State v. Stago, 312 P.2d 160 (Ariz. 1957). · Go Syfert
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State v. Stago, 312 P.2d 160 (Ariz. 1957). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
87 citation events (2 in the last 25 years) across 16 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: State v. Griffin (scctapp, 2015-06-24)
Treatment trajectory · 1958 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1958 1992 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 12 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Griffin
S.C. Ct. App. · 2015 · confidence medium
The court went on to find Amerson could still be found guilty of assaulting an officer and would "not be allowed to benefit from administrative failures because these failures were not readily apparent and were unknown to Amerson at the time of the assault.” Id.; see also Malone v. State, 406 So.2d 1060, 1062-63 (Ala.Crim.App.1981) (finding the trial court properly denied the appellant's motion to quash the arrest warrant and dismiss the complaint; despite not filing written copies of their oaths before arresting the appellant, both deputies were acting under color of right as de facto deput…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Cornell (2×)
Ariz. · 1994 · confidence medium
State v. Holsinger, 124 Ariz. 18, 21 , 601 P.2d 1054, 1057 (1979); State v. Williams, 111 Ariz. 511, 515 , 533 P.2d 1146, 1150 (1975); State v. Van Winkle, 106 Ariz. 481, 483 , 478 P.2d 105, 107 (1970); State v. Stago, 82 Ariz. 285, 287 , 312 P.2d 160, 161 (1957); see also State v. Ballantyne, 128 Ariz. 68, 71 , 623 P.2d 857, 860 (Ct.App. 1981); State v. Zappia, 8 Ariz. App. 549, 553 , 448 P.2d 119, 123 (1968), cert denied, 396 U.S. 861 , 90 S.Ct. 132 , 24 L.Ed.2d 113 (1969).
cited Cited as authority (rule) State v. Jones
Ariz. · 1978 · confidence medium
State v. Stago, 82 Ariz. 285, 287 , 312 P.2d 160, 161 (1957).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Jones
Ariz. Ct. App. · 1978 · confidence medium
As was stated in State v. Stago, 82 Ariz. 285, 287 , 312 P.2d 160, 161 (1957), in interpreting Criminal Rule 128(A), the predecessor of Rule 13.3(a): “By specifying when offenses may be consolidated, there is impliedly negatived any authority to consolidate under other or different circumstances.” Consequently, any misjoinder under Rule 13.3(a) which fails to comply with the minimum standards of joinder, is treated as conclusively prejudicial and upon a determination that misjoinder has occurred, the trial court has no discretion but to order severance.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Commonwealth v. Fillippini
Mass. App. Ct. · 1974 · confidence medium
See United States v. Rinaldi, 301 F. 2d 576, 578 (2d Cir. 1962); Thurman v. United States, 316 F. 2d 205, 206 (9th Cir. 1963); Maestas v. United States, 341 F. 2d 493, 496 (10th Cir. 1965); Odom v. United States, 377 F. 2d 853, 859-860 (5th Cir. 1967); United States v. Rudolph, 403 F. 2d 805, 806 (6th Cir. 1968); State v. Stago, 82 Ariz. 285, 287 (1957); Raifsnider v. State, 146 Texas Crim.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Williams
Ariz. · 1972 · confidence medium
The consolidation of the two informations for trial is, therefore, prejudicial and reversible error, (citations omitted).” State v. Stago, 82 Ariz. 285, 287 , 312 P.2d 160, 161 (1957). *386 Whether to sever or consolidate will depend upon the facts on a case-by-case basis.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Saul Semensohn
2d Cir. · 1970 · confidence medium
A judge’s corrective statement will rarely completely cure the prejudicial damage created when improper information reaches the ears of the jury. “ [Prejudices which are so easily aroused are not thus so readily expunged.” State v. Stago, 82 Ariz. 285 , 312 P.2d 160, 161 (1957).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Pence
Mo. · 1968 · confidence medium
See: State v. Spivey, 191 Mo. 87 , 90 S.W. 81, 88 ; State v. Stago, 82 Ariz. 285 , 312 P.2d 160, 161 [2,3]; State v. Singleton, 66 Ariz. 49 , 182 P.2d 920, 930-931 [17-21]; Kizer v. State, 67 Okl.Cr. 16 , 93 P.2d 58, 90 [16], [17]; Leo v. State, 63 Neb. 723 , 89 N.W. 303, 305-306 ; Buel v. State, 104 Wis. 132 , 80 N.W. 78, 82-83 ; People v. Perez, 58 Cal.2d 229 , 23 Cal.Rptr. 569 , 373 P.2d 617, 621-622 [4, 5], 3 A.L.R.3d 946 .
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Fairman v. State (2×)
Nev. · 1967 · confidence medium
Appellant cites State v. Stago, 312 P.2d 160, 161 (Ariz. 1957), as authority that, under these circumstances, the error of allowing Fairman's past history before the jury was inherently prejudicial, thus compelling reversal.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. Perez
Cal. · 1962 · confidence medium
(State v. Herrera (1958) 8 Utah 2d 188, 189-191 [ 330 P.2d 1086 ] [reversible error to question critical defense witness concerning priors, where many questions answered in negative, and where no documentary evidence offered to substantiate implications in questions]; State v. Stago (1957) 82 Ariz. 285, 287 [ 312 P.2d 160 ] [error to question defendant concerning a prior, where prosecutor not prepared to prove the prior if witness answered in negative]; Kizer v. State (1939) 67 Okla.
examined Cited "see" State v. Comer (4×)
Ariz. · 1990 · signal: see · confidence high
See State v. Stago, 82 Ariz. 285, 287 , 312 P.2d 160, 162 (1957); State v. Curiel, 130 Ariz. 176, 184 , 634 P.2d 988, 996 (App.1981).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." State v. Enriquez (2×)
Ariz. · 1967 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also State v. Stago, 82 Ariz. 285 , 312 P.2d 160 (1957).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
STATE of Arizona, Appellee,
v.
Ralph STAGO, Appellant
1096.
Arizona Supreme Court.
May 21, 1957.
312 P.2d 160
Robert Morrison, Atty. Gen., and L. Alton Riggs, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee., Axline & Shelley, Holbrook, for appellant.
Struckmeyer, Udall, Windes, Phelps, Prade.
Cited by 45 opinions  |  Published
STRUCKMEYER, Justice.

