Dept. of Prof. Reg., Bd. of Med. v. Durrani, 455 So. 2d 515 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984). · Go Syfert
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Dept. of Prof. Reg., Bd. of Med. v. Durrani, 455 So. 2d 515 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
“the legislative use of different terms in different portions of the same statute is strong evidence that different meanings were intended.”
81 citation events (8 in the last 25 years) across 7 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Carlson v. State, Department of Revenue (fladistctapp, 2017-09-29)
Treatment trajectory · 1984 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1984 2005 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 41 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (verbatim quote) Carlson v. State, Department of Revenue
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2017 · signal: see · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
the legislative use of different terms in different portions of the same statute is strong evidence that different meanings were intended.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Robert B. Leftwich v. Florida Department of Corrections (2×)
Fla. · 2014 · confidence medium
We have held that the “legislative use of different terms in different portions of the same statute is strong evidence that different meanings were intended.” State v. Marks, 698 So. 2d 533, 540-41 (Fla. 1997) (quoting Dep’t of Prof’l Regulation v. Durrani, 455 So. 2d 515, 518 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Gabriele v. School Board of Manatee County
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2013 · confidence medium
Rooney, Inc., 654 So.2d 911, 914 (Fla.1995). “ ‘The legislative use of different terms in different portions of the same statute is strong evidence that different meanings were intended.’” State v. Mark Marks, P.A., 698 So.2d 533, 541 (Fla.1997) (quoting Dep’t of Prof'l Regulation v. Durrani, 455 So.2d 515, 518 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In re Heartland Payment Systems, Inc.
S.D. Tex. · 2011 · confidence medium
Dade Malpractice Trust Fund, 673 So.2d 899, 901 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1996) (noting that “legislative intent may be discerned from the Legislature’s election to use different words to convey different meanings within a statute”) (citing Dep’t of Prof'l Regulation v. Durrani, 455 So.2d 515, 518 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1984)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Maddox v. State
Fla. · 2006 · confidence medium
Another principle of statutory construction that compels our conclusion that the Second District appropriately determined that section 316.650 is inapplicable to the instant matter is the rule which recognizes that "[t]he legislative use of different terms in different portions of the same statute is strong evidence that different meanings were intended." State v. Mark Marks, P.A., 698 So.2d 533, 541 (Fla.1997) (quoting Dep't of Prof'l Regulation v. Durrani, 455 So.2d 515, 518 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984)); see also Beach v. Great W.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Clarke v. Schimmel
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2000 · confidence medium
"The legislative use of different terms in different portions of the same statute is strong evidence that different meanings were intended." State v. Mark Marks, P.A., 698 So.2d 533, 541 (Fla.1997) (quoting Department of Prof'l Regulation v. Durrani, 455 So.2d 515, 518 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Turner v. Tokai Financial Services, Inc.
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2000 · confidence medium
The "use of different terms in different portions of the same statute is strong evidence that different meanings were intended." Department of Prof'l Regulation v. Durrani, 455 So.2d 515, 518 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Eason v. Department of Business & Professional Regulation
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1999 · confidence medium
Reg., Board of Medical Examiners v. Durrani, 455 So.2d 515, 517 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984). 12.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Mark Marks, PA
Fla. · 1997 · confidence medium
"The legislative use of different terms in different portions of the same statute is strong evidence that different meanings were intended." Department of Professional Regulation v. Durrani, 455 So.2d 515, 518 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984); see also Ocasio v. Bureau of Crimes Compensation, 408 So.2d 751, 753 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1982); accord Leisure Resorts, Inc. v. Frank J.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Harris Corp. v. Gary
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1997 · confidence medium
“The legislative use of different terms in different portions of the same statute is strong evidence that different meanings were intended.” Florida Dep’t of Professional Regulation v. Durrani, 455 So.2d 515, 518 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Morris v. Division of Retirement
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1997 · confidence medium
Exam'rs v. Durrani, 455 So.2d 515, 517 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984).
cited Cited as authority (rule) State, Department of Revenue v. Central Dade Malpractice Trust Fund
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1996 · confidence medium
Dep’t of Professional Regulation, Bd. of Medical Examiners v. Durrani, 455 So.2d 515, 518 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Golfcrest Nursing Home v. ST.(AHCA)
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1995 · confidence medium
Sunshine Jr. Stores, Inc. v. State, Dep't of Environmental Regulation, 556 So.2d 1177 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990), review denied, 564 So.2d 1085 (Fla. 1990), citing Dep't of Professional Reg., Bd. of Medical Examiners v. Durrani, 455 So.2d 515, 517 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984); Dep't of Admin. v. Nelson, 424 So.2d 852, 858 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982); State Dep't of Health & Rehab.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Cortes v. State Bd. of Regents
