In Re Marriage of Mitchell, 692 N.E.2d 281 (Ill. 1998). · Go Syfert
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In Re Marriage of Mitchell, 692 N.E.2d 281 (Ill. 1998). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
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cited 4× by 2 distinct cases · …once a court has acquired jurisdiction, an order will not be rendered void merely because of an error or impropriety in the issuing court's determination of the law. at p. 284 ✓
516 citation events (434 in the last 25 years) across 6 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Johnson v. Deer (illappct, 2025-05-14)
Treatment trajectory · 1998 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1998 2012 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 50 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (verbatim quote) Johnson v. Deer
Ill. App. Ct. · 2025 · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
a void order or judgment is one entered by a court without jurisdiction of the subject matter or the parties, or by a court that lacks the inherent power to make or enter the order involved.
discussed Cited as authority (verbatim quote) People v. Keenan
Ill. App. Ct. · 2024 · signal: see · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
if jurisdiction is lacking, any subsequent judgment of the court is rendered void and may be attacked collaterally.
examined Cited as authority (verbatim quote) McCormick v. Robertson (2×) also: Cited as authority (quoted)
Ill. App. Ct. · 2014 · quote attribution · 2 verbatim quotes · confidence high
once a court has acquired jurisdiction, an order will not be rendered void merely because of an error or impropriety in the issuing court's determination of the law.
examined Cited as authority (verbatim quote) McCormick v. Robertson (2×) also: Cited as authority (quoted)
Ill. App. Ct. · 2014 · quote attribution · 2 verbatim quotes · confidence high
once a court has acquired jurisdiction, an order will not be rendered void merely because of an error or impropriety in the issuing court's determination of the law.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In re Marriage of Winters
Ill. App. Ct. · 2026 · confidence medium
People v. Williams, 2017 IL App (1st) 123357-B , ¶ 15. ¶ 29 “The question whether a judgment is void or voidable depends on whether the court entering the challenged order possessed jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter.” In re Marriage of Mitchell, 181 Ill. 2d 169, 174 (1998) (citing People v. Davis, 156 Ill. 2d 149, 155 (1993)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In re Parentage of L.H.
Ill. App. Ct. · 2026 · confidence medium
“Once a court has acquired jurisdiction, an order will not be rendered void merely because of an error or impropriety in the issuing court’s determination of the law.” In re Marriage of Mitchell, 181 Ill. 2d 169, 174 (1998).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Municipal Trust & Savings Bank v. Moriarty
Ill. App. Ct. · 2025 · confidence medium
In re Marriage of Mitchell, 181 Ill. 2d 169, 174 (1998).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Issa Amer v. Rider
Ill. App. Ct. · 2024 · confidence medium
Although Amer can raise a new theory of voidness for the first time on appeal (see Casteel v. Jiminez, 2022 IL App (1st) 201288 , ¶ 23), he did argue in briefing below that the eviction court lacked personal jurisdiction over him due to a lack of service. ¶ 19 Whether an order is void “depends on whether the court entering the challenged order possessed jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter.” In re Marriage of Mitchell, 181 Ill. 2d 169, 174 (1998).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In re Marriage of Tener
Ill. App. Ct. · 2024 · confidence medium
“Judgments entered in a civil proceeding may be collaterally attacked as void only where there is -4- No. 1-22-0890 a total want of jurisdiction in the court which entered the judgment, either as to the subject matter or as to the parties.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Marriage of Mitchell, 181 Ill. 2d 169, 174 (1998).
cited Cited as authority (rule) BMO Harris Bank N.A. v. Scialabba
Ill. App. Ct. · 2024 · confidence medium
Similarly, without jurisdiction “any subsequent judgment of the court is rendered void and may be attacked collaterally.” In re Marriage of Mitchell, 181 Ill. 2d 169, 174 (1998).