Appellant Ralph Stago was charged in the court below with the commission of two crimes, both felonies; namely, that of burglary and that of resisting and obstructing a public officer. Separate informations were filed which were consolidated for trial and tried as consolidated cases over his objections. Appellant, defendant below, was acquitted of the charge of burglary and convicted of resisting and obstructing a public officer.

Three questions are raised by this appeal. (1) Whether the two offenses were properly consolidated for trial; (2) whether the county attorney during the course of the trial committed prejudicial error in referring to a prior felony conviction; and (3) whether the trial court erred in failing to grant defendant’s motion for a directed verdict on the grounds that the evidence did not establish the crime of resisting or obstructing a public officer.

As to the first question, this state has provided by its 17 A.R.S. Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 128, subd. A when offenses may be consolidated for trial:

[*287] “An indictment, information or complaint charging two or more different offenses connected together in their commission, or different statements of the same offense, or two or more different offenses of the same class of crimes or offenses, shall be under separate counts, and if two or more indictments or informations are filed in such cases, the court may order them consolidated.”

By specifying when offenses may be consolidated, there is impliedly negatived any authority to consolidate under other or different circumstances. Plainly these offenses are not different statements of the same offense, nor are they of the same class of crime. No facts are alleged on the informations from which it can be inferred that the two offenses are connected together in their commission. The simple allegations of both that they were committed on or about the 20th day of April, 1956, does not alone suggest that they were so connected as to be part of the same transaction. Moreover, the evidence introduced at the trial establishes that the two incidents of burglary and resisting and obstructing a public officer were not related in time, place, or causality. The consolidation of the two informations for trial is, therefore, prejudicial and reversible error. People v. Frank, 130 Cal.App. 212, 19 P.2d 850; State v. Agnew, 7 N.J.Misc. 915, 147 A. 485.

