Notes of Decisions
Lamar Advert. of Mobile, Inc. v. City of Lakeland, 189 F.R.D. 480 (M.D. Fla. 1999).
· cites it 6× “Defendant argues further that the notice provided was adequate to meet the legislative intent behind Section 166.041(3)(c), because it provided sufficient notice of the proposed changes.”
S. Ent. Co. v. City of Boynton Beach, 736 F. Supp. 1094 (S.D. Fla. 1990).
· cites it 14× “The advertisement shall also contain a geographic location map which clearly indicates the area covered by the proposed ordinance.”
Lady J. Lingerie, Inc. v. City of Jacksonville, 973 F. Supp. 1428 (M.D. Fla. 1997).
· cites it 13× “It is undisputed that the two Ordinances, 94-190-651 and 95-307-109, were not enacted in strict accordance with the procedures set forth in Fla. Stat. § 166.041 (3)(c)2. Ordinance 94-190-651 was advertised 14 days in advance of the public hearing, rather than *1434 the 5 days…”
Coleman v. City of Key West, 807 So. 2d 84 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001).
· cites it 9× “This advertisement two days prior to the second public hearing did not comply with the five-day mandate of section 166.”
Anderson v. City of St. Pete Beach, 161 So. 3d 548 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014).
· cites it 11× “Pete Beach, Florida, Ordinance 2011-19 (June 28, 2011), an amendment to the appellee City’s comprehensive plan based on the City’s failure to publish notice in accordance with section 166.041, Florida Statutes (2011).”
Fountain v. City of Jacksonville, 447 So. 2d 353 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984).
· cites it 6× “Appellants urge that the City of Jacksonville's Air Installation Compatible Use Zone ordinance ("AICUZ"), Ordinance 78-256-271, should be found invalid for the following three reasons: (1) the City of Jacksonville did not strictly adhere to the special notice and hearing…”
Daytona Leisure Corp. v. City of Daytona Beach, 539 So. 2d 597 (Fla. 5th DCA 1989).
· cites it 5× “Florida follows the majority view whereby measures passed in contravention of notice requirements are invalid (null and void if not strictly enacted pursuant to the requirement of section 166.041). Ellison v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 183 So.”
3299 N. Fed. Hwy. v. Broward Cty. Com'rs, 646 So. 2d 215 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994).
· cites it 4× “The court concluded that the temporary prohibition against further building constituted "a substantial restriction upon land use" which required that the city follow the same formalities prescribed for the enactment of a municipal zoning ordinance.”
City of Sanibel v. Buntrock, 409 So. 2d 1073 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981).
· cites it 8× “[2] In adopting the ordinance in question, the city followed section 166.041(3)(a), Florida Statutes (1979), which prescribes the ordinary method for enacting ordinances.”
Brooks v. Watchtower Bible & Tract, 706 So. 2d 85 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998).
· cites it 7× “02 of the Charter, permits a referendum only when the action taken is legislative in nature, as distinguished from executive or administrative. Section 166.041(1)(a) defines "ordinance" as "an official legislative action of a governing body, which action is a regulation of a…”
Jordan Chapel Freewill Baptist Ch. v. Dade Cnty., 334 So. 2d 661 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976).
· cites it 3× “"Regardless of which contention is correct, it is not necessary for the Court to determine exactly which procedural requirements must be followed since the plaintiffs have not established any violation of the requirements of Section 166.041, Florida Statutes. This Court,…”
— 166.041(1) — 1 case
— 166.041(1)(a) — 8 cases
Brooks v. Watchtower Bible & Tract, 706 So. 2d 85 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998).
“02 of the Charter, permits a referendum only when the action taken is legislative in nature, as distinguished from executive or administrative. Section 166.041(1)(a) defines "ordinance" as "an official legislative action of a governing body, which action is a regulation of a…”
— 166.041(1)(b) — 4 cases
Brooks v. Watchtower Bible & Tract, 706 So. 2d 85 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998).
“02 of the Charter, permits a referendum only when the action taken is legislative in nature, as distinguished from executive or administrative. Section 166.041(1)(a) defines "ordinance" as "an official legislative action of a governing body, which action is a regulation of a…”
— 166.041(2) — 7 cases
— 166.041(3) — 10 cases
Coleman v. City of Key West, 807 So. 2d 84 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001).
“This advertisement two days prior to the second public hearing did not comply with the five-day mandate of section 166.”
3299 N. Fed. Hwy. v. Broward Cty. Com'rs, 646 So. 2d 215 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994).
“The court concluded that the temporary prohibition against further building constituted "a substantial restriction upon land use" which required that the city follow the same formalities prescribed for the enactment of a municipal zoning ordinance.”
Anderson v. City of St. Pete Beach, 161 So. 3d 548 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014).
“Pete Beach, Florida, Ordinance 2011-19 (June 28, 2011), an amendment to the appellee City’s comprehensive plan based on the City’s failure to publish notice in accordance with section 166.041, Florida Statutes (2011).”
