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Griffith
Fla. · 1996 · confidence medium
See, e.g., Troutman v. State, 630 So.2d 528, 531 (Fla.1993); Sirmons v. State, 620 So.2d 1249, 1252 (Fla.1993); State v. Rhoden, 448 So.2d 1013, 1017 (Fla.1984); Veach v. State, 614 So.2d 680 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993), approved, 630 So.2d 1096 (Fla.1994).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Norman v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1996 · confidence medium
The first district cited to State v. Rhoden, 448 So.2d 1013, 1016 (Fla.1984), in support of its statement.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Schotsch v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1996 · confidence medium
Our supreme court's holdings in Whitfield, Dailey, Spivey and Larson restrict the effect of broad dicta in State v. Rhoden, 448 So.2d 1013, 1016 (Fla.1984), that the contemporaneous objection rule is inapplicable to claims of error during sentencing.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Mitchell v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1995 · confidence medium
One of the cases relied upon by L.A.D. was State v. Rhoden, 448 So.2d 1013 (Fla. 1984), in which the supreme court set forth part of the rationale for not requiring contemporaneous objections to sentencing errors: [I]t is difficult, if not impossible, for counsel to contemporaneously object to the absence of a written order at the sentencing hearing, "since counsel at that stage does not know for sure what the written sentence may be and a written order pursuant to section 39.11 may indeed be subsequently filed." Id. at 1016 (citations omitted).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Thomas v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1995 · confidence medium
Troutman v. State, 630 So.2d 528, 532 (Fla. 1993); State v. Rhoden, 448 So.2d 1013, 1016 (Fla. 1984).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Berry v. State (2×)
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1994 · confidence medium
In State v. Rhoden, 448 So.2d 1013 (Fla. 1984), the supreme court construed the provisions of section 39.111(6), Florida Statutes (1981), the predecessor to section 39.059(7). [4] It determined that under the statutory scheme of juvenile justice, the legislature "grant[ed] to juveniles the right to be treated differently from adults." 448 So.2d at 1016 (emphasis in original).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Troutman v. State
Fla. · 1993 · confidence medium
A written order is necessary in order to make effective the right of sentence review granted to juveniles by the legislature. 448 So.2d at 1016-17 (emphasis supplied).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Veach v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1993 · confidence medium
State v. Rhoden, 448 So.2d 1013, 1016 (Fla. 1984).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Townsend v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1993 · confidence medium
In State v. Rhoden, 448 So.2d 1013, 1016 (Fla.1984), the supreme court explained that errors such as the lack of proper findings must be preserved by objection if they arise during trial: The contemporaneous objection rule, which the state seeks to apply here to prevent respondent from seeking review of his sentence, was fashioned primarily for use in trial proceedings.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Rollins v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1992 · confidence medium
The state responds that such findings can be knowingly and intelligently waived, State v. Rhoden, 448 So.2d 1013, 1016 (Fla.1984), and that Rollins made such a waiver by waiving the PDR requirement.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Croskey v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1992 · confidence medium
The supreme court, in State v. Rhoden, 448 So.2d 1013, 1016 (Fla. 1984), has recognized that juveniles have the right to be treated differently from adults under the juvenile justice statutory scheme.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Taylor v. State
Fla. · 1992 · confidence medium
