State v. Carter, 835 So. 2d 259 (Fla. 2002). · Go Syfert
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State v. Carter, 835 So. 2d 259 (Fla. 2002). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
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cited 2× by 2 distinct cases, 2008–2025 · 2 courts · …the trial court is in a better position to identify the probation violator's motive, intent, and attitude and assess whether the violation is both willful and substantial. at p. 262 ✓
163 citation events (163 in the last 25 years) across 3 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Brittany Nichole Rossi v. State of Florida (fladistctapp, 2025-07-16)
Treatment trajectory · 2002 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
2002 2014 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 50 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (verbatim quote) Brittany Nichole Rossi v. State of Florida
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2025 · signal: see · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
the trial court is in a better position to identify the probation violator's motive, intent, and attitude and assess whether the violation is both willful and substantial.
examined Cited as authority (verbatim quote) SHAYEON SWAIN v. THE STATE OF FLORIDA (2×)
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2023 · signal: see · quote attribution · 2 verbatim quotes · confidence high
the trial court has broad discretion to determine whether there has been a willful and substantial violation of a term of probation and whether such a violation has been demonstrated by the greater weight of the evidence.
discussed Cited as authority (verbatim quote) Erin Vontez Thompson v. State of Florida
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2018 · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
he appellate court must determine whether or not the trial court acted in an arbitrary, fanciful or unreasonable manner in determining that carter's violation was both willful and substantial.
examined Cited as authority (verbatim quote) Lydia Ann Rush v. State of Florida
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2016 · signal: see · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
trial courts must consider each violation on a case-by- case basis for a determination of whether, under the facts and circumstances, a particular violation is willful and substantial and is supported by the greater weight of the evidence.
discussed Cited as authority (verbatim quote) Adams v. State (2×) also: Cited as authority (rule)
Fla. · 2008 · signal: see · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
the trial court is in a better position to identify the probation violator's motive, intent, and attitude and assess whether the violation is both willful and substantial.
discussed Cited as authority (verbatim quote) Bland v. State (2×) also: Cited "see"
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2005 · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
a trial court is vested with broad discretion in determining whether a probationer has violated a condition of the probation.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Erick Ascano v. State of Florida
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2025 · confidence medium
As the Florida Supreme Court explained: “The trial court has broad discretion to determine whether there has been a willful and substantial violation of a term of probation and whether such a violation has been demonstrated by the greater weight of the evidence.” State v. Carter, 835 So. 2d 259, 262 (Fla. 2002).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Fernard George Ramcald, Jr. v. State of Florida (2×) also: Cited "see"
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2025 · confidence medium
The trial court then should give “careful consideration” to the decision to revoke, and it should in fact revoke probation “only when the probation violation is both willful and substantial so as to indicate that probation will not work for that defendant.” State v. Carter, 835 So. 2d 259, 262 (Fla. 2002). 4 Keeping this due-process caveat in mind, we review the trial court’s exercise of discretion in a revocation proceeding for abuse.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Felix Jonathan Del Corral v. State of Florida
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2024 · confidence medium
“Trial courts must consider each violation on a case-by-case basis for a determination of whether, under the facts and circumstances, a particular violation is willful and substantial and is supported by the greater weight of the evidence.” Demott v. State, 194 So. 3d 335, 339 (Fla. 2016) (quoting State v. Carter, 835 So. 2d 259, 261 (Fla. 2002)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Jean Claude Noel v. State of Florida
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2024 · confidence medium
“The trial court is in a better position to identify the probation violator’s motive, intent, and attitude and assess whether the violation is both willful and substantial.” State v. Carter, 835 So. 2d 259, 262 (Fla. 2002).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) MANUEL ALBERTO GALLARDO v. THE STATE OF FLORIDA
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2023 · confidence medium
State v. Carter, 835 So. 2d 259, 261 (Fla. 2002); see also Russell v. State, 982 So. 2d 642, 647 (Fla. 2008) (“[T]he trial court must assess the credibility of the particular witnesses, the reliability of the available evidence, and the totality of the evidence under the circumstances in each individual case.”).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) JORGE PEREZ MENDOZA v. THE STATE OF FLORIDA
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2022 · confidence medium
ANALYSIS In making a determination whether revocation of probation is appropriate, a trial court must assess whether the “violation is both willful and substantial[.]” State v. Carter, 835 So. 2d 259, 262 (Fla. 2002).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Jalyn Virginia Brownworth v. State of Florida
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2019 · confidence medium
State v. Carter, 835 So. 2d 259, 261 (Fla. 2002); Junk v. State, 230 So. 3d 984 , 965- 86 (Fla. 1st DCA 2017).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Alfred James Scott v. State of Florida
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2018 · confidence medium
Stated differently, an “appellate court must determine whether or not the trial court acted in an arbitrary, fanciful or unreasonable manner in determining that [the probationer’s] violation was both willful and substantial.” Friddle v. State, 989 So. 2d 1254, 1255 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008) (citing State v. Carter, 835 So. 2d 259, 262 (Fla. 2002)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) BRIAN HARRINGTON v. STATE OF FLORIDA
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2018 · confidence medium
