Wright v. State, 581 P.2d 442 (Nev. 1978). · Go Syfert
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Wright v. State, 581 P.2d 442 (Nev. 1978). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
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Incidental movement from one room to another during a robbery is insufficient to sustain a separate charge of first-degree kidnapping.

After three men robbed a motel and detained the clerk and auditor for several minutes to empty a safe, the defendant was convicted of both robbery and kidnaping. The defendant challenged the kidnaping convictions, arguing that the movement of the victims was incidental to the robbery. The court must determine if the movement of the victim increases the risk of harm beyond that inherent in the robbery itself. The court holds that if the movement of the victim is incidental to the robbery and does not substantially increase the risk of harm, a separate kidnaping charge cannot stand. Because the detention was only for the short period necessary to consummate the robbery, the kidnaping convictions are set aside.

146 citation events (72 in the last 25 years) across 14 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Miguel v. Howell, No. 2:18-cv-02111 (D. Nev. Jan. 22, 2025)
Treatment trajectory · 1978 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1978 2002 2026
How cited ↗
Cited for
581 P.2d at 443 Interpreting the scope of kidnapping statute13 citing casesobserving NRS § 200.310(1) “is 25 broad in its sweep.1 citing court put it this way · also cited as 94 Nev. at 417
  • Miguel v. Howell, No. 2:18-cv-02111 (D. Nev. Jan. 22, 2025).
    (observing NRS § 200.310(1) “is 25 broad in its sweep.)
  • Gould (Steven) v. State, 518 P.3d 482 (Nev. 2022).published 3 cites
    See NRS 200.310(1) ("A person who willfully . . . confines . . . a person by any means whatsoever with the intent to hold or detain . . . the person . . . for the purpose of . . . robbery upon or from the person . . . is guilty of kidnappi…
  • Boyd (Keair) v. State, 501 P.3d 1003 (Nev. 2022).published 7 cites
    “The statute is broad in its sweep”
  • Knight (Wilbert) Vs. State, 475 P.3d 765 (Nev. 2020).published
    Wright v. State, 94 Nev. 415, 417-18 , 581 P.2d 442, 443-44 (1978), holding modified by Mendoza v. State, 122 Nev. 267, 274-75 , 130 P.3d 176, 180 (2006).
  • Gonzales v. Dir. Nevada Dep't of Corr., No. 2:16-cv-02015 (D. Nev. Oct. 7, 2020). 3 cites
    In the case at hand, the Nevada Court of Appeals reasonably 19 concluded that either of the two latter circumstances could have been found in this case: 20 “Michelle’s movement substantially exceeded that necessary to complete the robbery…
  • Mendoza v. State, 130 P.3d 176 (Nev. 2006).published 3 cites
    In addition to Wright and Jefferson , see Garcia v. State, 121 Nev. 327, 335-36 , 113 P.3d 836, 842 (2005); Hutchins v. State, 110 Nev. 103 , 867 P.2d 1136 (1994); and Clem v. State, 104 Nev. 351 , 760 P.2d 103 (1988), overruled in part by…
  • Garcia v. State, 113 P.3d 836 (Nev. 2005).published
    Gibbons and Hardesty, JJ., concur. 1 McKenna v. State, 114 Nev. 1044, 1052 , 968 P.2d 739, 745 (1998) (noting that the “[fjailure to object to or request a jury instruction precludes appellate review, unless the error is patently prejudici…