State v. Rhoden, 448 So.2d 1013, 1016 (Fla. 1984) (citations omitted).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Fuller v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1991 · confidence medium
Larson v. State, 572 So.2d 1368, 1371 (Fla. 1991); Williams v. State, 500 So.2d 501, 503 (Fla. 1986), clarified in Quarterman v. State, 527 So.2d 1380 (Fla. 1988); State v. Rhoden, 448 So.2d 1013, 1016 (Fla. 1984); Poppell v. State, 509 So.2d 390, 390 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Taylor v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1991 · confidence medium
State v. Rhoden, 448 So.2d 1013 *175 (Fla. 1984); Lang v. State, 566 So.2d 1354 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990); Reed v. State, 544 So.2d 1077 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Larson v. State
Fla. · 1991 · confidence medium
As we stated in State v. Rhoden, 448 So.2d 1013, 1016 (Fla. 1984), The purpose for the contemporaneous objection rule is not present in the sentencing process because any error can be corrected by a simple remand to the sentencing judge.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Youngblood v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1990 · confidence medium
State v. Rhoden, 448 So.2d 1013, 1017 (Fla. 1984). *410 In the present case, in the order imposing adult sanctions upon appellant, the trial court simply tracked the six broad criteria set forth in section 39.111(7)(c) using conclusory language without identifying any specific underlying findings of fact or reasons; nor were the four factors enumerated in section 39.111(7)(c)(5) mentioned.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Whittington v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1989 · confidence medium
The opinion in State v. Rhoden, 448 So.2d 1013, 1016-17 (Fla. 1984), stated, in a case involving mandatory application of the sentencing provisions of section 39.111(6), that "the juvenile justice statutory scheme, as adopted by the Florida Legislature, grants to juveniles the right to be treated differently from adults.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Sheffield v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1987 · confidence medium
The provisions of section 39.111(6) “must be followed by a trial judge in sentencing a juvenile as an adult, and the failure to do so requires a remand for resentencing.” State v. Rhoden, 448 So.2d 1013, 1017 (Fla. 1984); Broome v. State, 466 So.2d 1271 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Whitfield
Fla. · 1986 · confidence medium
Relying on language in State v. Rhoden, 448 So.2d 1013, 1016 (Fla. 1984), that "[t]he purpose of the contemporaneous objection rule is not present in the sentencing process because error may be corrected by a simple remand to the sentencing judge," the district court held "that a defendant's failure to contemporaneously object upon imposition of a sentence does not preclude appellate review of sentencing errors.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Webster v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1986 · confidence medium
State v. Rhoden, 448 So.2d 1013, 1016-1017 (Fla.1984).
discussed Cited "see" Vanderblomen v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1998 · signal: see · confidence high
See State v. Rhoden, 448 So.2d 1013, 1016 (Fla.1984). [2] Despite the new procedural bar for claims which could or should have been raised at trial or on direct appeal, the courts of this state continued to issue opinions reaching the merits of postconviction claims for additional presentencing jail or prison credit raised in *147 3.850 motions without specifically discussing, particularly in light of Rhoden , whether the alleged denials of credit could have been raised on direct appeal.
cited Cited "see" Thompson v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1998 · signal: see · confidence high
See State v. Rhoden, 448 So.2d 1013, 1016 (Fla.1984).
discussed Cited "see" State v. Anton
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1997 · signal: see · confidence high
