Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co. v. Martin, 399 So. 2d 536 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981). · Go Syfert
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Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co. v. Martin, 399 So. 2d 536 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
26 citation events (3 in the last 25 years) across 6 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: White v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC (fladistctapp, 2015-03-25)
Treatment trajectory · 1981 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1981 2003 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 10 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (rule) White v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2015 · confidence medium
Co. v. Martin, 399 So.2d 536, 537 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981) (noting that “the numerous procedural defects in the arbitration and the circuit court proceedings below did not adversely affect the substantial rights of the appellant so as to interfere with an appropriate determination of the merits.”); see also Blatch v. Wesley, 238 So.2d 308, 309 (Fla. 3d DCA 1970) (holding the time set by Rule 1.510 is not jurisdictional and may be waived by a failure to object or move for a continuance); E. & I.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Costarell v. FLORIDA UNEMP. APPEALS COM'N (2×)
Fla. · 2005 · confidence medium
Co. v. Martin, 399 So.2d 536, 537 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981), review denied, 408 So.2d 1094 (Fla.1981).) Id. at 1209-10 (footnote omitted).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Dines v. FLA. UNEMPLOYMENT APPEALS COM'N
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1999 · confidence medium
Co. v. Martin, 399 So.2d 536, 537 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981), review denied, 408 So.2d 1094 (Fla.1981).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Savage v. MacY's East, Inc.
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1998 · confidence medium
Co. v. Martin, 399 So.2d 536, 537 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981), review denied, 408 So.2d 1094 (Fla.1981).) For these reasons, we order the Commission and the Department forthwith to pay Ms. Savage the benefits specified and to refund any benefits she may have previously repaid, with interest from the dates of our mandate and of any repayment, respectively.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Golden Door Jewelry Creations, Inc., a Corporation and Suisse Gold Assayer & Refinery, Inc., a Corporation, Leach & Garner Company, Plaintiff-Intervenor-Appellee, Westway Metals Corp., Plaintiff-Intervenor-Appellee, Capital Bank and Stern Metals, Inc., Plaintiffs-Intervenors v. Lloyds Underwriters Non-Marine Association, an Association Licensed to Underwrite Insurance in the State of Florida and Peter Frederick Wright, Sanford Credini and Lawrence Systems, Inc., Defendants-Intervenors. Leach & Garner Company v. Peter Frederick Wright, Cross-Appellee. Golden Door Jewelry Creations, Inc., a Corporation and Suisse Gold Assayer & Refinery, Inc., a Corporation, Leach & Garner Company, Plaintiff-Intervenor-Appellee, Westway Metals Corp., Plaintiff-Intervenor-Appellee, Capital Bank and Stern Metals, Inc., Plaintiffs-Intervenors v. Lloyds Underwriters Non-Marine Association, an Association Licensed to Underwrite Insurance in the State of Florida and Peter Frederick Wright, Sanford Credini and Lawrence Systems, Inc., Defendants-Intervenors. Leach & Garner Company v. Peter Frederick Wright
11th Cir. · 1993 · confidence medium
Co. v. Martin, 399 So.2d 536, 537 (Fla.3d DCA), rev. den'd, 408 So.2d 1094 (Fla.1981)); a mutually mistaken endorsement which inadvertently deleted fleet insurance coverage (Boston Old Colony Ins.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Golden Door Jewelry Creations, Inc. v. Lloyds Underwriters Non-Marine Ass'n
11th Cir. · 1993 · confidence medium
Co. v. Martin, 399 So.2d 536, 537 (Fla.3d DCA), rev. den’d, 408 So.2d 1094 (Fla.1981)); a mutually mistaken endorsement which inadvertently deleted fleet insurance coverage (Boston Old Colony Ins.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Pick v. Gilbert
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1992 · confidence medium
Casualty Co. v. Martin, 399 So.2d 536, 537 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981), rev. denied, 408 So.2d 1094 (Fla.1981); (b) the sums due the public adjuster responsible for securing the funds from the carrier were properly computed and awarded, see Government Employees Ins.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Allstate Insurance v. Ferrante
Conn. · 1986 · confidence medium
Finally, such cases as Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Co. v. Martin, 399 So. 2d 536, 537-38 (Fla. App. 1981), and Block v. Reliance Ins.
discussed Cited "see" Farm & City Insurance v. Stevens
Conn. · 1990 · signal: see · confidence high
Co., 120 N.H. 718, 721-22 , 422 A.2d 1312 (1980). ‘Intra-policy stacking is the aggregation of the limits of liability for uninsured-motorist coverage of each car covered in one policy, whereas inter-policy stacking involves the aggregation of coverage under more than one policy.’ Taft v. Cerwonka, 433 A.2d 215 , 217 n.3 (R.1.1981); see Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Co. v. Martin, 399 So. 2d 536 , 538 n.4 (Fla. App. 1981).” Nationwide Ins.
discussed Cited "see" Nationwide Insurance v. Gode (2×)
Conn. · 1982 · signal: see · confidence high
“Intra-policy stacking is the aggregation of the limits of liability for uninsured-motorist coverage of each car covered in one policy, whereas inter-poliey stacking involves the aggregation of coverage under more than one policy.” Taft v. Cerwonka, 433 A.2d 215 , 217 n.3 (R.I. 1981); see Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Co. v. Martin, 399 So. 2d 536 , 538 n.4 (Fla. App. 1981).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
LUMBERMENS MUTUAL CASUALTY COMPANY, Appellant,
v.
Francisco MARTIN, as Personal Representative of the Estate of Francisco Martin, Jr., Appellee.
80-414.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
Jun 16, 1981.
399 So. 2d 536
Hubbart, C.J., and Schwartz and Daniel S. Pearson.
Cited by 24 opinions  |  Published

[*537] Kimbrell, Hamann, Jennings, Womack, Carlson & Kniskern and W. Sam Holland, Miami, for appellant.