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1995 · confidence medium
The legislature may authorize administrative agencies to interpret, Department of Professional Regulation, Bd. of Medical Examiners v. Durrani, 455 So.2d 515, 517 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984), but never to alter statutes.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Koger v. Department of Professional Regulation
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1994 · confidence medium
Durrani, 455 So.2d at 517 (citations omitted).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Smith v. Crawford (2×)
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1994 · confidence medium
While the advisory opinion was not necessarily binding on Bob Crawford, as he was not a party who sought the opinion or a person with reference to whom the opinion was sought, nevertheless, as the trial court recognized in its September 22 order, in construing and applying these statutory provisions a court is required to give deference and great weight to the agency's construction of the statutes it is charged with administering, and a court is not authorized to overturn the agency's determination unless it is "contrary to the language of the statute," Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Yarborough, 275…
cited Cited as authority (rule) DEPT. OF LABOR AND EMP. SEC. v. Bradley
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1994 · confidence medium
Department of Professional Regulation, Board of Medical Examiners v. Durrani, 455 So.2d 515, 517 (Fla.1st DCA 1984).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Department of Labor & Employment Security, Division of Workers' Compensation v. Bradley
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1994 · confidence medium
Department of Professional Regulation, Board of Medical Examiners v. Durrani, 455 So.2d 515, 517 (Fla.1st DCA 1984).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Dept. of Prof. Reg., Bd. of Dentistry v. Dental Hygienist Ass'n
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1993 · confidence medium
Reg., etc., v. Durrani, 455 So.2d 515, 517 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984).
cited Cited as authority (rule) State, Dept. of Envir. v. Scm Glidco Org.
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1992 · confidence medium
Examiners v. Durrani, 455 So.2d 515, 517 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Florida League of Cities v. DER (2×)
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1992 · confidence medium
Comm'n, 473 So.2d 237, 239-40 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985), review denied, 486 So.2d 596 (Fla. 1986); Department of Professional Reg., Bd. of Medical Examiners v. Durrani, 455 So.2d 515, 517 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Humana, Inc. v. Department of Banking & Finance
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1992 · confidence medium
Reg., 560 So.2d 1322, 1323 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990); Department of Professional Regulation v. Durrani, 455 So.2d 515, 517 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984) (agency’s construction of statute it administers is entitled to great weight and will not be overturned unless clearly erroneous).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Pershing Indus., Inc. v. DEPT. OF BANKING AND FINANCE
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1991 · confidence medium
Motel 6, Operating L.P. v. Department of Business Reg., Div. of Hotels & Restaurants, 560 So.2d 1322, 1323 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990); Department of Professional Reg., Bd. of Medical Examiners v. Durrani, 455 So.2d 515, 517 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Motel 6 Operating LP v. DEPT. OF BUSINESS REG.
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1990 · confidence medium
Department of Professional Reg., Bd. of Medical Examiners v. Durrani, 455 So.2d 515, 517 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Hobe Assoc. v. State, Dept. of Business Regulation
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1987 · confidence medium
"Agencies are to be accorded wide discretion in the exercise of their lawful rulemaking authority, clearly conferred or fairly implied and consistent with agencies' general statutory duties." Department of Professional Regulation, Board of Medical Examiners v. Durrani, 455 So.2d 515, 517 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Gretz v. Department of Labor & Employment Security
Fla. Div. Admin. Hr'g · 1987 · confidence medium
The legislature may authorize administrative agencies to interpret, Department of Professional Regulation, Board of Medical Examiners v. Durrani, 455 So.2d 515, 517 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984), but never to alter statutes.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Gretz v. Department of Labor & Employment Security
Fla. Div. Admin. Hr'g · 1987 · confidence medium
The legislature may authorize administrative agencies to interpret, Department of Professional Regulation, Board of Medical Examiners v. Durrani, 455 So.2d 515, 517 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984), but never to alter statutes.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Florida League of Cities v. Department of Insurance & Treasurer
Fla. Div. Admin. Hr'g · 1987 · confidence medium
“An agency’s construction of a statute is entitled to great weight and is not to be overturned unless clearly erroneous.” Department of Professional Regulation, Board of Medical Examiners v. Durrani, 455 So.2d 515, 517 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Fairfield Communities, Inc. v. Florida Land & Water Adjudicatory Commission
Fla. Div. Admin. Hr'g · 1987 · confidence medium
