Commonwealth v. Rienzi, 827 A.2d 369 (Pa. 2003). · Go Syfert
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Commonwealth v. Rienzi, 827 A.2d 369 (Pa. 2003). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
107 citation events (107 in the last 25 years) across 4 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Com. v. Roberts, C. (pasuperct, 2026-06-16)
Treatment trajectory · 2003 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
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Top citers, strongest first. 50 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Com. v. Roberts, C.
Pa. Super. Ct. · 2026 · confidence medium
The premature and null September 7, 2023 petition does not save the subsequent petition, as when an initial petition has no legal effect, there is “nothing pending before the PCRA court that [the petitioner] could ‘amend.’” Commonwealth v. Rienzi, 827 A.2d 369, 371 (Pa. 2003).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Com. v. Woodson, R.
Pa. Super. Ct. · 2025 · confidence medium
Commonwealth v. Rienzi, 827 A.2d 369, 371 (Pa. 2003).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Com. v. Conroy, D.
Pa. Super. Ct. · 2025 · confidence medium
Commonwealth v. Rienzi, 827 A.2d 369, 371 (Pa. 2003).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Com. v. Butler, L.
Pa. Super. Ct. · 2024 · confidence medium
Commonwealth v. Rienzi, 827 A.2d 369, 371 (Pa. 2003).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Com. v. Bent, J.
Pa. Super. Ct. · 2024 · confidence medium
PCRA Md - tion As an initial matter, we note that acoui tcannot have jurisdiction 'to bear an untimely PC RA petition; Commonwealth aRobinson, 837 A.2d 1157 , 1 ,161 (Pa. 2003) (citing Comm,o•imJ. ealth v, Rienzi, 827 A.2d 369,371 (Pa. 2003 ) (citations 16 omitted)). "[A]ny PCRA. petition, including asecond or subsequent petition., must be filed within one year of the date the judgement becomes Final." Commomv)ealth vBeeakiron, 781 A.2d 94, 97 (Pa. 2001) (citing 42 Pa.C.S.. § 9545(b)(1)).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Com. v. Clark, Q.
Pa. Super. Ct. · 2024 · confidence medium
Commonwealth v. Rienzi, 827 A.2d 369, 371 (Pa. 2003).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Com. v. Hyman, J.
Pa. Super. Ct. · 2024 · confidence medium
Commonwealth v. Rienzi, 827 A.2d 369, 371 (Pa. 2003).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Com. v. Carter, T.
Pa. Super. Ct. · 2023 · confidence medium
Commonwealth v. Robinson, 837 A.2d 1157 [, 1157-58] (Pa. 2003) [(]citing Commonwealth v. Baroni, 827 A.2d 419, 420 (Pa. 2003); Commonwealth v. Rienzi, 827 A.2d 369, 371 (Pa. 2003); Commonwealth v. Eller, 807 A.2d 838 , 845-[]46 (Pa. 2002); Commonwealth v. Hall, 771 A.2d 1232, 1234 (Pa. 2001); Commonwealth v. Murray, 753 A.2d 201, 202 (Pa. 2000); Commonwealth v. Fahy, 737 A.2d 214, 222 (Pa. 1999)[)].
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Com. v. Gebhart, S. (2×) also: Cited "see"
Pa. Super. Ct. · 2021 · confidence medium
Commonwealth v. Rienzi, 827 A.2d 369, 371 (Pa. 2003).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Com. v. Yelverton, J. (2×) also: Cited "see"
Pa. Super. Ct. · 2021 · confidence medium
Commonwealth v. Rienzi, 827 A.2d 369, 371 (Pa. 2003).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Com. v. Glasgow, O.
Pa. Super. Ct. · 2021 · confidence medium
Commonwealth v. Rienzi, 827 A.2d 369, 371 (Pa. 2003).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Com. v. Walker, G.
Pa. Super. Ct. · 2021 · confidence medium
Commonwealth v. Rienzi, 827 A.2d 369, 371 (Pa. 2003).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Com. v. Rivera, R.
Pa. Super. Ct. · 2019 · confidence medium