  • Wright v. State, 799 P.2d 548 (Nev. 1990).published
    (unrelated to the present appeal)
  • State v. La France, 569 A.2d 1308 (N.J. 1990).published
    What each formulation seeks to guide is the qualitative judgment of juries on whether the asportation or detention that occurs during the course of the commission of another crime “significantly increases the dangerousness or undesirabilit…
  • Lofthouse (jason) Vs. State, 467 P.3d 609 (Nev. 2020).published 4 cites
    See Wright v. State, 94 Nev. 415, 417, 581 P.2d 442, 443-44 (1978) (observing that NRS 200.310(1) "is broad in its sweep" in the context of considering the circumstances in which the Legislature intended to allow a conviction for first-deg…
Show 3 more citing cases
  • Morales (Steven) v. State, No. 71893 (Nev. Feb. 15, 2018).unpublished 2 cites
    See Wright v. State, 94 Nev. 415, 416 , 581 P.2d 442, 443 (1978), modified on other grounds by Mendoza, 122 Nev. at 274 , 130 P.3d at 180 .
  • Turner v. Housewright, 599 F. Supp. 1358 (D. Nev. 1984).published 2 cites
    See Wright v. State, 94 Nev. 415, 417 , 581 P.2d 442, 443-444 (1978).
  • State of Iowa v. Scott Robert Robinson, 859 N.W.2d 464 (Iowa 2015).published 4 cites
    See Nelson v. United States, 601 A.2d 582, 598 (D.C. 1991) (noting that in determining whether confinement is significant to warrant an independent prosecution of kidnapping turned on “whether the kidnapping substantially increased the ris…
94 Nev. at 417 providing that incidental movement frorn one room to another during a robbery is, alone, insufficient to sustain a separate kidnapping charge2 citing cases1 citing court put it this way
  • Gould (Steven) v. State, 518 P.3d 482 (Nev. 2022).published 3 cites
    (providing that incidental movement frorn one room to another during a robbery is, alone, insufficient to sustain a separate kidnapping charge)
  • Lofthouse (jason) Vs. State, 467 P.3d 609 (Nev. 2020).published 4 cites
    (observing that NRS 200.310(1) "is broad in its sweep" in the context of considering the circumstances in which the Legislature intended to allow a conviction for first-degree kidnapping based on movement during a robbery)
94 Nev. at 418 “only for the short period of time necessary to consummate the robbery”1 citing case1 citing court quotes it
  • Gonzales v. Dir. Nevada Dep't of Corr., No. 2:16-cv-02015 (D. Nev. Oct. 7, 2020). 3 cites
    In the case at hand, the Nevada Court of Appeals reasonably 19 concluded that either of the two latter circumstances could have been found in this case: 20 “Michelle’s movement substantially exceeded that necessary to complete the robbery…
Other citing cases5 with no pin cite or quoted language on record
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Eddie Dean Wright, Appellant,
v.
State of Nevada, Respondent
9987.
Nevada Supreme Court.
Jul 12, 1978.
Published opinion
581 P.2d 442
1978 Nev. LEXIS 580
Morgan D. Harris, Public Defender, and R. Michael Gardner, Deputy Public Defender, Clark County, for Appellant., Robert List, Attorney General; George E. Holt, District Attorney, H. Leon Simon and Gordon C. Richards, Deputy District Attorneys, Clark County, for Respondent.
Thompson, Batjer, Mowbray, Gunderson, Manou-Kian.
Cited by 55 opinions  |  Published

