Hyman v. Jordan, 412 S.E.2d 615 (Ga. Ct. App. 1991). · Go Syfert
Hyman v. Jordan, 412 S.E.2d 615 (Ga. Ct. App. 1991). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
13 citation events (2 in the last 25 years) across 1 distinct court.
Strongest positive: Douglas Coe v. Proskauer, LLP. (gactapp, 2021-06-30)
Top citers, strongest first. 6 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Douglas Coe v. Proskauer, LLP.
Ga. Ct. App. · 2021 · confidence medium
In other words, the period within which a suit may be brought is measured from the date upon which the plaintiff could have successfully maintained the action.8 Additionally, “[i]t is well-settled in this state that in a malpractice action for damages against an attorney, the statute of limitation runs from the date of the breach of the duty and not from the time when the extent of the resulting injury is ascertained nor from the date of the client’s discovery of the error.”9 statute of limitation applicable to fraud claims runs from the date actual injury occurs.”) (citations and punc…
cited Cited as authority (rule) Wright v. Swint
Ga. Ct. App. · 1997 · confidence medium
Riddle v. Driebe, 153 Ga. App. 276, 280 ( 265 SE2d 92 ), cited in Hyman v. Jordan, 201 Ga. App. 852, 854 ( 412 SE2d 615 ).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Morris v. Atlanta Legal Aid Society, Inc.
Ga. Ct. App. · 1996 · confidence medium
Hyman v. Jordan, 201 Ga. App. 852, 853 (1) ( 412 SE2d 615 ) (1991).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Farmers State Bank v. Huguenin
Ga. Ct. App. · 1996 · confidence medium
The fraud which the statute provides will toll the running of the period of limitation “ ‘must be of that character which involves moral turpitude, and must have the effect of barring or deterring the plaintiff from his action.’ [Cit.]” Frates, supra at 245 ; Hyman v. Jordan, 201 Ga. App. 852, 854 (2) ( 412 SE2d 615 ) (1991).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Brown v. Kinser
Ga. Ct. App. · 1995 · confidence medium
OCGA § 9-3-96 provides: “If the defendant or those under whom he claims are guilty of a fraud by which the plaintiff has been debarred or deterred from bringing an action, the period of limitation shall run only from the time of the plaintiff’s discovery of the fraud.” It was held in Findley v. Davis, 202 Ga. App. 332, 335 (2) (a) ( 414 SE2d 317 ), rev’d on other grounds, Davis v. Findley, 262 Ga. 612 ( 422 SE2d 859 ), that “ ‘ “[t]he fraud which will relieve the bar of the statute of limitation must be of that character which involves moral turpitude, and must have the effect o…
examined Cited as authority (rule) Long v. Wallace (3×) also: Cited "see"
Ga. Ct. App. · 1994 · confidence medium
Ballard v. Frey, 179 Ga. App. 455, 459 (3) ( 346 SE2d 893 ) (1986); Hamilton v. Powell, Goldstein, Frazer & Murphy, 167 Ga. App. 411, 412-413 ( 306 SE2d 340 ) (1983), aff’d 252 Ga. 149 ( 311 SE2d 818 ) (1984); OCGA [§] 9-3-25. . . .” Hyman v. Jordan, 201 Ga. App. 852, 853 (1), supra. Nevertheless, plaintiff Ms. Long contends that defendant committed separate subsequent acts of malpractice during his representation of Mr. Long by failing to urge his own ineffective assistance as a basis for new trial on direct appeal or in a petition for habeas corpus.
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
HYMAN
v.
JORDAN Et Al.
A91A1421.
Court of Appeals of Georgia.
Nov 18, 1991.
412 S.E.2d 615
Steve Hyman, pro se., Jordan & Jordan, Hill R. Jordan, H. Rhodes Jordan, pro se.
Pope, Birdsong, Cooper.
Cited by 6 opinions  |  Published
Pope, Judge.