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court "has repeatedly stated that the PCRA timeliness requirements are jurisdictional in nature and, accordingly, a PCRA court cannot hear untimely PCRA petitions." Comm. v. Ligons, 971 A.2d 1125, 1164 (Pa. 2009) (citing Comm. v. Rienzi, 827 A.2d 369, 371 (Pa. 2003)). 4 In this case, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied Defendant's petition for allowance of appeal on February 1, 2016.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Com. v. Berlin, G.
Pa. Super. Ct. · 2019 · confidence medium
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court "has repeatedly stated that the PCRA timeliness requirements are jurisdictional in nature and, accordingly, a PCRA court cannot hear untimely PCRA petitions." Comm. v. Ligons, 971 A.2d 1125, 1164 (Pa. 2009) (citing Comm. v. Rienzi, 827 A.2d 369, 371 (Pa. 2003)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Com. v. Saunders, T.
Pa. Super. Ct. · 2018 · confidence medium
Prior to the Act of September 23, 1980, P.L. 686, No. 137, § 1, effective November 22, 1980 (Act 137 of 1980), section 722 of the Judicial Code included among the classes of cases within the Supreme Court’s exclusive jurisdiction, under the former version of its subsection (1), “Felonious homicide.” -2- J-S62005-18 discretionary review in the Supreme Court of the United States and the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, or at the expiration of time for seeking the review.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(3). “[Our Supreme] Court has repeatedly stated that the PCRA timeliness requirements are jur…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Com. v. Remedio, M.
Pa. Super. Ct. · 2018 · confidence medium
“This Court has repeatedly stated that -2- J-S27018-18 the PCRA timeliness requirements are jurisdictional in nature and, accordingly, a PCRA court cannot hear untimely PCRA petitions.” Commonwealth v. Rienzi, 827 A.2d 369, 371 (Pa. 2003); see also Commonwealth v. Albrecht, 994 A.2d 1091, 1093 (Pa. 2010) (PCRA petition cannot be addressed unless PCRA court has jurisdiction, and jurisdiction does not exist if PCRA petition is untimely filed).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Com. v. Bartling, D.
Pa. Super. Ct. · 2017 · confidence medium
Commonwealth v. Robinson, 837 A.2d 1157, 1161 (Pa. 2003) (citing Commonwealth v. Rienzi, 827 A.2d 369, 371 (Pa. 2003) (citations omitted)). "{A]ny PCRA petition, including a second or subsequent petition, must be filed within one year of the datethe judgment becomes final." Commonwealth v. Breakiron, 781 A.2d 94, 97 (Pa. 2001) (citing 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(l)).
examined Cited as authority (rule) Com. v. Briscoe, R. (4×) also: Cited "see", Cited "see, e.g."
Pa. Super. Ct. · 2017 · confidence medium
“This Court has repeatedly stated that the PCRA timeliness requirements are jurisdictional in nature and, accordingly, a PCRA 4 The PCRA court later appointed Briscoe’s current counsel to represent him in connection with this appeal. -3- J-A24044-17 court cannot hear untimely PCRA petitions.” Commonwealth v. Rienzi, 827 A.2d 369, 371 (Pa. 2003); see also Commonwealth v. Albrecht, 994 A.2d 1091, 1093 (Pa. 2010) (stating that a PCRA petition cannot be addressed unless the PCRA court has jurisdiction, and jurisdiction does not exist if the PCRA petition is untimely filed).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Com. v. Zurita, R.
Pa. Super. Ct. · 2017 · confidence medium