— 166.041(3)(C) — 1 case
— 166.041(3)(a) — 16 cases
— 166.041(3)(b) — 3 cases
Daytona Leisure Corp. v. City of Daytona Beach, 539 So. 2d 597 (Fla. 5th DCA 1989).
“Florida follows the majority view whereby measures passed in contravention of notice requirements are invalid (null and void if not strictly enacted pursuant to the requirement of section 166.041). Ellison v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 183 So.”
City of Sanibel v. Buntrock, 409 So. 2d 1073 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981).
“[2] In adopting the ordinance in question, the city followed section 166.041(3)(a), Florida Statutes (1979), which prescribes the ordinary method for enacting ordinances.”
— 166.041(3)(c) — 20 cases
Lamar Advert. of Mobile, Inc. v. City of Lakeland, 189 F.R.D. 480 (M.D. Fla. 1999).
“Defendant argues further that the notice provided was adequate to meet the legislative intent behind Section 166.041(3)(c), because it provided sufficient notice of the proposed changes.”
S. Ent. Co. v. City of Boynton Beach, 736 F. Supp. 1094 (S.D. Fla. 1990).
“The advertisement shall also contain a geographic location map which clearly indicates the area covered by the proposed ordinance.”
Daytona Leisure Corp. v. City of Daytona Beach, 539 So. 2d 597 (Fla. 5th DCA 1989).
“Florida follows the majority view whereby measures passed in contravention of notice requirements are invalid (null and void if not strictly enacted pursuant to the requirement of section 166.041). Ellison v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 183 So.”
City of Sanibel v. Buntrock, 409 So. 2d 1073 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981).
“[2] In adopting the ordinance in question, the city followed section 166.041(3)(a), Florida Statutes (1979), which prescribes the ordinary method for enacting ordinances.”
— 166.041(3)(c)(1) — 2 cases
— 166.041(3)(c)(2) — 3 cases
Lady J. Lingerie, Inc. v. City of Jacksonville, 973 F. Supp. 1428 (M.D. Fla. 1997).
“It is undisputed that the two Ordinances, 94-190-651 and 95-307-109, were not enacted in strict accordance with the procedures set forth in Fla. Stat. § 166.041 (3)(c)2. Ordinance 94-190-651 was advertised 14 days in advance of the public hearing, rather than *1434 the 5 days…”
Coleman v. City of Key West, 807 So. 2d 84 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001).
“This advertisement two days prior to the second public hearing did not comply with the five-day mandate of section 166.”
— 166.041(3)(c)(2)(a) — 2 cases
Coleman v. City of Key West, 807 So. 2d 84 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001).
“This advertisement two days prior to the second public hearing did not comply with the five-day mandate of section 166.”
— 166.041(3)(e) — 1 case
S. Ent. Co. v. City of Boynton Beach, 736 F. Supp. 1094 (S.D. Fla. 1990).
“The advertisement shall also contain a geographic location map which clearly indicates the area covered by the proposed ordinance.”
— 166.041(3)(e)(2) — 1 case
Lady J. Lingerie, Inc. v. City of Jacksonville, 973 F. Supp. 1428 (M.D. Fla. 1997).
“It is undisputed that the two Ordinances, 94-190-651 and 95-307-109, were not enacted in strict accordance with the procedures set forth in Fla. Stat. § 166.041 (3)(c)2. Ordinance 94-190-651 was advertised 14 days in advance of the public hearing, rather than *1434 the 5 days…”
— 166.041(4) — 4 cases
Brooks v. Watchtower Bible & Tract, 706 So. 2d 85 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998).
“02 of the Charter, permits a referendum only when the action taken is legislative in nature, as distinguished from executive or administrative. Section 166.041(1)(a) defines "ordinance" as "an official legislative action of a governing body, which action is a regulation of a…”
— 166.041(6) — 4 cases
— 166.041(7) — 6 cases
— 166.041(8) — 1 case
Lady J. Lingerie, Inc. v. City of Jacksonville, 973 F. Supp. 1428 (M.D. Fla. 1997).
“It is undisputed that the two Ordinances, 94-190-651 and 95-307-109, were not enacted in strict accordance with the procedures set forth in Fla. Stat. § 166.041 (3)(c)2. Ordinance 94-190-651 was advertised 14 days in advance of the public hearing, rather than *1434 the 5 days…”
— 166.041(a) — 1 case
— 166.041(c) — 1 case
Lamar Advert. of Mobile, Inc. v. City of Lakeland, 189 F.R.D. 480 (M.D. Fla. 1999).
“Defendant argues further that the notice provided was adequate to meet the legislative intent behind Section 166.041(3)(c), because it provided sufficient notice of the proposed changes.”
— 166.041(c)(3) — 1 case
Anderson v. City of St. Pete Beach, 161 So. 3d 548 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014).
“Pete Beach, Florida, Ordinance 2011-19 (June 28, 2011), an amendment to the appellee City’s comprehensive plan based on the City’s failure to publish notice in accordance with section 166.041, Florida Statutes (2011).”
— 166.041(l)(a) — 3 cases
— 166.041(l)(b) — 2 cases
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