State v. Richardson, 622 N.W.2d 823 (Minn. 2001). · Go Syfert
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State v. Richardson, 622 N.W.2d 823 (Minn. 2001). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
45 citation events (45 in the last 25 years) across 5 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: State of Minnesota v. Michael Patrick Daly (minnctapp, 2026-01-05)
Treatment trajectory · 2001 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
2001 2013 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 35 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State of Minnesota v. Michael Patrick Daly
Minn. Ct. App. · 2026 · confidence medium
In determining whether reasonable suspicion exists, courts “consider the totality of the circumstances and acknowledge that trained law enforcement officers are permitted to make inferences and deductions that would be beyond the competence of an untrained person.” State v. Richardson, 622 N.W.2d 823, 825 (Minn. 2001).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State of Minnesota, Respondent, vs. Noel Cortez, Appellant
Minn. Ct. App. · 2025 · confidence medium
In determining whether reasonable suspicion exists, courts “consider the totality of the circumstances and acknowledge that trained law enforcement officers are permitted to make inferences and deductions that would be beyond the competence of an untrained person.” State v. Richardson, 622 N.W.2d 823, 825 (Minn. 2001).
cited Cited as authority (rule) State of Minnesota v. Anthony Lee Prellwitz
Minn. Ct. App. · 2024 · confidence medium
State v. Richardson, 622 N.W.2d 823, 825 (Minn. 2001).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Daniel Wayne Siegfried v. Commissioner of Public Safety
Minn. Ct. App. · 2024 · confidence medium
Cf. Anderson, 683 N.W.2d at 824 (concluding that the officer lacked a reasonable, articulable suspicion for a stop because his interpretation of the law was erroneous, and he therefore lacked a particularized and objective basis for stopping the driver); State v. Richardson, 622 N.W.2d 823, 825 (Minn. 2001) (citing State v. Pike, 551 N.W.2d 919, 921-22 (Minn. 1996)) (explaining that “it is not necessary that the police detect an actual violation of the law” to conduct an investigatory stop).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State of Minnesota v. Randall Thomas Graham
Minn. Ct. App. · 2023 · confidence medium
Later, in State v. Richardson, the supreme court held that “[a] police officer who, after receiving a police radio dispatch relaying a motorist’s report that a motor vehicle was being driven erratically, observed the same vehicle cross and recross the fog line, possessed 11 an objective basis for reasonable suspicion warranting an investigative stop.” 622 N.W.2d 823, 824 (Minn. 2001).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Kendall Martin v. State of Mississippi
Miss. · 2017 · confidence medium
Ct. App. Div. 2010) (“[Officer Eric] Bittman “observed [Enright’s] vehicle ‘straddling the fog line . . . drift to the shoulder . . . and cross the-the two lane dividing lanes.’”); State v. Richardson, 622 N.W.2d 823, 825 (Minn. 2001) (After a particular “car was reported to be ‘driving all over the road,’” a “police officer, driving . . . and monitoring the police radio, saw an approaching red vehicle cross over the fog line and come back across its lane to the center line.”).
cited Cited as authority (rule) State of Minnesota v. Mary Lynn Boline
Minn. Ct. App. · 2017 · confidence medium
Heien v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 530, 536 (2014); State v. Richardson, 622 N.W.2d 823, 825 (Minn. 2001).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State of Minnesota v. Sean Adam Peake
Minn. Ct. App. · 2017 · confidence medium
In assessing reasonable 5 suspicion, Minnesota courts “consider the totality of the circumstances and acknowledge that trained law enforcement officers are permitted to make inferences and deductions that would be beyond the competence of an untrained person.” State v. Richardson, 622 N.W.2d 823, 825 (Minn. 2001).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State of Minnesota v. Gregory Walter Bakke
Minn. Ct. App. · 2017 · confidence medium
State v. Richardson, 622 N.W.2d 823, 826 (Minn. 2001). 5 Here, the district court properly found, and the record clearly supports, that the officer had “a reasonable articulable suspicion” to stop Bakke’s vehicle—the stop was not pretextual.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State of Minnesota v. Devin Keith Barner
Minn. Ct. App. · 2016 · confidence medium
DECISION The pretrial ruling had a critical impact “When the state appeals a pretrial order, it must show clearly and unequivocally (1) that the ruling was erroneous and (2) that the order will have a ‘critical impact’ on its ability to prosecute the case.” State v. McLeod, 705 N.W.2d 776, 784 (Minn. 2005) (quoting State v. Anderson, 683 N.W.2d 818, 821 (Minn. 2004), and State v. Richardson, 622 N.W.2d 823, 825 (Minn. 2005)); see also Minn. R.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State of Minnesota v. Darren Gregory Melges