Further, any petition claiming an exception under § 9545(b)(1) must be filed within 60 days of the date the claim could have been presented. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(2). “[T]he PCRA’s timeliness requirements are jurisdictional in nature and, accordingly, a PCRA court cannot hear untimely PCRA petitions.” Commonwealth v. Robinson, 837 A.2d 1157, 1161 (Pa. 2003) (quoting Commonwealth v. Rienzi, 827 A.2d 369, 371 (Pa. 2003)).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Com. v. Jones, S.
Pa. Super. Ct. · 2017 · confidence medium
Commonwealth v. Rienzi, 827 A.2d 369, 371 (Pa. 2003).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Com. v. Marcy, J.
Pa. Super. Ct. · 2016 · confidence medium
Commonwealth v. Rienzi, 827 A.2d 369, 371 (Pa. 2003).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Com. Zurita, R.
Pa. Super. Ct. · 2015 · confidence medium
Further, any petition claiming an exception under § 9545(b)(1) must be filed within 60 days of the date the claim could have been presented. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545 _______________________ (Footnote Continued) Alleyne, 133 S. Ct. at 2155 (internal citation omitted). -3- J-S57037-15 (b)(2). “[T]he PCRA’s timeliness requirements are jurisdictional in nature and, accordingly, a PCRA court cannot hear untimely PCRA petitions.” Commonwealth v. Robinson, 837 A.2d 1157, 1161 (Pa. 2003) (quoting Commonwealth v. Rienzi, 827 A.2d 369, 371 (Pa. 2003)).
examined Cited as authority (rule) Com. v. Dale, L. (3×) also: Cited "see, e.g."
Pa. Super. Ct. · 2015 · confidence medium
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has rejected attempts " ... to circumvent the PCRA time-bar by treating the second petition as an amendment to the first petition, where . . . the 14 Circulated 10/30/2015 02:48 PM second petition was filed after the expiration of the PCRA. filing deadline." Commonwealth v. Rienzi, 573 Pa. 503, 508 , 827 A.2d 369, 371 (2003).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Com. v. McPherson, W.
Pa. Super. Ct. · 2015 · confidence medium
Further, any petition claiming an exception under § 9545(b)(1) must be filed within 60 days of the date the -3- J-S57036-15 claim could have been presented. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545 (b)(2). “[T]he PCRA’s timeliness requirements are jurisdictional in nature and, accordingly, a PCRA court cannot hear untimely PCRA petitions.” Commonwealth v. Robinson, 837 A.2d 1157, 1161 (Pa. 2003) (quoting Commonwealth v. Rienzi, 827 A.2d 369, 371 (Pa. 2003)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Com. v. Green, C.
Pa. Super. Ct. · 2015 · confidence medium
Therefore, the Commonwealth did not maintain it was in any way adversely affected by the deficiencies in Appellant’s brief. -4- J-S57035-15 days of the date the claim could have been presented. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545 (b)(2). “[T]he PCRA’s timeliness requirements are jurisdictional in nature and, accordingly, a PCRA court cannot hear untimely PCRA petitions.” Commonwealth v. Robinson, 837 A.2d 1157, 1161 (Pa. 2003) (quoting Commonwealth v. Rienzi, 827 A.2d 369, 371 (Pa. 2003)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Com. v. Martin, S.
Pa. Super. Ct. · 2015 · confidence medium
See Writ of Habeas Corpus Ad Subjiciendum, 8/17/12, ¶¶ 7-8. -7- J-S53008-15 enumerated exceptions contained in section 9545(b), “the period for filing a PCRA petition is not subject to the doctrine of equitable tolling[.]” Commonwealth v. Fahy, 737 A.2d 214, 222 (Pa. 1999); Commonwealth v. Rienzi, 827 A.2d 369, 371 (Pa. 2003).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Com. v. Padgett, L.
Pa. Super. Ct. · 2015 · confidence medium
