green
Positive treatment
Quoted verbatim 1×
31.5 score
G Cite
Treatment trajectory · 1992 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1992
2009
2026
Top citers, strongest first. 26 distinct citers.
How cited ↗
examined
Cited as authority (verbatim quote)
State v. Jones
(2×)
also: Cited as authority (quoted)
hen there is a discrepancy between the oral pronouncement of sentence and the minute entry that cannot be resolved by reference to the record, a remand for clarification of sentence is appropriate.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Charlson v. State
State v. Bowles, 173 Ariz. 214, 216 (App. 1992). 4 CHARLSON v. STATE Decision of the Court ¶13 Second, Charlson was not denied the opportunity to speak before sentence was imposed—the court asked if there was any reason sentence should not be pronounced and his counsel said no.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
State v. Molina
“Where there is a discrepancy between the oral sentence and the written judgment, the oral pronouncement of sentence controls.” State v. Hanson, 138 Ariz. 296 , 304-05 (App. 1983); cf. State v. Bowles, 173 Ariz. 214, 216 (App. 1992) (finding remand for clarification of sentence is appropriate where discrepancy “cannot be resolved by reference to the record”).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Kempton v. Chappell
Servs., Inc., 195 Ariz. 564, 568, ¶ 21 (App. 1999) (“Because the alleged inconsistency is easily resolved by reference to the record, we do not find any defect in the judgment.”) (citing State v. Bowles, 173 Ariz. 214, 216 (App. 1992)). 4 KEMPTON v. CHAPPELL Decision of the Court ¶10 Lastly, Mother suggests the child support order itself was erroneously entered based upon false information provided by Father.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
State v. Smith
P. 26.16; State v. Whitney, 159 Ariz. 476, 487 (1989) (indicating that the court can order the correction of the record so that it clearly identifies the intended sentence); State v. Bowles, 173 Ariz. 214, 216 (App. 1992) (noting that if a record indicates the minute entry contains a clerical error, remand is unnecessary).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
State v. Bragna
State v. Bowles, 173 Ariz. 214, 216 (App. 1992). ¶4 We do not address the additional issues Bragna raises in his petition for review because he did not raise those issues in the motion he filed below.
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
State v. Bradley
State v. Bowles, 173 Ariz. 214, 216 , 841 P.2d 209, 211 (App. 1992). ¶18 Here, reference to the record supports the oral pronouncement of sentence.
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
State v. Benally
State v. Bowles, 173 Ariz. 214, 216 , 841 P.2d 209, 211 (App. 1992).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
State v. Cook
See State v. Diaz, 223 Ariz. 358 , 360–62, ¶¶11-19, 224 P.3d 174, 176-78 (2010) (holding that defendant failed to meet his burden to establish that only eleven jurors deliberated, “[w]hen the uncorrected record is considered as a whole”); State v. Bowles, 173 Ariz. 214, 216 , 841 P.2d 209, 211 (App. 1992) (holding that because the remaining record was clear, it was not necessary to remand for resentencing to resolve a discrepancy between the oral pronouncement of sentence and minute entry). ¶15 Alternatively, Cook argues that even if the methamphetamine in fact weighed 22.5 grams, the…
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
State v. PROVENZINO
However, the minute entry and the Order of Confinement raise a question about whether the court “expressly direet[ed]” that Defendant’s sentences be served concurrently. ¶ 25 “[W]hen there is a discrepancy between the oral pronouncement of sentence and the minute entry that cannot be resolved by reference to the record, a remand for clarification of sentence is appropriate.” State v. Bowles, 173 Ariz. 214, 216 , 841 P.2d 209, 211 (App.1992) (emphasis in original).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
State v. Viramontes
State v. Bowles, 173 Ariz. 214, 216 , 841 P.2d 209, 211 (App.1992) (remand appropriate to clarify sentencing discrepancy). 2 ESPINOSA, C.J., and DRUKE, J., concurring. 1 .
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
State v. Contreras
(2×)
State v. Bowles, 173 Ariz. 214, 216 , 841 P.2d 209, 211 (App. 1992).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
State v. Stevens
State v. Bowles, 173 Ariz. 214, 215 , 841 P.2d 209, 210 (App.1992).
discussed
Cited "see"
State v. Fullen
See State v. Bowles, 173 Ariz. 214, 216 (App. 1992); State v. Stevens, 173 Ariz. 2 As our supreme court has explained, the term “prosecutorial misconduct” broadly encompasses any conduct that violates a defendant’s constitutional rights and “sweeps in prosecutorial conduct ranging from inadvertent error or innocent mistake to intentional misconduct.” State v. Murray, 250 Ariz. 543, 548, ¶ 12 (2021) (quoting In re Martinez, 248 Ariz. 458 , 469, ¶ 45 (2020)). 4 STATE v. FULLEN Decision of the Court 494, 496 (App. 1992).