Minn. Ct. App. · 2016 · confidence medium
In assessing reasonable suspicion, Minnesota courts “consider the totality of the circumstances and acknowledge that trained law enforcement officers are permitted to 5 make inferences and deductions that would be beyond the competence of an untrained person.” State v. Richardson, 622 N.W.2d 823, 825 (Minn. 2001).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Carole Jean Halverson v. State of Minnesota, and State of Minnesota v. Carole Jean Halverson
Minn. Ct. App. · 2016 · confidence medium
In assessing reasonable suspicion, Minnesota courts “consider the totality of the circumstances and acknowledge that trained law enforcement officers are permitted to make inferences and deductions that would be beyond the competence of an untrained person.” State v. Richardson, 622 N.W.2d 823, 825 (Minn. 2001).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State of Minnesota v. William Lee Hutchins, Jr. (2×) also: Cited "see"
Minn. Ct. App. · 2016 · confidence medium
In assessing reasonable suspicion, Minnesota courts “consider the totality of the circumstances and acknowledge that trained law enforcement officers are permitted to make inferences and deductions that would be beyond the competence of an untrained person.” State v. Richardson, 622 N.W.2d 823, 825 (Minn. 2001) (discussing reasonable suspicion in context of initial investigatory stop).
cited Cited as authority (rule) State of Minnesota v. Robert Carl Thoensen
Minn. Ct. App. · 2016 · confidence medium
Heien, 135 S. Ct. at 536 ; State v. Richardson, 622 N.W.2d 823, 825 (Minn. 2001).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State of Minnesota v. Ann Marie Hoyer
Minn. Ct. App. · 2016 · confidence medium
When analyzing whether a stop is justified, a district court should consider “the totality of the circumstances and acknowledge that trained law enforcement officers are permitted to make inferences and deductions that would be beyond the competence of an untrained person.” State v. Richardson, 622 N.W.2d 823, 825 (Minn. 2001).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Troy K. Scheffler v. Commissioner of Public Safety
Minn. Ct. App. · 2015 · confidence medium
State v. Richardson, 622 N.W.2d 823, 825 (Minn. 2001).
cited Cited as authority (rule) State of Minnesota v. Erik Edward Malmquist
Minn. Ct. App. · 2015 · confidence medium
State v. Richardson, 622 N.W.2d 823, 825 (Minn. 2001).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Ryan John Nordell v. Commissioner of Public Safety
Minn. Ct. App. · 2015 · confidence medium
“In determining whether a stop is justified, we consider the totality of the circumstances and acknowledge that trained law enforcement officers are permitted to make inferences and deductions that would be beyond the competence of an untrained person.” State v. Richardson, 622 N.W.2d 823, 825 (Minn. 2001).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Lester Leroy Hiltz, Jr. v. Commissioner of Public Safety
Minn. Ct. App. · 2015 · confidence medium
State v. Richardson, 622 N.W.2d 823, 825 (Minn. 2001).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) James Fletcher Cameron v. Commissioner of Public Safety (2×) also: Cited "see"
Minn. Ct. App. · 2015 · confidence medium
State v. Richardson, 622 N.W.2d 823, 825 (Minn. 2001).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Baker v. Commonwealth
Ky. Ct. App. · 2015 · confidence medium
In Minnesota, for example, “[e]ven observing* a motor vehicle weaving within its own lane in an erratic manner can justify an officer stopping a driver.” State v. Richardson, 622 N.W.2d 823, 826 (Minn.2001).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State of Minnesota v. Stephanie Evon Glover
Minn. Ct. App. · 2015 · confidence medium
When analyzing whether a stop is justified, a district court should consider “the totality of the circumstances and acknowledge that trained law enforcement officers are permitted to make inferences and deductions that would be beyond the competence of an untrained person.” State v. Richardson, 622 N.W.2d 823, 825 (Minn. 2001).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State of Minnesota v. Sharleen Leslie Paulson
Minn. Ct. App. · 2015 · confidence medium
“In determining whether a stop is justified, we consider the totality of the circumstances and acknowledge that trained law enforcement officers are permitted to make inferences and deductions that would be beyond the competence of an untrained person.” State v. Richardson, 622 N.W.2d 823, 825 (Minn. 2001).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State of Minnesota v. George Kimuhu Gatungu
Minn. Ct. App. · 2014 · confidence medium
