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Van Wagner v. State, 677 So. 2d 314 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
“to establish a violation of probation, the prosecution must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that a probationer willfully violated a substantial condition of probation.”
76 citation events (62 in the last 25 years) across 5 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Lydia Ann Rush v. State of Florida (fladistctapp, 2016-08-15)
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discussed Cited as authority (verbatim quote) Lydia Ann Rush v. State of Florida
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2016 · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
where a probationer makes reasonable efforts to comply with a condition of probation, violation of the condition cannot be deemed 'willful.
discussed Cited as authority (verbatim quote) Haywood v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2008 · signal: see · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
where a probationer makes reasonable efforts to comply with a condition of probation, violation of the condition cannot be deemed willful.
discussed Cited as authority (verbatim quote) Marzendorfer v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2007 · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
to establish a violation of probation, the prosecution must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that a probationer willfully violated a substantial condition of probation.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Fernard George Ramcald, Jr. v. State of Florida
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2025 · confidence medium
In Prickett there is one mention of “competent, substantial evidence,” and it is in a parenthetical tied to the panel’s citation to Van Wagner v. State, 677 So. 2d 314, 317 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) McCray, Terrelance v. Florida Department of Corrections
S.D. Fla. · 2024 · confidence medium
A search of 4 Under Florida law, the State cannot establish a probation violation unless it proves “by a preponderance of the evidence that [the] probationer willfully violated a substantial condition of probation.” Van Wagner v. State, 677 So. 2d 314, 316 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Junk v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2017 · confidence medium
Van Wagner v. State, 677 So.2d 314, 316 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) David Lee Brown v. State of Florida
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2017 · confidence medium
Analysis “ ‘To establish a violation of probation, the prosecution must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that a probationer willfully violated a substantial condition of probation.’ ” White v. State, 76 So.3d 410, 411 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012) (quoting Van Wagner v. State, 677 So.2d 314, 316 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Rush v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2016 · confidence medium
See State v. Carter, 835 So.2d 259, 261 (Fla.2002) (“Trial courts must consider each violation on a case-by-case basis for a determination of whether, under the facts and circumstances, a particular violation is willful and substantial and is supported by the greater weight of the evidence.”); Van Wagner v. State, 677 So.2d 314, 317 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996) (‘Where a probationer makes reasonable efforts to comply with a condition of probation, violation of the condition cannot be deemed ‘willful.’ ”).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Marcus White v. State of Florida
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2015 · confidence medium
Prickett v. State, 895 So.2d 538, 534 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005); Van Wagner v. State, 677 So.2d 314, 317 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Warner v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2015 · confidence medium
“To establish a violation of probation, the prosecution must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that a probationer willfully violated a substantial condition of probation.” Van Wagner v. State, 677 So.2d 314, 316 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Tyson v. State (2×) also: Cited "see"
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2015 · confidence medium
However, “[t]o establish a violation of probation, the prosecution must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that a probationer willfully violated a substantial condition of probation.” Van Wagner v. State, 677 So.2d 314, 316 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) James Arlie Tyson v. State of Florida (2×) also: Cited "see"
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2015 · confidence medium
However, “[t]o establish a violation of probation, the prosecution must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that a probationer willfully violated a substantial condition of probation.” Van Wagner v. State, 677 So.2d 314, 316 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Randolph Alex Lawhorn v. State of Florida
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2014 · confidence medium
While “[t]he trial court is vested with broad discretion to determine whether a probationer has violated a condition of probation,” Williamson v. State, 43 So.3d 843, 845 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010), “[t]o establish a violation of probation, the prosecution must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that a probationer willfully violated a substantial condition of probation.” Van Wagner v. State, 677 So.2d 314, 316 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996) (citing Salzano v. State, 664 So.2d 23 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995); Thorpe v. State, 642 So.2d 629, 629 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994)); see also Lindsay v. State, 54 So.3d 638 (F…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Savage v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2013 · confidence medium
See, e.g., Carter, 835 So.2d at 262 ; Russell v. State, 982 So.2d 642, 646 (Fla.2008) (citing Carter and holding that “the trial court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the evidence was legally sufficient to sustain a violation of probation”); Lawson v. State, 969 So.2d 222, 237 (Fla.2007) (citing Carter; applying abuse of discretion standard to factual finding of willful and substantial violation); Selig v. State, 112 So.3d 746, 749 (Fla. 2d DCA 2013) (citing Carter; holding that trial court abused its discretion in finding willful and substantial violation); Brown v. State,…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Knite v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2012 · confidence medium
