United States v. Lynch, 132 F.2d 111 (3rd Cir. 1942). · Go Syfert
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United States v. Lynch, 132 F.2d 111 (3rd Cir. 1942). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
37 citation events (7 in the last 25 years) across 19 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Gary v. Nichols (tnwd, 2019-08-20)
Treatment trajectory · 1942 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1942 1984 2026
Statutes interpreted (leading-cases list)
#3 18 U.S.C. § 454 cited 1× in this case · 8 total citations of statute #7 18 U.S.C. § 565 cited 1× in this case · 15 total citations of statute
Top citers, strongest first. 13 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Gary v. Nichols
W.D. Tenn. · 2019 · confidence medium
Va. 2000) (citing United States v. Lynch, 132 F.2d 111, 112 (3d Cir. 1942) (explaining that the due-process right “to be present at all stages of the trial . . . has not been extended to include a right to be present at all motions hearings before the trial.” (internal quotation and citation omitted)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Leon Burke
6th Cir. · 2003 · confidence medium
See Diaz, 223 U.S. at 455 , 32 S.Ct. 250 ("In cases of felony our courts, with substantial accord, have regarded [the defendant's right to be present] as extending to every stage of the trial, inclusive of the empaneling of the jury and the reception of the verdict, and as being scarcely less important to the accused than the right of trial itself.” (emphasis added)); Lynch, 132 F.2d at 113 ("We do not understand that the right of a defendant to be present in court throughout his trial has ever been considered to embrace a right to be present also at the argument of motions prior to trial or…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Edelin
D.D.C. · 2003 · confidence medium
United States v. Lynch, 132 F.2d 111, 113 (3d Cir.1943); see also Snyder v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 107 , 54 S.Ct. 330 , 78 L.Ed. 674 (1934) (“The underlying principle gains point and precision from the distinction everywhere drawn between proceedings at the trial and those before and after.
cited Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Boyd
11th Cir. · 1997 · confidence medium
See, e.g., Council v. Clemmer, 177 F.2d 22, 24-25 (D.C.Cir.1949); United States v. Lynch, 132 F.2d 111, 113 (3d Cir.1942); Alexis v. United States, 129 F. 60, 64-65 (5th Cir.1904); see also L.S.
cited Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Boyd
11th Cir. · 1997 · confidence medium
Cir. 1949); United States v. Lynch, 132 F.2d 111, 113 (3d Cir. 1942); Alexis v. United States, 129 F. 60, 64-65 (5th Cir. 1904); see also L.S.
cited Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Calvin Maurice Boyd, A.K.A., \Mee Tee\" Pinkney Clowers
unknown court · 1997 · confidence medium
See, e.g., Council v. Clemmer, 177 F.2d 22, 24-25 (D.C.Cir.1949); United States v. Lynch, 132 F.2d 111, 113 (3d Cir.1942); Alexis v. United States, 129 F. 60, 64-65 (5th Cir.1904); see also L.S.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Gaddy v. State
Ala. Crim. App. · 1995 · confidence medium
In so holding, this court stated: "In United States v. Lynch, 132 F.2d 111, 113 (3d Cir.1942), cert. denied, 318 U.S. 777 , 63 S.Ct. 831 , 87 L.Ed. 1146 , it was held that the defendant's right to be present at his trial did not `embrace a right to be present also at the argument of motions prior to trial or subsequent to verdict.' Accord, Cuckovich v. United States, 170 F.2d 89 (6th Cir.1948); United States v. Makris, 398 F.Supp. 507 (S.D.Tex.1975).
cited Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Posey
C.D. Cal. · 1987 · confidence medium
Villarreal v. United States, 508 F.2d 1132, 1133-34 (9th Cir. 1974); accord Barnes v. United States, 579 F.2d 364, 365 (5th Cir.1978); United States v. Lynch, 132 F.2d 111, 113 (3d Cir.1942).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Singletary v. United States
D.C. · 1978 · confidence medium
Similarly, the notes of the Advisory Committee with respect to the federal rule indicate that the mandatory principle of Rule 43 “does not apply to hearing on motions made prior to or after trial.” 6 Original (1946) Advisory Committee Note to Fed.R.Cr.P. 43, citing United States v. Lynch, 132 F.2d 111, 113 (3d Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 318 U.S. 777 , 63 S.Ct. 831 , 87 L.Ed. 1146 (1943).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Frederick Schiavo. Appeal of Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc., and Susan q.stranahan. Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc., and Susan Q. Stranahan v. United States of America and Frederick Schiavo, and the Honorablej. William Ditter, Jr., Nominal
3rd Cir. · 1974 · confidence medium
Cf. United States v. Morgan, 346 U.S. 502, 506-513 , 74 S.Ct. 247 , 98 L.Ed. 248 (1954); 9 Moore's Federal Practice (2d ed.) 110.29; United States v. Steese, 144 F.2d 439, 442, 445-447 (3d Cir. 1944); United States v. Lynch, 132 F.2d 111, 113 (3d Cir. 1943) 11 See also Ashwander v. Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288, 345-348 , 56 S.Ct. 466 , 80 L.Ed. 688 (1936) (concurring opinion of Brandeis, J.); United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 340 , 92 S.Ct. 2125 , 32 L.Ed.2d 752 (1972) (concurring opinion of White, J.); Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 444-445 , 88 S.Ct. 664 , 19…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Schiavo
3rd Cir. · 1974 · confidence medium
Cf. United States v. Morgan, 346 U.S. 502, 506-513 , 74 S.Ct. 247 , 98 L.Ed. 248 (1954) ; 9 Moore’s Federal Practice (2d ed.) § 110.29; United States v. Steese, 144 F.2d 439, 442, 445-447 (3d Cir.1944) ; United States v. Lynch, 132 F.2d 111, 113 (3d Cir.1943). .
cited Cited "see" Courtney R. Logan v. State of Tennessee, et al.
M.D. Tenn. · 2026 · signal: see · confidence high
See United States v. Burke, 345 F.3d 416, 422 (6th Cir. 2003) (citing United States v. Lynch, 132 F.2d 111 (2d Cir. 1942)).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." United States v. Steese (2×)
3rd Cir. · 1944 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also the decision of this court in United States v. Lynch, 3 Cir., 132 F.2d 111, 113 .
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
United States
v.
Lynch
8126.
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.
Nov 27, 1942.
132 F.2d 111
Joseph P. Lynch, pro se., Cloyd Steininger, of Lewisburg, Pa., for appellant., Herman F. Reich, of Sunbury, Pa., for appellee.
Maris, Jones, Goodrich.
Cited by 30 opinions  |  Published
PER CURIAM.

