Gainey v. Smacky's Investments, Inc., 652 S.E.2d 167 (Ga. Ct. App. 2007). · Go Syfert
Gainey v. Smacky's Investments, Inc., 652 S.E.2d 167 (Ga. Ct. App. 2007). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
44 citation events (44 in the last 25 years) across 3 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Betty Denson v. Donald Gerteisen (ca11, 2023-09-08)
Treatment trajectory · 2008 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
2008 2017 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 12 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Betty Denson v. Donald Gerteisen
11th Cir. · 2023 · confidence medium
To prevail on a failure-to-repair theory, the court observed, Denson must prove two elements: “a duty to repair” and “no- tice . . . of the defect.” Id. at 18 (quoting Gainey v. Smacky’s Invs., Inc., 652 S.E.2d 167, 169 (Ga. Ct. App. 2007)).
examined Cited as authority (rule) Wce Holdings B, LLC v. Michael Lewis (5×) also: Cited "see", Cited "see, e.g."
Ga. Ct. App. · 2022 · confidence medium
As for defective construction, a landlord who wasn’t involved with building the 5 property may be held liable only if the landlord “knew or by the exercise of reasonable diligence could have known,” before the tenancy was created, of a “structural defect” of the kind that “would be discovered during a pre-purchase building inspection.” Gainey, 287 Ga. App. at 531 (2) (b) (punctuation and footnote omitted).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Christina Watson v. Katherine Dana (2×)
Ga. Ct. App. · 2020 · confidence medium
Generally, a landlord that fully parts with possession of leased property is not liable to third parties injured on the property “unless it is shown that the damages resulted either from failure to repair the premises or faulty construction of the premises.” Gainey v. Smacky’s Investments, 287 Ga. App. 529, 530 (2) ( 652 SE2d 167 ) (2007) (citations and punctuation omitted).
examined Cited as authority (rule) Julio Pajaro v. South Georgia Bank (7×) also: Cited "see, e.g."
Ga. Ct. App. · 2016 · confidence medium
Unlike in Gainey, 287 Ga. App. at 532 (2) (b), cited by both the trial court and the landlord, here the appellants’ expert opined that the defects that led to the collapse of the staircase would have been discovered during an inspection.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Thomas R. Stephenson v. Government Employees Insurance Company
Ga. Ct. App. · 2016 · confidence medium
Membership Corp., 307 Ga.App. 739, 742 (1) ( 706 SE2d 676 ) (2011) (“An invitee is one who, by express or implied invitation, has been induced or led to come upon premises for any lawful purpose; he may be deemed an invitee if his presence on the property is of mutual benefit to him and the owner or occupier.”) (footnote omitted). 6 See Forest Cove Apartments, supra at 734. 7 See id. 8 Id. (citation omitted). 9 See id. (contractor who fell through floor while repairing it had equal knowledge of hazard posed by damaged floor joists); Yon v. Shimeall, 257 Ga.App. 845, 847 (1) ( 572 SE2d 694 …
examined Cited as authority (rule) Sidhi Investment Corporation v. Thrift (4×)
Ga. Ct. App. · 2016 · confidence medium
OCGA § 44-7-14 provides: Having fully parted with possession and the right of possession, the landlord is not responsible to third persons for damages resulting from the negligence or illegal use of the premises by the tenant; provided, however, the landlord is responsible for damages arising from defective construction or for damages arising from the failure to keep the premises in repair. *619 “Under this Code section, an out-of-possession landlord is not liable to third persons for damages in tort unless it is shown that the damages resulted either from failure to repair the premises or …
examined Cited as authority (rule) Sidhi Investment Corporation v. Vicki Lee Thrift (4×)
Ga. Ct. App. · 2016 · confidence medium
“Under this Code section, an out-of-possession landlord is not liable to third persons for damages in tort unless it is shown that the damages resulted either from failure to repair the premises or faulty construction of the premises.” Gainey v. Smacky’s Investments, 287 Ga. App. 529, 530 (2) ( 652 SE2d 167 ) (2007).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Garvin v. Atlanta Gas Light Company
Ga. Ct. App. · 2015 · confidence medium
Corp., 332 Ga. App. 171, 172 (1) ( 770 SE2d 14 ) (2015), citing Huggins, 245 Ga. at 249 (1). 18 (Emphasis in original.) Davenport v. Cummins Alabama, Inc., 284 Ga. App. 666, 673 (2) ( 644 SE2d 503 ) (2007). 19 See id. 20 (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Herrington v. Gaulden, 294 Ga. 285, 288 ( 751 SE2d 813 ) (2013). 21 See Gainey v. Smacky’s Investments, 287 Ga. App. 529, 532 (2) (e) ( 652 SE2d 167 ) (2007).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Martin v. Hansen
Ga. Ct. App. · 2014 · confidence medium
Pursuant to that provision, a landlord who has fully parted with his or her property “is not liable to third persons for damages in tort unless it is shown that the damages resulted either from failure to repair the premises or faulty construction of the premises.” 1 (Punctuation omitted.) Gainey v. Smacky’s Investments, 287 Ga. App. 529, 530 (2) ( 652 SE2d 167 ) (2007). “[T]he responsibility of a landlord for failure to repair a latent defect is not absolute but is predicated only on the landlord’s knowledge of the defect and the consequent necessity for repairs.” (Citation omitte…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Frank A. Martin v. Pamela W. Hansen
Ga. Ct. App. · 2014 · confidence medium
Pursuant to that provision, a landlord who has fully parted with his or her property “is not liable to third persons for damages in tort unless it is shown that the damages resulted either from failure to repair the premises or faulty construction of the premises.” 1 (Punctuation omitted.) Gainey v. Smacky’s Investments, Inc., 287 Ga. App. 529, 530 (2) ( 652 SE2d 167 ) (2007). “[T]he 1 Hansen does not allege that the Martins’ are liable under a theory of faulty construction. 3 responsibility of a landlord for failure to repair a latent defect is not absolute but is predicated only on…
cited Cited as authority (rule) Watts & Colwell Builders, Inc. v. Martin
Ga. Ct. App. · 2011 · confidence medium
See Silman, supra, 294 Ga. App. at 765 (2); Gainey v. Smacky’s Investments, 287 Ga. App. 529, 530-531 (2) (a) ( 652 SE2d 167 ) (2007). 4.
discussed Cited "see" Karle v. Belle (2×)
Ga. Ct. App. · 2011 · signal: see · confidence high
See Gainey v. Smacky’s Investments, 287 Ga. App. 529 ( 652 SE2d 167 ) (2007).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
GAINEY
v.
SMACKY’S INVESTMENTS, INC. Et Al.
A07A1138.
Court of Appeals of Georgia.
Sep 12, 2007.
652 S.E.2d 167
R. Lars Anderson, for appellant., Bullard, Garcia & Wangerin, Kevin A. Wangerin, for appellees.
Ruffin, Blackburn, Bernes.
Cited by 15 opinions  |  Published
Pinpoint authority: bottom 50%
Ruffin, Judge.