See State v. Rhoden, 448 So.2d 1013, 1016 (Fla.1984) ("The [contemporaneous objection] rule prohibits trial counsel from deliberately allowing known errors to go uncorrected as a defense tactic and as a hedge to provide a defendant with a second trial if the first trial decision is adverse to the defendant.") *748 Second, Anton argues that the trial court committed reversible error by reading back the portions of Campbell's testimony relating to his possession of a firearm during the incident.
cited Cited "see" Norris v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1995 · signal: see · confidence high
See Rhoden, 448 So.2d at 1016-1017 .
discussed Cited "see" Varela v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1995 · signal: see · confidence high
See State v. Rhoden, 448 So.2d 1013 (Fla. 1984) (a trial judge must enter written findings pertaining to the suitability or non-suitability of a juvenile for adult sanctions and the failure to enter such findings requires a remand for resentencing).
cited Cited "see" Daniels v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1994 · signal: see · confidence high
See State v. Rhoden, 448 So.2d 1013 (Fla. 1984); Castor v. State, 365 So.2d 701 (Fla. 1978).
cited Cited "see" Brown v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1994 · signal: see · confidence high
See State v. Rhoden, 448 So.2d 1013 (Fla. 1984). [1] Thus, the erroneous imposition of a minimum mandatory sentence is reviewable on direct appeal.
cited Cited "see" Padilla v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1993 · signal: see · confidence high
See State v. Rhoden, 448 So.2d 1013 (Fla.1984).
cited Cited "see" Blanchette v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1993 · signal: see · confidence high
See State v. Rhoden, 448 So.2d 1013 (Fla. 1984).
cited Cited "see" In the Interest of L.A.D. v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1993 · signal: see · confidence high
See State v. Rhoden, 448 So.2d 1013 (Fla.1984).
cited Cited "see" LAD v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1993 · signal: see · confidence high
See State v. Rhoden, 448 So.2d 1013 (Fla. 1984).
cited Cited "see" Smith v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1992 · signal: see · confidence high
See, generally, State v. Rhoden, 448 So.2d 1013 (Fla. 1984).
cited Cited "see" Troutman v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1992 · signal: see · confidence high
See State v. Rhoden, 448 So.2d 1013 (Fla. 1984).
discussed Cited "see" Taylor v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1992 · signal: see · confidence high
See State v. Rhoden, 448 So.2d 1013 (Fla. 1984); Wiley v. State, 582 So.2d 169 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991); Franklin ; Martin v. State, 547 So.2d 998 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989); Banks v. State, 488 So.2d 161 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986).
cited Cited "see" Donald v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1991 · signal: see · confidence high
See State v. Rhoden, 448 So.2d 1013 (Fla.1984).
cited Cited "see" Ford v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1991 · signal: see · confidence high
See State v. Rhoden, 448 So.2d 1013 (Fla.1984); Martin v. State, 547 So.2d 998 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989); Leonard v. State, 522 So.2d 543 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988).
cited Cited "see" Silver v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1991 · signal: see · confidence high
See State v. Rhoden, 448 So.2d 1013 (Fla. 1984); Green v. State, 506 So.2d 41 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987).
cited Cited "see" Allen v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1990 · signal: see · confidence high
See State v. Rhoden, 448 So.2d 1013 (Fla.1984); Murphy v. State, 546 So.2d 1157 (Fla. 5th DCA 1989).
cited Cited "see" Mackey v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1990 · signal: see · confidence high
See State v. Rhoden, 448 So.2d 1013 (Fla.1984).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
STATE of Florida, Petitioner,
v.
Learnhart RHODEN, Respondent.
62918.
Supreme Court of Florida.
Apr 5, 1984.
448 So. 2d 1013
Overton.
Cited by 176 opinions  |  Published