As to the second question, it appears that the county attorney in cross-examining the defendant asked him if he had ever been convicted of a felony. After objection and discussion between the court and counsel, the question was withdrawn; seemingly, the county attorney was not prepared to prove the prior conviction if the defendant answered in the negative. While it is well settled in this jurisdiction that when a defendant offers himself as a witness he may be examined on whether he has suffered a previous conviction of a felony, State v. Polan, 78 Ariz. 253, 278 P.2d 432; Hadley v. State, 25 Ariz. 23, 212 P. 458, it is also equally well settled that a prosecuting officer, in order to impeach him as a witness, cannot engage in questioning which casts insinuations without being prepared and able to prove the insinuations, State v. Singleton, 66 Ariz. 49, 182 P.2d 920. Although the trial court instructed the jury to disregard " * * * any thought whatsoever of the meaning of the question propounded * * * ”, prejudices which are so easily aroused are not thus so readily expunged.

Finally, the defendant complains that the evidence does not establish the crime of resisting or obstructing a public officer. We observe the information charges that the defendant, by the use of force and violence, resisted, delayed and obstructed “* * * a public officer, to-wit: Ernest Dillon, Deputy Sheriff of[*288] Navajo County, * The evidence in support of the charge showed that at the time of the alleged offense Dillon was wearing a police officer’s uniform. He did not receive a salary from the county as a deputy sheriff, but worked for the Pinetop Merchant Patrol. He did have a deputy sheriff’s card issued to him by the Sheriff of Navajo County. His appointment was not recorded in the office of the county recorder, nor does it appear that his appointment was ever directly approved by the Board of Supervisors of Navajo County.

Section 11-409, A.R.S.1956 provides the method by which deputy sheriffs are appointed:

“A. The county officers enumerated in § 11-401 may, by and with the consent of, and at salaries fixed by the board, appoint deputies, stenographers, clerks and assistants necessary to conduct the affairs of their respective offices. The appointments shall be in writing, and filed in the office of the county recorder.
“B. Deputies shall hold office at the pleasure of the officer appointing them. Deputies appointed by and with the advice and consent of the board of supervisors may be removed by the board or by the' officer appointing them.”

In order for a deputy sheriff to be a de jure public officer, it must appear, pursuant to the foregoing statute, that he has been appointed in writing by and with the consent of the Board of Supervisors and the appointment filed in the office of the county recorder except the emergency appointments recognized in Section 11-441, subd. B, A.R.S.1956. In the instant case, the Sheriff of Navajo County testified that he had appointed Dillon as a deputy sheriff and issued to him a card confirming the appointment. This is sufficient compliance with the statute that “appointments shall be in writing.” There is no evidence that the appointment was ever formally approved by the Navajo County Board of Supervisors, but since the statute does not require any particular method, we think consent is sufficiently evidenced by the Board’s acceptance of a bond executed by Dillon in the sum of $1,000 running to the State of Arizona and L. Ben Pearson, Sheriff of Navajo County, to faithfully perform such duties as may be imposed upon him by law in the discharge of the office of deputy sheriff. This bond was recorded in the office of the county recorder at the request of the Board of Supervisors.

As noted, the written appointment of Dillon as deputy sheriff was not recorded as is required by the statute. However, such statutes have often been construed as directory so that in any event his acts were valid as a de facto officer. 43 Am. Jur. 234, Public Officers, Section 483. It has been specifically held that the failure[*289] of a deputy sheriff to qualify hy filing his appointment and oath of office, as required by the statute, did not deprive him of de facto status. Gulbrandson v. Town of Midland, 72 S.D. 461, 36 N.W.2d 655. It is our conclusion that Ernest Dillon was a deputy sheriff against whom the offense of resisting or obstructing a public officer could be committed, but for the .reasons stated, it is necessary to reverse this cause for a new trial and it is so ordered.

UDALL, C. J., and WINDES, PHELPS and LA PRADE, JJ., concur.