When considering the totality of the circumstances, the court acknowledges that “trained law enforcement officers are permitted to make inferences and deductions that would be beyond the competence of an untrained person.” State v. Richardson, 622 N.W.2d 823, 825 (Minn. 2001).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State of Minnesota v. Ronaldo Earl Rounds
Minn. Ct. App. · 2014 · confidence medium
Diede, 795 N.W.2d at 843 . “[W]e consider the totality of the circumstances and acknowledge that trained law enforcement officers are permitted to make inferences and deductions that would be beyond the competence of an untrained person.” State v. Richardson, 622 N.W.2d 823, 825 (Minn. 2001).
cited Cited as authority (rule) State v. Wiggins
Minn. Ct. App. · 2010 · confidence medium
State v. Richardson, 622 N.W.2d 823, 825 (Minn. 2001).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. McLeod (2×)
Minn. · 2005 · confidence medium
State v. Anderson, 683 N.W.2d 818, 821 (Minn.2004); State v. Richardson, 622 N.W.2d 823, 825 (Minn.2001); see also Minn. R.Crim.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Abeln (2×)
Mo. Ct. App. · 2004 · confidence medium
United States v. Pulliam, 265 F.3d 736, 739 (8th Cir.2001); United States v. Ozbirn, 189 F.3d 1194, 1198 (10th Cir.1999) (“[Officer] had probable cause to stop [defendant] after he saw the motor home drift onto the shoulder twice within a quarter mile under optimal road, weather and traffic conditions.”); United States v. Smith, 80 F.3d 215, 219 (7th Cir.1996); United States v. Fiala, 929 F.2d 285, 287 (7th Cir.1991); State v. Richardson, 622 N.W.2d 823, 825-26 (Minn.2001); State v. Waters, 780 So.2d 1053, 1056 (La.2001) (per curiam); State v. Arnold, 779 So.2d 840, 844 (La.App.2000); Stat…
discussed Cited "see" State of Minnesota v. Joseph John West, IV
Minn. Ct. App. · 2015 · signal: see · confidence high
See State v. Richardson, 622 N.W.2d 823, 825 (Minn. 2001) (relying on vehicle crossing a fog line to establish reasonable suspicion 9 for suspecting the driver of criminal activity); see also State v. Lee, 585 N.W.2d 378, 383 (Minn. 1998) (incorporating the time of day into the probable cause determination and recognizing that drinking is often involved later at night).
discussed Cited "see" Del Roy Lloyd Wendt, III v. Commissioner of Public Safety
Minn. Ct. App. · 2015 · signal: see · confidence high
See State v. Richardson, 622 N.W.2d 823, 825 (Minn. 2001); State v. Lopez, 698 N.W.2d 18, 24 (Minn. App. 2005). 3 Without deciding whether a seizure took place or at what point Wendt may have been seized, we hold that a seizure was reasonable under the circumstances.
cited Cited "see" State v. Waddell
Minn. · 2003 · signal: see · confidence high
See State v. Richardson, 622 N.W.2d 823, 825 (Minn. 2001).
discussed Cited "see" State v. Wagner (2×) also: Cited "see, e.g."
Minn. Ct. App. · 2001 · signal: see · confidence high
See Richardson, 622 N.W.2d at 825 (acknowledging that trained law-enforcement officers are permitted to make inferences and deductions that would be beyond competence of untrained person).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." State of Minnesota v. Heather Marie Mangen
Minn. Ct. App. · 2025 · signal: see also · confidence medium
See Minn. Stat. § 169.18 , subd. 7(1) (2022) (requiring vehicle to be driven “as nearly as practicable entirely within a single lane”); see also State v. Richardson, 622 N.W.2d 823, 825-26 (Minn. 2001) (concluding that officer had reasonable suspicion of criminal activity because driver crossed and recrossed fog line); State v. Schinzing, 342 N.W.2d 105, 106, 109 (Minn. 1983) (concluding that officer had reasonable suspicion because driver committed multiple “violations of the traffic laws,” including “crossing over into the opposite lane of traffic”); Soucie v. Commissioner 6 of …
discussed Cited "see, e.g." State v. Askerooth (2×)
Minn. · 2004 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence medium
See, e.g., State v. Richardson, 622 N.W.2d 823, 826 (Minn.2001) (applying Terry principles to traffic stop when erratic driving indicated violation of “any number of Minnesota statutes”).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." State v. Bergerson
Minn. Ct. App. · 2003 · signal: see also · confidence medium
United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 , 122 S.Ct. 744, 750 , 151 L.Ed.2d 740 (2002); see also State v. Richardson, 622 N.W.2d 823, 825 (Minn. 2001) (using the totality of the circumstances to determine reasonable suspicion for a traffic stop, including inferences and deductions made by trained and experienced officers).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
STATE of Minnesota, Petitioner, Appellant,
v.
Dennis Eugene RICHARDSON, Respondent
C5-99-1819.
Supreme Court of Minnesota.
Mar 15, 2001.
622 N.W.2d 823
Lancaster.
Cited by 38 opinions  |  Published