Furthermore, our Supreme Court has held that apart from the specifically enumerated exceptions contained in section 9545(b), “the period for filing a PCRA petition is not subject to the doctrine of equitable tolling[.]” Commonwealth v. Fahy, 737 A.2d 214, 222 (Pa. 1999); Commonwealth v. Rienzi, 827 A.2d 369, 371 (Pa. 2003). -7- J-S53003-15 (i) the failure to raise the claim previously was the result of interference by government officials with the presentation of the claim in violation of the Constitution or laws of this Commonwealth or the Constitution or laws of the United States; (ii) t…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Com. v. Ramzee, M.
Pa. Super. Ct. · 2015 · confidence medium
Moreover, the Supreme Court "has repeatedly stated that the PCRA timeliness requirements are jurisdictional in nature and, accordingly, a PCRA court cannot hear untimely PCRA petitions." Commonwealth v. Rienzi, 827 A.2d 369, 371 (Pa. 2003).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Commonwealth v. Future
pactcompllackaw · 2015 · confidence medium
A petition filed pursuant to the PCRA, “including a second or subsequent petition, shall be filed within one year of the date of the judgment becomes final.” 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1); Commonwealth v. Cintora, 69 A.3d 759, 762 (Pa. Super. 2013); Bennett, 593 Pa. at 388 , 930 A.2d at 1267 . 1 The PCRA time-bar is jurisdictional in nature, and is not subject to equitable exceptions. 2 Commonwealth v. Ligons, 601 Pa. 103 , 169, 971 A.2d 1125 , 1164 (2009) (quoting Commonwealth v. Rienzi, 573 Pa. 503, 507 , 827 A.2d 369, 371 (2003)); Bennett, 593 Pa. at 388 , 930 A.2d at 1267 ; Commonwealth …
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Com. v. White, K.
Pa. Super. Ct. · 2015 · confidence medium
Our Supreme Court “has repeatedly stated that the PCRA timeliness requirements are jurisdictional in nature and, accordingly, a PCRA court cannot hear untimely PCRA petitions.” Commonwealth v. Ligons, 601 Pa. 103 , 971 A.2d 1125 , 1164 (2009) (citing Commonwealth v. Reinzi, 573 Pa. 503 , 827 A.2d 369, 371 (2003)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Commonwealth v. Feliciano
Pa. Super. Ct. · 2013 · confidence medium
Our Supreme Court “has repeatedly stated that the PCRA timeliness requirements are jurisdictional in nature and, accordingly, a PCRA court cannot hear untimely PCRA petitions.” Commonwealth v. Ligons, 601 Pa. 103 , 971 A.2d 1125, 1164 (2009) (citing Commonwealth v. Rienzi, 573 Pa. 503 , 827 A.2d 369, 371 (2003)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Commonwealth v. Lewis
Pa. Super. Ct. · 2013 · confidence medium
Second, our Supreme Court has held that apart from the specifically enumerated exceptions contained in Section 9545(b), “the period for filing a PCRA petition is not subject to the doctrine of equitable tolling[.]” Commonwealth v. Fahy, 558 Pa. 313, 329 , 737 A.2d 214, 222 (1999); Commonwealth v. Rienzi, 573 Pa. 503, 508 , 827 A.2d 369, 371 (2003) 2 .
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Commonwealth v. Brown (2×)
Pa. · 2008 · confidence medium
Rather, it appears that the Murray dictum is presently invoked by Appellant in a post hoc manner, just as it would have been entirely possible for him to present alternative arguments, such as the constitutional claim fashioned sua sponte by the dissent. [3] See also Commonwealth v. Abu-Jamal, 574 Pa. 724 , 731 n. 5, 833 A.2d 719 , 724 n. 5 (2003); Commonwealth v. Rienzi, 573 Pa. 503, 508 , 827 A.2d 369, 371 (2003); Commonwealth v. Eller, 569 Pa. 622, 634 , 807 A.2d 838, 845 (2002).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Commonwealth v. Flanagan (2×)
Pa. · 2004 · confidence medium
Commonwealth v. Rienzi, 573 Pa. 503 , 827 A.2d 369, 371 (2003).
discussed Cited "see" Com. v. McKahan, C. (2×)
Pa. Super. Ct. · 2020 · signal: see · confidence high
