Branch v. Jackson, 629 A.2d 170 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993). · Go Syfert
Branch v. Jackson, 629 A.2d 170 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
55 citation events (37 in the last 25 years) across 9 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Metzker, M. v. Marlowe, C. (pasuperct, 2019-10-16)
Treatment trajectory · 1994 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1994 2010 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 13 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Metzker, M. v. Marlowe, C.
Pa. Super. Ct. · 2019 · confidence medium
In Branch v. Jackson, 629 A.2d 170, 171 (Pa. Super. 1993), we held that reasonable needs of wealthy children are not limited to: Reasonable needs are not, of course, limited to the bare necessities of life.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Kern v. Kern
Ariz. Ct. App. · 2018 · confidence medium
See Miller v. Schou, 616 So.2d 436 , 438–39 (Fla.1993) [stating children of multimillionaires, however, need not ride to school in a Rolls Royce]; accord Hansel v. Hansel, 802 So.2d 875 , 882–83 (La.App.2001) [where father’s income exceeded $1 million dollars, the court upheld child support in the amount of $11,800/monthly] (correct standard is pre-divorce standard, not “basic needs”); Isaacson v. Isaacson, [] 792 A.2d 525, 537, 539 (N.J.Super.A.D.2002) [father’s earnings exceeded $500,000 a year resulting in an award of $1750 per child] (beyond bare necessities, a wealthy parent m…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Nash v. Nash
Ariz. Ct. App. · 2013 · confidence medium
See Miller v. Schou, 616 So.2d 436, 438-39 (Fla.1993); accord Hansel v. Hansel, 802 So.2d 875, 882-83 (La.App.2001) (correct standard is pre-divorce standard, not “basic needs”); Isaacson v. Isaacson, 348 N.J.Super. 560 , 792 A.2d 525, 537, 539 (N.J.Super.A.D.2002) (beyond bare necessities, a wealthy parent must “share with the children the benefit of his financial achievement,” including reasonable but “non-essential items” such as “tutoring, summer camps, sports climes, music or art lessons, vacations [and] study abroad”) (quotation omitted); Montgomery v. Montgomery, 481 N.W…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Gibbons v. Kugle
Pa. Super. Ct. · 2006 · confidence medium
See Nischal v. Nischal, 879 A.2d 813 , 815 n. 3 (Pa.Super.2005), (stating, in the context of an appeal of a child support order, that “[ajccording to the American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language, the term ‘standard of living’ refers to the ‘level of material comfort as measured by the goods, services, and luxuries available to an individual, group, or nation.’ ”); Edelstein v. Edelstein, 399 Pa.Super. 536 , 582 A.2d 1074, 1077 (1990) (stating, in upholding an award of alimony to wife, that the standard of living to which a wife was entitled was one reasonably supportabl…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Spahr v. Spahr
Pa. Super. Ct. · 2005 · confidence medium
See also DeWalt v. DeWalt, 365 Pa.Super. 280 , 529 A.2d 508, 510 (1987) (stating child is entitled to reasonable standard of living based upon social station, fortune and financial achievements of parents); Branch v. Jackson, 427 Pa.Super. 417 , 629 A.2d 170, 171 (1993) (stating wealthy parent with assets and ability to provide has legal duty to give his children advantages in reasonable accord with his financial status).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Pearson v. Pearson