Betty Gainey sued Frank E. Briggett and Smacky’s Investments, Inc. (“Smacky’s”), claiming that she was injured when she fell from an attic staircase at a rental home owned, leased, and managed by Briggett and Smacky’s. The defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing, among other things, that Gainey had equal knowledge of the alleged hazard that caused her fall. The trial court granted the motion, and Gainey appeals. For reasons that follow, we affirm.

On appeal from a grant of summary judgment, we conduct a de novo review, construing the evidence and all inferences drawn from it in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party. [1] So viewed, the record shows that Briggett purchased the rental home for investment purposes in 2002. During a pre-purchase inspection, he entered the attic using a two-piece, pull-down staircase. The top portion of the staircase was bolted to plywood that dropped down from the ceiling. A separate portion was then manually attached to grooves at the bottom of the upper section to complete the staircase. By design, the lower portion of the completed staircase was not locked or bracketed into the upper section.

Briggett rented the home to Gainey’s daughter, Felicia Patterson, in August 2003, and he demonstrated how to use the attic staircase by assembling it while she watched. Thereafter, Patterson assembled and used the staircase on one occasion to place items in the attic. She had no problem using the staircase, did not notice anything wrong with it, and never complained to Briggett about it.

On October 19,2003, Gainey visited Patterson atthe rentalhome and asked to store several lamps in the attic. When her daughter agreed, Gainey assembled the staircase and climbed to the top. Gainey testified that she did not notice anything wrong with the staircase, which appeared to be in good working order, and the stairs felt stable as she climbed toward the attic. On her way down, however,[*530] Gainey fell. According to Gainey, as she stepped on the lower portion of the staircase, it disconnected from the top portion, causing her to fall.

Gainey sued Briggett and his corporation, Smacky’s, alleging that the defendants failed to keep the pull-down staircase in proper repair and failed to warn of the dangers it presented. The trial court granted summary judgment to both defendants.

1. Smacky’s liability. Finding no evidence that Smacky’s owned, leased, or managed the property at issue, the trial court entered summary judgment for the corporation. Gainey does not address this ruling on appeal, focusing instead on Briggett’s liability. To the extent Gainey’s claims of error relate to the award of summary judgment to Smacky’s, therefore, we deem those claims abandoned. [2]

2. Briggett’s liability. Without dispute, Briggett was an out-of-possession landlord for the property. As such, his liability is governed by OCGA§ 44-7-14. [3] “Under this Code section, an out-of-possession landlord is not liable to third persons for damages in tort unless it is shown that the damages resulted either from failure to repair the premises or faulty construction of the premises.” [4]

(a) Failure to repair. Liability for failure to repair arises “ ‘only in instances where there is a duty to repair and notice has been given of the defect.’” [5] Such duty does not include a duty of maintenance. [6] Rather, the term “repair” “contemplates an existing structure which has become imperfect, and means to supply in the original structure that which is lost or destroyed, and thereby restore it to the condition in which it originally existed, as near as may be.” [7]

In her complaint, Gainey alleged that the pull-down staircase “was replaced, repaired, and/or maintained” improperly. As noted above, improper maintenance will not support a claim under OCGA § 44-7-14. And she has pointed to no evidence that Briggett replaced or repaired the staircase prior to her fall. [8] She also offered no evidence that anyone notified Briggett of a problem with the staircase or requested a repair, and Briggett specifically testified that he received[*531] no such notice or request. Under these circumstances, Gainey failed to raise a question of fact as to liability for failure to repair.