See Commonwealth v. Rienzi, 573 Pa. 503 , 827 A.2d 369 (2003) (rejecting attempt to circumvent PCRA time-bar by treating second PCRA petition as amendment to first petition; explaining that after first petition is withdrawn, there is nothing pending before PCRA court that petitioner can amend).
discussed Cited "see" Com. v. Reyes, R.
Pa. Super. Ct. · 2020 · signal: see · confidence high
See Commonwealth v. Rienzi, 827 A.2d 369 (Pa. 2003) (indicating that when a first PCRA petition has been withdrawn, a subsequent petition that does not relate back to the first petition is considered to be a second PCRA petition). -2- J-S59023-19 Appellant argues that under the Pennsylvania Sentencing Guidelines, his prior misdemeanor conviction should not have increased his sentence for the conspiracy convictions and that he should have received a lesser sentence.
discussed Cited "see" Com. v. Shick, R.
Pa. Super. Ct. · 2019 · signal: see · confidence high
See Commonwealth v. Rienzi, 827 A.2d 369, 371 (Pa. 2003) (concluding that when nothing is pending before the PCRA court, a second petition cannot be treated as an amended first petition).
discussed Cited "see" Com. v. Miller, J.
Pa. Super. Ct. · 2019 · signal: see · confidence high
See Commonwealth v. Rienzi, 827 A.2d 369 (Pa. 2003) (providing that a second, untimely PCRA petition should not be treated as an amendment to a timely, but withdrawn, first petition). -3- J-S16034-19 the date the judgment becomes final.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545.
discussed Cited "see" Com. v. Helsel, D.
Pa. Super. Ct. · 2018 · signal: see · confidence high
See Commonwealth v. Rienzi, 827 A.2d 369 (Pa. 2003) (indicating that when a first PCRA petition has been withdrawn, a subsequent petition does not relate back to the first petition and is considered to be a second PCRA petition). -4- J-S43043-18 dated January 3, 2018, the PCRA court allowed Appellant thirty days to refile his motion to modify sentence, since it was based on Commonwealth v. Muniz, 164 A.3d 1189 (Pa. 2017),4 but lacked specificity.
discussed Cited "see" Com. v. Rankin, L.
Pa. Super. Ct. · 2018 · signal: see · confidence high
See Commonwealth v. Rienzi, 827 A.2d 369 (Pa. 2003) (indicating that when a first PCRA petition has been withdrawn, a subsequent petition does not relate back to the first petition and is considered to be a second PCRA petition). -3- J-S38019-18 Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 and providing Appellant thirty days from the date of service to file a response.
discussed Cited "see" Com. v. Mowery, A.
Pa. Super. Ct. · 2018 · signal: see · confidence high
See Commonwealth v. Rienzi, 827 A.2d 369, 371 (Pa. 2003) (holding Superior Court erred in holding second, late-filed petition constituted an amendment to the earlier, timely petition that had been withdrawn, because “there was nothing pending before the PCRA court that [the petitioner] could ‘amend’”).
discussed Cited "see" Commonwealth v. Sepulveda, M., Aplt.
Pa. · 2016 · signal: see · confidence high
See id. at 371 (finding that the Superior Court erred by treating petitioner’s second filing as an amendment to his first PCRA petition, as petitioner had withdrawn his first PCRA petition before the PCRA court, only filing the petition at issue ten months later, at which point there was nothing to “amend”); Flanagan, 854 A.2d at 500 n. 7 (distinguishing Flanagan from Rienzi because “Flanagan’s original petition for collateral relief was never withdrawn or dismissed”).
cited Cited "see" Com. v. Ellington, T.
Pa. Super. Ct. · 2016 · signal: see · confidence high
See Commonwealth v. Rienzi, 827 A.2d 369, 371 (Pa.2003) (“the PCRA jurisdictional time limitation is not subject to equitable principles such as tolling.”) (citation omitted). -7- J-S65039-15 -8-
discussed Cited "see" Commonwealth v. Robinson (2×)