Analysis A. Violation of Probation “The trial court has broad discretion to determine whether there has been a willful and substantial violation of a term of probation and whether such a violation has been demonstrated by the greater weight of the evidence.” State v. Carter, 835 So. 2d 259, 262 (Fla. 2002); see also Mata v. State, 31 So. 3d 257, 259 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010) (the State must prove by a preponderance of the evidence the probationer willfully and substantially violated the terms of probation). 3 ‘“When a decision in a non-jury trial is based on findings of fact from disputed ev…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Warren Staples v. State of Florida (2×)
Fla. · 2016 · confidence medium
State v. Carter, 835 So. 2d 259, 262 (Fla. 2002).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Kevin R. Laing v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2016 · confidence medium
The State must prove the violation “by the greater weight of the evidence.” Del Valle v. State, 80 So.3d 999, 1012 (Fla.2011) (citing State v. Carter, 835 So.2d 259, 261 (Fla.2002)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Justin Randolph Demott v. State of Florida
Fla. · 2016 · confidence medium
“Trial courts must consider each violation on a case-by-case basis for a determination of whether, under the facts and circumstances, a particular violation is willful and substantial and.is supported by the greater %might of the evidence.” State v. Carter, 835 So.2d 259, 261 (Fla.2002) (emphasis added).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Francique v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2015 · confidence medium
State v. Carter, 835 So.2d 259, 262 (Fla.2002); Harris v. State, 898 So.2d 1126, 1127 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Thompson v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2015 · confidence medium
State v. Carter, 835 So.2d 259, 262 (Fla.2002); Harris v. State, 898 So.2d 1126, 1127 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Kelvin Crapps v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2015 · confidence medium
The court “ ‘must consider each violation on a case-by-case basis for a determination of whether, under the facts and circumstances, a particular violation is willful and substantial and is supported by the greater weight of the evidence.’ ” Id. (quoting State v. Carter, 835 So.2d 259, 261 (Fla.2002)).
examined Cited as authority (rule) Filmore v. State (3×) also: Cited "see", Cited "see, e.g."
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2014 · confidence medium
THE APPLICABLE LAW “In deciding whether to revoke a defendant’s community control, the trial court must determine whether the facts and circumstances of the case demonstrate a willful and substantial violation that is supported by the greater weight of the evidence.” Anthony v. State, 854 So.2d 744, 747 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003) (citing State v. Carter, 835 So.2d 259, 261 (Fla.2002)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Savage v. State (2×) also: Cited "see, e.g."
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2013 · confidence medium
Del Valle v. State, 80 So.3d 999, 1012 (Fla.2011) (citing State v. Garter, 835 So.2d 259, 261 (Fla.2002)); see also McCumber v. State, 682 So.2d 1214, 1215-16 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996) (citing Davidson v. State, 419 So.2d 728 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982)); Hanania v. State, 855 So.2d 92, 94 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003) (using term “preponderance” of the evidence) (citing Stevens v. State, 823 So.2d 319, 321 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002)); Hightower v. State, 529 So.2d 726, 727 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988) (citing Molina v. State, 520 So.2d 320 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988)); Wheeler v. State, 344 So.2d 630, 632 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Broome v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2012 · confidence medium
This is because “such a rule may undermine the trial court’s ability to ‘consider each violation on a case-by-case basis for a determination of whether, under the facts and circumstances, a particular violation is willful and substantial and is supported by the greater weight of the evidence.’ ” Id. at 236 (citing State v. Carter, 835 So.2d 259, 261 (Fla.2002)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Brown v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2012 · confidence medium
Thus, the appellate court’s task is to “determine whether or not the trial court acted in an arbitrary, fanciful or unreasonable manner in determining that [the defendant's violation was both willful and substantial.” State v. Carter, 835 So.2d 259, 262 (Fla.2002).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Del Valle v. State (2×)
Fla. · 2011 · confidence medium
Constitutionality of Not Requiring the State to Establish Willfulness The general principle in probation revocation proceedings is that “the burden is on the state to establish that the probationer willfully violated the terms of his probation.” Howard v. State, 484 So.2d 1232, 1233 (Fla.1986). 8 The trial court must “consider each violation on a case-by-case basis for a determination of whether, under the facts and circumstances, a particular violation is willful and substantial and is supported by the greater weight of the evidence.” State v. Carter, 835 So.2d 259, 261 (Fla.2002).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Carter v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2011 · confidence medium
On appeal, the standard of review is abuse of discretion, see State v. Carter, 835 So.2d 259, 262 (Fla.2002), which requires the reviewing court to evaluate the sufficiency of the evidence adduced at the probation revocation hearing.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Johnson v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2011 · confidence medium
The trial court has considerable discretion in determining whether a violation of probation has occurred, State v. Carter, 835 So.2d 259, 262 (Fla.2002), but, for a probationer to be at fault or responsible for his dismissal, he must at least be informed that dismissal is a potential sanction for the behavior at issue.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Ruise v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2010 · confidence medium
State v. Carter, 835 So.2d 259, 261 (Fla.2002).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Correa v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2010 · confidence medium
“That is, the appellate court must determine whether or not the trial court acted in an arbitrary, fanciful or unreasonable manner in determining that [the] violation was both willful and substantial.” State v. Carter, 835 So.2d 259, 262 (Fla.2002).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Odom v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2009 · confidence medium
