green
Positive treatment
Quoted verbatim 5×
88.5 score
“we ... review the district court's exclusion of plaintiffs' expert's evidence ... for abuse of discretion, and then review de novo the grant of summary judgment based on the evidence properly before the district court”
Treatment trajectory · 2000 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
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Top citers, strongest first. 50 distinct citers.
How cited ↗
discussed
Cited as authority (verbatim quote)
Shonda Howard v. Universal Protection Service, LLC, et al.
district courts have considerable discretion in managing discovery.
discussed
Cited as authority (verbatim quote)
Greenberg v. Board of Supervisors of Louisiana University and Agricultural and Mechanical College
both the determination of reliability itself and the factors taken into account are left to the discretion of the district court consistent with its gatekeeping function under 702.
discussed
Cited as authority (verbatim quote)
Smith v. Mississippi Department of Child Protective Services
disparate treatment refers to deliberate dis- crimination in the terms or conditions of employment . . . on account of race, national origin, or gender.
discussed
Cited as authority (verbatim quote)
Tyler v. Union Oil Co of CA
both the determination of reliability itself and the factors taken into account are left to the discretion of the district court consistent with its gatekeeping function under fed. r. evid. 702.
examined
Cited as authority (verbatim quote)
DAVID A. HAMMOND v. COLEMAN COMPANY, The Coleman Company, Inc
we ... review the district court's exclusion of plaintiffs' expert's evidence ... for abuse of discretion, and then review de novo the grant of summary judgment based on the evidence properly before the district court
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
The Jones Company v. Signature Flight Support, LLC, ET AL.
“Both the determination of reliability itself and the factors taken into account are left to the discretion of the district court consistent with its gatekeeping function under [Rule] 702.” Munoz v. Orr, 200 F.3d 291, 301 (5th Cir. 2000).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
CARLA DeYOUNG, ET AL. v. GREATER BATON ROUGE ASSOCIATION OF REALTORS, INC., ET AL.
Co., 920 F.3d 890 , 909–10 (5th Cir. 2019), citing Munoz v. Orr, 200 F.3d 291, 299 (5th Cir. 2000).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Shawn Thomas and The Tabletop Adventure, LLC v. Leyline Publishing, LLC; Leyline Education, PLLC; Anthony Bean; and Alicia Figliuolo
Munoz v. Orr, 200 F.3d 291, 302 (5th Cir. 2000).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Harrison v. John W. Stone Oil Distributors, LLC
After filing his EEOC 1835299, at *4 (5th Cir. 2000) (cleaned up) (quoting Munoz v. Orr, 200 F.3d 291, 299 (5th Cir. 2000)); see Gen.
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Frazier v. Luther
Co., 920 F.3d 890, 909 (Sth Cir. 2019) (citing Munoz v. Orr, - 200 F.3d 291, 299 (Sth Cir. 2000)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Alexander v. Intracoastal Tug and Barge Company, L.L.C.
“Both the determination of reliability itself and the factors taken into account are left to the discretion of the district court consistent with its gatekeeping function under [Rule] 702.” Munoz v. Orr, 200 F.3d 291, 301 (5th Cir. 2000).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Puradigm LLC v. DBG Group Investments LLC
(2×)
also: Cited "see"
Munoz v. Orr, 200 F.3d 291, 302 (5th Cir. 2000).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Southern Oil of Louisiana LLC v. Alliance Offshore, L.L.C.
In that case, most of the safeguards provided for in Daubert are not as essential.7 Daubert’s binary choice—admit or 2 See Johnson v. Arkema, Inc. 685 F.3d 452, 459 (5th Cir. 2012) (citation omitted); Munoz v. Orr, 200 F.3d 291, 301 (5th Cir. 2000). 3 See Gen.