cited Cited as authority (rule) In re Marriage of Tronsrue
Ill. App. Ct. · 2024 · confidence medium
In re Marriage of Mitchell, 181 Ill. 2d 169, 174 (1998). ‘If jurisdiction is lacking, any subsequent judgment of the court is rendered void and may be attacked collaterally.’ Id.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In re Marriage of Tener
Ill. App. Ct. · 2023 · confidence medium
“Judgments entered in a civil proceeding may be collaterally attacked as void only where there is -4- No. 1-22-0890 a total want of jurisdiction in the court which entered the judgment, either as to the subject matter or as to the parties.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Marriage of Mitchell, 181 Ill. 2d 169, 174 (1998).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In re Marriage of Tener
Ill. App. Ct. · 2023 · confidence medium
“Judgments entered in a civil proceeding may be collaterally attacked as void only where there is a total want of jurisdiction in the court which entered the judgment, either as to the subject matter or as to the parties.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Marriage of Mitchell, 181 Ill. 2d 169, 174 (1998).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) O'Connell v. Alvarado (2×) also: Cited "see"
Ill. App. Ct. · 2023 · confidence medium
LVNV Funding, LLC v. Trice, 2015 IL 116129, ¶ 27 ; In re Marriage of Mitchell, 181 Ill.2d 169, 174 (1998).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In re Application of the County Treasurer & ex officio County Collector of Cook County
Ill. App. Ct. · 2023 · confidence medium
“Judgments entered in a civil proceeding may be collaterally attacked as void only where there is a total want of jurisdiction in the court which entered the judgment, either as to the subject matter or as to the parties.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Marriage of Mitchell, 181 Ill. 2d 169, 174 (1998).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Hyman v. Club Meadows Realty, LLC
Ill. App. Ct. · 2023 · confidence medium
LVNV Funding, LLC v. Trice, 2015 IL 116129, ¶¶ 38-39 ; In re Marriage of Mitchell, 181 Ill. 2d 169, 174 (1998).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In re Marriage of Shulga
Ill. App. Ct. · 2022 · confidence medium
LVNV Funding, 2015 IL 116129 , ¶ 38. “[W]hether a judgment is void or voidable depends on whether the court entering the challenged order possessed jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter.” In re Marriage of Mitchell, 181 Ill. 2d 169, 174 (1998).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In re Estate of Schroeder
Ill. App. Ct. · 2022 · confidence medium
In re Marriage of Mitchell, 181 Ill. 2d 169, 173 (1998). ¶ 42 Section 2 of the Mortgage Act requires: “Every mortgagee of real property ***, having received full satisfaction and payment of all such sum or sums of money as are really due to him or her from the mortgagor, *** shall, at the request of the mortgagor, *** make, execute and deliver to the mortgagor *** an instrument in writing executed in conformity with the provisions of this Section releasing such mortgage ***, which release shall be entitled to be recorded or registered and the recorder or registrar upon receipt of such a rel…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In re Marriage of Hampton (2×) also: Cited "see"
Ill. App. Ct. · 2022 · confidence medium
Respondent cites In re Marriage of Mitchell, 181 Ill. 2d 169, 175 (1988), for the proposition that an error in a child support order entered by a court of competent jurisdiction does not make the order subject to collateral attack— that is, attack outside a direct appeal from the order. ¶ 19 In our de novo review, we agree with respondent’s interpretation and application of Mitchell.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In re T.E.
Ill. App. Ct. · 2022 · confidence medium
App. 3d at 654-55. ¶ 36 A judgment in a civil proceeding may be collaterally attacked on voidness grounds “ ‘only where there is a total want of jurisdiction in the court which entered the judgment, either as to the subject matter or as to the parties.’ ” In re Marriage of Mitchell, 181 Ill. 2d 169, 174 (1998) (quoting Johnston v. City of Bloomington, 77 Ill. 2d 108, 112 (1979)).
