Coleman v. City of Key West, 807 So. 2d 84 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001). · Go Syfert
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Coleman v. City of Key West, 807 So. 2d 84 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
10 citation events (10 in the last 25 years) across 1 distinct court.
Strongest positive: MICHAEL DAVID TESTA, Individually and as Trustee of the M. DAVID TESTA REVOCABLE LIVING TRUST, DATED OCTOBER 25, 2017 v. TOWN OF JUPITER ISLAND (fladistctapp, 2023-02-08)
Top citers, strongest first. 6 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (rule) MICHAEL DAVID TESTA, Individually and as Trustee of the M. DAVID TESTA REVOCABLE LIVING TRUST, DATED OCTOBER 25, 2017 v. TOWN OF JUPITER ISLAND
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2023 · confidence medium
P. 1.510(a) (2021). “[O]rdinances which fall within the ambit of section 166.041(3) … must be strictly enacted pursuant to the statute’s notice provisions[.]” Coleman v. City of Key West, 807 So. 2d 84, 85 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Anderson v. City of St. Pete Beach
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2014 · confidence medium
See, e.g., David v. City of Dunedin, 473 So.2d 304, 306 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985) (“[T]he ordinance and its amendment are zoning ordinances which are null and void if not strictly enacted pursuant to the requirements of section 166.041.”); Coleman v. City of Key West, 807 So.2d 84, 85 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001) (same).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Rollison v. City of Key West
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2004 · confidence medium
Coleman v. City of Key West, 807 So.2d 84, 85-86 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001), review denied, 828 So.2d 385 (Fla. 2002).
discussed Cited "see" SAVE CALUSA INC. v. MIAMI-DADE COUNTY
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2023 · signal: see · confidence high
See Coleman v. City of Key West, 807 So. 2d 84 , 85–86 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001) (holding ordinance null and void where rescheduled public hearing on proposed zoning ordinance failed to comply with statutory notice requirements); City of Fort Pierce v. Davis, 400 So. 2d 1242, 1245 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981) (holding ordinance void for failure to give notice as required by applicable statute where public hearing had been rescheduled). 9 This interpretation is consistent with the plain text of the ordinance and the purpose underlying the notice requirements.
discussed Cited "see" SAVE CALUSA INC. v. MIAMI-DADE COUNTY
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2022 · signal: see · confidence high
See Coleman v. City of Key West, 807 So. 2d 84 , 85–86 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001) (holding ordinance null and void where rescheduled public hearing on proposed zoning failed to comply with statutory notice requirements); City of Fort Pierce v. Davis, 400 So. 2d 1242, 1245 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981) (holding ordinance void for failure to give notice as required by applicable statute where public hearing had been rescheduled).
cited Cited "see" Allen v. City of Key West
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2011 · signal: see · confidence high
See Coleman v. City of Key West, 807 So.2d 84 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Jerry COLEMAN, Appellant,
v.
The CITY OF KEY WEST, and Henry and Martha Dupont, Appellees. Timothy Henshaw, Appellant, v. The City of Key West, Florida, and Henry and Martha Dupont, Appellees.
3D01-1779, 3D01-1808.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
Dec 19, 2001.
807 So. 2d 84
Cope, Fletcher, and Ramirez.
Cited by 6 opinions  |  Published

Hicks, Anderson & Kneale, Miami; Jerry Coleman (Key West), for appellant Coleman.

Ritter, Chusid, Bivona & Cohen and Jeffrey M. Bell (Boca Raton); James C. Pilkey[*85] (Ft.Lauderdale), for appellant Henshaw.

David J. Audlin, Jr. (Key West), for appellee City of Key West.

Lee Robert Rohe (Summerland Key), for appellees DuPont.

Before COPE, FLETCHER, and RAMIREZ, JJ.

FLETCHER, Judge.

On November 10, 1998, the City of Key West held its second and final hearing on the enactment of its ordinance no. 98-31, amending Chapter V, Article XXI of the City's land development regulations in order to regulate the transient use of residential dwellings. The basic purpose of the ordinance is to control (or halt) the transient use of residences "in order to preserve the residential character of neighborhoods." [R.8] The appellants, Jerry Coleman and Timothy Henshaw, contend that the ordinance is null and void as it was not validly enacted. We agree with Coleman and Henshaw and reverse the single final judgment entered in these two cases.

As ordinance no. 98-31 was an effort to change the permitted uses within the City's residential zoning category (or categories), the City was required by section 166.041(3)(c)(2), Florida Statutes (1997), to hold two advertised public hearings to consider its enactment. The first public hearing was required to be held at least seven days after the day that the first advertisement was published, while the second public hearing was to be advertised at least five days prior to the date set for that public hearing. § 166.041(3)(c)(2)(a), Fla. Stat. (1997). The parties are in agreement that the City satisfied the advertisement requirements for the first public hearing. It is the advertisement for the second public hearing that creates the dispute.

On October 30, 1998, the second public hearing was advertised for a scheduled date of November 4. However, due to an approaching tropical storm there was no November 4, 1998 city commission meeting at all. As that meeting was gone with the wind, the notice published on October 30 was rendered meaningless. In an attempt to rectify the situation, the City rescheduled the second hearing for November 10, 1998, with the advertisement therefor being published on November 8. This advertisement two days prior to the second public hearing did not comply with the five-day mandate of section 166.041(3)(c)(2). Nonetheless ordinance no. 98-31 was attempted to be enacted at the hearing on November 10.

The courts have consistently held that ordinances which fall within the ambit of section 166.041(3), Florida Statutes (1997) must be strictly enacted pursuant to the statute's notice provisions or they are null and void. HealthSouth Doctors' Hosp., Inc. v. Hartnett, 622 So.2d 146 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993); David v. City of Dunedin, 473 So.2d 304 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985); Fountain v. City of Jacksonville, 447 So.2d 353 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984). The notices are mandated in order to protect interested persons, who are thus given the opportunity to learn of proposed ordinances; given the time to study the proposals for any negative or positive effects they might have if enacted; and given notice so that they can attend the hearings and speak out to inform the city commissioners prior to ordinance enactment. Noncompliance with the notice provisions takes away or reduces these opportunities. Although a tropical storm is an excellent reason to cancel a hearing, it is not a valid reason for noncompliance with the notice requirements. Indeed, the havoc and confusion such a storm causes make strict compliance even more important, so that the[*86] opportunities meant to be provided are not lost in the storm's wake.

Ordinance no. 98-31 is null and void for failure to comply with the notice requirements of section 166.041(3)(c)(2), Florida Statutes (1997). The final judgment entered in these two cases is reversed and the cause is remanded with directions to the trial court to enter final judgment in accordance herewith.

Reversed and remanded.