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Bardell v. Jefferson Prsh Sch Bd
Munoz v. Orr, 200 F.3d 291, 299 (5th Cir. 2000).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Ozuna v. Pena
The official comments explain that this “was made necessary by the courts that have failed to apply correctly the reliability standard of th[e] rule“14 Second, Rule 702(d) was amended to emphasize that an expert’s opinion “must stay within the bounds of what can be concluded from a reliable application of the expert’s basis and methodology.”15 8 Moore v. Ashland Chem., Inc., 151 F.3d 269, 276 (5th Cir.1998), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1064 (1999). 9 Munoz v. Orr, 200 F.3d 291, 301 (5th Cir. 2000); Ricks v. City of Alexandria, 2014 WL 4274144 , at *8 (W.D.La., 2014). 10 Bourjaily v. Uni…
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
In Re: The Matter of FMT Industries, LLC
“Both the determination of reliability itself and the factors taken into account are left to the discretion of the district court consistent with its gatekeeping function under [Rule] 702.” Munoz v. Orr, 200 F.3d 291, 301 (5th Cir. 2000).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Parmley v. Home Depot USA Inc
The Court agrees. “‘In considering a Rule 56(c) motion opposed by expert testimony, the trial court has broad discretion to rule on the admissibility of the expert’s evidence and may inquire into the reliability and foundation of any expert’s opinion.’” Munoz v. Orr, 200 F.3d 291, 301 (5th Cir. 2000) (alterations omitted) (quoting Washington v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 839 F.2d 1121, 1123 (5th Cir. 1988)).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Hebert v. BP America, Inc.
Select Plan, 167 F. App’x 377, 381 (5th Cir. 2006) (“[A] trial judge has ‘considerable leeway’ in determining ‘how to test an expert’s reliability.’” (quoting Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 152 )). 28 Munoz v. Orr, 200 F.3d 291, 301 (5th Cir. 2000). proposed opinion would assist the trier of fact to understand or determine a fact in issue.”29 The “helpfulness” prong is concerned with ensuring the expert testimony is not only scientifically reliable but also “relevant to the task at hand.”30 II.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Austin v. Sontheimer Offshore/Catering Co.
“Both the determination of reliability itself and the factors taken into account are left to the discretion of the district court consistent with its gatekeeping function under [Rule] 702.” Munoz v. Orr, 200 F.3d 291, 301 (5th Cir. 2000).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Stewart v. Gruber
Standard of Review Because this case involves the exclusion of expert reports and testimony for the purposes of a summary judgment determination, “the applicable standards of review overlap somewhat.” Munoz v. Orr, 200 F.3d 291, 300 (5th Cir. 2000).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Ikerd v. Berkshire Hathaway Homestate Insurance Company
“Both the determination of reliability itself and the factors taken into account are left to the discretion of the district court consistent with its gatekeeping function under [Rule] 702.” Munoz v. Orr, 200 F.3d 291, 301 (5th Cir. 2000).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
McDonald v. BP Exploration & Production, Inc.
“Both the determination of reliability itself and the factors taken into account are left to the discretion of the district court consistent with its gatekeeping function under [Rule] 702.” Munoz v. Orr, 200 F.3d 291, 301 (5th Cir. 2000).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Johnson v. BP Exploration & Production, Inc.
“Both the determination of reliability itself and the factors taken into account are left to the discretion of the district court consistent with its gatekeeping function under [Rule] 702.” Munoz v. Orr, 200 F.3d 291, 301 (5th Cir. 2000).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Morales v. McPherson Companies, Inc.
“Both the determination of reliability itself and the factors taken into account are left to the discretion of the district court consistent with its gatekeeping function under [Rule] 702.” Munoz v. Orr, 200 F.3d 291, 301 (5th Cir. 2000).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Dale Hartley v. University of Holy Cross
Disparate impact 10 See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-05 , 93 S.Ct. 1817, 1824-26 , 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973) (setting forth a three-part burden-shifting framework). 8 claims do not require proof of intent to discriminate; rather, “[such claims] focus on facially neutral employment practices that create such statistical disparities disadvantaging members of a protected group that they are ‘functionally equivalent to intentional discrimination.’” Munoz v. Orr, 200 F.3d 291, 299-300 (5th Cir. 2000) (quoting Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 987 , 108 S.Ct…
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Dale Hartley v. University of Holy Cross
Disparate impact 10 See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-05 , 93 S.Ct. 1817, 1824-26 , 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973) (setting forth a three-part burden-shifting framework). 8 claims do not require proof of intent to discriminate; rather, “[such claims] focus on facially neutral employment practices that create such statistical disparities disadvantaging members of a protected group that they are ‘functionally equivalent to intentional discrimination.’” Munoz v. Orr, 200 F.3d 291, 299-300 (5th Cir. 2000) (quoting Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 987 , 108 S.Ct…
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Bruton v. BP Exploration & Production, Inc.