discussed
Cited "see"
State v. Estell
See State v. Bowles, 173 Ariz. 214 (App. 1992) (holding that the trial court intended to impose a consecutive sentence where, despite describing the sentence as “concurrent” during its oral pronouncement, the court “clearly stated at both the change of plea hearing and the sentencing hearing that the sentence was to be consecutive per the plea agreement,” and “[a]t no time did she state that she was not going to follow the plea agreement”). ¶15 Rule 24.4 may not be used “to cause an order or judgment that was never previously made or rendered to be placed upon the record of the …
discussed
Cited "see"
State v. Sales
(2×)
See State v. Bowles, 173 Ariz. 214, 216 , 841 P.2d 209, 211 (App. 1992) (providing that when the oral pronouncement of a sentence and the minute entry differ, a remand is unnecessary if the record indicates that the minute entry contains a clerical error).
discussed
Cited "see"
State v. Kegler
See State v. Bowles, 173 Ariz. 214, 216 (App. 1992) (when an appellate court can determine the superior court's intent from the record, remand for clarification is unnecessary).
discussed
Cited "see"
State v. Marshall
See State v. Bowles, 173 Ariz. 214, 216 (App. 1992) (when an appellate court can determine the superior court's intent from the record, remand for clarification is unnecessary).
discussed
Cited "see"
State v. Johnson
See State v. Bowles, 173 Ariz. 214, 216 (App. 1992) (when an appellate court can determine the superior court's intent from the record, remand for clarification is unnecessary).
discussed
Cited "see"
State v. Sutton
(2×)
See State v. Bowles, 173 Ariz. 214, 216 , 841 P.2d 209, 211 (App. 1992). 3 Absent material revisions after the relevant date, we cite the current version of the statute. 4 Although Sutton argues that the jury was given an erroneous jury instruction as to burglary in the third degree because the apartment complex was not a nonresidential structure, his argument is misplaced; the term “nonresidential structure” in the instruction relates to the cable box and not the apartment complex.
discussed
Cited "see"
State of Arizona v. Francisco Antonio Lopez
(2×)
See State v. Bowles, 173 Ariz. 214, 216 , 841 P.2d 209, 211 (App.1992).
discussed
Cited "see"
Meineke v. GAB Business Services, Inc.
(2×)
See State v. Bowles, 173 Ariz. 214, 216 , 841 P.2d 209, 211 (App.1992) (concluding that remand was unnecessary because inconsistency in oral pronouncement of sentence and minute entry was clarified by reference to record).
discussed
Cited "see"
State v. Doss
(2×)
See generally State v. Bowles, 173 Ariz. 214, 216 , 841 P.2d 209, 211 (App.1992) (appellate court can look to statements by the court in determining court’s intent).
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
State v. Campbell
(2×)
When the trial court makes an “inadvertent error in the sentencing minute entry[,] [it] must be corrected.” State v. Sands, 145 Ariz. 269, 278 , 700 P.2d 1369, 1378 (App. 1985); see also State v. Bowles, 173 Ariz. 214, 216 , 841 P.2d 209, 211 (App. 1992) (holding that “when there is a discrepancy between the oral pronouncement of sentence and the minute entry,” it may be resolved by referring to the record).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
STATE of Arizona, Appellee,
v.
Bobby Lee BOWLES, Appellant
v.
Bobby Lee BOWLES, Appellant
1 CA-CR 90-1933.
Court of Appeals of Arizona.
Jan 9, 1992.
Grant Woods, Atty. Gen. by Paul J. McMurdie, Chief Counsel, Crim. Div., and John Pressley Todd, Asst. Atty. Gen., Phoenix, for appellee., Dean W. Trebesch, Maricopa County Public Defender by Alex D. Gonzalez, Deputy Public Defender, Phoenix, for appellant.
Shelley, Fidel, Voss.
Cited by 28 opinions | Published
Citer courts: Court of Appeals of Arizona (1)
OPINION
SHELLEY, Judge.On November 8, 1990, appellant Bobby Lee Bowles (defendant) pled guilty to aggravated assault, a class 3 felony with one prior felony conviction committed while on parole. The plea agreement provided that defendant be sentenced to a term of 11 years to run concurrently with a sentence imposed in cause number CR 90-01015 but consecutive to Bowles’ unexpired parole term. However, the transcript reflects that when the court imposed the sentence, the court said:
It is therefore the judgment of this Court that the Defendant is sentenced to an aggravated but [sic] the maximum term of 11 years with the Department of Corrections. This sentence shall be concurrent with CR 90-01015. The sentence is concurrent with any additional time the Defendant may be required to serve concerning CR-A-788798 out of Los Angeles County Superior Court of California where the Defendant was convicted on December 1st of 1986. [Emphasis added.]
However, the minute entry is consistent with the plea agreement. It states that defendant committed this offense while on parole in CR-A-788798 and that the sentence “is to date from the completion of the sentence imposed in Los Angeles County Superior Court Cause No. CR-A-788798.” The minute entry is signed by the judge.
