Schoditsch v. Schoditsch, 888 So. 2d 709 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004). · Go Syfert
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Schoditsch v. Schoditsch, 888 So. 2d 709 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
16 citation events (16 in the last 25 years) across 1 distinct court.
Strongest positive: Patel v. Patel (fladistctapp, 2015-01-30)
Top citers, strongest first. 6 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Patel v. Patel
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2015 · confidence medium
In addition, the monthly insurance premium payments made by the former husband should be factored into the support equation. 1 Although it is proper to order one party to obtain the health insurance coverage, the court “is required by statute to apportion the cost of the insurance between the parties on a percentage basis.” Piedra v. Piedra, 126 So.3d 1104, 1107 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012) (quoting Schoditsch v. Schoditsch, 888 So.2d 709, 709 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004)).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Piedra v. Piedra
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2012 · confidence medium
“However, the court is required by statute to apportion the cost of the insurance between the parties on a percentage basis.” Schoditsch v. Schoditsch, 888 So.2d 709, 709 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Rashid v. Rashid
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2010 · confidence medium
In ordering this protection, the court should consider the “availability and cost of such insurance and the financial impact it will have on the former husband.” Lorman v. Lorman, 633 So.2d 106, 108 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994); see also Kotlarz v. Kotlarz, 21 So.3d 892, 893 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009); Schoditsch v. Schoditsch, 888 So.2d 709, 709 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004); Burnham v. Burnham, 884 So.2d 390, 392 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Winney v. Winney (2×) also: Cited "see"
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2008 · confidence medium
Schoditsch v. Schoditsch, 888 So.2d 709, 709 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004) (addressing life insurance as security); Shoffner, 744 So.2d at 1158 (addressing alimony and equitable distribution).
cited Cited "see" Foster v. Foster
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2011 · signal: see · confidence high
See Schoditsch v. Schoditsch, 888 So.2d 709 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004).
cited Cited "see" Gazaleh v. Reeves
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2006 · signal: see · confidence high
See Schoditsch v. Schoditsch, 888 So.2d 709, 709 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Susan SCHODITSCH, Appellant/Cross-Appellee,
v.
Richard SCHODITSCH, Appellee/Cross-Appellant.
1D04-1992, 1D04-2121.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
Dec 3, 2004.
888 So. 2d 709
Hawkes.
Cited by 12 opinions  |  Published

John P. Townsend; John P. Townsend, P.A., Fort Walton Beach, for Appellant /Cross-Appellee.

Anthony C. Bisordi; Bisordi & Bisordi, P.A., Shalimar, for Appellee/Cross-Appellant.

HAWKES, J.

In this appeal and cross-appeal following a final order of dissolution of marriage, six issues are raised. Concluding only two have merit, we affirm the remaining issues on appeal, and the sole issue on cross-appeal, without discussion.

In its final order, the trial court ordered Appellant to pay the entire cost of the health insurance for the parties' minor child, and required her to obtain a life insurance policy for as long as she is required to pay child support. However, the court is required by statute to apportion the cost of the insurance between the parties on a percentage basis. See § 61.13(1)(b), Fla. Stat. (2003); Artuso v. Dick, 843 So.2d 942 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003); Forrest v. Ron, 821 So.2d 1163 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002).

Additionally, before ordering a party to obtain and maintain a life insurance policy, the court is required to make findings regarding the necessity for such coverage. See § 61.08(3), Fla. Stat. (2003); Guerin v. DiRoma, 819 So.2d 968 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002); Cissel v. Cissel, 845 So.2d 993 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003). In determining such necessity, the trial court should consider the cost and availability of the insurance and the financial impact on the obligor. See Guerin, 819 So.2d at 970; Cissel, 845 So.2d at 995.

The final order is REVERSED as to these two issues only, and the case REMANDED for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

ERVIN and DAVIS, JJ., concur.