cited Cited as authority (rule) In re Marriage of Padilla
Ill. App. Ct. · 2022 · confidence medium
In re Marriage of Mitchell, 181 Ill. 2d 169, 174 (1998).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Pinkston v. City of Chicago
Ill. App. Ct. · 2022 · confidence medium
See, e.g., People v. Castleberry, 2015 IL 116916, ¶¶ 1, 14, 19 (abolishing the “void sentence rule” and explaining that criminal sentences that do not conform to statutory requirements are not void but merely voidable); In re Marriage of Mitchell, 181 Ill. 2d 169, 174 (1998) (noting that the “question whether a judgment is void or voidable depends on whether the court entering the challenged order possessed jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter”). ¶ 32 As an apparent corollary to his voidness argument, Mr. Pinkston argues that he was denied 11 No. 1-20-0957 due proces…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In re The Marriage of Clutts
Ill. App. Ct. · 2022 · confidence medium
Any order entered by a - 20 - Nos. 1-20-1120 & 1-21-0107 (cons.) court without personal jurisdiction is void (Mitchell, 2014 IL 116311, ¶ 17 ), but “[o]nce a court has acquired jurisdiction, an order will not be rendered void merely because of an error or impropriety in the issuing court’s determination of the law” (In re Marriage of Mitchell, 181 Ill. 2d 169, 174 (1998)).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Kristen B. v. Department of Children & Family Services
Ill. App. Ct. · 2022 · confidence medium
In re Marriage of Mitchell, 181 Ill. 2d 169, 174 (1998).
cited Cited as authority (rule) In re Commitment of Walker
Ill. App. Ct. · 2020 · confidence medium
App. 3d 729, 732 (2002) (quoting In re Marriage of Mitchell, 181 Ill. 2d 169, 174 (1998)). ¶ 22 In short, respondent has not set forth a basis upon which we could find the agreed order void. ¶ 23 IV.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Lamarca v. Che Ce Ce Corp.
Ill. App. Ct. · 2019 · confidence medium
In order to obtain relief pursuant to section 2-1401 of the Code, the petition must set forth specific factual allegations supporting three elements: (1) the existence of a meritorious defense or claim; (2) due 4 No. 1-18-2718 that “whether a judgment is void or voidable presents a question of jurisdiction.” LVNV Funding, LLC v. Trice, 2015 IL 116129, ¶ 27 (citing In re Marriage of Mitchell, 181 Ill. 2d 169, 174 (1998)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Lamarca v. Che Ce Ce Corp.
Ill. App. Ct. · 2019 · confidence medium
In order to obtain relief pursuant to section 2-1401 of the Code, the petition must set forth specific factual allegations supporting three elements: (1) the existence of a meritorious defense or claim; (2) due 4 No. 1-18-2718 that “whether a judgment is void or voidable presents a question of jurisdiction.” LVNV Funding, LLC v. Trice, 2015 IL 116129, ¶ 27 (citing In re Marriage of Mitchell, 181 Ill. 2d 169, 174 (1998)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Taylor v. Bayview Loan Servicing (2×) also: Cited "see"
Ill. App. Ct. · 2019 · confidence medium
In re Marriage of Mitchell, 181 Ill. 2d 169, 174 (1998).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Urban Partnership Bank v. Chicago Title Land & Trust Co.
Ill. App. Ct. · 2017 · confidence medium
Because any order entered by a court that lacks subject matter jurisdiction is void (LVNV Funding, LLC v. Trice, 2015 IL 116129, ¶ 27 (citing In re Marriage of Mitchell, 181 Ill. 2d 169, 174 (1998))), we address appellant’s jurisdictional challenge before proceeding further. ¶9 SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION ¶ 10 Here on appeal, appellant contends that the court should have vacated its April 20, 2016, order because “it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over deceased defendants, Martha Burns and Wallace Burns.” Citing ABN AMRO Mortgage Group, Inc. v. McGahan, 237 Ill. 2d 526 (2010), she …
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Urban Partnership Bank v. Chicago Title Land and Trust Company
Ill. App. Ct. · 2017 · confidence medium
Because any order entered by a court that lacks subject matter jurisdiction is void (LVNV Funding, LLC v. Trice, 2015 IL 116129, ¶ 27 (citing In re Marriage of Mitchell, 181 Ill. 2d 169, 174 (1998)), we address appellant’s jurisdictional challenge before proceeding further. -3- No. 1-16-2086 ¶9 SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION ¶ 10 Here on appeal, appellant contends that the court should have vacated its April 20, 2016, order because “it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over deceased defendants, Martha Burns and Wallace Burns.” Citing ABN AMRO Mortgage Group, Inc. v. McGahan, 237 Ill. 2d…
cited Cited as authority (rule) In re Marriage of Altman
Ill. App. Ct. · 2016 · confidence medium
In re Marriage of Mitchell, 181 Ill. 2d 169, 173 (1998); In re Marriage of Beyer, 324 Ill.