Mass. App. Ct. · 2001 · confidence medium
Ct. App. 1995); Pratt v. McCullough, 100 Ohio App. 3d 479, 481-482 (1995); Branch v. Jackson, 427 Pa. Super. 417, 419-420 (1993). 5 In this case, a pure income-sharing approach is problematic because it does not account for the noncustodial parent whose income far exceeds any reasonable needs the child might have.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Sanchez v. Sanchez (2×)
pactcomplcheste · 2001 · confidence medium
Moreover, ‘a wealthy father has the legal duty to give his children the “advantages” which his financial status indicates to be reasonable.’ Branch [v. Jackson, 427 Pa. Super. 417, 420 , 629 A.2d 170, 171 (1993)] (quoting Hecht v. Hecht, 189 Pa. Super. 276 , 150 A.2d 139 (1959))....
cited Cited as authority (rule) Chévere Mouriño v. Levis Goldstein
prsupreme · 2000 · confidence medium
(Escolio omitido.) En Branch v. Jackson, 629 A.2d 170, 171 (1993), la Corte Superior de Pennsylvania definió el concepto de lo que constituye reasonable needs de la manera siguiente: ...
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Gowdy v. Kesselring
Pa. Super. Ct. · 1996 · confidence medium
As we recognized in Branch v. Jackson, 427 Pa.Super. 417 , , 629 A.2d 170, 172 (1993), “Mother’s budget may or may not be indicative of the reasonable needs of the child when viewed in terms of Father’s income and standard of living.” Clearly, “[rjeasonable needs are not, of course, limited to the bare necessities of life.” Branch, 629 A.2d at 171 , quoting Hecht v. Hecht, 189 Pa.Super. 276, 283-284 , 150 A.2d 139, 143 (1959).
discussed Cited "see" C.L.M. v. M.L.M.
Pa. Super. Ct. · 2020 · signal: see · confidence high
See id. at 171 .4 Children of wealthy parents are, therefore, entitled to benefits that their financial status indicates to be reasonable, including educational advantages, lessons, travel, the best medical care, quality clothing and familiarity with good restaurants, hotels, shows and camps.
examined Cited "see" Klahold v. Kroh (4×)
Pa. Super. Ct. · 1994 · signal: see · confidence high
See Branch v. Jackson, 427 Pa.Super. 417 , 629 A.2d 170 (1993) (citing 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5102(a)). .
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Isaacson v. Isaacson (2×)
N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. · 2002 · signal: see also · confidence low
The child is only entitled to share in the good fortune of his parent consistent with an appropriate lifestyle." Id. at 438-439 ; see also Branch v. Jackson, 427 Pa.Super. 417 , 629 A. 2d 170, 171 (1993) (noting that while a child is entitled to the lifestyle commensurate with a supporting parent's income, the child was not entitled to all the luxuries available; the supporting parent still has the right to participate in the upbringing of the child and limit expenses to the reasonable needs of the child of a wealthy parent); Hanley M.
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Smith v. Stewart
Vt. · 1996 · signal: see also · confidence medium
App. 1993); see also Branch v. Jackson, 629 A.2d 170, 171 (Pa. Super.
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Deanna BRANCH, Appellee,
v.
Michael JACKSON, Appellant; Deanna BRANCH, Appellant, v. Michael JACKSON, Appellee
00880 and 00924.
Superior Court of Pennsylvania.
Aug 12, 1993.
629 A.2d 170
Mark J. Goldberg, Pittsburgh, for Michael Jackson., J. Richard Narvin, Pittsburgh, for Deanna Branch.
Rowley, Johnson, Montgomery.
Cited by 25 opinions  |  Published
[*419] PER CURIAM:

