Anderson v. State, Com. Fisheries Entry Comm'n, 654 P.2d 1320 (Alaska 1982). · Go Syfert
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Anderson v. State, Com. Fisheries Entry Comm'n, 654 P.2d 1320 (Alaska 1982). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
26 citation events (10 in the last 25 years) across 2 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Rand J. Hooks, Jr v. Helen Stephan (alaska, 2021-06-09)
Treatment trajectory · 1982 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1982 2004 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 13 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Rand J. Hooks, Jr v. Helen Stephan
Alaska · 2021 · confidence medium
Because Hooks’s late appeal appears to be caused by “reasonable confusion about the state of the law and there is no prejudice to the opposing party,”13 we “relax 10 (...continued) represented litigant’s untimely appeal). 11 325 P.3d at 505-07 . 12 333 P.3d at 748 ; see also; Mattfield v. Mattfield, 133 P.3d 667 , 674 n.7 (Alaska 2006) (relaxing the deadline for appeal to avoid injustice); Anderson v. State, Commercial Fisheries Entry Comm’n, 654 P.2d 1320, 1320-22 (Alaska 1982) (holding that superior court abused its discretion by failing to relax the rules to allow a late appeal)…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Regulatory Commission of Alaska v. Matanuska Electric Association, Inc. (2×)
Alaska · 2019 · confidence medium
Civil Liberties Union, 204 P.3d 364, 367-68 (Alaska 2009). 37 Griswold v. City of Homer, 252 P.3d 1020, 1025 (Alaska 2011). 38 See Anderson v. State, Commercial Fisheries Entry Comm’n, 654 P.2d 1320, 1322 (Alaska 1982). 39 Norville v. Carr-Gottstein Foods Co., 84 P.3d 996 , 1000 n.1 (Alaska 2004). -20- 7338 A. The Superior Court Had Jurisdiction To Determine The RCA’s Authority To Issue Order 10.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Conitz v. Alaska State Commission for Human Rights
Alaska · 2014 · confidence medium
Anderson v. State, Commercial Fisheries Entry Comm'n, 654 P.2d 1320, 1320-22 (Alaska 1982) (late-filed appeal accepted because appellant's incorrect belief that motion for reconsideration terminated time to appeal was "far from untenable"). 22 .
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Conitz v. Alaska State Commission for Human Rights
Alaska · 2013 · confidence medium
But before today we had never expressly held that motions for reconsideration filed in the superior court under Appellate Rule 503(h), unlike motions for 19 Cook v. Aurora Motors, Inc., 503 P.2d 1046, 1049 (Alaska 1972) (internal footnotes omitted). 20 See, e.g., McCarrey v. Comm’r of Natural Res., 526 P.2d 1353, 1354-55 (Alaska 1974) (holding that plaintiff’s failure to bring timely appeal of administrative decision in superior court was forgiven where “a great deal of confusion existed concerning the method and procedures by which appeals from an administrative decision might be taken …
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Copeland v. Ballard
Alaska · 2009 · confidence medium
Anderson v. State, Comm'l Fisheries Entry Comm'n, 654 P.2d 1320, 1322 (Alaska 1982) (noting that the agency "made no showing that the minimal (seventeen day) delay worked to its disadvantage"). 40 .
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Kilmer v. Dillingham City School District (2×)
Alaska · 1997 · confidence medium
Skudrzyk v. Reynolds, 856 P.2d 462 , 463 n. 3 (Alaska 1993); Anderson v. State, Commercial Fisheries Entry Comm'n, 654 P.2d 1320, 1322 (Alaska 1982). [7] The bill of particulars listed the following ten reasons for Kilmer's termination: 1.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Skudrzyk v. Reynolds
Alaska · 1993 · confidence medium
Anderson v. State, Commercial Fisheries Entry Comm’n, 654 P.2d 1320, 1322 (Alaska 1982).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Sublett v. State, Commercial Fisheries Entry Commission
Alaska · 1989 · confidence medium
The 30-day period can be relaxed "where ‘a strict adherence to [the rules] will work a surprise or injustice.’ ” Anderson v. Commercial Fisheries Entry Comm’n, 654 P.2d 1320, 1322 (Alaska 1982) (citations omitted).
examined Cited as authority (rule) Powers v. State, Public Employees' Retirement Board (4×)
Alaska · 1988 · confidence medium
In his brief to this court Powers argues in part that “[w]here confusion exists on the method or procedure by which an appeal from an administrative decision should be taken to the superior court, the right of appeal should be upheld.” 2 In Anderson v. State, CFEC, 654 P.2d 1320, 1322 (Alaska 1982) this court held that Appellate Rule 521 should be applied to relax the requirements of Rule 602(a)(2) where an administrative appeal was seventeen days late and “Anderson’s position that the regulations permitted him to file for reconsideration without jeopardizing his right to appeal is far…
discussed Cited "see" Regulatory Comm'n of Alaska v. Matanuska Elec. Ass'n, Inc. (2×)
Alaska · 2019 · signal: see · confidence high
See Anderson v. State, Commercial Fisheries Entry Comm'n , 654 P.2d 1320 , 1322 (Alaska 1982).
discussed Cited "see" Manning v. Alaska RR Corp.
Alaska · 1993 · signal: see · confidence high
See Anderson v. State, Commercial Fisheries Entry Comm., 654 P.2d 1320, 1322 (Alaska 1982) (rulings on motions to relax the thirty day time limit of Appellate Rule 602(a)(2) are reviewed for abuse of discretion).
discussed Cited "see" Witte v. Matanuska-Susitna Borough
D. Alaska · 1992 · signal: see · confidence high
See Anderson v. State, Commercial Fisheries Entry Comm’n, 654 P.2d 1320, 1322 (Alaska 1982) (failure to relax thirty day rule was abuse of discretion); Owsichek v. State, Guide Licensing & Control Board, 627 P.2d 616, 621 (Alaska 1981) (same).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." King v. State, Department of Natural Resources
Alaska · 1987 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence medium
See, e.g., Anderson v. State, Commercial Fisheries Entry Comm'n, 654 P.2d 1320,1320-22 (Alaska 1982) (abuse of discretion not to relax time limitation for appeal where confusion exists as to whether regulations permitted reconsideration of administrative decision).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Valdemar C. ANDERSON, Appellant,
v.
STATE of Alaska, COMMERCIAL FISHERIES ENTRY COMMISSION, Appellee
6107.
Alaska Supreme Court.
Nov 12, 1982.
654 P.2d 1320
Raymond A. Gillespie, Cowan, Gillespie & Jefferson, Seward, for appellant., Michael Sewright, Asst. Atty. Gen., Anchorage, and Wilson L. Condon, Atty. Gen., Juneau, for appellee.
Burke, Rabinowitz, Connor, Matthews, Compton.
Cited by 16 opinions  |  Published