Violations for “Associating] with any Person Engaged in Criminal Activity” and “Visiting] Places where Intoxicants, Drugs, or Other Dangerous Substances are Unlawfully Sold, Dispensed or Used” “ ‘To establish a violation of probation, the prosecution must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that a probationer willfully violated a substantial condition of probation.’ ” Lindsay v. State, 54 So.3d 638, 639 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011) (quoting Van Wagner v. State, 677 So.2d 314, 316 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) McPeek v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2011 · confidence medium
“To establish a violation of probation, the prosecution must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that a probationer willfully violated a substantial condition of probation.” Van Wagner v. State, 677 So.2d 314, 316 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996) (citing Salzano v. State, 664 So.2d 23 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Lindsay v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2011 · confidence medium
While “[t]he trial court is vested with broad discretion to determine whether a probationer has violated a condition of probation,” Williamson v. State, 43 So.3d 843, 845 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010), “[t]o establish a violation of probation, the prosecution must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that a probationer willfully violated a substantial condition of probation.” Van Wagner v. State, 677 So.2d 314, 316 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996) (citing Salzano v. State, 664 So.2d 23 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995); Thorpe v. State, 642 So.2d 629, 629 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Corker v. State (2×)
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2010 · confidence medium
"To establish a violation of probation, the prosecution must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that a probationer willfully violated a substantial condition of probation." Van Wagner v. State, 677 So.2d 314, 316 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996) (citing Salzano v. State, 664 So.2d 23 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Deese v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2010 · confidence medium
“To establish a violation of probation, the prosecution must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that a probationer willfully violated a substantial condition of probation.” Van Wagner v. State, 677 So.2d 314, 316 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996)(citing Salzano v. State, 664 So.2d 23 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995)); Michael .
discussed Cited as authority (rule) J.A.B. v. State
Fla. · 2010 · confidence medium
We note, however, that in any subsequent enforcement proceeding brought by the State, the prosecution would have to prove that the “ ‘probationer willfully violated a substantial condition of probation.’” E.P. v. State, 901 So.2d 193, 195 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005) (quoting Van Wagner v. State, 677 So.2d 314, 316 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) JAB v. State
Fla. · 2010 · confidence medium
We note, however, that in any subsequent enforcement proceeding brought by the State, the prosecution would have to prove that the "`probationer willfully violated a substantial condition of probation.'" E.P. v. State, 901 So.2d 193, 195 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005) (quoting Van Wagner v. State, 677 So.2d 314, 316 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996)).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Odom v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2009 · confidence medium
Van Wagner v. State, 677 So.2d 314, 317 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Michael v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2008 · confidence medium
"To establish a violation of probation, the prosecution must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that a probationer willfully violated a substantial condition of probation." Van Wagner v. State, 677 So.2d 314, 316 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996) (citing Salzano v. State, 664 So.2d 23 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Easterling v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2008 · confidence medium
Van Wagner v. State, 677 So.2d 314, 317 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996) (holding where a probationer makes reasonable efforts to comply with a condition of probation, the violation cannot be deemed willful).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Brown v. McNeil
M.D. Fla. · 2008 · confidence medium
See Vitek, 445 U.S. at 488 , 100 S.Ct. 1254 ; Ellard, 824 F.2d at 942 (“once a state has created the right ... and has established standards for its revocation, the prisoner’s interest has real substance and falls within the protections of the [Fourteenth [Ajmendment”) (internal quotations and citations omitted); Smith v. Florida Parole Comm’n, 971 So.2d 1028 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008) (remanding for further proceedings where, notwithstanding petitioner’s guilty plea as to curfew violation, Parole Commission failed to make findings as to whether violation was willful or substantial); Van Wa…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Bowman v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2008 · confidence medium
To establish a violation of probation, the State bears the burden of proving "by a preponderance of the evidence that a probationer willfully violated a substantial condition of probation." Van Wagner v. State, 677 So.2d 314, 316 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Campbell v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2006 · confidence medium
The State has the burden to "prove by a preponderance of the evidence that a probationer willfully violated a substantial condition of probation." Van Wagner v. State, 677 So. 2d 314, 316 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Rochell v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2006 · confidence medium
“Where a probationer makes reasonable efforts to comply with a condition of probation, violation of the condition cannot be deemed ‘willful.’ ” Van Wagner v. State, 677 So.2d 314, 317 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996) (citing Thorpe v. State, 642 So.2d 629 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Stewart v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2006 · confidence medium
Trial courts are not without discretion in revoking probation, see Bernhardt v. State, 288 So.2d 490, 495 (Fla. 1974); Van Wagner v. State, 677 So.2d 314, 317 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996), and presumably in revoking community control, as well.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Ellis v. FLORIDA PAROLE COM'N
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2005 · signal: cf. · confidence medium