State v. Carter, 835 So.2d 259, 262 (Fla.2002) (noting that the appellate court determines “whether or not the trial court acted in an arbitrary, fanciful or unreasonable manner in determining that [appellant’s] violation was both willful and substantial”).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Miffin v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2009 · confidence medium
State v. Carter, 835 So.2d 259, 262 (Fla.2002).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Joslin v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2008 · confidence medium
That is, the appellate court must determine whether or not the trial court acted in an arbitrary, fanciful or unreasonable manner in determining that [a] violation was both willful and substantial." State v. Carter, 835 So.2d 259, 262 (Fla. 2002) (citations omitted).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Russell v. State
Fla. · 2008 · confidence medium
State v. Carter, 835 So.2d 259, 261 (Fla.2002).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Johnson v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2007 · confidence medium
State v. Carter, 835 So.2d 259, 262 (Fla.2002).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Wagle v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2007 · confidence medium
State v. Carter, 835 So.2d 259, 262 (Fla.2002).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Kasischke v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2006 · confidence medium
In doing so, we must determine "whether or not the trial court acted in an arbitrary, fanciful or unreasonable manner." State v. Carter, 835 So.2d 259, 262 (Fla.2002).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Hurst v. State (2×) also: Cited "see"
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2006 · confidence medium
In applying the Canakaris rule in particular to a revocation order, the supreme court instructs that an "appellate court must determine whether or not the trial court acted in an arbitrary, *1255 fanciful or unreasonable manner in determining that [the probationer's] violation was both willful and substantial." State v. Carter, 835 So.2d 259, 262 (Fla.2002).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Robinson v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2006 · confidence medium
Blackshear v. State, 838 So.2d 1228, 1229 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003). “[F]ailure to file a single monthly report may, in certain circumstances, justify probation revocation if such failure is willful and substantial and supported by the greater weight of the evidence.” State v. Carter, 835 So.2d 259, 261 (Fla.2002) (citing Hightower v. State, 529 So.2d 726 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Dawson v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2006 · confidence medium
"The trial court has broad discretion to determine whether there has been a willful and substantial violation of a term of probation and whether such a violation has been demonstrated by the greater weight of the evidence." State v. Carter, 835 So.2d 259, 262 (Fla.2002).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Gilbert v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2005 · confidence medium
However, "[t]here may be circumstances where revocation is patently unfair." State v. Carter, 835 So.2d 259, 262 (Fla.2002).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Harris v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2005 · confidence medium
"On appeal from the trial court's decision on the issue [revocation of probation], the standard of review is abuse of discretion." State v. Carter, 835 So.2d 259, 262 (Fla.2002); Bernhardt v. State, 288 So.2d 490, 501 (Fla.1974).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Hill v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2004 · confidence medium
State v. Carter, 835 So.2d 259, 262 (Fla.2002).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Hicks v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2004 · confidence medium
State v. Carter, 835 So.2d 259, 261 (Fla.2002).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Castro v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2004 · confidence medium
As our supreme court recently noted in State v. Carter, 835 So.2d 259, 261 (Fla.2002), “probation reports are not merely technical niceties and the failure to report is a serious violation of the privilege of probation.” The failure to file the required monthly reports for a year clearly constitutes a substantial violation.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Davis v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2004 · confidence medium
In determining whether a violation is willful and substantial and is supported by the greater weight of the evidence, "the trial court must review the evidence to determine whether the defendant has made reasonable efforts to comply with the terms and conditions of his or her probation." State v. Carter, 835 So.2d 259, 261 (Fla.2002).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Rollman v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2003 · confidence medium
Because robbery with a firearm is a felony “punishable by imprisonment for a term of years not exceeding life imprisonment,” § 812.18(2)(a), Fla. Stat. (2002), any subsequent revocation of probation — and it has recently been held that a probationer’s failure to file a single monthly report may justify revoking probation, see State v. Carter, 835 So.2d 259, 261 (Fla.2002) — might mean appellant’s return to prison for the remainder of his life. 1 See § 944.275(4)(b)(3), Fla. Stat. (2002) (“State prisoners sentenced to life imprisonment shall be incarcerated for the rest of their…
cited Cited as authority (rule) Anthony v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2003 · confidence medium
State v. Carter, 835 So.2d 259, 261 (Fla.2002).
cited Cited "see" ISAIAH JOE BEAN v. STATE OF FLORIDA
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2024 · signal: see · confidence high
See State v. Carter, 835 So. 2d 259, 261 (Fla. 2002); Riggins v. State, 830 So. 2d 920 , 921 7 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002).
discussed Cited "see" FRANKLIN CRUZ v. STATE OF FLORIDA
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2024 · signal: see · confidence high
See Romero v. State, 300 So. 3d 794 , 796 (Fla. 5th DCA 2020) (citing State v. Carter, 835 So. 2d 259, 262 (Fla. 2002) (recognizing trial court has broad discretion in determining whether there was willful and substantial violation of condition of probation and whether violation is supported by greater weight of evidence)).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
STATE of Florida, Petitioner,
v.
John H. CARTER, Respondent.
SC95605.
Supreme Court of Florida.
Dec 5, 2002.
835 So. 2d 259
Quince.
Cited by 108 opinions  |  Published