Pa. Super. Ct. · 2011 · signal: see · confidence high
See Commonwealth v. Rienzi, 573 Pa. 503, 508 , 827 A.2d 369, 371 (2003) (refusing to allow untimely petition to serve as amended pri- or petition, although prior petition had been withdrawn without prejudice, where subsequent petition was later filed outside one-year statutory time limits).
discussed Cited "see" Commonwealth v. Merritt
Pa. Super. Ct. · 2003 · signal: see · confidence high
Commonwealth v. Glover, 738 A.2d 460, 464 (Pa.Super.1999) (citations omitted). ¶ 6 As a threshold matter, Merritt was required to file his petition for PCRA relief “within one year of the date the judgment [of sentence] becomes final” or otherwise invoke one of three exceptions. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9546(b); see Commonwealth v. Rienzi — Pa. -, 827 A.2d 369, 371 , 2003 WL 1337334 (Pa. 2003) (noting “that the PCRA timeliness requirements are jurisdictional in nature and, accordingly, a PCRA court cannot hear untimely PCRA petitions.”) (citations omitted); Commonwealth v. Murray, 562 Pa. 1 …
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Com. v. Witherspoon, J. (2×)
Pa. Super. Ct. · 2024 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Rienzi, 573 Pa. 503 , 827 A.2d 369 (2003) (holding Superior Court erred in attempting to circumvent PCRA time- bar by treating untimely, second PCRA petition as if it were amendment to timely but withdrawn first petition; Superior Court ignored fact that first petition was withdrawn and, therefore, there was nothing pending before PCRA court to amend); Beatty, supra (holding PCRA court erred by holding defendant’s second PCRA petition in abeyance pending outcome of appeal of first PCRA petition, “reinstating” that petition after appeal on his first petition had…
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Com. v. Yelverton, J.
Pa. Super. Ct. · 2023 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence medium
See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Rienzi, 827 A.2d 369, 371 (Pa. 2003). ____________________________________________ 9 Regardless of how the pleading is titled, courts are to treat a pleading filed after a judgment of sentence becomes final as a PCRA petition if it requests relief contemplated by the PCRA.
cited Cited "see, e.g." Com. v. Murray, C.
Pa. Super. Ct. · 2022 · signal: see also · confidence medium
See id.; see also Commonwealth v. Rienzi, 827 A.2d 369, 371 (Pa. 2003).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Com. v. Souffrant, K.
Pa. Super. Ct. · 2021 · signal: see also · confidence medium
Id; see also Commonwealth v. Rienzi, 827 A.2d 369, 371 (Pa. 2003) (holding “[t]his Court has repeatedly stated that the PCRA timeliness requirements are jurisdictional in nature, and accordingly a PCRA court cannot -4- J-S26044-21 hear untimely PCRA petitions.”).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Com. v. Murphy, E., Jr.
Pa. Super. Ct. · 2016 · signal: see also · confidence medium
See also Commonwealth v. Rienzi, 827 A.2d 369, 371 (Pa. 2003) (rejecting an attempt to “circumvent the PCRA time-bar” by treating a subsequent petition as an amendment to the first petition, and noting that, because the first petition had been previously withdrawn, “there was nothing pending before the PCRA court that [the petitioner] could ‘amend’”).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellant
v.
Anthony RIENZI, Appellee
8 EAP 2002.
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
Mar 19, 2003.
827 A.2d 369
Catherine Lynn Marshall, Philadelphia, Regina Marie Oberholzer, Harrisburg, for the Com. of PA, Appellant., Patrick Joseph Egan, Philadelphia, for Appellee, Anthony Rienzi.
Newman, Nigro.
Cited by 66 opinions  |  Published

