Kennedy v. Pineland State Bank, 439 S.E.2d 106 (Ga. Ct. App. 1993). · Go Syfert
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Kennedy v. Pineland State Bank, 439 S.E.2d 106 (Ga. Ct. App. 1993). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
30 citation events (13 in the last 25 years) across 4 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Burns International Security Services Corp. v. Johnson (gactapp, 2007-03-19)
Treatment trajectory · 1995 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1995 2010 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 6 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Burns International Security Services Corp. v. Johnson
Ga. Ct. App. · 2007 · confidence medium
Compare Johnson v. Holiday Food Stores, 238 Ga. App. 822, 824 (1) ( 520 SE2d 502 ) (1999) (assault upon employee by her fiancé held entirely personal to employee, when the fiancé had no relationship with the employer or the premises whatsoever, and the employer did not create or allow to exist an environment which placed the employee at risk any more than if she had been anywhere else); Kennedy v. Pineland State Bank, 211 Ga. App. at 375 (employee was sexually assaulted by a member of the bank’s board of directors for reasons personal to her because the victim’s exposure to the hazard of…
discussed Cited "see" Simon v. Morehouse School of Medicine (2×)
N.D. Ga. · 1995 · signal: see · confidence high
See Kennedy v. Pineland State Bank, 211 Ga.App. 375 , 439 S.E.2d 106, 107 (1993); Murphy v. ARA Services, Inc., 164 Ga.App. 859 , 298 S.E.2d 528, 530-31 (1982); Compare Hennly v. Richardson, 264 Ga. 355 , 444 S.E.2d 317 (1994); Echols v. Chattooga Mercantile Co., 74 Ga.App. 18 , 38 S.E.2d 675 (1946).
examined Cited "see, e.g." Shannon Dawson v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. (3×)
Ga. Ct. App. · 2013 · signal: see also · confidence medium
See also Kennedy v. Pineland State Bank, 211 Ga. App. 375, 376 ( 439 SE2d 106 ) (1993) (sexual assault of employee by board member was not barred by the exclusive remedy provision of the Act because she was equally exposed to the attack apart from her employment); Wood v. Aetna Cas. &c., 116 Ga. App. 284, 286 (1) ( 157 SE2d 60 ) (1967) (decedent shot by co-worker’s jealous husband was not a compensable injury because the injury did not arise out of employment). 21 Compare with Dixie Roadbuilders, 318 Ga. App. at 233-234 (2) (b). 10 if her appearance somehow played a part in his decision to a…
examined Cited "see, e.g." Dawson v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. (3×)
Ga. Ct. App. · 2013 · signal: see also · confidence medium
See also Kennedy v. Pineland State Bank, 211 Ga. App. 375, 376 ( 439 SE2d 106 ) (1993) (sexual assault of employee by board member was not barred by the exclusive remedy provision of the Act because she was equally exposed to the attack apart from her employment); Wood v. Aetna Cas. & Surety Co., 116 Ga. App. 284, 286 (1) ( 157 SE2d 60 ) (1967) (decedent shot by co-worker’s jealous husband was not a compensable injury because the injury did not arise out of employment).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Anderson v. Save-A-Lot Ltd. (2×)
Tenn. · 1999 · signal: see also · confidence low
Murphy, 298 S.E.2d at 531 ; see also Kennedy, 439 S.E.2d at 107 .
cited Cited "see, e.g." Anderson v. Save-A-Lot, Ltd.
Tenn. · 1999 · signal: see also · confidence low
Murphy, 298 S.E.2d at 531 ; see also Kennedy, 439 S.E.2d at 107 .
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Kennedy
v.
Pineland State Bank
A93A2226.
Court of Appeals of Georgia.
Dec 14, 1993.
439 S.E.2d 106
Franklin, Taulbee, Rushing & Bunce, Elizabeth F. Bunce, for appellant., Fletcher Farrington, Brown & Livingston, Charles H. Brown, Ford & Harrison, Patricia G. Griffith, Callaway, Neville & Brinson, William J. Neville, Jr., for appellee.
McMurray, Johnson, Blackburn.
Cited by 11 opinions  |  Published
McMurray, Presiding Judge.

Joyce Ann Kennedy brought an action against her former employer Pineland State Bank (“the bank”), alleging a member of the bank’s board of directors, William L. Lanier, sexually assaulted her at work while she was assisting Lanier in the bank’s vault. The bank denied the material allegations of the complaint and filed a motion to dismiss or for summary judgment, arguing Kennedy’s action is barred by the exclusive remedy provision of the Workers’ Compensation Act, OCGA § 34-9-11. The trial court agreed and granted the bank’s motion on this basis. [1] This appeal followed. Held: '

Workers’ compensation is the exclusive remedy for injuries arising out of and in the course of employment. OCGA § 34-9-11; Mur [*376] phy v. ARA Svcs., 164 Ga. App. 859, 860 (298 SE2d 528). However, an injury compensable under the Workers’ Compensation Act “shall not include injury caused by the willful act of a third person directed against an employee for reasons personal to such employee. . . .” OCGA § 34-9-1 (4).

Decided December 14, 1993. Franklin, Taulbee, Rushing & Bunce, Elizabeth F. Bunce, for appellant. Fletcher Farrington, Brown & Livingston, Charles H. Brown, Ford & Harrison, Patricia G. Griffith, Callaway, Neville & Brinson, William J. Neville, Jr., for appellee.

An injury caused by the wilful act of a third person is personal to the injured employee if the injury cannot fairly be traced to the employment as a contributing proximate cause and the injury comes from a hazard which the employee would have been equally exposed apart from the employment. Murphy v. ARA Svcs., 164 Ga. App. 859, 862, supra. In the case sub judice, there is no question that Kennedy (as other members of society) was equally exposed to the hazard of sexual assault apart from her employment at the bank. However, Kennedy’s employment at the bank exposed her to the presence of Lanier and to Lanier’s alleged deviant sexual propensities. Nonetheless, “[w]e refuse to say that the risk of. . . physical abuse of a sexual nature alleged by [Kennedy] belongs to or is in any way connected with what [Kennedy] had to do in fulfilling her responsibilities of employment. . . .” Murphy v. ARA Svcs., 164 Ga. App. 859, 862, supra. Consequently, Kennedy’s claims against the bank are not covered by Workers’ Compensation and the trial court erred in granting the bank’s motion to dismiss or for summary judgment based on the exclusive remedy provision of the Workers’ Compensation Act, OCGA § 34-9-11. See Lindsey v. Winn Dixie Stores, 186 Ga. App. 867 (368 SE2d 813).

Judgment reversed.

Johnson and Blackburn, JJ., concur.
1

Christy Calhoun is a party to the complaint, joining Kennedy in an action against William L. Lanier in his individual capacity for alleged sexual assault. These claims remain pending in the trial court.