The rule simply enables a party to the proceeding to offer suggestions in this regard, but does not require FLWAC to adopt as issues any or all of the matters the intervenor(s) request FLWAC to consider. “[T]he validity of ... [a challenged] rule must be upheld if it is reasonably related to the purpose of the legislation interpreted and it is not arbitrary and capricious.” Department of Professional Regulation v. Durrani, 455 So.2d 515, 517 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Fairfield Communities, Inc. v. Florida Land & Water Adjudicatory Commission
Fla. Div. Admin. Hr'g · 1987 · confidence medium
The rule simply enables a party to the proceeding to offer suggestions in this regard, but does not require FLWAC to adopt as issues any or all of the matters the intervenor(s) request FLWAC to consider. “[T]he validity of ... [a challenged] rule must be upheld if it is reasonably related to the purpose of the legislation interpreted and it is not arbitrary and capricious.” Department of Professional Regulation v. Durrani, 455 So.2d 515, 517 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Organized Fishermen v. State
Fla. Div. Admin. Hr'g · 1986 · confidence medium
The challengers’ burden “is a stringent one indeed.” Agrico Chemical Co. v. State Department of Environmental Regulation, 365 SO.2d 759, 763 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978) cert. den. 376 So.2d 74 (Fla. 1979). “[T]he validity of ... [a challenged] rule must be upheld if it is reasonably related to the purpose of the legislation interpreted and it is not arbitrary and capricious.” Department of Professional Regulation v. Durrani, 455 So.2d 515, 517 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Austin v. Department of Health & Rehabilitative Services
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1986 · confidence medium
“An agency’s construction of a statute is entitled to great weight and is not to be overturned unless clearly erroneous." Department of Professional Regulation, Board of Medical Examiners v. Durrani, 455 So.2d 515, 517 (Fla 1st DCA 1984).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Kelley v. Bechtel Power Corp.
S.D. Fla. · 1986 · confidence medium
Reg. v. Durrani, 455 So.2d 515, 517 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Department of Professional Regulation, Construction Industry Licensing Board v. Pariser
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1985 · confidence medium
I simply cannot agree with the hearing officer’s conclusion that “[sjection 489.129(1) ... does not specify that an administrative fine must be paid; it simply authorizes the imposition of such a fine.” It is a well established rule “that agencies are to be accorded wide discretion in the exercise of their lawful rulemaking authority, clearly conferred or fairly implied and consistent with the agencies’ general statutory duties.” Department of Professional Regulation, Board of Medical Examiners v. Durrani, 455 So.2d 515, 517 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984) (e.s.).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) White Construction Co. v. Department of Transportation
Fla. Div. Admin. Hr'g · 1985 · confidence medium
The standards for determining the validity of rules proposed or promulgated by State agencies are set forth in the recent case of Dept. of Professional Regulation, Board of Medical Examiners v. Durrani, 455 So.2d 515, 517 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984).
discussed Cited "see" Bk v. Dept. of Health & Rehab. Serv.
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1988 · signal: see · confidence high
See Dep't of Professional Regulation, Bd. of Medical Examiners v. Durrani, 455 So.2d 515 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984); Dep't of Admin. v. Nelson, 424 So.2d 852 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982); State Dep't of Health and Rehabilitative Servs. v. Framat Realty, Inc., 407 So.2d 238 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981).
cited Cited "see" Home Health Services v. State
Fla. Div. Admin. Hr'g · 1986 · signal: see · confidence high
See Department of Professional Regulation, Board of Medical Examiners v. Durrani, 455 So.2d 515 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984). 7.
discussed Cited "see, e.g." State, Dept. of Agriculture v. Quick Cash of Tallahasee, Inc.
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1992 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See, e.g., Department of Professional Regulation v. Durrani, 455 So.2d 515 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984); Ocasio v. Bureau of Crimes Compensation Division of Workers' Compensation, 408 So.2d 751 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982).
cited Cited "see, e.g." Fletcher v. Fletcher
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1991 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also Department of Professional Regulation, Board of Medical Examiners v. Durrani, 455 So.2d 515 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Roberts v. District of Columbia Board of Medicine
D.C. · 1990 · signal: see also · confidence medium
See also Department of Professional Regulation, Bd. of Medical Examiners v. Durrani, 455 So.2d 515, 518 (Fla.App.1984) (“[ejstablishment of examination criteria for endorsement candidates identical to that imposed on examination candidates implements” goal of national uniformity).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Sunshine Jr. Stores, Inc. v. STATE, DER
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1990 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence medium
See, e.g., Department of Professional Reg., Bd. of Medical Examiners v. Durrani, 455 So.2d 515, 517 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984); Department of Admin. v. Nelson, 424 So.2d 852, 858 (Fla. 1st DCA *1181 1982); State Dep't of Health & Rehab.
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
DEPARTMENT OF PROFESSIONAL REGULATION, BOARD OF MEDICAL EXAMINERS, Appellant/Cross-Appellee,
v.
Zia DURRANI, Appellee/Cross-Appellant.
AX-329.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
Aug 16, 1984.
455 So. 2d 515
Ervin.
Cited by 67 opinions  |  Published