(b) Defective construction. Liability for defective construction under OCGA § 44-7-14 generally arises when a landlord builds or supervises construction of an allegedly defective structure or building. [9] Liability may also attach, however, to defective construction by a landlord’s predecessor in title where “ ‘the landlord knew or by the exercise of reasonable diligence could have known of [the] improper construction before the tenancy was created.’” [10] This exception is limited, and it only applies to “structural defects that would be discovered during a pre-purchase building inspection.” [11]

The evidence shows that Briggett did not build or construct the pull-down staircase on which Gainey fell; it was in the house when he bought it. Nevertheless, Gainey argues that Briggett can be held liable for alleged faulty construction of the staircase under the predecessor-in-title exception because he knew or should have known that it-was defective.

Through expert testimony from a professional engineer, Gainey offered evidence that the staircase was defective because (1) no mechanism attached the lower portion of the staircase to the upper portion to prevent separation; and (2) the angle and design of the lower portion increased the chance of slippage and separation. It is clear that all parties involved — Briggett, Patterson, and Gainey — understood that the lower section of the staircase did not lock into or attach to the upper section when assembled. Briggett testified, however, that he did not know the staircase was unsafe, and the assembly method never concerned him. Patterson and Gainey similarly saw no defect in the staircase.

On appeal, Gainey argues that Briggett had “formal education in staircase construction,” through which he knew or should have known the staircase was defective. Briggett testified that he attended a course on staircase construction at an area technical college so that he could inspect repair work performed by contractors at his rental properties. But he did not recall discussing pull-down staircases in the class, and Gainey has pointed to no evidence that the classwork or textbook addressed such structures.

Simply put, evidence that Briggett took a general class on staircase construction does not raise a question of fact as to whether he knew or should have known that the pull-down staircase in his[*532] rental home was defective. Moreover, although Gainey’s expert testified about a defect in the staircase, the expert was not a home inspector, and Gainey offered no evidence that an inspector would have found the staircase to be defective during a pre-purchase inspection of the house. We recognize that Briggett used the staircase when he inspected the home before purchasing it. Again, however, Briggett testified that he saw nothing wrong with the staircase at that point or when he assembled it on subsequent occasions.

Decided September 12, 2007. R. Lars Anderson, for appellant. Bullard, Garcia & Wangerin, Kevin A. Wangerin, for appellees.

Gainey has not presented evidence that Briggett knew or should have known about the alleged defect. Accordingly, no genuine issue of material fact remains as to liability under OCGA § 44-7-14 for defective construction. [12]

(c) Failure to warn. Finally, Gainey argues that the trial court erred in granting Briggett summary judgment on her failure to warn claim. As discussed above, however, Briggett’s liability to Gainey for damages in tort is limited by OCGA § 44-7-14, [13] and Gainey failed to present evidence of such liability. Furthermore, Briggett demonstrated the staircase assembly to Patterson. And the record shows that Briggett, Patterson, and Gainey did not know of any hazards associated with the staircase. Given Briggett’s lack of superior knowledge regarding the alleged hazard, he is not liable for failure to warn. [14]

Judgment affirmed.

Blackburn, P. J., and Bernes, J., concur.
1

See Rainey v. 1600 Peachtree, LLC, 255 Ga. App. 299 (565 SE2d 517) (2002).

2

See Court of Appeals Rule 25 (o) (2) (“Any enumeration of error which is not supported in the brief by citation of authority or argument may be deemed abandoned.”).

3

See Rainey, supra at 300; see also Martin v. Johnson-Lemon, 271 Ga. 120, 123 (1) (516 SE2d 66) (1999) (“A landlord’s tort liability to a third person who is injured on property which was relinquished by rental or under a lease is determined by OCGA § 44-7-14.”) (punctuation omitted).

7

(Punctuation omitted.) Id.

8

At some point after the fall, Gainey’s attorney removed the staircase from the house, forcing Briggett to replace it.

12

See id. at 302; Harris v. Sloan, 199 Ga. App. 340, 341-342 (1) (405 SE2d 68) (1991); see also Norman v. Jones Lang LaSalle Americas, 277 Ga. App. 621, 632 (5) (627 SE2d 382) (2006) (no liability under OCGA § 44-7-14 where landlord’s knowledge of hazard equals claimant’s knowledge).

14

See id. at 300, 302 (trial court properly granted summary judgment to landowner on claimant’s failure to warn theory where landowner lacked superior knowledge of alleged defect); Sparks v. MARTA, 223 Ga. App. 768, 770 (3) (478 SE2d 923) (1996) (no liability for failure to warn where defendants lacked superior knowledge of alleged hazard).