[*416] OPINION

By the Court,

Thompson, J.:

This appeal is from judgments entered upon jury verdicts finding Eddie Dean Wright guilty on three counts of robbery with the use of a deadly weapon (NRS 200.380; NRS 193.165), and three counts of kidnaping with the use of a deadly weapon (NRS 200.310(1); NRS 193.165), [1] for which he has been sentenced to serve respectively three terms of 30 years on the robbery charges and three terms of life with the possibility of parole on the kidnaping charges. All sentences are to run concurrently.

Shortly after midnight on February 11, 1977, three young black males entered the lobby of the Ambassador Motel in Las Vegas. One of them, Wright, pulled a revolver on the night clerk, while another drew on the night auditor. After emptying the cash register behind the counter the two victims were told to walk to a back office, a distance of 20 to 40 feet. The night auditor subsequently was taken back to the lobby to open the safe. Upon his return to the back office he and the clerk were told to lie face down on the floor where they were taped hand and foot. A motel guest who had entered the lobby also was taken to the back office and taped. The victims were threatened while lying on the floor. The robbers then left. The episode lasted three to five minutes.

1. The appellant contends that the kidnaping involved a contemporaneous robbery and should not be considered a separate crime citing People v. Levy, 204 N.E.2d 842 (N.Y. 1965), and People v. Daniels, 459 P.2d 225 (Cal. 1969). In Levy the court noted that it was common in robbery to confine a victim at gunpoint, or bind and detain him, or move him to another room. The court then concluded that it was unlikely that the legislature intended for the offender to be guilty of kidnaping even though that crime could be found by a literal application of the words of the kidnaping statute.

[*417] In Daniels the court ruled that if the movements of the victim are incidental to the commission of the robbery and do not substantially increase the risk of harm over and above that necessarily present in the crime of robbery itself, the kidnaping conviction cannot stand.

Kidnaping and robbery are separate and distinct crimes. Lovell v. State, 92 Nev. 128, 546 P.2d 1301 (1976); Eckert v. Sheriff, 92 Nev. 719, 557 P.2d 1150 (1976). However, when the crimes are committed contemporaneously, we must determine whether the legislature intended that the offender be punished for both, or whether its intention was that he be punished only for robbery. [2] Cases elsewhere are not in harmony. Annot., 43 A.L.R.3d 699 (1972).

Our kidnaping statute, NRS 200.310, provides, among other things, that a “person who shall willfully seize, confine, inveigle, entice, decoy, abduct, conceal, kidnap or carry away any individual human being by any means whatsoever . . . for the purpose of committing . . . robbery . . . shall be deemed guilty of kidnaping in the first degree.” The penalty therefor, when no substantial bodily harm is sustained by the victim, is life with the possibility of parole. NRS 200.320(2).

The statute is broad in its sweep. Literally applied, it would encompass an ordinary robbery in the course of which the victim happens to be moved from one room to another. Indeed, under a literal reading of NRS 200.310, it is difficult to conceive how any robbery could be accomplished without committing the crime of kidnap: the “forcible taking” necessary to commit robbery under NRS 200.380 necessarily involves some form of “confinement” under NRS 200.310. The penalty for robbery, however, is significantly less severe than that imposed for kid-naping. [3] If, indeed, the movement of the victim is incidental to the robbery and does not substantially increase the risk of harm over and above that necessarily present in the crime of robbery itself, it would be unreasonable to believe that the legislature intended a double punishment. People v. Daniel, supra; cf. Stalley v. State, 91 Nev. 671, 541 P.2d 658 (1975). Within this[*418] context, we approve the reasoning of People v. Daniels. On the other hand, if the movement of the victim results in increased danger over and above that present in the crime of robbery itself, a kidnaping charge also may lie.

In the case at hand the movement of the victims appears to have been incidental to the robbery and without an increase in danger to them. Their detention was only for the short period of time necessary to consummate the robbery. In these circumstances, the convictions for kidnaping must be set aside. People v. Ross, 81 Cal.Rptr. 296 (Cal.App. 1969).

2. Other assigned errors have been considered and are rejected for lack of merit.

Batjer, C. J., and Mowbray, Gunderson, and Manou-kian, JJ., concur.
1

NRS 193.165 provides a greater punishment when one uses a firearm or other deadly weapon in committing a crime. The statute is constitutional. Woofter v. O’Donnell, 91 Nev. 756, 542 P.2d 1396 (1975).

2

Stalley v. State, 91 Nev. 671, 541 P.2d 658 (1975), concerned the crimes of kidnaping and rape. The People v. Levy, supra, and People v. Daniels, supra, cases were discussed but found inapposite since the rape and kidnaping were not contemporaneous in the sense expressed in Levy, nor could it be asserted that the risk of harm to the victim was not increased, contrary for the circumstances existing in Daniels.

3

The penalty for robbery is imprisonment for not less than 1 nor more than 15 years, which may be increased when a firearm or other deadly weapon is used. NRS 200.380(2); NRS 193.165.