[*824] OPINION

LANCASTER, Justice.

Respondent Dennis Eugene Richardson was charged in Kandiyohi County with driving after revocation of his license, in violation of Minn.Stat. § 171.24, subd. 2(3) (2000). Richardson moved to dismiss the charge, claiming that all evidence should be suppressed because the traffic stop was not supported by reasonable suspicion. The district court granted the motion and the state brought a pretrial appeal under Minn.R.Crim.P. 28.04. The court of appeals affirmed. We conclude that the low[*825] er courts erred; therefore, we reverse and remand for trial.

The essential facts are not disputed. On July 9, 1999, Atwater Police Dispatch sent out an “attempt to locate” call for a car traveling the Willmar-Atwater stretch of Highway 12; the car was reported to be “driving all over the road.” The radio message described the car as a red Plymouth and gave its license plate number. This information was relayed from the state patrol, which had in turn received its information from a motorist. [1] An Atwater police officer, driving from Willmar to At-water on Highway 12 and monitoring the police radio, saw an approaching red vehicle cross over the fog line and come back across its lane to the center line. The officer observed that the car’s license plate number matched that of the car reported in the radio dispatch. The officer stopped the vehicle and discovered that the license of the driver, Richardson, had been revoked. The officer cited Richardson for driving after license revocation.