These cross appeals are from an order directing Michael Jackson (“Father”) to pay $2,000.00 per month for child support and $3,000.00 per month into a trust fund for the parties’ minor child. For the reasons below, we vacate the order and remand for further proceedings.

The parties hereto are the parents of one child, Michael Jackson, Jr., born November 12, 1988. Mother earns $400.00 per month as a drug store cashier. Father, a major league baseball player, nets $75,000.00 per month.

Both parties have appealed. Father’s issues are:

(1) The support order is excessive and confiscatory as it bears no relationship to the child’s reasonable needs.
(2) The court abused its discretion in ordering Father to establish and pay $3,000.00 per month into a trust for future expenses.
Mother’s claims are:
(1) The support order is inadequate in view of Father’s income.
(2) The court erred in its determination of retroactivity.

Because the record does not reveal a calculation of the child’s reasonable needs, we are unable to determine whether the order is excessive, inadequate or just right. We are constrained therefore to vacate the order and remand for further proceedings. In light of this disposition, we will not at this time address the remaining issues.

Because of Father’s income, this case falls outside the Support Guidelines and support must be determined pursuant to case law. Pa.R.Civ.P. 1910.16-5(d). In order to determine an appropriate support order, the court must determine each parent’s income and/or earning capacity and the reasonable needs of the child involved. Melzer v. Witsberger, 505 Pa. 462, 480 A.2d 991 (1984). Reasonable needs are not, of course, limited to the bare necessities of life. Id. The reasonable needs of a child whose parent or parents are wealthy may well include items which would be considered[*420] frivolous to parents who are less well off. As was so eloquently stated by the Honorable Robert E. Woodside:

"... ‘necessaries,’ and ‘luxuries’ are relative matters____
“Children of wealthy parents are entitled to the educational advantages of travel, private lessons in music, drama, swimming, horseback riding, and other activities in which they show interest and ability. They are entitled to the best medical care, good clothes, and familiarity with good restaurants, good hotels, good shows, and good camps. It is possible that a child with nothing more than a house to shelter him, a coat to keep him warm and sufficient food to keep him healthy will be happier and more successful than a child who has all the ‘advantages,’ but most parents strive and sacrifice to give their children ‘advantages’ which cost money.
A wealthy father has a legal duty to give his children the ‘advantages’ which his financial status indicates to be reasonable____
[A parent] should not be forced by a support order to make personal sacrifices to give them all the advantages to which we referred above, but a father with the assets, the youth, and the ability of the defendant can furnish his children with these advantages without any recognizable sacrifice on his part.”

Hecht v. Hecht, 189 Pa.Super. 276, 283-84, 150 A.2d 139, 143 (1959).

While conceding this principle, Father argues that, because the child was born out of wedlock and has always lived with Mother, Mother’s lifestyle is controlling. We cannot agree. Our Supreme Court and this court have consistently held that a child is entitled to support in an amount commensurate with his parents’ station in life. Melzer v. Witsberger, supra; Conway v. Dana, 456 Pa. 536, 318 A.2d 324 (1974); Lesko v. Lesko, 392 Pa.Super. 240, 572 A.2d 780 (1990); Hecht v. Hecht, supra. No case law limits this principle only to children whose parents have been married. To the contrary, due process requires that children born out of[*421] wedlock be treated the same as children born during marriage. Nichols v. Horn, 363 Pa.Super. 301, 525 A.2d 1242 (1987). By statute, children born out of wedlock enjoy “all the rights and privileges as if they had been born during the wedlock of their parents.” 23 Pa.C.S. § 5102.

Those cases which have created or discussed distinctions between children born out of wedlock and those born in wedlock are the exception and have concerned problems with proof of paternity. See discussion in Estate of Greenwood, 402 Pa.Super. 536, 587 A.2d 749 (1991). Paternity is not at issue in this case so no such insurmountable proof problems present themselves.

We note that Father has stipulated that his income is sufficient “to pay any order this Court might enter ...” Tr. 1/14/92 at p. 3. Therefore, Father does not argue that the order in question imposes any financial hardship on him. In passing, we note that had the record contained sufficient information, we would not have found the order herein to be unreasonable solely on the basis of the amount.

Father’s complaint that an order commensurate with his income and lifestyle will result in a windfall to Mother is a make-weight argument. Obviously, if the child lives with Mother, Mother may indirectly benefit from certain of the child’s needs, for example, improved housing. However, that is no reason why the child should be shortchanged by denying him support commensurate with his Father’s income and lifestyle.

We recognize, as did the trial court, that Mother’s budget may or may not be indicative of the reasonable needs of the child when viewed in terms of Father’s income and standard of living. However, we see no reason why Mother cannot present, and the court consider, estimates of certain costs, e.g., the cost of housing which is not shared with other family members, [1] or the cost of a nursery school or other items which may be appropriate. We therefore vacate the order and remand for further proceedings consistent with this memorandum.

[*422] Order vacated and.case remanded for further proceedings consistent with this memorandum. Jurisdiction relinquished.

1

. Mother currently shares living quarters with her brother.