cited Cited as authority (rule) In re Marriage of Altman
Ill. App. Ct. · 2016 · confidence medium
In re Marriage of Mitchell, 181 Ill. 2d 169, 173 (1998); In re Marriage of Beyer, 324 Ill.
cited Cited as authority (rule) LVNV Funding, LLC v. Trice
Ill. · 2015 · confidence medium
In re Marriage of Mitchell, 181 Ill. 2d 169, 174 (1998).
cited Cited as authority (rule) McCormick v. Robertson
Ill. · 2015 · confidence medium
In re Marriage of Mitchell, 181 Ill. 2d 169, 174 (1998); McCarthy v. Pointer, 2013 IL App (1st) 121688, ¶ 13 .
cited Cited as authority (rule) JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Ontiveros
Ill. App. Ct. · 2015 · confidence medium
In re Marriage of Mitchell, 181 Ill. 2d 169, 174 (1998).
cited Cited as authority (rule) McCormick v. Robertson
Ill. · 2015 · confidence medium
In re Marriage of Mitchell, 181 Ill. 2d 169, 174 (1998); McCarthy v. Pointer, 2013 IL App (1st) 121688, ¶ 13 .
cited Cited as authority (rule) JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Ontiveros
Ill. App. Ct. · 2015 · confidence medium
In re Marriage of Mitchell, 181 Ill. 2d 169, 174 (1998).
cited Cited as authority (rule) LVNV Funding, LLC v. Trice
Ill. · 2015 · confidence medium
In re Marriage of Mitchell, 181 Ill. 2d 169, 174 (1998).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Cohen v. Cohen
Mass. · 2015 · signal: cf. · confidence medium
Cf. In re Marriage of Mitchell, 181 Ill. 2d 169, 174-176 (1998) (erroneous order that expressed child support payments as percentage of income was in violation of statute, but was voidable, not void, in part because it was purely State matter and did not “implicate the authority of another tribunal” [citation omitted]).
cited Cited as authority (rule) JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Ontiveros
Ill. App. Ct. · 2015 · confidence medium
In re Marriage of Mitchell, 181 Ill. 2d 169, 174 (1998).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Mahoney v. Gummerson
Ill. App. Ct. · 2012 · confidence medium
In re Marriage of Mitchell, 181 Ill. 2d 169, 173 (1998).
cited Cited as authority (rule) People v. Elliott
Ill. App. Ct. · 2012 · confidence medium
App. 3d at 516 , 884 N.E.2d at 722 (citing In re Marriage of Mitchell, 181 Ill. 2d 169, 174 , 692 N.E.2d 281, 284 (1998)).
