Defendant pleaded guilty of first-[*727] degree retail fraud, MCL 750.356c; MSA 28.588(3), and of being an habitual offender, third offense, MCL 769.11; MSA 28.1083. After being sentenced to 2 Vi to 4 years’ imprisonment, he filed this appeal as of right. We affirm.

Defendant’s sole claim on appeal is that MCL 750.356c; MSA 28.588(3) is unconstitutionally vague because he had no way of knowing that his twenty-year-old conviction for the theft of a snowmobile could be used to enhance a misdemeanor shoplifting offense to a felony status. We disagree. The ordinary and plain language of the applicable statute provides, in clear and understandable terms, that anyone who commits a shoplifting offense that would otherwise be a misdemeanor under MCL 750.356d(l)(b); MSA 28.588(4)(l)(b) but who also has a prior conviction of, among other things, a larceny, is guilty of the felony offense of first-degree retail fraud. MCL 750.356c(2); MSA 28.588(3)(2). The language used to prohibit the act or conduct is not so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning. State Treasurer v Wilson (On Remand), 150 Mich App 78, 80-81; 388 NW2d 312 (1986). Further, defendant’s challenge to the statute that is premised on a reading of its title only is without merit because an analysis of a void-for-vagueness claim requires an examination of the entire text of the applicable statute. People v Jackson, 140 Mich App 283; 364 NW2d 310 (1985). Finally, that defendant was unaware that his conduct was proscribed by a penal statute is irrelevant to a determination whether the statute is unconstitutionally vague. Ignorance of the law is no excuse. People v Turmon, 417 Mich 638, 657; 340 NW2d 620 (1983) (citing 4 Blackstone, Commentaries, p 27).

Affirmed.