After careful examination and consideration of the record before us on this appeal, we are unable to see wherein the District Court can be charged with error in denying the appellant’s “Motion to Vacate Judgment and Sentence”.

The motion is directed at a judgment of guilt entered by the court below on January 24, 1939, upon the defendant’s signed plea of guilt of murder in the second degree- and a sentence of twenty years servitude in a federal penitentiary duly imposed thereon. The indictment to which the defendant thus plead charged him with murder for a killing perpetrated while both he and the victim were inmates of the federal penitentiary at Lewisburg, Pennsylvania.

At the time the defendant signed and entered his plea of guilt, he was represented by able counsel of wide, experience in trial work whom the court had promptly appointed, six weeks earlier, on the defendant’s petition for assigned counsel because of poverty. Between the time of his counsel’s appointment and the date of the defendant’s plea, his counsel had conferred with him in the penitentiary at Lewisburg in preparation for trial on at least twenty-five separate occasions and at all times represented the defendant faithfully.

[*113] The defendant, who is now confined in the federal penitentiary at Alcatraz, California, filed the “Motion to Vacate Judgment and Sentence” in the court below, acting in propria persona, on April 24, 1942. The court, upon being informed of the pendency of the motion and after discussing with the United States attorney and the defendant’s formerly assigned counsel the matter raised thereby, entered an order on May 28, 1942, denying the motion for reasons stated. The present appeal followed, the defendant again acting in propria persona. The matter has been proceeded with both below and here in forma pauperis upon due allowance by the District Court.

No constitutional right of the defendant was violated by the court’s considering and disposing of the motion without summoning him to be present in court. We do not understand that the right of a defendant to be present in court throughout his trial has ever been considered to embrace a right to be present also at the argument of motions prior to trial or subsequent to verdict. See both majority and minority opinions in Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 54 S.Ct. 330, 78 L.Ed. 674, 90 A.L.R. 575.

Even if the motion be considered as a motion for a new trial, the time for filing had long since expired. See Rule 2 (2), Rules, Criminal Procedure after Plea, etc., 18 U.S.C.A. following section 688. Actually, there had been no occasion for moving timely for a new trial. The defendant’s conviction was adjudicated on the basis of his voluntary plea of guilt. But, passing those considerations, the matter which the defendant now assigns as justification for the killing does not qualify as after-discovered evidence. On his own showing, it was he who, at the time of his plea, deliberately chose not to disclose either to his counsel or to the court the provocation for the killing which he now alleges and which was as well known to him at the time of his plea as it is now. He preferred to accept sentence for the lesser degree of murder rather than to run the risk of two other possible eventualities (not including a possible conviction of first degree murder) which he says he anticipated and wished to avoid.

On the other hand, if the defendant’s motion be considered as in the nature of an application for a writ of error coram nobis because of new matter which, had it been made known timely to the court, would likely have inclined the court’s judgment in the defendant’s favor, still the trial court’s denial of the motion here involved would not constitute error. Such motions are not of right but are addressed to the court’s discretion which, on the record in this case, could not justly be said to have been abused.

The remaining reasons assigned by the appellant are equally without merit. The sentence of twenty years penal servitude was within the competence of the court to impose. Criminal Code, Section 275, 18 U.S.C.A. § 454. The suggestion that the trial court intended to impose the minimum sentence -(ten years), prescribed by the statute for second degree murder, but mistakenly named twenty years is sufficiently answered by the fact that the court below confirmed the intent of the original sentence when it denied the defendant’s motion to vacate wherein the same ground was advanced. In any event, the term of a sentence, so long as it is within the prescribed limits fixed by the relevant statute, is not open to review on appeal. Nor was the plea of guilt of murder in the second degree inconsistent with the charge in the indictment. The appellant was indicted for •murder and not for murder in the first degree as he erroneously conceives. A finding of guilt of murder in the lesser degree-upon an indictment for murder, which as is customary does not limit the degree, is legally permissible. R.S. § 1035, 18 U.S.C. A. § 565. The testimony of witnesses, relating to the killing, which the court received after the defendant’s plea of guilt, was in no sense a hearing for the adjudication of the defendant’s guilt. His plea, when accepted, concluded that matter. The-court merely sought to inform itself concerning the circumstances of the murder for its action upon the plea of guilt and in imposing sentence. The procedure was. within the court’s discretion and no abuse thereof appears.

The order of the District Court is affirmed.