Doctoroff v. Perez, 615 S.E.2d 623 (Ga. Ct. App. 2005). · Go Syfert
Doctoroff v. Perez, 615 S.E.2d 623 (Ga. Ct. App. 2005). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
“punitive damages may be awarded only in such tort actions in which it is proven by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant's actions showed willful misconduct, malice, fraud, wantonness, oppression, or entire want of care”
15 citation events (15 in the last 25 years) across 1 distinct court.
Strongest positive: Danielle D. Rollins v. Alvah O. Smith (gactapp, 2019-10-30)
Top citers, strongest first. 6 distinct citers. How cited ↗
examined Cited as authority (quoted) Danielle D. Rollins v. Alvah O. Smith (2×) also: Cited "see"
Ga. Ct. App. · 2019 · signal: see · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
punitive damages may be awarded only in such tort actions in which it is proven by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant's actions showed willful misconduct, malice, fraud, wantonness, oppression, or entire want of care
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Katherine Glynn Head v. Jadilson Silva De Souse (2×) also: Cited "see"
Ga. Ct. App. · 2019 · confidence medium
In his brief opposing Head’s motion for summary judgment, de Souse argued that the evidence that Head was talking and texting on her cell phone in violation of Georgia law during her trip leading up to when she struck him and his dog would 6 support an award of punitive damages.3 But motor vehicle and traffic-related violations that are not the proximate cause of the automobile accident in question generally will not support an award of punitive damages.4 See Doctoroff v. Perez, 273 Ga. App. 560, 561-562 ( 615 SE2d 623 ) (2005) (defendant’s action of driving without a valid license was not…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Benton v. Anderson
unknown court · 2008 · confidence medium
Andrews and Bernes, JJ., concur. 1 Brooks v. Gray, 262 Ga. App. 232 ( 585 SE2d 188 ) (2003). 2 OCGA §51-12-5.1 (b). 3 (Punctuation omitted.) Doctoroff v. Perez, 273 Ga. App. 560, 561 ( 615 SE2d 623 ) (2005). 4 See id. at 561-562 . 5 See Brooks, supra at 233-234 (2). 6 See Doctoroff, supra at 561 ; Brooks, supra at 233 .
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Western Industries, Inc. v. Poole
Ga. Ct. App. · 2006 · confidence medium
Bronsted, for appellee. 1 Rubin v. Cello Corp., 235 Ga. App. 250 ( 510 SE2d 541 ) (1998). 2 See OCGA § 40-6-270. 3 See OCGA § 40-6-48 (1). 4 (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Doctoroff v. Perez, 273 Ga. App. 560, 560-561 ( 615 SE2d 623 ) (2005). 5 (Punctuation omitted.) Id. 6 See Smith v. Tommy Roberts Trucking Co., 209 Ga. App. 826, 829-830 (3) ( 435 SE2d 54 ) (1993) (reversing grant of summary judgment on negligent entrustment and punitive damages where company ignored regulations requiring license record check, where such a check would *381 have unearthed numerous violations, including…
discussed Cited "see" John McKnight v. Anthony Love (2×)
Ga. Ct. App. · 2023 · signal: accord · confidence high
Hunt Transport v. Bentley, 207 Ga. App. 250 ( 427 SE2d 499 ) (1992) (truck driver drove 20 miles despite serious mechanical problem which caused collision); Viau v. Fred Dean, Inc., 203 Ga. App. 801 ( 418 SE2d 604 ) (1992) (drunken driving); Day v. Burnett, 199 Ga. App. 494 ( 405 SE2d 316 ) (1991) (driving under the influence and in violation of a number of traffic safety laws)). 12 simply violated a rule of the road,” which we also inferred by citing to the facts from several prior cases.22 But within and since Carter, we have never held that showing a pattern or policy of dangerous driving…
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Wardlaw v. Ivey (2×)
Ga. Ct. App. · 2009 · signal: see also · confidence medium
See also OCGA § 51-12-5.1 (b). 6 Kurtz, supra at 707 (1). 7 (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Kodadek v. Lieberman, 247 Ga. App. 606, 610 (2) ( 545 SE2d 25 ) (2001). 8 (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Muller v. English, 221 Ga. App. 672,676 (2) (c) ( 472 SE2d 448 ) (1996). 9 (Punctuation omitted.) Tecumseh Products Co. v. Rigdon, 250 Ga. App. 739, 743 (2) ( 552 SE2d 910 ) (2001). 10 See Doctoroff v. Perez, 273 Ga. App. 560,561-562 ( 615 SE2d 623 ) (2005); Brooks v. Gray, 262 Ga. App. 232, 234 (2) ( 585 SE2d 188 ) (2003).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Doctoroff
v.
Perez
A05A0625.
Court of Appeals of Georgia.
Jun 7, 2005.
615 S.E.2d 623
Moss & Rothenberg, Robert A. Moss, for appellant., Jabari C. Hill, for appellee.
Adams, Smith, Ellington.
Cited by 6 opinions  |  Published
1 passage pin-cited by 1 case
Pinpoint authority: bottom 77%
Citer courts: Court of Appeals of Georgia (1)
Adams, Judge.