[*1014] Jim Smith, Atty. Gen., David T. Weisbrod and Robert J. Krauss, Asst. Attys. Gen., Tampa, for petitioner.

Jack D. Hoogewind, Ridge Manor, for respondent.

OVERTON, Justice.

This is a petition to review a decision of the Second District Court of Appeal reported as Rhoden v. State, 421 So.2d 780 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982), which directly conflicts with Glenn v. State, 411 So.2d 1367 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982); Burley v. State, 402 So.2d 73 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981); and Dunman v. State, 400 So.2d 838 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981). We have jurisdiction, article V, section 3(b)(3), Florida Constitution. This cause concerns the trial court's sentencing of the juvenile respondent as an adult without complying with section 39.111(6), Florida Statutes (1981), which mandates that, when[*1015] sentencing a juvenile as an adult, the trial court must explain in writing why adult sanctions are appropriate. In the instant case, the district court reversed the trial court's sentencing of the juvenile respondent as an adult and remanded for resentencing in compliance with the statute. For the reasons expressed below, we approve the district court's decision.

The respondent was initially charged as a juvenile for the offense of discharging a destructive device. At the time of the offense, the respondent was seventeen years old. He was tried as an adult, however, and was convicted and sentenced to a mandatory ten-year term pursuant to section 790.161(3), Florida Statutes (1981). At sentencing, the trial judge failed to address the six criteria pertaining to the suitability or unsuitability of adult sanctions contained in section 39.111(6)(c) and failed to place in writing his findings and reasons for sentencing the respondent as an adult, as required in section 39.111(6)(d). Section 39.111(6)(c) directs that the "[s]uitability or nonsuitability for adult sanctions shall be determined by the court before any other determination of disposition... . [and] shall be made by reference to" six specified criteria.[*] Subsection (6)(d) further directs that "[a]ny decision to impose adult sanctions shall be in writing, and it shall be in conformity with each of the above criteria. The court shall render a specific finding of fact and the reasons for the decision to impose adult sanctions. Such order shall be reviewable on appeal by the child pursuant to s. 39.14." Although the respondent's counsel requested that the trial court give his client youthful offender status, he did not expressly request that the trial judge comply with section 39.111(6). Further, after the respondent's sentence was announced, counsel did not object to the trial judge's failure to place in writing his findings and reasons for imposing adult sanctions on the respondent.

On appeal, the district court reversed and remanded for resentencing, holding "the disposition procedures under section 39.111(6) are mandatory and necessitate a reversal regardless of whether appellant [respondent here] raised an objection in the trial court." 421 So.2d at 781. In its opinion, the district court acknowledged conflict with the Fifth District Court of Appeal's decisions in Burley v. State, 402 So.2d 73 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981), and Dunman v. State, 400 So.2d 838 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981). The district court's decision is supported by Sawyer v. State, 421 So.2d 4 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982); Leach v. State, 407 So.2d 1066 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981); Batch v. State, 405 So.2d 302 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981); Proctor v. State, 373 So.2d 450 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979); and Johnson v. State, 371 So.2d 556 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979).

The state contends that the issue is whether the trial court's noncompliance with the provisions of section 39.111(6) is fundamental error. The state argues that the Fifth District Court of Appeal's decisions in Burley, Dunman, and Glenn v. State, 411 So.2d 1367 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982), are correct in holding that a trial court's noncompliance with section 39.111(6) is not[*1016] fundamental error but is instead procedural error which must be objected to in order for a defendant to preserve the point for appeal. The state asserts that because the respondent did not object to the trial court's failure to follow the statute in this case, respondent could not raise the point for the first time on appeal. The state, while recognizing that under chapter 39, Florida Statutes, the legislature has given youthful offenders the right to be treated as juveniles, asserts that the right to be treated as a juvenile is not so fundamental that it obviates a need for an objection when the trial court fails to comply with certain provisions of chapter 39. Further, the state asserts that the failure to object is a waiver of the right for purposes of appeal and in any post-conviction proceeding. We reject these arguments.

In deciding a related issue in State v. Cain, 381 So.2d 1361, 1367 (Fla. 1980), we said that "[t]he [trial] court must follow the procedure provided in subsection 39.111(6), Florida Statutes (Supp. 1978), and must consider the criteria enumerated in subsection 39.111(6)(c)1-6 which in substantial part mirror the criteria the court is to consider in waiving juvenile jurisdiction in the first place. See § 39.09(2)(c)1-8 Fla. Stat. (Supp. 1978)." Further, as noted above, section 39.111(6)(d) requires that a decision to impose adult sanctions must be in writing. Finally, in section 39.111(6)(j), the legislature emphasized its purpose by stating that "[i]t is the intent of the Legislature that the foregoing criteria and guidelines shall be deemed mandatory and that a determination of disposition pursuant to this subsection is subject to the right of the child to appellate review pursuant to s. 39.14." (Emphasis added.) It is abundantly clear that the purpose of this legislation requiring the trial court to place in writing its findings of fact and reasons for imposing an adult sentence on a juvenile is to facilitate an intelligent appellate review of such a sentence. See G.D.W. v. State, 395 So.2d 638 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981).

