Las Vegas Plywood & Lumber, Inc. v. D & D Enter., 649 P.2d 1367 (Nev. 1982). · Go Syfert
Las Vegas Plywood & Lumber, Inc. v. D & D Enter., 649 P.2d 1367 (Nev. 1982). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
71 citation events (56 in the last 25 years) across 5 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Hines v. National Default Servicing Corp. (nev, 2015-07-31)
Treatment trajectory · 1984 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1984 2005 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 15 distinct citers. How cited ↗
examined Cited as authority (verbatim quote) Hines v. National Default Servicing Corp. (2×) also: Cited as authority (quoted)
Nev. · 2015 · signal: see · quote attribution · 2 verbatim quotes · confidence high
the district court has discretion to determine whether there has been substantial compliance with the statute.
examined Cited as authority (rule) In re: Robert Paul Vansant AND Judaline Laura Dellimore-Vansant (4×) also: Cited "see"
9th Cir. BAP · 2025 · confidence medium
Although NRS 108.239 appears to require strict compliance with use of the word "shall" in subsections (2) and (4), Nevada courts instruct that "the mechanic's lien statutes are remedial in character and should be liberally construed." Las Vegas Plywood & Lumber, Inc. v. D & D Enters., 649 P.2d 1367, 1368 (Nev. 1982); accord Iliescu v. Steppan, 394 P.3d 930 , 934 (Nev. 2017); Hardy Cos. v. SNMARK, LLC, 245 P.3d 1149, 1155 (Nev. 2010).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) BMO Harris Bank v. Whittemore (2×)
Nev. · 2023 · confidence medium
In contexts where we have held that a method-ofqrotice requirernent may be met by substantial compliance, additional considerations beyond the purpose factor weighed in favor of substantial compliance: •For example, in Hardy Companies v. SNMARK, LLC, we held that substantial-compliance with the notice requirement of a mechanic's lien statute was permissible because such statutes are "remedial in character and should be liberally construed." 126 Nev. 528, 536 , 245 P.3d 1149, 1155 (2010) (quoting Las Vegas Plywood v. D & D Enters., 98 Nev. •378, 380, 649 P.2d 1367, 1368 (1982)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Primerica Life Insurance Company v. Aguilar
D. Nev. · 2021 · confidence medium
Co., Inc., 895 P.2d 1321, 1323 (Nev. 1995) 18 (finding a form insufficient to terminate a beneficiary when the form was only partially filled out, not signed, not dated, and not mailed). 19 48 See, e.g., Derouen v. City of Reno, 491 P.2d 989, 990 (Nev. 1971) (applying substantial- compliance doctrine to statute governing tort claims against a city); Las Vegas Plywood and 20 Lumber, Inc. v. D&D Enters., 649 P.2d 1367, 1368 (Nev. 1982) (holding that substantial compliance with the notice provision of a mechanic’s lien statute was sufficient to perfect the 21 liens); Dunes Hotel, Inc. v. Schmut…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Building Tectonics, Inc. Vs. Brohawn
Nev. · 2020 · confidence medium
We also agree with the district court's finding that Building Tectonics would not have succeeded on its mechanic's lien claim, as the record does not support Building Tectonics argument that Rialto had actual notice of Building Tectonics' improvements to its property.2 See NRS 108.245(1), (3) (requiring a lien claimant to first deliver a notice of its right to lien to the property owner before it may enforce a lien); Las Vegas Plywood v. D & D Enters., 98 Nev. 378, 380 , 649 P.2d 1367, 1368 (1982) (holding that strict compliance with the lien statutes is not required where the property owner h…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Reed Vs. Soligent Distrib., Llc
Nev. · 2019 · confidence medium
Carpenters Local No. 1780 v. Durable Developers, Inc., 102 Nev. 401, 410 , 724 P.2d 736, 743 (1986) (emphasis added) (citing Las Vegas Plywood v. D & D Enters., 98 Nev. 378, 380 , 649 P.2d 1367, 1368 (1982)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) PAWLIK VS. DENG
Nev. · 2018 · confidence medium
Las Vegas Plywood & Lumber, Inc. v. D & D Enters., 98 Nev. 378, 380, 649 SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA (0) 1947A 11 P.2d 1367, 1368 (1982) (holding substantial compliance is appropriate under NRS 108.227); see also Schleining v. Cap One, Inc., 130 Nev. 323, 330, 326 P.3d 4, 8 (2014) (holding substantial compliance is appropriate under NRS 107.095).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) ILIESCU, JR. VS. STEPPAN
