Matter of Davison, 106 B.R. 1021 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1989). · Go Syfert
Matter of Davison, 106 B.R. 1021 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1989). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
11 citation events across 8 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: In Re Liuzzo (flnb, 1996-11-14)
Top citers, strongest first. 4 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In Re Liuzzo
Bankr. N.D. Fla. · 1996 · confidence medium
School D., 159 B.R. at 204 (finding that a 12 percent per annum statutory interest rate on a delinquent tax lien can be characterized as true interest rather than as a penalty); In re Davison, 106 B.R. at 1022 (awarding County its 14 percent per annum statutory rate on delinquent tax lien); In re Eastern Steel Barrel Corp., 164 B.R. 477, 481 (Bankr.D.N.J.1994) (allowing township the statutory rate set out in New Jersey statute); cf. Meilink v. Unemployment Reserves Comm’n, 314 U.S. 564, 567 , 62 S.Ct. 389, 391 , 86 L.Ed. 458 (1942) (finding that a 12 percent per annum statutory delinquency f…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Marc Stuart Goldberg, P.C. v. City of New York (In Re Navis Realty, Inc.) (2×) also: Cited "see, e.g."
Bankr. E.D.N.Y. · 1996 · confidence medium
We think, therefore, there would be no justification in holding the provision for 10 per cent, on delinquent taxes a penalty as distinguished from interest for the use of money.”); In re Davison, 106 B.R. 1021, 1022 (Bankr.D.Neb.1989) (in the context of 11 U.S.C. § 606 (c) and the appropriate post-petition interest rate, the court stated: “I conclude that the interest rate imposed [by the state statute] do (sic) not provide for a penalty.
discussed Cited "see" Matter of Greensboro Lumber Co.
Bankr. M.D. Ga. · 1995 · signal: see · confidence high
See In re Davison, 106 B.R. 1021, 1022 (Bankr.D.Neb.1989) (allowing County its 14% per annum statutory interest rate on delinquent tax lien); In re Krump, 89 B.R. 821, 825 (Bankr.D.S.D.1988) (awarding statutory rate of interest on tax lien); In re Charter Co., 63 B.R. 568, 571 (Bankr.M.D.Fla.1986) (allowing holder of oversecured mechanic’s hen the rate of interest specified by Texas statute); cf. Meilink [v. Unemployment Reserves Commission], 314 U.S. 564 , 62 S.Ct. 389 [ 86 L.Ed. 458 (1942) ] (allowing state fund to recover statutory 12% per annum interest on delinquent contributions from d…
discussed Cited "see" Galveston Independent School District v. Heartland Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n
S.D. Tex. · 1993 · signal: see · confidence high
See In re Davison, 106 B.R. 1021, 1022 (Bankr.D.Neb.1989) (allowing County its 14% per annum statutory interest rate on delinquent tax lien); In re Krump, 89 B.R. 821, 825 (Bankr.D.S.D.1988) (awarding statutory rate of interest on tax lien); In re Charter Co., 63 B.R. 568, 571 (Bankr.M.D.Fla.1986) (allowing holder of overse-cured mechanic’s lien the rate of interest specified by Texas statute); cf. Meilink, 314 U.S. 564 , 62 S.Ct. 389 (allowing state fund to recover statutory 12% per annum interest on delinquent contributions from debtor, as this was not so high as to constitute an un-allowe…
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
In the Matter of Michael L. DAVISON, Debtor
16-80583.
United States Bankruptcy Court, D. Nebraska.
Sep 28, 1989.
106 B.R. 1021
Vincent Powers, Lincoln, Neb., David E. Cygan, Lincoln, Neb., Steven J. Mercure, Tecumseh, Neb., Vincent Valentino, York, Neb., Susan L. Knight., Richard K. Lydick, Omaha, Neb., trustee.
Minahan.
Cited by 8 opinions  |  Published

MEMORANDUM

JOHN C. MINAHAN, Jr., Bankruptcy Judge.

Johnson County, Nebraska has objected to confirmation of the debtor’s Chapter 12 plan on the ground that it proposes to pay real estate taxes owed by the debtor to Johnson County for 1986, 1987 and 1988 over a three year period with amortized payments over such three year period at eleven percent interest per annum. Johnson County asserts that under the laws of the State of Nebraska, it is entitled to be paid interest at the rate of fourteen percent per annum for all such delinquent real estate taxes and that any plan of reorganization proposing interest at less than the statutory rate should not be confirmed by the court. The taxes in question accrued prior to the filing of the bankruptcy case. The question before the court is whether Johnson County is entitled to be paid interest after confirmation of the reorganization plan at the statutory rate of fourteen percent per annum pursuant to Neb.Rev.Stat. § 77-207 (Reissue 1986) and § 45-104.01. (Reissue 1988).

I conclude that the debtor is obligated to pay interest at the statutory rate and that the objection to plan of Johnson County should be sustained.

There is no dispute as to whether or not interest is payable. Under § 506(b), the county is entitled to post-bankruptcy petition interest on its secured claim because there is sufficient collateral value to secure such interest accrual. Under the confirmation standards of §§ 1222(a)(2) and 1225(a)(5), the county is entitled to post-confirmation interest with respect to any deferred payments. The issue is whether the county should be paid interest at the market rate or the statutory rate. I conclude that the county is entitled to be paid the statutory interest rate of fourteen percent, unless the court determines that the statutory interest rate constitutes a penalty. Cf. Meilink v. Unemployment Reserves Commission, 314 U.S. 564, 62 S.Ct. 389, 86 L.Ed. 458 (1942) (Bankruptcy Act Case); Horn v. Boone County, Nebraska, 44 F.2d 920 (8th Cir.1930) (Bankruptcy Act case wherein former Nebraska statutory ten percent interest on delinquent taxes was held not to be penalty).

I conclude that the interest rate imposed by Neb.Rev.Stat. § 77-207 (Reissue 1986) and Neb.Rev.Stat. § 45-104.01 (Reissue 1988) do not provide for a penalty. The rate charged is reasonable and it is imposed over time at the rate of fourteen percent per annum. Accordingly, the state statutory interest charges should be given force and effect in bankruptcy proceedings to the extent that, and only to the extent that, the bankruptcy code allows interest payments on the county tax claims. If such interest is payable, it shall be at the statutory rate.

As we know, claims for unmatured interest are generally not allowable in bankruptcy. See 11 U.S.C. § 502(b)(2). However, interest is properly allowed on secured claims to the extent provided in § 506(b). In addition, interest is properly payable on claims under the confirmation standards of § 1129 and § 1225.

The county’s objection to confirmation (Fil. # 17) is therefore sustained.