Further, with regard to the respondent's failure to contemporaneously object to the trial judge's failure to follow the statute in sentencing respondent, we agree with the reasoning of Judge Sharp in her dissent in Glenn v. State. Judge Sharp pointed out that it is difficult, if not impossible, for counsel to contemporaneously object to the absence of a written order at the sentencing hearing "since counsel at that stage does not know for sure what the written sentence may be, and a written order pursuant to section 39.111 may indeed be subsequently filed." 411 So.2d at 1368. The contemporaneous objection rule, which the state seeks to apply here to prevent respondent from seeking review of his sentence, was fashioned primarily for use in trial proceedings. The rule is intended to give trial judges an opportunity to address objections made by counsel in trial proceedings and correct errors. See Simpson v. State, 418 So.2d 984 (Fla. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1156, 103 S.Ct. 801, 74 L.Ed.2d 1004 (1983); State v. Cumbie, 380 So.2d 1031 (Fla. 1980); Clark v. State, 363 So.2d 331 (Fla. 1978). The rule prohibits trial counsel from deliberately allowing known errors to go uncorrected as a defense tactic and as a hedge to provide a defendant with a second trial if the first trial decision is adverse to the defendant. The primary purpose of the contemporaneous objection rule is to ensure that objections are made when the recollections of witnesses are freshest and not years later in a subsequent trial or a post-conviction relief proceeding. The purpose for the contemporaneous objection rule is not present in the sentencing process because any error can be corrected by a simple remand to the sentencing judge. If the state's argument is followed to its logical end, a defendant could be sentenced to a term of years greater than the legislature mandated and, if no objection was made at the time of sentencing, the defendant could not appeal the illegal sentence.

The juvenile justice statutory scheme, as adopted by the Florida Legislature, grants to juveniles the right to be treated differently from adults. The legislature has emphatically mandated that trial[*1017] judges not only consider the specific statutory criteria pertaining to the suitability of adult sanctions, but that they also reduce to writing their findings of fact and reasons for imposing an adult sentence on a juvenile. A written order is necessary in order to make effective the right of sentence review granted to juveniles by the legislature. See section 39.14, Florida Statutes (1981). This right of sentence review is not provided to adults. There is absolutely nothing in this record to show that the respondent waived his rights to these matters.

The legislature mandated that trial judges consider the statutory criteria in order to protect the rights which the legislature has given to juveniles. Trial courts cannot avoid that mandate absent an intelligent and knowing waiver of that right by a juvenile.

We hold that the provisions of section 39.111(6) must be followed by a trial judge in sentencing a juvenile as an adult, and the failure to do so requires a remand for resentencing.

For the reasons expressed, we approve the decision of the district court and we agree with the dissent of Judge Sharp in Glenn v. State. We disapprove the decisions of the Fifth District Court of Appeal in Glenn v. State, Burley v. State, and Dunman v. State.

It is so ordered.

ALDERMAN, C.J., and ADKINS, BOYD, McDONALD, EHRLICH and SHAW, JJ., concur.

[*] The six criteria set out in section 39.111(6)(c) are:

1. The seriousness of the offense to the community and whether the protection of the community requires adult disposition.

2. Whether the offense was committed in an aggressive, violent, premeditated, or willful manner.

3. Whether the offense was against persons or against property, greater weight being given to offenses against persons, especially if personal injury resulted.

4. The sophistication and maturity of the child, as determined by consideration of his home, environmental situation, emotional attitude, and pattern of living.

5. The record and previous history of the child, including:

a. Previous contacts with the department, the Department of Corrections, other law enforcement agencies, and courts,

b. Prior periods of probation or community control,

c. Prior adjudications that the child committed a violation of law, and

d. Prior commitments to institutions.

6. The prospects for adequate protection of the public and the likelihood of reasonable rehabilitation of the child if he is assigned to juvenile services and facilities.