Wright v. State, 581 P.2d 442 (Nev. 1978). · Go Syfert
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Wright v. State, 581 P.2d 442 (Nev. 1978). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
146 citation events (72 in the last 25 years) across 14 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Miguel v. Howell (nvd, 2025-01-22)
Treatment trajectory · 1978 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1978 2002 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 19 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Miguel v. Howell
D. Nev. · 2025 · confidence medium
Ground 2(B)—First-Degree Kidnapping 20 NRS § 200.310(1) defines first-degree kidnapping in Nevada, in relevant part as: 21 . . . a person who leads, takes, entices, or carries away or detains any minor with the intent to keep, imprison, or confine the minor from 22 his or her parents, guardians, or any other person having lawful custody of the minor, or with the intent to hold the minor to unlawful 23 service, or perpetrate upon the person of the minor any unlawful act. 24 See Wright v. State, 94 Nev. 415, 417 , 581 P.2d 442, 443 (1978) (observing NRS § 200.310(1) “is 25 broad in its swe…
examined Cited as authority (rule) Gould (Steven) v. State (3×)
Nev. · 2022 · confidence medium
See NRS 200.310(1) ("A person who willfully . . . confines . . . a person by any means whatsoever with the intent to hold or detain . . . the person . . . for the purpose of . . . robbery upon or from the person . . . is guilty of kidnapping in the first degree[1"); Wright v. State, 94 Nev. 415, 417-18 , 581 P.2d 442, 443-44 (1978) (providing that incidental movement frorn one room to another during a robbery is, alone, insufficient to sustain a separate kidnapping charge).
examined Cited as authority (rule) Boyd (Keair) v. State (7×)
Nev. · 2022 · confidence medium
Under NRS 200.310(1), "[a] person who willfully seizes, confines, inveigles, entices, decoys, abducts, conceals, kidnaps or carries away a person by any means whatsoever with the intent to hold or detain, or who holds or detains, the person for . . . the purpose of committing . . . extortion . . . upon or from the person" commits first-degree kidnapping.5 "The statute is broad in its sweep," Wright v. State, 94 Nev. 415, 417 , 581 P.2d 442, 443 (1978), and it does not necessarily require restraint of, force against, or movement of the victim, see, e.g., Bridges v. State, 116 Nev. 752 , 765, 6 …
cited Cited as authority (rule) Knight (Wilbert) Vs. State
Nev. · 2020 · confidence medium
Wright v. State, 94 Nev. 415, 417-18 , 581 P.2d 442, 443-44 (1978), holding modified by Mendoza v. State, 122 Nev. 267, 274-75 , 130 P.3d 176, 180 (2006).
examined Cited as authority (rule) Gonzales v. Director Nevada Department of Corrections (3×) also: Cited "see"
D. Nev. · 2020 · confidence medium
In the case at hand, the Nevada Court of Appeals reasonably 19 concluded that either of the two latter circumstances could have been found in this case: 20 “Michelle’s movement substantially exceeded that necessary to complete the robbery and/or 21 substantially increased the harm to her.” ECF No. 29-9 at 25-26. 22 Gonzales argues that any movement of Dimaya did not substantially increase the risk of 23 danger to Dimaya because no guns were pointed at her inside the house, she was assured that she 1 would not be harmed, and she was the one who brought the individuals into the master bedr…
examined Cited as authority (rule) Mendoza v. State (3×) also: Cited "see"
Nev. · 2006 · confidence medium