[*260] Richard E. Doran, Attorney General, James W. Rogers, Tallahassee Bureau Chief, Criminal Appeals, and Karla D. Ellis, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, FL, for Petitioner.

Nancy A. Daniels, Public Defender, and P. Douglas Brinkmeyer, Assistant Public Defender, Second Judicial Circuit, Tallahassee, FL, for Respondent.

QUINCE, J.

We have for review Carter v. State, 24 Fla. L. Weekly D1063, ___ So.2d ___, 1999 WL 289215 (Fla. 1st DCA April 30, 1999), which expressly and directly conflicts with Schwartz v. State, 719 So.2d 965 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998), and Strunk v. State, 728 So.2d 320 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999). We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const. Because the district court in Carter applied a per se rule to the question of whether the failure to file a single monthly report constitutes a substantial violation of probation, we quash and remand for reconsideration not inconsistent with this opinion. Although the First District's decision may ultimately be correct, we reject any per se rule that the failure to file a single report may never justify probation revocation.

After pleading nolo contendere to aggravated battery, trespass, and misdemeanor stalking, John H. Carter (Carter) was sentenced in 1997 to nine months in jail followed by two years of probation. Thereafter, the State filed an affidavit for violation[*261] of probation charging Carter with five violations, including failure to file a report for the month of February 1998. He was found not guilty of all violations except the failure to file the report; Carter admitted that violation. The trial court revoked Carter's probation and sentenced him to 54.9 months in state prison.