Select Plan, 167 F. App’x 377, 381 (5th Cir. 2006) (“[A] trial judge has ‘considerable leeway’ in determining ‘how to test an expert’s reliability.’” (quoting Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 152 )). 26 Munoz v. Orr, 200 F.3d 291, 301 (5th Cir. 2000). 27 Bocanegra v. Vicmar Servs., Inc., 320 F.3d 581, 584 (5th Cir. 2003). expert testimony is not only scientifically reliable but also “relevant to the task at hand.”28 II.
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Bardell v. Jefferson Parish School Board
Dist., 448 F. App’x 485, 491 (5th Cir. 2011) (quoting Munoz v. Orr, 200 F.3d 291, 299 (5th Cir. 2000)).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Holmes v. Reddoch
“Both the determination of reliability itself and the factors taken into account are left to the discretion of the district court consistent with its gatekeeping function under [Rule] 702.” Munoz v. Orr, 200 F.3d 291, 301 (5th Cir. 2000).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Lighthouse Ranch for Boys, Inc. v. Safepoint Insurance Company
“Both the determination of reliability itself and the factors taken into account are left to the discretion of the district court consistent with its gatekeeping function under [Rule] 702.” Munoz v. Orr, 200 F.3d 291, 301 (5th Cir. 2000).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Simon v. Grand Isle Shipyard Inc.
“Both the determination of reliability itself and the factors taken into account are left to the discretion of the district court consistent with its gatekeeping function under [Rule] 702.” Munoz v. Orr, 200 F.3d 291, 301 (5th Cir. 2000).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Walker v. Upp
Unpublished opinions issued in or after 1996 are “not controlling precedent” except in limited circumstances, but they “may be persuasive authority.” Ballard v. Burton, 444 F.3d 391 , 401 n.7 (5th Cir. 2006). 4 Case: 22-60374 Document: 00516671431 Page: 5 Date Filed: 03/09/2023 No. 22-60374 which amounts to manifest error.” 3 We “then review de novo the grant of summary judgment based on the evidence properly before the district court.” 4 A. Exclusion of Dr. McNair The admissibility of expert evidence is governed by Rule 702 5 which permits opinion testimony from “[a] witness w…
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
In the Matter of Aries Marine Corporation
“Both the determination of reliability itself and the factors taken into account are left to the discretion of the district court consistent with its gatekeeping function under [Rule] 702.” Munoz v. Orr, 200 F.3d 291, 301 (5th Cir. 2000).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Perkins v. Management & Training Corporation
Disparate impact claims “focus on facially neutral employment practices that create such statistical disparities disadvantaging members of a protected group that they are functionally equivalent to intentional discrimination.” Munoz v. Orr, 200 F.3d 291, 299 (5th Cir. 2000).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Walker v. BP Exploration & Production, Inc.
“Both the determination of reliability itself and the factors taken into account are left to the discretion of the district court consistent with its gatekeeping function under [Rule] 702.” Munoz v. Orr, 200 F.3d 291, 301 (5th Cir. 2000).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Norwood v. BP America Production Company
“Both the determination of reliability itself and the factors taken into account are left to the discretion of the district court consistent with its gatekeeping function under [Rule] 702.” Munoz v. Orr, 200 F.3d 291, 301 (5th Cir. 2000).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Shearon v. BP Exploration & Production, Inc.
“Both the determination of reliability itself and the factors taken into account are left to the discretion of the district court consistent with its gatekeeping function under [Rule] 702.” Munoz v. Orr, 200 F.3d 291, 301 (5th Cir. 2000).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Milsap v. BP Exploration & Production, Inc.
“Both the determination of reliability itself and the factors taken into account are left to the discretion of the district court consistent with its gatekeeping function under [Rule] 702.” Munoz v. Orr, 200 F.3d 291, 301 (5th Cir. 2000).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Keller v. BP Exploration & Production, Inc.