Nev. · 2017 · confidence medium
SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA (0) 1947A eu, 6 character and should be liberally construed; that substantial compliance with the statutory requirements is sufficient to perfect the lien if the property owner is not prejudiced." Las Vegas Plywood & Lumber, Inc. v. D & D Enters., 98 Nev. 378, 380 , 649 P.2d 1367, 1368 (1982).
examined Cited as authority (rule) ILIESCU, JR. VS. STEPPAN (5×)
Nev. · 2017 · confidence medium
SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA (0) 1947A eu, 6 character and should be liberally construed; that substantial compliance with the statutory requirements is sufficient to perfect the lien if the property owner is not prejudiced." Las Vegas Plywood & Lumber, Inc. v. D & D Enters., 98 Nev. 378, 380 , 649 P.2d 1367, 1368 (1982).
examined Cited as authority (rule) Schleining v. Cap One, Inc. (8×)
Nev. · 2014 · confidence medium
Las Vegas Plywood St Lumber, Inc. v. D & D Enters., 98 Nev. 378, 380, 649 P.2d 1367, 1368 (1982).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Wilmington Trust FSB v. A1 Concrete Cutting & Demolition, LLC
Nev. · 2012 · confidence medium
We have previously held “ ‘that the mechanic’s lien statutes are remedial in character and should be liberally construed.’ ” Lehrer McGovern, 124 Nev. at 1115 , 197 P.3d at 1041 (quoting Las Vegas Plywood v. D & D Enterprises, 98 Nev. 378, 380 , 649 P.2d 1367, 1368 (1982)); see Hardy Companies, Inc. v. SNMARK, LLC, 126 Nev. 528, 536 , 245 P.3d 1149, 1155 (2010); Peccole v. Luce & Goodfellow, 66 Nev. 360, 373 , 212 P.2d 718, 725 (1949); Lamb v. Lucky Boy M.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Hardy Companies, Inc. v. SNMARK, LLC
Nev. · 2010 · confidence medium
“This court has repeatedly held that the mechanic’s lien statutes are remedial in character and should be liberally construed; that substantial compliance with the statutory requirements is sufficient to perfect the lien if the property owner is not prejudiced.” Las Vegas Plywood v. D & D Enterprises, 98 Nev. 378, 380 , 649 P.2d 1367, 1368 (1982).
examined Cited as authority (rule) Washoe Medical Center, Inc. v. Reliance Insurance (3×) also: Cited "see"
Nev. · 1996 · confidence medium
This court has recognized that “lien statutes are remedial in character and should be liberally construed . . . .” Las Vegas Plywood v. D & D Enterprises, 98 Nev. 378, 380 , 649 P.2d 1367, 1368 (1982).
discussed Cited "see" Lehrer McGovern Bovis, Inc. v. Bullock Insulation, Inc. (2×)
Nev. · 2008 · signal: see · confidence high
See McKellar v. McKellar, 110 Nev. 200, 203 , 871 P.2d 296, 298 (1994) (holding that “[t]here is a general presumption in favor of prospective application of statutes unless the legislature clearly manifests a contrary intent or unless the intent of the legislature cannot otherwise be satisfied”). 40 Schofield v. Copeland Lumber, 101 Nev. 83, 85 , 692 P.2d 519, 520 (1985). 41 Las Vegas Plywood v. D & D Enterprises, 98 Nev. 378, 380 , 649 P.2d 1367, 1368 (1982). 42 Wm.
discussed Cited "see" Lehrer McGovern Bovis v. BULLOCK INSULATION (2×)
Nev. · 2008 · signal: see · confidence high
See McKellar v. McKellar, 110 Nev. 200, 203 , 871 P.2d 296, 298 (1994) (holding that "[t]here is a general presumption in favor of prospective application of statutes unless the legislature clearly manifests a contrary intent or unless the intent of the legislature cannot otherwise be satisfied"). [23] Schofield v. Copeland Lumber, 101 Nev. 83, 85 , 692 P.2d 519, 520 (1985). [24] Las Vegas Plywood v. D & D Enterprises, 98 Nev. 378, 380 , 649 P.2d 1367, 1368 (1982). [25] Wm.
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
LAS VEGAS PLYWOOD AND LUMBER, INC., Appellant,
v.
D & D ENTERPRISES, Respondent, HIBERNIA NATIONAL BANK IN NEW ORLEANS, Intervenor
13077.
Nevada Supreme Court.
Aug 27, 1982.
649 P.2d 1367
Ordowski & Eads, Las Vegas, for Appellant., Jolley, Urga & Wirth, and Phillip S. Aurbach, Las Vegas, for Respondent., Lionel Sawyer & Collins, and Robert M. Buckalew, Las Vegas, for Intervenor.
Per Curiam.
Cited by 23 opinions  |  Published
1 passage pin-cited by 1 case
Pinpoint authority: bottom 65%
Citer courts: Nevada Supreme Court (1)