[*516] Jim Smith, Atty. Gen., and John E. Griffin, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, for appellant/cross-appellee.

William M. Barley and John Barley of John A. Barley & Associates, Tallahassee, for appellee/cross-appellant.

ERVIN, Chief Judge.

Florida Department of Professional Regulation, Board of Medical Examiners (the Board), appeals a final order of the hearing officer of Florida Department of Administrative Hearings declaring Rule 21M-29.01(2), Florida Administrative Code (1983), to be an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority. Appellee, Durrani, cross-appeals, challenging the hearing officer's determination that deficiencies in the Economic Impact Statement (EIS), accompanying promulgation of the rule, did not impair the fairness of the rulemaking proceeding. We reverse the order on appeal and affirm as to the issue raised on cross-appeal.

Durrani was licensed in Illinois on the basis of having achieved a weighted average score of 75% following two separate seatings while he was taking the examination of the Federation of State Medical Boards of the United States (FLEX). Illinois applies the general formula, rejected by the subject rule, of considering the highest score obtained on any of the three FLEX parts in multiple seatings in computing the weighted average scores of candidates who have taken any part more than once. Durrani's Illinois FLEX scores did[*517] not meet the criteria of Rule 21M-29.01(2) and his application for licensure in Florida was denied by the Board. Durrani challenged the rule in an administrative hearing, resulting in the order which found the rule to be an invalid delegation of legislative authority in that it adds substantive requirements to section 458.313(1)(d).

In Florida, medical licensure may be secured either "by examination" of previously unlicensed persons or "by endorsement" of persons licensed elsewhere. Licensure by endorsement is provided for in Section 458.313(1)(d), Florida Statutes, as follows:

(1) The department shall issue a license by endorsement to any applicant who, upon applying to the department and remitting a fee not to exceed $250 set by the board, demonstrates to the board that he has met the qualifications for licensure in s. 458.311 and:
* * * * * *
(d) Has been certified by licensure examination of the Federation of State Medical Boards of the United States, Inc. (FLEX) or is certified by the National Board of Medical Examiners as having completed its examination; provided that said examination required shall have been so certified within the 10 years immediately preceding the filing of his application for licensure under this section.

Section 458.311, Florida Statutes, referenced above, is the provision controlling licensure by examination, one qualification of which is successful completion of the FLEX examination.

Rule 21M-29.01(2) interprets the section 458.313(1)(d) phrase "has been certified by licensure examination of the Federation of State Medical Boards of the United States, Inc." as requiring that applicants obtain a 75% weighted average score from a single complete sitting of FLEX, a three-day, three-part examination. The EIS accompanying the rule anticipated no significant impact on competition or on the open market for employment.

The well recognized general rule is that agencies are to be accorded wide discretion in the exercise of their lawful rulemaking authority, clearly conferred or fairly implied and consistent with the agencies' general statutory duties. Florida Commission on Human Relations v. Human Development Center, 413 So.2d 1251 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982). An agency's construction of the statute it administers is entitled to great weight and is not to be overturned unless clearly erroneous. Pan American World Airways, Inc. v. Florida Public Service Commission, 427 So.2d 716 (Fla. 1983); Barker v. Board of Medical Examiners, 428 So.2d 720 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983). Where, as here, the agency's interpretation of a statute has been promulgated in rulemaking proceedings, the validity of such rule must be upheld if it is reasonably related to the purposes of the legislation interpreted and it is not arbitrary and capricious. The burden is upon petitioner in a rule challenge to show by a preponderance of the evidence that the rule or its requirements are arbitrary and capricious. Agrico Chemical Co. v. State, Dept. of Environmental Regulation, 365 So.2d 759 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978); Florida Beverage Corp. v. Wynne, 306 So.2d 200 (Fla. 1st DCA 1975). Moreover, the agency's interpretation of a statute need not be the sole possible interpretation or even the most desirable one; it need only be within the range of possible interpretations. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services v. Wright, 439 So.2d 937 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983) (Ervin, C.J., dissenting); Department of Administration v. Nelson, 424 So.2d 852 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982); Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services v. Framat Realty, Inc., 407 So.2d 238 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981). In the instant case the Board is authorized to adopt rules under the general authority conferred upon it by Section 458.309, Florida Statutes, and the specific authority of Section 458.313(4), Florida Statutes. The latter provision clearly empowers the Board with the authority to make such rules necessary to implement the provisions of the licensure by endorsement statute at issue here and the agency's interpretive rulemaking is entitled to the deference outlined above. The issue is[*518] whether Rule 21M-29.01(2), in setting a minimum FLEX score of 75% and requiring that the score be obtained in one sitting, exceeds the range of possible interpretations of section 458.313(1)(d), thereby constituting an addition or alteration to the statute, in excess of lawfully delegated rulemaking authority?