Greene & Cooper and Sharon L. Wolfe and Marc Cooper, Miami, Grover, Ciment, Weinstein & Stauber, Miami Beach, for appellee.

Before HUBBART, C.J., and SCHWARTZ and DANIEL S. PEARSON, JJ.

SCHWARTZ, Judge.

The insurer appeals from a judgment confirming a $50,000 arbitration award in an uninsured motorist-wrongful death case. We reject each of its arguments for reversal and hold that:

(a) The numerous procedural defects in the arbitration and the circuit court proceedings below did not adversely affect the substantial rights of the appellant so as to interfere with an appropriate determination of the merits,[1]Griffin v. Workman, 73 So.2d 844 (Fla. 1954); Kest v. Nathanson, 184 So.2d 690 (Fla. 4th DCA 1966); Section 682.14(1)(c), Florida Statutes (1979);

(b) In view of the clear and unrebutted testimony that a simple mistake had been made, the policy was properly reformed to change the named insured from Felix Martin to Francisco Martin, Sr., the father of the decedent, Francisco, Jr.; Poland v. Phillips, 371 So.2d 1053 (Fla.3d DCA 1979); Boston Old Colony Ins. Co. v. Popple, 305 So.2d 877 (Fla. 1st DCA 1974); see Hanover Ins. Co. v. Publix Market, Inc., 198 So.2d 346 (Fla. 4th DCA 1967); and

(c) Under the applicable pre- § 627.4132 law,[2] since Francisco, Jr. was a relative of the named insured residing in his household and therefore a "class one" additional insured,[3] the $15,000 UM limits[*538] for the four vehicles so-insured by the policy[4] were correctly stacked for a total of $60,000 in available coverage.

Affirmed.

1 The term "harmless error" may not be properly applied because, while several essentially immaterial flubs were committed by both sides and the arbitrators as well, the only one who did not err, harmlessly or otherwise, was the trial judge. Perhaps a new doctrine of "meaningless mistake" should instead be employed to describe the occurrences below.
2 See Dewberry v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 363 So.2d 1077 (Fla. 1978).
3 The controlling cases require stacking of coverage afforded either a named or a "class one" omnibus insured, e.g., United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Curry, 395 So.2d 530 (Fla. 1981), and cases cited; Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. Searle, 379 So.2d 131 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979), cert. denied, 388 So.2d 1118 (Fla. 1980); Florida Farm Bureau Casualty Co. v. Andrews, 369 So.2d 346 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978), cert. denied, 381 So.2d 764 (Fla. 1980), but preclude it as to coverage available only because the claimant is occupying an insured vehicle and is thus a so-called "class two" insured under Mullis v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., 252 So.2d 229 (Fla. 1971). Travelers Ins. Co. v. Pac, 337 So.2d 397 (Fla.2d DCA 1976), cert. denied, 351 So.2d 407 (Fla. 1977); Marks v. Travelers Indemnity Co., 339 So.2d 1123 (Fla.3d DCA 1976); Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Richendollar, 368 So.2d 603 (Fla.2d DCA 1979).

Citing Pac, Marks, and Richendollar, Lumbermens contends that stacking is never permitted when a "commercial," as opposed to a "personal," automobile policy is involved. We do not decide whether the instant policy (which insured, among others, several vehicles used by Martin, Sr. in his landscaping business) may properly be so characterized because the law of stacking draws no such distinction. Neither the nature and purpose of the insured vehicles nor the kind of policy involved makes any difference in deciding the stacking issue. Florida Farm Bureau Casualty Co. v. Andrews, supra (stacking required of coverage provided named insured for six pickup trucks insured in single "fleet" policy); see Cox v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., 378 So.2d 330 (Fla.2d DCA 1980), quoted with approval in Curry, supra. While there are some broad references, particularly in Marks, to the non-stackability of "commercial automobile" policies in general, the results in Pac, Marks, and Richendollar all turn on the fact that, in each case, the named insured was a corporation, and that neither the injured person nor anyone else could therefore qualify as a "class one" additional insured. In this case, in which the named insured is an individual and the claimant a "class one" resident relative, stacking is required.

4 The stacking concept clearly applies not only to separate policies but, as in this case, to the aggregation of the coverage applicable to each of multiple vehicles covered by a single policy. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. Searle, supra; Tucker v. Government Employees Ins. Co., 288 So.2d 238 (Fla. 1973); Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. Furman, 341 So.2d 1056 (Fla.3d DCA 1977); Florida Farm Bureau Casualty Co. v. Andrews, supra.

While the stacking of vehicles insured in one policy was precluded by § 627.4132, Fla. Stat. (1977), it has been restored as to UM coverage by Ch. 80-364, Laws of Fla., effective October 1, 1980. See South Carolina Ins. Co. v. Kokay, 398 So.2d 1355 (Fla. 1981).