Brandi Doctoroff asserted a negligence claim against Jazmin Perez arising out of a traffic accident. Doctoroff sought punitive damages on the sole ground that Perez was knowingly driving without a valid driver’s license at the time of the accident. The trial court granted partial summary judgment to Perez on the punitive damage claim, and Doctoroff appeals. We affirm.

The record shows that on August 21, 2003, Doctoroff was driving southbound on Peachtree Industrial Boulevard near its intersection with Howell Ferry Road in Gwinnett County. At the same time, Perez pulled out of a driveway, crossed the northbound lanes of Peachtree Industrial Boulevard, and entered the southbound lane into the path of Doctoroff s car. The cars collided, causing Doctoroff s car to overturn, resulting in injuries to Doctoroff. Perez admitted in her pleadings that she was negligent in entering the roadway, in failing to yield to Doctoroffs approaching vehicle, in failing to maintain a proper lookout and in failing to operate her vehicle in a manner so as to avoid injuring Doctoroff. She also admitted in her deposition that she did not possess a valid driver’s license from Georgia or any other state at the time of the collision, although she stated that she did possess a driver’s license from Mexico.

Under Georgia law, “[pjunitive damages maybe awarded only in such tort actions in which it is proven by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant’s actions showed willful misconduct, malice, fraud, wantonness, oppression, or that entire want of care which would raise the presumption of conscious indifference to consequences.” OCGA § 51-12-5.1 (b). “Mere negligence, although gross, will not alone authorize the recovery of punitive damages.[*561] There must be circumstances of aggravation or outrage.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Artzner v. A & A Exterminators, 242 Ga. App. 766, 772 (3) (531 SE2d 200) (2000). Accordingly, in reviewing a trial court’s grant of summary judgment in this case, “[i]t is our appellate responsibility to determine whether there is any evidence to support the trial court’s determination that the evidence of aggravated conduct failed to be clear and convincing.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Taylor v. Powertel, 250 Ga. App. 356, 358 (1) (c) (551 SE2d 765) (2001).

And “in automobile collision cases, punitive damages are not recoverable where the driver at fault simply violated a rule of the road.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Brooks v. Gray, 262 Ga. App. 232, 233 (1) (585 SE2d 188) (2003). Rather, to support an award of punitive damages in such cases, Georgia courts have “required that the collision result from a pattern or policy of dangerous driving, such as driving while intoxicated or speeding excessively.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Id.

In Brooks v. Gray, this Court affirmed the grant of summary judgment on a claim of punitive damages arising out of a collision involving a teenage driver, who was driving at a time not allowed by his restricted license. Id. at 234 (2). The driver’s Class D license prohibited him from driving between the hours of 1:00 a.m. and 5:00 a.m., during which time the collision occurred. The plaintiffs argued that this conduct justified an award of punitive damages. Id. at 233 (1). But this Court rejected that argument noting that “[e]ven if operating a vehicle without a proper license affords a basis for actionable negligence, it does not warrant consideration of punitive damages” under the circumstances of the case. Id. In reaching this conclusion, the Court noted that the teenager’s driving during the restricted period was not the proximate cause of the accident and further that “his action did not constitute a pattern or policy of dangerous driving.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Id.

Similarly, as the trial court recognized, Perez’s actions in driving without a valid license were not the proximate cause of the accident here. [1] Rather, the collision occurred because Perez admittedly failed to yield to Doctoroffs oncoming car. Moreover, a review of the record reveals no evidence that Perez caused this collision through a pattern or policy of dangerous driving. Miller v. Crumbley, 249 Ga. App. 403, 405 (3) (548 SE2d 657) (2001). Under these circumstances, we find that the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment on[*562] Doctoroff s claim for punitive damages.

Decided June 7, 2005 Moss & Rothenberg, Robert A. Moss, for appellant. Jabari C. Hill, for appellee.

Judgment affirmed.

Smith, P. J., and Ellington, J., concur.
1

We note that this Court has previously held that evidence that a driver had no valid license is inadmissible in a collision case “unless a causal connection exists between the accident and the absence of a license.” (Citation omitted.) Xpress Cargo Systems v. McMath, 225 Ga. App. 32 (1) (481 SE2d 885) (1997).