Durrani contends that the rule imposes additional requirements not encompassed within the statute. He interprets the language of section 458.313(1)(d), "certified by licensure examination of the Federation of State Medical Boards of the United States, Inc.", to mean that if one is licensed by another state on the basis of the FLEX exam, such person is entitled to Florida licensure by endorsement, regardless of the score achieved on FLEX or the number of tests combined to achieve the score. This interpretation has two obvious faults. First, if "certified by licensure examination" means certified by licensure in another state, the statute should have included that language. The language describing licensure "in another state" is included within other sections of the act. See Sections 458.311(2)(a), 458.315 and 458.317, Florida Statutes. The legislative use of different terms in different portions of the same statute is strong evidence that different meanings were intended. Ocasio v. Bureau of Crimes Compensation Division of Workers' Compensation, 408 So.2d 751 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982).

Second, Durrani is mistaken in his contention that subsection (d) establishes the FLEX requirement for endorsement candidates. Section 458.313(1) requires that endorsement candidates meet the qualifications for licensure in section 458.311, which statute requires candidates for licensure by exam to complete the FLEX examination. Thus, section 458.313(1) establishes the FLEX exam requirement for endorsement candidates, and subsection (d), rather than uselessly reiterating that requirement, imposes the additional condition that the FLEX be certified as having been completed within ten years preceding application for endorsement. Sections 458.313(1) and 458.311, read in pari materia, reflect the legislative intent that candidates for licensure by endorsement and by examination satisfy the same examination requirement. Establishment of a minimum passing score is required by Section 455.217(1), Florida Statutes; Rule 21M-21.01(3) sets the score for examination candidates. The challenged rule, consistent with the legislative intent of uniformity, adopts the same passing score for endorsement candidates. No additional criteria are imposed.

As earlier observed, the criteria selected by the Board to constitute an acceptable FLEX examination in Rule 21M-29.01(2) need not be the only possible interpretation or even the best interpretation of statutory language — it need only be within the range of possibilities. The choices of a 75% minimum score and the requirement that all test section scores calculated into this overall score be attained at a single sitting of FLEX are certainly within the range of permissible choices. There is nothing in the record to suggest that this choice was arbitrary or capricious. The establishment of examination criteria for endorsement candidates identical to that imposed on examination candidates implements the legislative intent of uniformity. Additionally, the criteria selected are reasonably related to the statutory purpose of requiring some basic level of medical competence to assure protection of the public health, safety and welfare. Both the 75% score and the single sitting requirement are criteria having a possible correlation to medical competence.

The interpretation of section 458.313(1)(d) urged by Durrani, and apparently accepted by the hearing officer, would result in the licensing of any physician who has obtained a license by examination in another state, even if such licensing were conceivably based on a passing score of only one percent. An interpretation open to this possibility would establish mere physical completion of FLEX as a standard of medical competence. A statute must be interpreted to avoid so unreasonable a result where, as[*519] here, it is open to another interpretation. Agrico, 365 So.2d at 766.

On cross-appeal we note that the preparation of an EIS is a procedural aspect of rulemaking that is subject to the harmless error rule. Plantation Residents' Association, Inc. v. School Board of Broward County, 424 So.2d 879 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982); School Board of Broward County v. Gramith, 375 So.2d 340 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979); Polk v. School Board of Polk County, 373 So.2d 960 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979). Therefore before the agency action adopting Rule 21M-29.01(2) may be invalidated on the ground that it was not accompanied by an appropriate EIS, the court must first determine whether the fairness of the proceeding or the correctness of the action was found to be impaired. Gramith, 375 So.2d at 341. See also Wright, 439 So.2d at 942 (Ervin, C.J., dissenting). There is no evidence in this record supportive of any finding of incorrectness or unfairness in the rule's adoption, therefore the hearing officer's ruling was not in error.

Accordingly, we reverse as to the issue on appeal, affirm the issue raised on cross-appeal, and remand this cause for action consistent with this opinion.

SMITH and JOANOS, JJ., concur.