“Both the determination of reliability itself and the factors taken into account are left to the discretion of the district court consistent with its gatekeeping function under [Rule] 702.” Munoz v. Orr, 200 F.3d 291, 301 (5th Cir. 2000).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Turner v. BP Exploration & Production, Inc.
“Both the determination of reliability itself and the factors taken into account are left to the discretion of the district court consistent with its gatekeeping function under [Rule] 702.” Munoz v. Orr, 200 F.3d 291, 301 (5th Cir. 2000).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Acosta v. Texas Department of Criminal Justice
Munoz v. Orr, 200 F.3d 291, 302 (5th Cir. 2000).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Harrison v. BP Exploration & Production, Inc.
Select Plan, 167 F. App’x 377, 381 (5th Cir. 2006) (“[A] trial judge has ‘considerable leeway’ in determining ‘how to test an expert’s reliability.’” (quoting Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 152 )). 23 Munoz v. Orr, 200 F.3d 291, 301 (5th Cir. 2000). 24 Bocanegra v. Vicmar Servs., Inc., 320 F.3d 581, 584 (5th Cir. 2003). 25 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 597 . of law.”26 “An issue is material if its resolution could affect the outcome of the action.”27 When assessing whether a material factual dispute exists, the Court considers “all of the evidence in the record but refrain[s] from maki…
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Martin v. Turnipseed
But a district court’s discretion is not unlimited, see 19 Case: 21-30475 Document: 00516378091 Page: 20 Date Filed: 06/30/2022 No. 21-30475 Munoz v. Orr, 200 F.3d 291, 305 (5th Cir. 2000), nor is it a talisman precluding otherwise appropriate mandamus relief, see In re Volkswagen, 545 F.3d at 311–12.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Harrison v. BP Exploration & Production, Inc.
Select Plan, 167 F. App’x 377, 381 (5th Cir. 2006) (“[A] trial judge has ‘considerable leeway’ in determining ‘how to test an expert’s reliability.’” (quoting Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 152 )). 23 Munoz v. Orr, 200 F.3d 291, 301 (5th Cir. 2000). 24 Bocanegra v. Vicmar Servs., Inc., 320 F.3d 581, 584 (5th Cir. 2003). 25 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 597 . 26 FED.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Brown v. Alabama Great Southern Railroad Company
“Both the determination of reliability itself and the factors taken into account are left to the discretion of the district court consistent with its gatekeeping function under [Rule] 702.” Munoz v. Orr, 200 F.3d 291, 301 (5th Cir. 2000).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Lewis v. Cain
Dr. Mathis’ expert report addresses the current delivery of clinical care, specialty care services, infirmary and inpatient care, sick call, emergency care, the Assessment 4 Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171 (1987). 5 Moore v. Ashland Chemical, Inc., 151 F.3d 269, 276 (5th Cir.1998), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1064 (1999). 6 Munoz v. Orr, 200 F.3d 291, 301 (5th Cir. 2000); Ricks v. City of Alexandria, 2014 WL 4274144 , at *8 (W.D.La., 2014). 7 Fed.R.Evid. 702 advisory committee’s note. and Triage Unit (“ATU”) and medical leadership and organizational structure, including mortality r…
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Lewis v. Cain
Evid. 702; Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). 10 Moore v. Ashland Chemical, Inc., 151 F.3d 269, 276 (5th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1064 (1999). 11 Munoz v. Orr, 200 F.3d 291, 301 (5th Cir. 2000); Ricks v. City of Alexandria, 2014 WL 4274144 , at *8 (W.D.
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Dickson v. Bosworth Company, Ltd.
Evid. 702.” Id. at * 3 (quoting Munoz v. Orr, 200 F.3d 291, 301 (5th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 812 (2000)).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Novelozo v. BP Exploration & Production Inc.
“Both the determination of reliability itself and the factors taken into account are left to the discretion of the district court consistent with its gatekeeping function under [Rule] 702.” Munoz v. Orr, 200 F.3d 291, 301 (5th Cir. 2000).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Jesus G. Munoz; Manual Munoz, Jr
v.
Verne Orr; Et Al
v.