Lead Opinion

OPINION

JUSTICE NEWMAN.

We granted allowance of appeal in this matter to address the treatment of an untimely, second petition filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA).[1]

[*505] Facts and Procedural History

On November 11, 1994, Anthony Rienzi (Appellee) was part of a gang of teenagers from Abington, Pennsylvania, who went to the Fox Chase section of Philadelphia, seeking revenge over an altercation that took place previously. After attacking several young men, Appellee and others from his group, caught up with Eddie Polec (Polec) at the St. Cecelia’s Roman Catholic Church, where Polec fell on the ground, as he attempted to escape from the gang. Appellee struck Polec in the head and then lifted him off the ground by the belt and collar. As Appellee held Polec in the air, one of his cohorts used a baseball bat to deliver additional blows to Polec’s head. Other members of the gang also hit and kicked Polec in the head. The next morning, Polec died from multiple head trauma inflicted in the beating.

Following a jury trial in the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas, Appellee was tried jointly with other individuals involved in the attack. He was convicted of third degree murder[2] and criminal conspiracy[3] on February 5, 1996. Thereafter, the judge sentenced Appellee to an aggregate term of fifteen to thirty years of imprisonment. On December 16, 1997, the Superior Court affirmed the judgment of sentence [4] and Appellee did not seek allowance of appeal.

On July 2, 1998, Appellee, represented by Oscar Gaskins, Esquire, filed a petition seeking relief pursuant to the PCRA. The Commonwealth filed a Motion to Dismiss the petition. Subsequently, new counsel, Jettie Newkirk, Esquire, entered her appearance replacing Mr. Gaskins. On December 7, 1998, the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County (PCRA court) issued a Notice of Intent to Dismiss Without a Hearing pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 1507.[5] [*506] However, on December 28, 1998, the petition was withdrawn without prejudice.[6]

Approximately ten months later, on October 12, 1999, Appellee, now represented by Patrick Egan, Esquire, filed a second PCRA petition, raising some of the issues from the first petition, as well as several others. The PCRA Court dismissed this petition as untimely and Appellee sought review with the Superior Court, arguing that previous PCRA counsel was ineffective for withdrawing the first petition. The Superi- or Court reversed the PCRA Court and remanded for an evidentiary hearing, holding that, due to the “unique procedural posture” of the case, the second, untimely petition should be treated as an amended first petition. The Commonwealth filed a petition for reconsideration, which the Superior Court denied. Thereafter, the Commonwealth sought allowance of appeal, which we granted. For the following reasons, we reverse the Order of the Superior Court.

Discussion

In 1996, the Legislature enacted amendments to the PCRA, “which mandate that all petitions for post-conviction relief, including second and subsequent petitions, be filed within one year of the date upon which the judgment became final, unless one of three enumerated exceptions apply.” Commonwealth v. Lark, 560 Pa. 487, 746 A.2d 585, 587 (2000). See also 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1); Commonwealth v. Peterkin, 554 Pa. 547, 722 A.2d 638, 641-42 (1998). This Court has described these exceptions as follows:

[Petitioner] must show that his failure to raise these claims previously was the result of illegal interference by government officials, or that facts upon which his claims rest were unknown and could not have been ascertained with due diligence, or that he is asserting a newly recognized constitutional right, and that the petition raising these claims was[*507] filed within 60 days of the date the claim could have been presented.

Commonwealth v. Crawley, 559 Pa. 9, 739 A.2d 108, 109 (1999) (emphasis in original) (citing 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b) throughout). A judgment of sentence becomes final at the conclusion of direct review or at the expiration of the time for seeking such review. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(3); Lark, 746 A.2d at 587. This Court has repeatedly stated that the PCRA timeliness requirements are jurisdictional in nature and, accordingly, a PCRA court cannot hear untimely PCRA petitions. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Murray, 562 Pa. 1, 753 A.2d 201, 203 (2000) (stating that “given the fact that the PCRA’s timeliness requirements are mandatory and jurisdictional in nature, no court may properly disregard or alter them in order to reach the merits of the claims raised in a PCRA petition that is filed in an untimely manner”); Commonwealth v. Fahy, 558 Pa. 313, 737 A.2d 214, 220 (1999) (holding that where a petitioner fails to satisfy the PCRA time requirements, this Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the petition).