In addition to Wright and Jefferson , see Garcia v. State, 121 Nev. 327, 335-36 , 113 P.3d 836, 842 (2005); Hutchins v. State, 110 Nev. 103 , 867 P.2d 1136 (1994); and Clem v. State, 104 Nev. 351 , 760 P.2d 103 (1988), overruled in part by Zgombic v. State, 106 Nev. 571 , 798 P.2d 548 (1990). 3 The district court sentenced Mendoza to a series of consecutive and concurrent sentences ranging from four years minimum to life imprisonment. 4 The jury also acquitted Mendoza on the charge of battery of Mr. Canon. 5 See NRS 200.310(1) (defining kidnapping in the first degree under Nevada law). 6 94 Ne…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Garcia v. State
Nev. · 2005 · confidence medium
Gibbons and Hardesty, JJ., concur. 1 McKenna v. State, 114 Nev. 1044, 1052 , 968 P.2d 739, 745 (1998) (noting that the “[fjailure to object to or request a jury instruction precludes appellate review, unless the error is patently prejudicial and requires the court to act sua sponte to protect the defendant’s right to a fair trial”). 2 95 Nev. 577 , 599 P.2d 1043 (1979). 3 Id. at 578 , 599 P.2d at 1043 . 4 Id. at 579-80 , 599 P.2d at 1044 (citation omitted). 5 94 Nev. 415, 417 , 581 P.2d 442, 443 (1978). 6 Lay v. State, 110 Nev. 1189, 1192 , 886 P.2d 448, 450 (1994); Hutchins v. State, 11…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Wright v. State
Nev. · 1990 · confidence medium
In Wright v. State, 94 Nev. 415, 417-18 , 581 P.2d 442, 443-44 (1978) (unrelated to the present appeal), we held that where the *649 accused is convicted of first degree kidnapping and an associated offense, the kidnapping conviction would not lie if the movement of the victim was incidental to the associated offense and did not increase the risk of harm to the victim beyond that necessarily present in the associated offense.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. La France
N.J. · 1990 · confidence medium
What each formulation seeks to guide is the qualitative judgment of juries on whether the asportation or detention that occurs during the course of the commission of another crime “significantly increases the dangerousness or undesirability of the defendant’s behavior.” Ibid. (citing People v. Timmons, 4 Cal.3d 411, 415, 93 Cal.Rptr. 736, 739 , 482 P.2d 648, 651 (1971); Wright v. State, 94 Nev. 415, 415 , 581 P.2d 442, 443 (1978); Note, “A Rationale of the Law of Kidnapping,” 53 Colum.L.Rev. 540, 556 (1953); Comment, 110 U.Pa.L.Rev. 293, 296 (1961)).
discussed Cited "see" Stewart v. Najera (2×)
D. Nev. · 2024 · signal: see · confidence high
See 18 e.g., Gonzales v. State, 131 Nev. 481 , 497–500, 354 P.3d 664 , 666 (2015) (evidence sufficient 19 for robbery and kidnapping where accomplices forced victim at gunpoint from her open garage 20 into the house and moved her from room to room, as they could have accomplished the robbery 21 by detaining her in the garage while they searched the house). 22 Stewart relies on Wright v. State, 94 Nev. 415 , 581 P.2d 442 (1978) to argue the Supreme 23 Court of Nevada’s determination is objectively unreasonable.
discussed Cited "see" Morales v. Garrett (2×)
D. Nev. · 2023 · signal: see · confidence high
See Wright v. State, 94 Nev. 415, 416 , 581 P.2d 442 , 443 9 (1978), modified on other grounds by Mendoza, 122 Nev. 274 .
examined Cited "see" LOFTHOUSE (JASON) VS. STATE (4×)
Nev. · 2020 · signal: see · confidence high
See Wright v. State, 94 Nev. 415, 417, 581 P.2d 442, 443-44 (1978) (observing that NRS 200.310(1) "is broad in its sweep" in the context of considering the circumstances in which the Legislature intended to allow a conviction for first-degree kidnapping based on movement during a robbery), modified on other grounds by Mendoza v. State, 122 Nev. 267, 130 P.3d 176 (2006).
discussed Cited "see" Morales (Steven) v. State (2×)
Nev. · 2018 · signal: see · confidence high
See Wright v. State, 94 Nev. 415, 416 , 581 P.2d 442, 443 (1978), modified on other grounds by Mendoza, 122 Nev. at 274 , 130 P.3d at 180 .