Lead Opinion

OPINION

PER CURIAM.

This case involves an administrative appeal filed seventeen days late. The superi- or court dismissed the action as untimely under Alaska Appellate Rule 602(a)(2). This appeal followed.

On November 29, 1978, the Commercial Fisheries Entry Commission (CFEC) denied Anderson’s application for a limited entry permit. Anderson requested an administrative hearing. On April 12, 1979, the CFEC denied that request. On April 26, Anderson requested that the CFEC reconsider its decision to deny him a hearing. On May 7, a hearing officer wrote Anderson that:

Commission regulations do not provide for such reconsideration. This case was closed to further consideration by the Commission on April 12, 1979 when I denied the hearing request and exhausted Mr. Anderson’s administrative remedies.

Anderson filed an appeal on May 29.

The superior court ruled that the time for appealing the April 12 denial of Anderson’s[*1321] hearing request expired on May 12. Anderson contends that the April 26 request for reconsideration tolled the thirty-day period in which to appeal. The Commission maintains that the pertinent regulations do not authorize reconsideration of a hearing officer’s decision to deny a hearing and that Anderson’s request therefore failed to suspend the time in which to appeal.[1]

Availability of Reconsideration

Former Appellate Rule 45(a)(2), now Appellate Rule 602(a)(2), provided:

The time within which an appeal may be taken to the superior court from an administrative agency shall be 30 days from the date that the order appealed from is mailed or delivered to the appellant. If a request for agency reconsideration is timely filed before the agency, the notice of appeal must be filed within 30 days after the agency’s reconsideration decision.

Implicit in this rule is the requirement that the pertinent statutes or regulations provide for reconsideration within specified time limits if a timely request for reconsideration is to toll the thirty-day period. Cf. Oaks v. Grocers Wholesale, Inc., 377 P.2d 1001, 1003 (Alaska 1963) (where there is no provision for reconsideration, the decision is final and the time for taking a civil appeal commences to run).

AS 44.62.540, which provides for reconsideration in administrative agencies generally, is not applicable to CFEC proceedings. AS 16.43.120(a).[2] Anderson submits, however, that reconsideration was available under 20 AAC 05.850, which at the time stated:

(a) The commissioners may order a reconsideration of their decision on their own motion or on petition of the applicant or other party. A petition for reconsideration by the applicant or other party shall set forth specifically the grounds upon which the petitioner believes the decision to be erroneous or specify new evidence he believes will have a substantial bearing on the decision.
(b) The power to order a reconsideration expires 30 days after the hand delivery or mailing of a decision to the applicant or other party. If no action is taken on a petition for reconsideration within the time allowed for ordering reconsideration, the petition is considered denied.
(c) The commissioners may reconsider a matter in the original record or order a supplementary hearing in accordance with 20 AAC 05.845(e).[3]

(Emphasis added.)