On appeal the First District Court of Appeal, relying on its earlier precedent, held that failure to file a single monthly report does not by itself constitute a substantial violation of probation. See Moore v. State, 632 So.2d 199 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994); accord Sanders v. State, 675 So.2d 665 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996). The First District acknowledged that its decision was in conflict with the decision by the Fourth District in Schwartz v. State, 719 So.2d 965 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998). This petition for discretionary review followed.

The State argues that the failure to file a single monthly report by itself may be a proper basis for revocation as was held in Schwartz and Strunk. We hold that failure to file a single monthly report may, in certain circumstances, justify probation revocation if such failure is willful and substantial and supported by the greater weight of the evidence. See Hightower v. State, 529 So.2d 726 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988).[1]

In the instant case, the district court improperly applied a per se rule when it relied on Moore and Sanders in reaching its conclusion that the failure to file a single monthly report as a matter of law is not a substantial violation, and thus not sufficient to justify a probation revocation. Such a holding means that under no circumstances could a failure to file a single report justify a revocation of probation. Such a per se rule strips the trial court of its obligation to assess any alleged violations in the context of a defendant's case. Trial courts must consider each violation on a case-by-case basis for a determination of whether, under the facts and circumstances, a particular violation is willful and substantial and is supported by the greater weight of the evidence. In other words, the trial court must review the evidence to determine whether the defendant has made reasonable efforts to comply with the terms and conditions of his or her probation. See Thorpe v. State, 642 So.2d 629 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994); Stevens v. State, 599 So.2d 254 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992).

We agree with Judge Letts' statements in his specially concurring opinion in Davis v. State, 474 So.2d 1246 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985) (Letts, J., specially concurring), that probation reports are not merely technical niceties and the failure to report is a serious violation of the privilege of probation. The probation system operates under a tremendous workload. In order to maintain its effectiveness, all participants, including the defendants, must comply with the requirements imposed upon them. Failure to enforce the reporting requirements undermines the system and the practical consequence is no control, no supervision, and no probation.

However, the application of these principles does not mean failure to comply in every instance is, a fortiori, a willful and substantial violation justifying revocation.[*262] Indeed, the initial decision to place someone on probation is a serious matter and is made by the trial court only after careful consideration. Likewise, the decision to revoke that probation should be made with no less care, and only when the probation violation is both willful and substantial so as to indicate that probation will not work for that defendant. There may be circumstances where revocation is patently unfair. For example, in Hightower v. State, 529 So.2d 726 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988), the record was not clear as to whether the defendant was informed that he had the duty to file a report, and in Jordan v. State, 412 So.2d 970 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982), the defendant filed three reports late because he was in the hospital. However, there are also circumstances where failure to file a single report may be a willful and substantial violation which would justify revocation. In Schwartz, the defendant argued that he did not file his monthly probation report because he was in an accident. The evidence showed that the defendant went to work after the accident, during the time he claimed to be incapacitated. The defendant's failure to comply with the terms of probation was a blatant disregard of his probation obligations and the revocation was found to be justified.

These cases demonstrate why it makes sense to allow the trial court the discretion to weigh each situation without the mandates of a bright line rule requiring revocation or preventing it. The trial court is in a better position to identify the probation violator's motive, intent, and attitude and assess whether the violation is both willful and substantial.

Carter filed his report late on purpose (which may constitute willful behavior), but he states that he did so because he wished to appear before the court to discuss his ability to make restitution. When he attempted to get help from the public defender's office, he said they gave him the runaround. A friend told him to stop reporting, that he would then be in violation and would have to appear before the court, at which time he could address the issue of restitution. Although the probation officer may not have realized the consequences of her discussion with the defendant, she apparently tacitly endorsed this method. The probation officer testified that she told Carter that in order for a probationer to get back before the court, he or she would need either to get a public defender or violate probation. Since Carter felt he got the runaround from the public defender's office, he then intentionally violated his probation by failing to file his report. Whether these actions rise to the level necessary to justify revocation is within the province of the trial court to determine. The trial court has broad discretion to determine whether there has been a willful and substantial violation of a term of probation and whether such a violation has been demonstrated by the greater weight of the evidence. See Van Wagner v. State, 677 So.2d 314 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996); Harris v. State, 610 So.2d 36 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992). The trial court in this case weighed the evidence and determined that Carter's conduct warranted revocation.