discussed Cited "see" Clem v. State (2×)
Nev. · 1988 · signal: see · confidence high
See Wright v. State, 94 Nev. 415 , 581 P.2d 442 (1978); Langford v. State, 95 Nev. 631 , 600 P.2d 231 (1979).
discussed Cited "see" Turner v. Housewright (2×)
D. Nev. · 1984 · signal: see · confidence high
See Wright v. State, 94 Nev. 415, 417 , 581 P.2d 442, 443-444 (1978).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Hover (Gregory) v. State (Death Penalty-Direct) (2×)
Nev. · 2016 · signal: see also · confidence low
See Mendoza v. State, 122 Nev. 267, 275 , 130 P.3d 176, 181 (2006) (explaining that to be a separate crime when arising from the same conduct as a robbery, a kidnapping must involve (1) "movement or restraint [that has] independent significance from the act of robbery itself," (2) "create a risk of danger to the victim substantially exceeding that necessarily present in the crime of robbery," or (3) "involve movement, seizure or restraint substantially in excess of that necessary to its completion"); see also Wright v. State, 94 Nev. 415, 418 , 581 P.2d 442, 444 (1978) (setting aside a kidnapp…
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Amended April 16, 2015 State of Iowa v. Scott Robert Robinson
Iowa · 2015 · signal: see also · confidence low
See Nelson v. United States, 601 A.2d 582, 598 (D.C. 1991) (noting that in determining whether confinement is significant to warrant an independent prosecution of kidnapping turned on “whether the kidnapping substantially increased the risk of harm to the victim beyond that inherent in the underlying crime”); see also Wright v. State, 581 P.2d 442 , 443–44 (Nev. 1978), modified in part by Mendoza v. State, 130 P.3d 176 , 180 & n.19 (Nev. 2006) (noting that dual convictions are proper “where the movement or restraint serves to substantially increase the risk of harm to the victim over a…
examined Cited "see, e.g." State of Iowa v. Scott Robert Robinson (3×)
Iowa · 2015 · signal: see also · confidence low
See Nelson v. United States, 601 A.2d 582, 598 (D.C.1991) (noting that in determining whether confinement is significant to warrant an independent prosecution of kidnapping turned on “whether the kidnapping substantially increased the risk of harm to the victim beyond that inherent in the underlying crime”); see also Wright v. State, 94 Nev. 415 , 581 P.2d 442, 443-44 (1978), modified in part by Mendoza v. State, 122 Nev. 267 , 130 P.3d 176 , 180 & n. 19 (2006) (noting that dual convictions are proper “where the movement or restraint serves to substantially increase the risk of harm to t…
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Jackson v. State (2×)
Nev. · 2012 · signal: see also · confidence low
Braunstein, 118 Nev. at 79 , 40 P.3d at 421 ; Crowley, 120 Nev. at 33-34 , 83 P.3d at 285 ; see also Wright v. State, 94 Nev. 415, 418 , 581 P.2d 442, 444 (1978) (Nevada’s kidnapping statute, as a matter of substantive law, requires movement that increases the risk to the victim, over and above that to be expected in any robbery—essen tially, a sufficiency-of-the-evidence determination); Wright v. State, 106 Nev. 647, 650 , 799 P.2d 548, 549-50 (1990) (to similar effect).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
EDDIE DEAN WRIGHT, Appellant,
v.
STATE OF NEVADA, Respondent
9987.
Nevada Supreme Court.
Jul 12, 1978.
581 P.2d 442
Morgan D. Harris, Public Defender, and R. Michael Gardner, Deputy Public Defender, Clark County, for Appellant., Robert List, Attorney General; George E. Holt, District Attorney, H. Leon Simon and Gordon C. Richards, Deputy District Attorneys, Clark County, for Respondent.
Thompson, Batjer, Mowbray, Gunderson, Manou-Kian.
Cited by 55 opinions  |  Published