The Commission reads the regulation as limiting reconsideration to administrative adjudications, i.e., the Commission’s decisions in reviewing previously held hearings. We think this interpretation neither plainly erroneous nor inconsistent with the wording of § .850. Tunley v. Municipality of An[*1322] chorage School District, 631 P.2d 67, 78 n. 30 (Alaska 1980). By its terms, § .850 authorizes the commissioners to reconsider their decisions, an apparent reference to administrative adjudications conducted pursuant to 20 AAC 05.845. Moreover, § .845 refers to the possibility of reconsideration, whereas § 805, which establishes the right to request a hearing, makes' no such reference. Finally, we note that § .850 was amended in 1981 to provide for reconsideration of a hearing officer’s decision to deny a hearing. This suggests to us that the regulations did not previously establish such a right.

Abuse of Discretion

Anticipating this result, Anderson also argues that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to relax the strictures of Appellate Rule 602(a)(2). We agree. Appellate Rule 521 authorizes a relaxation of the rules “where a strict adherence to them will work surprise or injustice.” See Owsichek v. State Guide Licensing, 627 P.2d 616, 621 (Alaska 1981); Commercial Fisheries Entry Commission v. Apokedak, 606 P.2d 1255, 1258 n. 6 (Alaska 1980) (where we held that the superior court did not abuse its discretion in relaxing the thirty-day limitation for appealing an administrative order). Here, Anderson’s position that the regulations permitted him to file for reconsideration without jeopardizing his right to appeal is far from untenable. See McCarrey v. Commissioner of Natural Resources, 526 P.2d 1353, 1355 (Alaska 1974) (four month delay in filing appeal excused by confusion concerning proper method for appealing administrative decision); compare Vogt v. Winbauer, 376 P.2d 1007, 1009 (Alaska 1962). The agency has made no showing that the minimal (seventeen day) delay worked to its disadvantage. And the consequences of adhering to Appellate Rule 602(a)(2) are severe, foreclosing Anderson from obtaining an entry permit for the Cook Inlet drift gill net fishery. Given these points, and inasmuch as it appears that Anderson was merely trying to exhaust his administrative remedies, we conclude that a literal adherence to Appellate Rule 602(a)(2) would work an injustice. Owsichek v. State Guide Licensing, 627 P.2d 616 (Alaska 1981).

REVERSED.

1

The CFEC also contends that since the jurisdictional statement in Anderson’s brief states that the appeal “is taken from the order denying Appellant Anderson’s Motion for Reconsideration,” the merits of the superior court’s decision are not properly before this court. This is so, reasons the CFEC, because the denial of a motion for reconsideration is nonappealable according to “generally accepted doctrine.” We find no merit in this contention. Anderson’s notice of appeal designates the underlying judgment as the subject of the appeal, and “it clearly appears from the record as a whole that [Anderson’s] intent was to appeal from the [underlying] judgment.” In Re Mountain View Public Utility District No. 1, 359 P.2d 951, 954-55 (Alaska 1961).

2

AS 16.43.120(a) provides:

(a) The administrative adjudication procedures of the Administrative Procedure Act (AS 44.62) do not apply to adjudicatory proceedings of the commission except that final administrative determinations by the commission are subject to judicial review as provided in AS 44.62.560-44.62.570.
3

20 AAC 05.850 has since been amended by the addition of the following section:

(d) The commissioners will, in their discretion, reconsider any final action by a hearing officer on petition of the applicant or other party. The petition for reconsideration shall specifically set forth the alleged error committed by the hearing officer.

Concurrence

MATTHEWS, Justice,

joined by RABI-NOWITZ, Justice, concurring.

In my opinion the appeal to the superior court was timely under 20 AAC 05.850. That regulation is expressly applicable to “a decision” of the Commission. The denial of a hearing under 20 AAC 05.805[1] is a decision of the Commission. It therefore is subject to reconsideration under § 850.

In fact, the denial of a hearing under § 805 is a determination that the written request for a hearing has demonstrated no right to relief. As such, the denial is akin to a judgment on the pleadings in a civil action and is a final decision on the merits of the controversy. It makes no sense to conclude that such a decision should not be subject to reconsideration by the Commission while all other final decisions by the Commission are. There is certainly no language in the regulations which suggests that this unusual conclusion is warranted.

For these reasons I conclude that the appeal to the superior court was timely and that the court erred in dismissing it.

1

20 AAC 05.805 provides in part:

REQUEST FOR AN ADMINISTRATIVE HEARING, (a) An applicant or other party may request an oral or written administrative hearing by filing a request for a hearing with the commission. The request for a hearing must contain a statement of why the commission’s determination should be changed, and indicate which findings of fact, interpretation of regulation, or interpretation of statute the party believes to be in error. An administrative hearing will be granted upon the determination that the written request for a hearing demonstrates a genuine issue in contention.