On appeal from the trial court's decision on the issue, the standard of review is abuse of discretion. See Bell v. State, 643 So.2d 674 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994); Steiner v. State, 604 So.2d 1265 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992). That is, the appellate court must determine whether or not the trial court acted in an arbitrary, fanciful or unreasonable manner in determining that Carter's violation was both willful and substantial. See Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So.2d 1197 (Fla.1980). In this case, the First District's opinion states only that a single failure to file could not trigger revocation. Because we reject any per se rule[*263] that the failure to file a single report can never, alone, be a substantial violation so as to preclude revocation, we quash the First District's decision and remand this case for reconsideration consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

SHAW, WELLS, and LEWIS, JJ., and HARDING, Senior Justice, concur.

PARIENTE, J., dissents with an opinion, in which ANSTEAD, C.J., concurs.

PARIENTE, J., dissenting.

I respectfully dissent. In my opinion, a failure to file a single monthly probation report, by itself, cannot serve as the basis for the revocation of probation. Therefore, I would affirm the First District's decision in Carter v. State, 24 Fla. L. Weekly D1063, ___ So.2d ___, 1999 WL 289215 (Fla. 1st DCA Apr.30, 1999).

Section 948.06, Florida Statutes (1997), provides for the revocation of probation and states:

Whenever within the period of probation or community control there are reasonable grounds to believe that a probationer or offender in community control has violated his or her probation or community control in a material respect, any law enforcement officer who is aware of the probationary or community control status of the probationer or offender in community control or any parole or probation supervisor may arrest or request any county or municipal law enforcement officer to arrest such probationer or offender without warrant wherever found and forthwith return him or her to the court granting such probation or community control.... The court, upon the probationer or offender being brought before it, shall advise him or her of such charge of violation and, if such charge is admitted to be true, may forthwith revoke, modify, or continue the probation or community control or place the probationer into a community control program.

(Emphasis supplied.)

The Florida Legislature has chosen not to define which violations are "material." Accordingly, under the well established principles of statutory construction, this Court must give the term "material" its plain and ordinary meaning. See Green v. State, 604 So.2d 471, 473 (Fla.1992) This plain and ordinary meaning may be determined by reference to a dictionary definition. See id. "Material" is defined as "significant" or "essential," Black's Law Dictionary 991 (7th ed.1999), or as "having real importance or great consequence." Merriam Webster's Collegiate Dictionary 717 (10th ed.1996). Although the failure to submit one monthly report is certainly a violation of probation, I cannot agree with the majority that this single failure, by itself, could ever be significant or essential. Therefore, in the absence of legislative action to clarify which probation violations are "material," I would follow those district courts that have held that this type of isolated technical probation violation does not rise to the level of a revocable violation. See e.g., Butler v. State, 775 So.2d 320, 321 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000); Sanders v. State, 675 So.2d 665, 665-66 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996) (citing Glenn v. State, 558 So.2d 513 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990)); Moore v. State, 632 So.2d 199, 199 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994).

Moreover, today's majority decision gives little guidance to the trial courts as to when the failure to file a single report, standing alone, would be considered a material violation of probation warranting revocation. Further, the appellate standard of review of abuse of discretion provides little to no guidance to the appellate courts as to where the line of demarcation[*264] should be. This lack of guidance raises the real possibility that whether probation is revoked for failure to file a single report will not depend on an objective standard but on the philosophy of the individual judge. Given that the consequence of the decision in many cases will be a considerable period of incarceration, applying a per se rule that the failure to file a single monthly probation report without more cannot serve as the basis for the revocation of probation is the better course in this limited circumstance.

ANSTEAD, C.J., concurs.

1 Recently, in State v. Meeks, 789 So.2d 982 (Fla.2001), we held, under the youthful offender sentencing scheme, that only a new criminal offense constitutes a substantive violation of probation or community control. Under section 958.14, Florida Statutes (1995), the trial court must determine whether the offender has committed a technical or substantive violation. However, under the general sentencing scheme pertaining to this defendant, the question for the trial court is whether there has been a willful and substantial violation of the terms and conditions of probation.