[*416] OPINION

By the Court,

Thompson, J.:

This appeal is from judgments entered upon jury verdicts finding Eddie Dean Wright guilty on three counts of robbery with the use of a deadly weapon (NRS 200.380; NRS 193.165), and three counts of kidnaping with the use of a deadly weapon (NRS 200.310(1); NRS 193.165), [1] for which he has been sentenced to serve respectively three terms of 30 years on the robbery charges and three terms of life with the possibility of parole on the kidnaping charges. All sentences are to run concurrently.

Shortly after midnight on February 11, 1977, three young black males entered the lobby of the Ambassador Motel in Las Vegas. One of them, Wright, pulled a revolver on the night clerk, while another drew on the night auditor. After emptying the cash register behind the counter the two victims were told to walk to a back office, a distance of 20 to 40 feet. The night auditor subsequently was taken back to the lobby to open the safe. Upon his return to the back office he and the clerk were told to lie face down on the floor where they were taped hand and foot. A motel guest who had entered the lobby also was taken to the back office and taped. The victims were threatened while lying on the floor. The robbers then left. The episode lasted three to five minutes.

1. The appellant contends that the kidnaping involved a contemporaneous robbery and should not be considered a separate crime citing People v. Levy, 204 N.E.2d 842 (N.Y. 1965), and People v. Daniels, 459 P.2d 225 (Cal. 1969). In Levy the court noted that it was common in robbery to confine a victim at gunpoint, or bind and detain him, or move him to another room. The court then concluded that it was unlikely that the legislature intended for the offender to be guilty of kidnaping even though that crime could be found by a literal application of the words of the kidnaping statute.

[*417] In Daniels the court ruled that if the movements of the victim are incidental to the commission of the robbery and do not substantially increase the risk of harm over and above that necessarily present in the crime of robbery itself, the kidnaping conviction cannot stand.

Kidnaping and robbery are separate and distinct crimes. Lovell v. State, 92 Nev. 128, 546 P.2d 1301 (1976); Eckert v. Sheriff, 92 Nev. 719, 557 P.2d 1150 (1976). However, when the crimes are committed contemporaneously, we must determine whether the legislature intended that the offender be punished for both, or whether its intention was that he be punished only for robbery. [2] Cases elsewhere are not in harmony. Annot., 43 A.L.R.3d 699 (1972).

Our kidnaping statute, NRS 200.310, provides, among other things, that a “person who shall willfully seize, confine, inveigle, entice, decoy, abduct, conceal, kidnap or carry away any individual human being by any means whatsoever . . . for the purpose of committing . . . robbery . . . shall be deemed guilty of kidnaping in the first degree.” The penalty therefor, when no substantial bodily harm is sustained by the victim, is life with the possibility of parole. NRS 200.320(2).

The statute is broad in its sweep. Literally applied, it would encompass an ordinary robbery in the course of which the victim happens to be moved from one room to another. Indeed, under a literal reading of NRS 200.310, it is difficult to conceive how any robbery could be accomplished without committing the crime of kidnap: the “forcible taking” necessary to commit robbery under NRS 200.380 necessarily involves some form of “confinement” under NRS 200.310. The penalty for robbery, however, is significantly less severe than that imposed for kid-naping. [3] If, indeed, the movement of the victim is incidental to the robbery and does not substantially increase the risk of harm over and above that necessarily present in the crime of robbery itself, it would be unreasonable to believe that the legislature intended a double punishment. People v. Daniel, supra; cf. Stalley v. State, 91 Nev. 671, 541 P.2d 658 (1975). Within this[*418] context, we approve the reasoning of People v. Daniels. On the other hand, if the movement of the victim results in increased danger over and above that present in the crime of robbery itself, a kidnaping charge also may lie.

In the case at hand the movement of the victims appears to have been incidental to the robbery and without an increase in danger to them. Their detention was only for the short period of time necessary to consummate the robbery. In these circumstances, the convictions for kidnaping must be set aside. People v. Ross, 81 Cal.Rptr. 296 (Cal.App. 1969).

2. Other assigned errors have been considered and are rejected for lack of merit.

Batjer, C. J., and Mowbray, Gunderson, and Manou-kian, JJ., concur.
1

NRS 193.165 provides a greater punishment when one uses a firearm or other deadly weapon in committing a crime. The statute is constitutional. Woofter v. O’Donnell, 91 Nev. 756, 542 P.2d 1396 (1975).

2

Stalley v. State, 91 Nev. 671, 541 P.2d 658 (1975), concerned the crimes of kidnaping and rape. The People v. Levy, supra, and People v. Daniels, supra, cases were discussed but found inapposite since the rape and kidnaping were not contemporaneous in the sense expressed in Levy, nor could it be asserted that the risk of harm to the victim was not increased, contrary for the circumstances existing in Daniels.

3

The penalty for robbery is imprisonment for not less than 1 nor more than 15 years, which may be increased when a firearm or other deadly weapon is used. NRS 200.380(2); NRS 193.165.