Cf. Van Wagner v. State, 677 So.2d 314, 316 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) E.P. v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2005 · confidence medium
“To establish a violation of probation, the prosecution must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that a probationer willfully violated a substantial condition of probation.” Van Wagner v. State, 677 So.2d 314, 316 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996); see also W.B.S. v. State, 851 So.2d 802 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003); Jones v. State, 730 So.2d 349 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) EP v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2005 · confidence medium
"To establish a violation of probation, the prosecution must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that a probationer willfully violated a substantial condition of probation." Van Wagner v. State, 677 So.2d 314, 316 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996); see also W.B.S. v. State, 851 So.2d 802 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003); Jones v. State, 730 So.2d 349 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Bland v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2005 · confidence medium
Van Wagner v. State, 677 So.2d 314, 317 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Smith v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2004 · confidence medium
Van Wagner v. State, 677 So.2d 314, 317 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996); see also State v. Carter, 835 So.2d 259, 261 (Fla.2002) (stating that before revoking probation, the trial court must determine whether the probationer has made "reasonable efforts to comply with the terms and conditions of his or her probation").
cited Cited as authority (rule) Johnson v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2004 · confidence medium
Van Wagner v. State, 677 So.2d 314, 316 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Mitchell v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2004 · confidence medium
"To establish a violation of probation, the prosecution must prove ... that a probationer willfully violated a substantial condition of probation." Lynom v. State, 816 So.2d 1218 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002) (citing Van Wagner v. State, 677 So.2d 314, 316 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996)).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Lynom v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2002 · confidence medium
Van Wagner v. State, 677 So.2d 314, 316 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Meade v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2001 · confidence medium
"Where a probationer makes reasonable efforts to comply with a condition of probation, violation of the condition cannot be deemed `willful.'" Van Wagner v. State, 677 So.2d 314, 317 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Crume v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1997 · confidence medium
Van Wagner v. State, 677 So.2d 314, 316 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996); Kolovrat v. State, 574 So.2d 294, 297 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Davis v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1997 · confidence medium
Van Wagner v. State, 677 So.2d 314, 317 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996).
cited Cited "see" Carter v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2011 · signal: see · confidence high
See Van Wagner v. State, 677 So.2d 314, 316 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996).
cited Cited "see" Melton v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2011 · signal: see · confidence high
See Van Wagner v. State, 677 So.2d 314, 316 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996).
cited Cited "see" Mier v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2011 · signal: see · confidence high
See Van Wagner v. State, 677 So.2d 314, 817 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996); Burgin v. State, 628 So.2d 575, 576 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993).
discussed Cited "see" Faircloth v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2010 · signal: see · confidence high
See State v. Carter, 835 So.2d 259, 262 (Fla.2002) (recognizing that the “trial court has broad discretion to determine whether there has been a willful and substantial violation of a term of probation and whether such a violation has been demonstrated by the greater weight of the evidence” (citing Van Wagner v. State, 677 So.2d 314 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996))).
cited Cited "see" CHEEVES v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2009 · signal: see · confidence high
See Van Wagner v. State, 677 So.2d 314, 316 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996).
cited Cited "see" Mathis v. FLORIDA PAROLE COM'N
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2006 · signal: see · confidence high
See Van Wagner v. State, 677 So.2d 314, 316 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996).
discussed Cited "see" Prickett v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2005 · signal: see · confidence high
See Van Wagner v. State, 677 So.2d 314, 317 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996) (holding that, while a trial court has broad discretion to determine whether a term of probation has been violated, findings of fact must rest on competent, substantial evidence).
cited Cited "see" Hicks v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2004 · signal: see · confidence high
See Van Wagner v. State, 677 So.2d 314, 316 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996).
discussed Cited "see" Boatwright v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2003 · signal: see · confidence high
See VanWagner v. State, 677 So.2d 314 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996); Johnson v. State, 668 So.2d 240 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996); Tobias v. State, 641 So.2d 194 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994); Shaw v. State, 391 So.2d 754 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980); see also Navedo v. State, 847 So.2d 585 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003)(voluntary surrender at 2:50 p.m. rather than 9:00 a.m. as agreed, de minimis deviation which did not vitiate agreement to mitigate sentence); Amaya v. State, 653 So.2d 1112 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995)(same; surrender at 3:30 p.m. rather than 9:00 a.m. as provided by plea bargain).
cited Cited "see" Parker v. State
Fla. · 2003 · signal: see · confidence high
See Van Wagner v. State, 677 So.2d 314 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996); Harris v. State, 610 So.2d 36 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Bruce P. VAN WAGNER, Appellant,
v.
STATE of Florida, Appellee.
95-1375.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
Apr 12, 1996.
677 So. 2d 314
Benton.
Cited by 68 opinions  |  Published
Pinpoint authority: bottom 48%

