State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. v. Kuhn, 374 So. 2d 1079 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979). · Go Syfert
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State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. v. Kuhn, 374 So. 2d 1079 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
“where words used and grammatical construction employed in a statute are clear and they convey a definite meaning, the legislature is presumed to have meant what it said and therefore, it is unnecessary to resort to the rules of statutory construction”
30 citation events across 2 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: State v. Howard (fladistctapp, 1987-06-23)
Treatment trajectory · 1979 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1979 2002 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 4 distinct citers. How cited ↗
examined Cited as authority (verbatim quote) State v. Howard
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1987 · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
where words used and grammatical construction employed in a statute are clear and they convey a definite meaning, the legislature is presumed to have meant what it said and therefore, it is unnecessary to resort to the rules of statutory construction
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Henhill Corp. v. State, Department of Legal Affairs
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1991 · confidence medium
By the plain wording of the subsection, therefore, the State’s lien priority lapsed because of the State’s failure to file a RICO lien notice under section 895.07 within 90 days. “[W]here the words used and the grammatical construction employed in a statute are clear and they convey a definite meaning, the legislature is presumed to have meant what it said and therefore, it is unnecessary to resort to the rules of statutory construction.” State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company v. Kuhn, 374 So.2d 1079, 1080-1081 (Fla.3d DCA 1979); cert. denied, 383 So.2d 1197 (Fla.1980); State v…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Kokay v. South Carolina Ins. Co.
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1980 · confidence medium
Co. v. Kuhn, 374 So.2d 1079, 1080-1081 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979): The well established principle of law is that where the words used and the grammatical construction employed in a statute are clear and they convey a definite meaning, the legislature is presumed to have meant what it said and, therefore, it is unnecessary to resort to the rules of statutory construction.
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Reynolds v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1983 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Kuhn, 374 So.2d 1079 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979), cert. denied, 383 So.2d 1197 (Fla.1980); Allstate Insurance Co. v. Alvarez, 414 So.2d 224 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982); Vetter v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 423 So.2d 991 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
STATE FARM Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, Appellant,
v.
Robert H. Kuhn and Rebecca W. Kuhn, His Wife, Appellees.
79-279.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
Aug 21, 1979.
374 So. 2d 1079
Haverfield, C.J., and Kehoe and Schwartz.
Cited by 25 opinions  |  Published

[*1080] Walton, Lantaff, Schroeder & Carson and George W. Chesrow, Miami, for appellant.

Post & Gordon, Greene & Cooper and Marc Cooper, Miami, for appellees.

Before HAVERFIELD, C.J., and KEHOE and SCHWARTZ, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

In this declaratory judgment action defendant insurer appeals a partial summary judgment determining that plaintiff insured is entitled to uninsured motorist benefits.

Appellant, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, had issued to the appellee, Robert H. Kuhn, two separate liability insurance policies, one for his motorcycle and the other for his pickup truck. The truck policy provided uninsured motorist coverage. Kuhn had rejected in writing such coverage for his motorcycle. While riding his motorcycle, Kuhn sustained injuries when an automobile owned and operated by Dana Tucker struck the motorcycle. Tucker had no liability insurance and Kuhn made demand upon State Farm for the uninsured motorist benefits under the truck policy. State Farm denied coverage and Kuhn filed the instant suit for declaratory relief. Subsequently both parties moved for summary judgment, which after hearing was entered in favor of Kuhn. From the judgment finding that Kuhn is entitled to uninsured motorist benefits, State Farm perfected this appeal.

The dispositive question presented for our determination is whether Kuhn is precluded by Section 627.4132, Florida Statutes (1977), below, from recovery of the uninsured motorist benefits provided in the truck policy.

"627.4132 Stacking of coverages prohibited. — If an insured or named insured is protected by any type of motor vehicle insurance policy for liability, uninsured motorist, personal injury protection, or any other coverage, the policy shall provide that the insured or named insured is protected only to the extent of the coverage he has on the vehicle involved in the accident. However, if none of the insured's or named insured's vehicles is involved in the accident, coverage is available only to the extent of coverage on any one of the vehicles with applicable coverage. Coverage on any other vehicles shall not be added to or stacked upon that coverage. This section shall not apply to reduce the coverage available by reason of insurance policies insuring different named insureds." [Emphasis Supplied]

The well established principle of law is that where the words used and the grammatical construction employed in a statute are clear and they convey a definite meaning,[*1081] the legislature is presumed to have meant what it said and, therefore, it is unnecessary to resort to the rules of statutory construction. Hialeah, Inc. v. B & G Horse Transp., Inc., 368 So.2d 930 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979).

A reading of Section 627.4132 clearly evidences a two fold purpose: (1) to prohibit the stacking of coverages, and (2) to restrict an insured to the coverage contained in the policy covering the vehicle which he was operating at the time of the accident. McLellan v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 366 So.2d 811, 812 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979). Kuhn's motorcycle being the vehicle involved in accident, Kuhn is restricted to the coverage in the policy issued on the motorcycle. Having rejected uninsured motorist coverage thereon, he is not entitled to the uninsured motorist benefits provided for in his truck policy under the plain terms of the statute.

In an attempt to circumvent Section 627.4132, Kuhn argues that his motorcycle is not a "vehicle." However, we must reject this argument for the reasons cited in Standard Marine Insurance Company v. Allyn, 333 So.2d 497 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976).

Accordingly, the judgment for Kuhn is reversed and the cause is remanded to the trial court to enter judgment for State Farm.

Reversed and remanded.