Verne Orr; Et Al
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
_______________________
No. 97-50736
_______________________
JESUS G. MUNOZ; MANUAL MUNOZ, JR.,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
VERNE ORR; ET AL.,
Defendants,
SHEILA E. WIDNALL, Secretary of the
United States Department of the Air Force,
Defendant-Appellee.
---------------------------------
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Texas
(SA-85-CV-2991)
---------------------------------
October 7, 1998
Before JOLLY, BARKSDALE, and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges.
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
_______________________
No. 97-50736
_______________________
JESUS G. MUNOZ; MANUAL MUNOZ, JR.,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
VERNE ORR; ET AL.,
Defendants,
SHEILA E. WIDNALL, Secretary of the
United States Department of the Air Force,
Defendant-Appellee.
---------------------------------
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Texas
(SA-85-CV-2991)
---------------------------------
October 7, 1998
Before JOLLY, BARKSDALE, and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
The plaintiffs in a Title VII class action filed on behalf of Hispanic male civilian employees at the Kelly Air Force Base in San Antonio appeal a summary judgment order dismissing all of their claims. Based upon the district court’s failure to state its reasons for granting summary judgment, we remand to the district court for the limited purpose of explaining the rationale for its decision.
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the Court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
This suit, now almost thirteen years old, involves a complex statistical claim alleging that facially neutral Air Force employment procedures illegally disfavor the promotion of Hispanic males in civilian positions. The appellants have relied almost exclusively upon testimony and reports by a single expert, Dr. George Benz, to support their claim. The Air Force has sought to discredit Dr. Benz’s analysis by challenging its reliability and countering it with statistical evidence from other experts.
After the close of discovery, the Air Force moved for summary judgment on all of the appellants’ claims, providing three bases upon which its motion could be granted. First, the Air Force argued that the court should rule the evidence from Dr. Benz inadequate to support a prima facie case of discrimination and thus find there was no genuine issue as to a material fact to take to trial. Second, the Air Force argued that the court should exclude the evidence from Dr. Benz as inadmissible under the reliability standards articulated in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993), leaving the appellants without any evidence in support of their claim. Third, the Air Force argued that the district court should, relying upon dicta in earlier decisions of this court that have suggested the possibility of a different summary judgment standard in nonjury cases, grant summary judgment based upon its own factual finding that Dr. Benz’s testimony would not be convincing at trial. In its order dated July 28, 1997, the district court granted the Air Force’s motion without providing any discussion of which of these three reasons, or any other reasons, it had adopted in reaching its decision.
[*2]Although Fed.R.Civ.P. 56 does not expressly require that a grant of summary judgment be supported with a statement of reasons, the district court’s failure to provide any reasons leaves us “unable to perform our coordinate role of reviewing the decision of the district court because we cannot tell whether the court properly evaluated all of the potentially relevant evidence.” Wildbur v. Arco Chemical Co., 974 F.2d 631, 645 (5th Cir. 1992). “‘When . . . we have no basis for a district court’s decision, because its reasoning is vague or simply left unsaid, there is little opportunity for effective review. In such cases, we have not hesitated to remand the case for an illumination of the court’s analysis through some formal or informal statement of reasons.’” McInrow v. Harris County, 878 F.2d 835, 836 (5th Cir. 1989) (quoting Myers v. Gulf Oil Corp., 731 F.2d 281, 284 (5th Cir. 1984)); see also Davis v. Bayless, 70 F.3d 367, 376 (5th Cir. 1995) (“[W]e have required that the district court explain its reasons in sufficient detail to allow this Court to determine whether the district court applied the proper legal rule.”).
The Air Force argues that we need not remand to the district court in this instance because it was “utterly apparent” from the context of the ruling that the basis for the district court’s order was the exclusion of Dr. Benz’s testimony. Because we have absolutely no indication from the district court that it intended to exclude Dr. Benz’s testimony and because it was only one of the possible grounds for summary judgment proffered by the Air Force in its brief, we do not find the district court’s reasoning so apparent.
[*3]For the foregoing reasons, we retain jurisdiction over this case but make a limited remand to the district court for the sole purpose of providing us with a statement of reasons for its grant of summary judgment. Upon being provided with those reasons, we will consider any requests by the parties to file supplemental briefs addressing any aspect of those reasons not already addressed in their earlier briefs to this court.
REMANDED.
[*4]