[*315] Nancy A. Daniels, Public Defender; Jamie Spivey, Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant.

Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General; Trisha E. Meggs and Amelia L. Beisner, Assistant Attorneys General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.

BENTON, Judge.

Bruce P. Van Wagner appeals the trial court's decision finding him guilty of willful and substantial violations of the terms of his probation; and also contends that the sentence pronounced after revocation of probation was unlawful. We reverse the order revoking appellant's probation, which renders the sentencing issue moot.

After serving time in prison for trafficking in cocaine, appellant began a probationary term that was interrupted when he was rejailed on the filing of an initial affidavit alleging a violation of probation. Kimber Glesenkamp, a probation officer in Pinellas County, supervised him till the rejailing. While he was released on his own recognizance pending the hearing on the initial affidavit, he was under the supervision of Jeff Hogan, a probation officer in Columbia County. At the hearing on the initial affidavit, appellant's probationary term was extended until January 19, 1999, and he was again released on probation.

A second affidavit of violation of probation, filed December 27, 1994, framed the issues that were decided in the order under review. This affidavit alleged that appellant violated conditions of his (extended) probation because he "did not provide a verifiable residence to Correctional Probation Officer Kimber Glesenkamp of the Pasadena Probation and Parole Office in Pinellas County, Florida," in violation of condition three;[1] and "in that ... Kimber Glesenkamp ... instructed [appellant] to contact Aaron Roberts in the Lake City Probation Office immediately, and, as of ... December 13, 1994, [appellant] ha[d] neglected [to] contact this officer, and his whereabouts [we]re unknown," in violation of condition eight.[2] (Aaron Roberts, a probation officer in Columbia County, drafted, signed, and filed the affidavit.)

At the revocation hearing, appellant testified that he lost both his apartment and his job when he was jailed (before his release on his own recognizance) pending the hearing at which his probation was extended. He also testified that, before he left the courtroom on the day his probation was extended, he spoke to Mr. Hogan, the probation officer in Lake City who had supervised him while he was released on his own recognizance.[*316] (Mr. Hogan did not testify at the revocation hearing.) According to appellant, Mr. Hogan, who allegedly knew appellant was from St. Petersburg and that he had been supervised there before his rejailing, told him to contact his "regular probation officer." Mr. Van Wagner testified that he took that to mean Ms. Glesenkamp, whom he contacted promptly upon his arrival in St. Petersburg, some two weeks after extension of his probation.

Mr. Van Wagner testified that he informed Ms. Glesenkamp where he was living as soon as he acquired a new place to live early in January of 1995, but that by then (unbeknownst to him) the second affidavit of violation of probation had already been filed. He acknowledged that Ms. Glesenkamp instructed him to contact Aaron Roberts in Lake City. He testified that he was unable to comply with this instruction because collect calls to the Lake City probation office were refused, and he had no money and no telephone from which to make long-distance calls until early in January of 1995. He also testified that he made several collect calls to a friend in Lake City, Polly Johnson, in an effort to contact Mr. Roberts through her.

Appellant's testimony was unrebutted in all material respects. Mr. Roberts testified that, although he never had direct contact with Mr. Van Wagner, he received telephone calls from Kimber Glesenkamp reporting that appellant had contacted her and was in St. Petersburg. Mr. Roberts also testified that Polly Johnson made several attempts to reach him at the probation office, but that by the time he and Ms. Johnson spoke to each other in January of 1995, the violation affidavit had been filed and the arrest warrant had issued.

Ms. Glesenkamp testified that Mr. Van Wagner contacted her on November 30, 1994, and told her he had been "transferred" to St. Petersburg. Finding no "transfer paperwork," she testified she telephoned the Lake City probation office and made inquiry. She also testified that she instructed appellant on several occasions to contact Aaron Roberts in Lake City, but she conceded that appellant explained to her his difficulty in getting in touch with Mr. Roberts, and she confirmed that the Lake City probation office would not accept collect calls.

In response to requests for a definite home address, Ms. Glesenkamp testified, appellant first told her he had no residence or stable employment and was going from job to job and place to place, working and staying with friends. But she testified that, on January 11, 1995, appellant came to her office and provided an address.[3] She did not testify that she withheld consent for any change of residence.