In the case sub judice, Appellee’s judgment of sentence became final upon the expiration of the thirty-day period to seek appellate review with this Court,[7] which was January 15, 1998. Therefore, unless he could demonstrate that one of the exceptions outlined in 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1) applied, Appellee had until January 15, 1999, to file all PCRA petitions for post-conviction relief. Instantly, Appellee filed his first PCRA petition within this one-year period, on July 2, 1998, and, on December 28,1998, this petition was withdrawn without prejudice.

Notwithstanding the fact that Appellee had until January 15, 1999, to file a timely PCRA petition, Appellee did not do so. Instead, approximately eleven months after withdrawing his initial petition, well past the one-year time limit mandated by the PCRA, he filed the latest PCRA petition. The Superi- or Court treated this new petition as an amended first petition, “based upon the unique procedural posture of this case[*508] and the fact [Appelleej’s first counseled PCRA petition was effectively withdrawn without prejudice.” Commonwealth v. Rienzi, No. 1468 Philadelphia 2000, Slip op. at 3, 777 A.2d 508 (Pa.Super. filed March 20, 2001). By doing so, the Superior Court allowed Appellee to avoid the PCRA time-bar and, effectively, tolled the mandatory time requirements of the PCRA.

As previously stated, this Court has consistently upheld and repeatedly noted the jurisdictional nature of the PCRA time requirement. See, e.g., Murray; Fahy; Lark. Indeed, in Fahy, we specifically held that the PCRA “jurisdictional time limitation is not subject to equitable principles such as tolling____” Fahy, 737 A.2d at 222. Accordingly, we reject the instant attempt by the Superior Court to circumvent the PCRA time-bar by treating the second PCRA petition as an amendment to the first petition, where, as here, the second petition was filed after the expiration of the PCRA filing deadline. Moreover, we note that the Superior Court ignored the fact that the petition was withdrawn and, therefore, there was nothing pending before the PCRA court that Appellee could “amend.”

Appellee maintains that his counsel withdrew the petition without discussing her intentions to do so with him and without any review of the merits. However, that argument does not overcome the fact that Appellee had adequate time to amend his petition or file a new one in a timely manner, but failed to do so. Instantly, Appellee does not offer any explanation as to why he waited until after the filing period expired to file his second petition.

Conclusion

Accordingly, because a PCRA court is without jurisdiction to consider the merits of an untimely PCRA petition, we reverse the Order of the Superior Court.

Justice NIGRO files a concurring opinion.
1

42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546.

4

See Commonwealth v. Crook, 706 A.2d 1250 (Pa.Super.1997) (Unpublished Memorandum).

5

Rule 1507 has since been renumbered as Rule 907, but the rule remains substantially the same in relevant part, as it concerns this case.

6

As noted by the Superior Court, the December 28, 1998 Order withdrawing the petition is not included in the record. However, in their briefs, both the Commonwealth and Appellee agree that the petition was withdrawn at the behest of Appellee’s counsel.

7

See Pa.R.A.P. 1113(a).

Concurrence

[*509] JUSTICE NIGRO

CONCURRING.

Given this Court’s strict adherence to the PCRA’s time requirements, I am constrained to concur in the result reached by the majority. I also note that although I find Appellee’s allegations that counsel withdrew his first PCRA petition without his consent to be disconcerting, the fact remains that the withdrawal occurred while there was still time remaining in the PCRA’s one-year filing limit and Appellee failed to file another petition within that time period.