On December 11, 1989, plaintiff filed this action alleging malpractice against attorneys Hill R. Jordan and H. Rhodes Jordan. As pertinent to this appeal, the facts show that in 1982, appellant/plaintiff[*853] Steve Hyman retained the services of Hill R. Jordan, Esq., to represent him in a breach of contract action Hyman wished to file against four defendants. Jordan subsequently filed a complaint on behalf of plaintiff against those defendants in the State Court of Gwinnett County styled Hyman v. Jessco Jewelry Mfg. Inc., Civil Action No. 84C-219-2 [hereinafter the “Jessco case”]. On November 22, 1985, Rhodes Jordan, Esq., who practiced with his son, Hill Jordan, executed a dismissal with prejudice of two of the defendants in the Jessco case on behalf of his son. At the time the elder Jordan executed the dismissal with prejudice, Hyman had not authorized their dismissal nor had Hill Jordan, Hyman’s counsel, authorized his father to execute such a dismissal.

Hill Jordan did not become aware of the dismissal of the two defendants in the Jessco case until April 1986. On April 23, 1986, Jordan moved to vacate the dismissal, but the trial court refused to consider the motion because it was not filed during the same term of court as the dismissal of the defendants.

In this case, all parties moved for summary judgment and the trial court granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment finding that the applicable statute of limitation had expired before Hyman filed this legal malpractice case on December 11, 1989. Plaintiff appeals from that order.

1. It is well-settled in this state that “[i]n a malpractice action for damages against an attorney, the statute of [limitation] runs from ‘the date of the breach of the duty and not from the time when the extent of the resulting injury is ascertained nor from the date of the client’s discovery of the error.’ Peppers v. Siefferman, 166 Ga. App. 389 (304 SE2d 511) (1983). See also Jankowski v. Taylor, Bishop & Lee, 154 Ga. App. 752 (269 SE2d 871) affirmed 246 Ga. 804 (273 SE2d 16) (1980).” Consolidated Mgmt. Svcs. v. Halligan, 186 Ga. App. 621, 622 (1) (368 SE2d 148) affirmed 258 Ga. 471 (369 SE2d 745) (1988). The statute of limitation on Hyman’s legal malpractice claim against the Jordans began to run on November 22, 1985, the date of the breach of duty, and the complaint was filed on December 11, 1989, more than four years from the date of the breach of duty. Thus, any claim Hyman might have against the Jordans in contract, subject to a four-year statute of limitation, or in tort, subject to a two-year statute of limitation, is time barred. Ballard v. Frey, 179 Ga. App. 455, 459 (3) (346 SE2d 893) (1986); Hamilton v. Powell, Goldstein, Frazer & Murphy, 167 Ga. App. 411, 412-413 (306 SE2d 340) (1983), aff’d 252 Ga. 149 (311 SE2d 818) (1984); OCGA §§ 9-3-25; 9-3-33.

2. Hyman argues that the statute of limitation should be tolled in this case because he contends the Jordans fraudulently concealed their breach of duty to him. “The statute of limitation [in a legal malpractice action] does not cease to run due to defendants’ alleged[*854] fraudulent concealment.” Peppers v. Siefferman, 166 Ga. App. 389 (1) (304 SE2d 511) (1983). “ ‘The fraud which will relieve the bar of the statute of limitation must be of that character which involves moral turpitude, and must have the effect of debarring or deterring the plaintiff from his action.’ Riddle v. Driebe, 153 Ga. App. 276, 280 (265 SE2d 92) [(1980)]; Frates v. Sutherland, Asbill & Brennan, 164 Ga. App. 243 (1), 245 (296 SE2d 788) [(1982)]. Since [Hyman in opposition to the Jordans’ motion for summary judgment] did not show that [he] was prevented or deterred by any act of [defendants] from discovering [their] alleged negligence or from bringing [his] malpractice action, there is nothing upon which [he] can base [his] claim of fraud and the statutes of limitation were not tolled. [Cit.]” Kilby v. Shepherd, 177 Ga. App. 462, 463 (339 SE2d 742) (1986).

Decided November 18, 1991. Steve Hyman, pro se. Jordan & Jordan, Hill R. Jordan, H. Rhodes Jordan, pro se.

3. In view of the foregoing holdings, the remaining enumerations of error need not be addressed.

Judgment affirmed.

Birdsong, P. J., and Cooper, J., concur.