[*379] OPINION

Per Curiam:

This is an appeal from an order granting summary judgment in a mechanic’s lien foreclosure action in favor of respondent D & D Enterprises (D & D) and against appellant Las Vegas Plywood and Lumber, Inc., the lien claimant. The district court held that, because appellant did not comply with the statutory requirements for service of a mechanic’s lien, the lien was never perfected. Appellant argues that substantial compliance with the statute was sufficient, where respondent had acutal notice of the lien. We agree with appellant and reverse.

Appellant provided materials as a subcontractor for a construction project on respondent D & D’s land. When the general contractor failed to pay for the materials, appellant recorded a mechanic’s lien on the property. Appellant attempted to serve the lien on respondent by leaving it with a person of suitable age and discretion at respondent’s place of business. When no suitable person could be found, appellant posted a copy of the lien in a conspicuous place at respondent’s place of business, rather than on the property which was the subject of the lien, and appellant mailed a copy to respondent. Respondent received actual notice of the existence of the lien.

Appellant brought this action to foreclose the lien. The district court granted summary judgment in respondent’s favor, ruling that appellant had failed to serve respondent with a copy of the lien in conformity with the requirements of NRS 108.227(1). [1]

[*380] This court has repeatedly held that the mechanic’s lien statutes are remedial in character and should be liberally construed; that substantial compliance with the statutory requirements is sufficient to perfect the lien if the property owner is not prejudiced. Peccole v. Luce & Goodfellow, Inc., 66 Nev. 360, 212 P.2d 718 (1949); Ferro v. Bargo Mining and Milling Co., 37 Nev. 139, 140 P. 527 (1914); Malter v. Falcon Mining Co., 18 Nev. 209 (1883). In Malter, we stated that:

the spirit and purpose of the [mechanic’s lien statute] is to do substantial justice to all parties who may be affected by its provisions; and that courts should avoid “unfriendly strictness and mere technicality.” [Citations omitted.] This rule should always be followed where the objections urged serve only to perplex and embarrass a remedy intended to be simple and summary, without adding anything to the security of the parties having an interest in the property sought to be affected.

18 Nev. at 212-213. Cf. Fisher Brothers, Inc. v. Harrah Realty Co., 92 Nev. 65, 545 P.2d 203 (1976) (Complete failure to give the required notice prevents perfection of a mechanic’s lien.) See also Peterman-Donnelly Engineers & Contractors Corp. v. First National Bank of Arizona, 408 P.2d 841 (Ariz.App. 1965); Watson v. Auburn Iron Works, 318 N.E.2d 508 (Ill.App 1974); Schubloom v. Donavon and Assoc., 241 N.W.2d 710 (S.D. 1976).

The purpose of NRS 108.227(1) is to notify the property owner of the lien; therefore, substantial compliance with the requirements of the statute will suffice if the owner receives actual notice and is not prejudiced. The district court has discretion to determine whether there has been substantial compliance with the statute. In the instant case it is undisputed that[*381] appellant complied with the statute in every respect except that appellant mistakenly posted the lien at the wrong location. It is also undisputed that respondent had actual notice of the lien, and that respondent was not prejudiced by appellant’s dereliction. On these facts, we hold that, as a matter of law, appellant’s substantial compliance with NRS 108.227(1) was sufficient to perfect the mechanic’s lien. We therefore reverse and remand the case for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.

1

NRS 108.227 Service of copy of claim on “record owner” of property; “record owner’’ defined.

1. In addition to the requirements of NRS 108.226, a copy of the claim[*380] shall be served upon the record owner of the property within 30 days, in one of the following ways:

(a) By delivering a copy to the owner personally; or
(b) If he is absent from his place of residence, or from his usual place of business, by leaving a copy with some person of suitable age and discretion at either place, and sending a copy through the mail addressed to the owner at his place of residence or place of business; or
(c) If such place of residence or business cannot be ascertained, or a person of suitable age or discretion cannot be found there, then by fixing a copy in a conspicuous place on the property, and also delivering a copy to a person there residing, if such person can be found, and also sending a copy through the mail addressed to the owner at the place where the property is situated.