Defendant asserts that the minute entry imposing defendant’s sentence to be consecutive to his unexpired parole term is erroneous. He posits that when there is a discrepancy between the oral sentence and the written judgment, the oral pronouncement controls. He relies on State v. Hanson, 138 Ariz. 296, 304-05, 674 P.2d 850, 858-59 (App.1983), wherein the court stated:
Appellant also contends that even if the trial court had jurisdiction to correct the minute entry, double jeopardy protects him from a subsequent increase in punishment. See United States v. Best, 571 F.2d 484 (9th Cir.1978). This argument fails because the trial court was simply correcting the minute entry so that it would be an accurate record of the judgment and sentence. Rule 26.16, Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure, 17 A.R.S., provides that a judgment and sentence are complete and valid when orally pronounced. Where there is a discrepancy between the oral sentence and the written judgment, the oral pronouncement of sentence controls.
However, this statement is dictum since that court held that the trial court did not modify the defendant’s sentence but only corrected the record. In State v. Jefferson, 108 Ariz. 600, 601, 503 P.2d 942, 943 (1972), our supreme court stated:
Defendant’s last contention is that the reporter’s transcript shows that the judge ordered the three sentences to run concurrently, while the typed minute entry shows that they were to run consecutively. This of course is a matter which requires investigation. The question is not so much which order takes precedence over the other, as which order represents what the judge actually said.
There is no question but that the oral judgment is valid and complete when the judge speaks—the question is what he actually said. The minute entry, having been typed, was not made in the courtroom. Likewise, the transcript, having been typed, was not made in the courtroom. Each was made by a different person, one of whom misunderstood the judge. It is also possible that the court reporter mistranslated his notes.
The judgment of guilt is affirmed, but the case is remanded to the Superior Court for the purpose of determining what sentence was actually imposed.
[*216] In State v. Denson, 110 Ariz. 159, 160, 515 P.2d 1179, 1180 (1973), our supreme court stated:
In examining the record for fundamental error pursuant to A.R.S. § 13-1715, we have found an irregularity in the sentence imposed. The minutes and the formal judgment of guilt and sentence state that the defendant is to be confined for a term of five years to five and one-half years in the State Prison. However, the transcript reflects that the sentence was five years to five years and one day. The situation presented is identical with that found in State v. Jefferson, 108 Ariz. 600, 503 P.2d 942 (1972). The question posed is what is the true sentence. While there was a dissenting opinion in Jefferson, the position of the dissent has not been accepted, and the holding in the cited case will be followed.
The judgment of guilt is affirmed, but the case is remanded to the Superior Court for the purpose of determining what sentence was actually imposed.
We believe the law in Arizona to be that when there is a discrepancy between the oral pronouncement of sentence and the minute entry that cannot be resolved by reference to the record, a remand for clarification of sentence is appropriate. In the cases cited by the parties to this case, there was no indication that the plea transcript and the sentencing transcript contained any additional statements by the court indicating the court’s intent. In this case, at the time the defendant pled guilty, the court informed him:
THE COURT: Mr. Bowles, if it’s established that you committed this offense while on parole, the minimum sentence that this Court can impose is seven-and-a-half years, and we are talking about hard time. That means you will not be eligible for early release credits. You must serve the entire sentence imposed by the Court.
Additionally, this sentence must be made to run after you have completed serving any sentence that remains on the matter for which you were on parole.
You have admitted that you committed this offense while on parole, which means the minimum term then becomes seven-and-a-half.
Do you understand all of that, Mr. Bowles? [Emphasis added.]
To which defendant replied, “Yes, I do.”
At the time of sentencing, the court stated in pertinent part:
I have read the presentence report and considered the stipulations in the plea agreement that call for 11 years with the Department of Corrections running concurrently with CR 90-01015 and consecutively to any unexpired parole term in CR A-788798 out of Los Angeles County Superior Court, and that you have agreed to pay restitution in a sum not to exceed $100,000.
Mr. Ross [DEFENSE COUNSEL], is there anything you wish to say on behalf of your client?
MR. ROSS: I’d ask the Court just to follow the plea agreement, which appears to be also the recommendation of Ms. Lawrence, the presentence writer. [Emphasis added.]
The trial court clearly stated on two occasions that the plea agreement called for the sentence to be consecutive to the parole term. The trial court clearly stated at both the change of plea hearing and the sentencing hearing that the sentence was to be consecutive per the plea agreement. At no time did she state that she was not going to follow the plea agreement. On the record before us, we opine that the court intended that the sentence imposed be consecutive to the parole term rather than concurrent. Therefore, it is not necessary to remand for resentencing in order to determine the true sentence.
Pursuant to A.R.S. § 13-4035, we have reviewed the entire record for fundamental error. We find no error.
The judgment and sentence as stated in the minute entry are affirmed.
FIDEL, P.J., and VOSS, J., concur.[*217] NOTE: Retired Judge MELVYN T. SHELLEY was authorized to participate in this appeal by order of the Chief Justice of the Arizona Supreme Court pursuant to Ariz. Const, art. 6, § 20, and A.R.S. § 38-813.