Richardson moved to dismiss the complaint, claiming that all evidence should be suppressed, arguing that neither the information provided to the officer in the radio dispatch nor the officer’s own observations provided sufficient particularized facts to support the reasonable suspicion required for a stop. The district court concluded that the traffic stop had violated Richardson’s right against unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution; the court suppressed all evidence and dismissed the complaint. In an- unpublished opinion, a divided panel of the court of appeals affirmed the suppression of evidence and dismissal of the complaint.

We will normally reverse a district court’s pretrial decision to suppress evidence only when the state demonstrates clearly and unequivocally that the district court erred in its judgment and that the error will have a critical impact on the outcome of the trial. State v. Othoudt, 482 N.W.2d 218, 221 (Minn.1992); State v. Webber, 262 N.W.2d 157, 159 (Minn.1977). Where, as in this case, the facts are not in dispute and the decision to suppress is a question of law, we may independently review the facts and determine whether, as a matter of law, the evidence needs to be suppressed. Othoudt, 482 N.W.2d at 221.

A brief investigatory stop by police requires reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21-22, 27, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). Such a stop is lawful “if the state can show the officer to have had a ‘particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity.’ ” State v. Pike, 551 N.W.2d 919, 921 (Minn.1996) (quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417-18, 101 S.Ct. 690, 66 L.Ed.2d 621 (1981)). The investigatory stop must be based upon specific and articulable facts that, along with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant the intrusion of a stop, but it is not necessary that the police detect an actual violation of the law. Id. at 921-22. In determining whether a stop is justified, we consider the totality of the circumstances and acknowledge that trained law enforcement officers are permitted to make inferences and deductions that would be beyond the competence of an untrained person. State v. Kvam, 336 N.W.2d 525, 528 (Minn.1983).

In this case, the police officer saw an oncoming vehicle cross and recross the fog line after he had been apprised by a radio report that the same vehicle had been reported to be driving “all over the road.” This combination of the officer’s own observations, together with information received in the police dispatch, was sufficient to give the officer a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the driver of criminal activity. Erratic driving of the type observed by the officer and[*826] reported by the motorist could reasonably indicate violation of any of a number of Minnesota statutes. [2] E.g., Minn.Stat. § 169.13, subd. 2 (2000) (operating a vehicle in manner likely to endanger property or person, including driver); Minn.Stat. § 169A.20, subd. 1(1) (2000) (operating a vehicle under the influence of alcohol). Even observing a motor vehicle weaving within its own lane in an erratic manner can justify an officer stopping a driver. Kvam, 336 N.W.2d at 528.

Both the court of appeals and the respondent compare this case to Olson v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 371 N.W.2d 552 (Minn.1985), in which we held that an anonymous citizen report of a possibly drunken driver, giving the vehicle’s license plate number and vehicle’s location and direction of travel, did not provide reasonable suspicion for a traffic stop. Id. at 554, 556. In Olson, the police did not observe any erratic driving before they stopped the vehicle, and were acting solely on the unidentified motorist’s tip. Id. at 553. In contrast, here the officer’s independent observation of erratic driving forms part of the totality of the circumstances to which we look for justification of the stop.

After an independent review of the undisputed facts, we conclude that the district court erred in its determination that the officer’s stop of Richardson was unlawful. We hold that the officer was in possession of specific, articulable facts that, together with rational inferences from those facts, provided an objective basis for suspicion of criminal activity and therefore, the stop was warranted.

Reversed and remanded.

1

. The dispatch announcement did not include any information regarding the identity of the reporting motorist and it is unknown whether the stale patrol received the motorist's name when the information was phoned in.

2

. The state argues that Officer Schmidt actually observed (as opposed to reasonably suspected) two traffic violations when he saw Richardson cross the fog line: first, that Richardson was not driving in the "roadway” as required by Minn.Stat. § 169.18, subd. 1 (2000), and second, that Richardson drove outside his marked traffic lane in violation of Minn.Stat. § 169.18, subd. 7(a) (2000). Because we determine that the stop was justified based on reasonable suspicion, we do not address this argument.