Revocation of probation is appropriate when a probationer violates "his probation... in a material respect." § 948.06(3), Fla.Stat.(1995). While it has been said that a "trial court has the inherent power to revoke probation for misconduct which demonstrates the probationer's unfitness for probation." Washington v. State, 579 So.2d 400, 401 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991), most cases reflect the view that "[p]robation may be revoked only upon a showing that the probationer deliberately and willfully violated one or more conditions of probation." Steiner v. State, 604 So.2d 1265, 1267 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992). We do not, in any event, believe the second affidavit alleges misconduct demonstrating appellant's unfitness for probation.

To establish a violation of probation, the prosecution must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that a probationer willfully violated a substantial condition of probation. Salzano v. State, 664 So.2d 23 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995); Thorpe v. State, 642 So.2d 629, 629 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994) ("Where a probationer has made reasonable efforts to comply with the terms of probation, his or her failure to do so has been held not to be willful."). See also Washington v. State, 667 So.2d 255 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995) (finding no "willful and substantial" violation of probation); Carter v. State, 659 So.2d 453 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995) (same); Green v. State, 620 So.2d 1126 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993) (unemployed probationer[*317] unable to make restitution not guilty of willful violation); White v. State, 619 So.2d 429, 431 (Fla. 1st DCA), review denied, 626 So.2d 208 (Fla.1993) (probationer who failed to perform community service had reported "to the community service worksite many times").

"Any violation triggering a revocation of probation must be `willful' and `substantial,' Young v. State, 566 So.2d 69, 70 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990)." Rainer v. State, 657 So.2d 1230, 1230 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995) (failure to complete drug rehabilitation program not shown to be willful); Bell v. State, 643 So.2d 674 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994); Kolovrat v. State, 574 So.2d 294 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991) (unemployed probationer's failure to make restitution not shown to be willful); Drayton v. State, 490 So.2d 229, 230 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986) ("no evidence from which the trial court could properly conclude that appellant had the ability to file the monthly report but willfully failed to do so").

Where a probationer makes reasonable efforts to comply with a condition of probation, violation of the condition cannot be deemed "willful." Thorpe; Stevens v. State, 599 So.2d 254 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992) (probationer's unsuccessful, "quixotic and inept" attempt to attend classes for sex offenders precluded finding of willful violation of probationary term requiring attendance); Jacobsen v. State, 536 So.2d 373 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988) (defendant's failure to leave county by a specified time not grounds for revocation when he made reasonable efforts to comply); Shaw v. State, 391 So.2d 754 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980) (no willful violation of condition requiring personal delivery of a report when timely completed report was not delivered because of probationer's lack of transportation and subsequent incarceration for an unrelated offense); Gardner v. State, 365 So.2d 1053 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978) (no willful violation of condition that probationer leave Florida proven because his car broke down).

A "trial court has broad discretion to determine whether a term of probation has been violated...." Harris v. State, 610 So.2d 36, 37 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992). "The standard of review for probation revocation orders is whether the trial court abused its discretion. Steiner v. State, 604 So.2d 1265, 1267 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992.)" Bell v. State, 643 So.2d 674, 675 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994). On this record, however, we conclude the trial court did abuse its discretion because the record does not support a finding that any violation was willful and substantial. Harris; Hightower v. State, 529 So.2d 726, 727 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988).

The evidence does not establish appellant's willful noncompliance with Ms. Glesenkamp's instructions. Through Ms. Johnson, he made repeated, although unsuccessful, attempts to establish communication with Mr. Roberts prior to the filing of the affidavit of violation of probation. While for a time he had no fixed abode and no address to give, he did not withhold information he had from Ms. Glesenkamp. Nor was it shown that he made any change of residence without her consent. Appellant's penury, homelessness, and unemployment were not intentional, as far as the record shows.

Accordingly, the order revoking probation is reversed, and the sentence imposed after revocation is vacated.

JOANOS and VAN NORTWICK, JJ., concur.

1 Condition three provides:

(3) You will not change your residence or employment or leave the county of your residence without first procuring the consent of your probation officer.

2 Condition eight provides:

(8) You will promptly and truthfully answer all inquiries directed to you by the Court or the probation officer, and allow the Officer to visit in your home, at your employment site or elsewhere, and you will comply with all instructions he/she may give you.

3 Van Wagner gave his address as "around one hundred and thirty-seventhish Madeira Beach behind the candy store." From his description, Ms. Glesenkamp found the building in which he lived without difficulty.