cited Cited as authority (rule) J.P. Morgan Mortgage Acquisition Corporation v. Straus
Ill. App. Ct. · 2012 · confidence medium
In re Marriage of Mitchell, 181 Ill. 2d 169, 175 (1998). ¶ 12 Furthermore, the trend of more recent authority favors the finality of judgments over -4- alleged defects in validity.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Jordan v. BANGLORIA
Ill. App. Ct. · 2012 · confidence medium
"Both Illinois Appellate and Supreme Court case law have consistently held that a judgment or order is void [only] where it is entered by a court or agency lacking personal jurisdiction, subject-matter jurisdiction, or the inherent power to enter the particular judgment or order, or where the judgment or order is procured by fraud." Juszczyk, 334 Ill.App.3d at 125 , 267 Ill.Dec. 651 , 777 N.E.2d at 456 (citing Johnston v. City of Bloomington, 77 Ill.2d 108, 112 , 32 Ill.Dec. 319 , 395 N.E.2d 549, 550 (1979), People v. Davis, 156 Ill.2d 149, 155 , 189 Ill.Dec. 49 , 619 N.E.2d 750, 754 (1993), I…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Jordan v. Bangloria
Ill. App. Ct. · 2011 · confidence medium
App. 3d at 125 , 777 N.E.2d at 456 (citing Johnston v. City of Bloomington, 77 Ill. 2d 108, 112 , 395 N.E.2d 549, 550 (1979), People v. Davis, 156 Ill. 2d 149, 155 , 619 N.E.2d 750, 754 (1993), In re Marriage of Mitchell, 181 Ill. 2d 169, 174-75 , 692 N.E.2d 281, 284 (1998), Steinbrecher v. Steinbrecher, 197 Ill. 2d 514, 530-31 , 759 N.E.2d 509, 519 (2001), and LaSalle National Trust, N.A. v. Lamet, 328 Ill.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Tilschner v. Spangler
Ill. App. Ct. · 2011 · confidence medium
In re Marriage of Mitchell, 181 Ill. 2d 169, 176 (1998).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. Ralph L. (2×)
Ill. App. Ct. · 2010 · confidence medium
Sarkissian v. Chicago Board of Education, 201 Ill. 2d 95, 104 (2002). “ ‘Judgments entered in a civil proceeding may be collaterally attacked as void only where there is a total want of jurisdiction in the court which entered the judgment, either as to the subject matter or as to the parties.’ ” In re Marriage of Mitchell, 181 Ill. 2d 169, 174 (1998), quoting Johnston v. City of Bloomington, 77 Ill. 2d 108, 112 (1979).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) GMB Financial Group, Inc. v. Marzano
Ill. App. Ct. · 2008 · confidence medium
App. 3d 876, 881 (1984)), as illegitimized by Belleville Toyota, the latest in a long line of cases holding that an order is void only where the court lacked “ ‘inherent power’ ” to enter it (In re Marriage of Mitchell, 181 Ill. 2d 169, 177 (1998), quoting In re Estate of Steinfeld, 158 Ill. 2d 1, 12 (1994)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) GMB Financial Group, Inc. v. Marzano
Ill. App. Ct. · 2008 · confidence medium
App. 3d 876, 881 (1984)), as illegitimized by Belleville Toyota, the latest in a long line of cases holding that an order is void only where the court lacked " 'inherent power' " to enter it (In re Marriage of Mitchell, 181 Ill. 2d 169, 177 (1998), quoting In re Estate of Steinfeld, 158 Ill. 2d 1, 12 (1994)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. Meginnes
Ill. App. Ct. · 2008 · confidence medium
Davis, 156 Ill. 2d at 155-56 , 619 N.E.2d at 754 . “ ‘Judgments entered in a civil proceeding may be collaterally attacked as void only where there is a total want of jurisdiction in the court which entered the judgment, either as to the subject matter or as to the parties.’ ” In re Marriage of Mitchell, 181 Ill. 2d 169, 174 , 692 N.E.2d 281, 284 (1998), quoting Johnston v. City of Bloomington, 77 Ill. 2d 108, 112 , 395 N.E.2d 549, 550 (1979).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
In Re MARRIAGE OF VICKY O. MITCHELL, Appellant, and STEPHEN G. MITCHELL, Appellee
81791.
Illinois Supreme Court.
Feb 20, 1998.
692 N.E.2d 281
David M. Mattenson and Stuart Gordon, of Kanter & Mattenson, Ltd., of Chicago, for appellant., Paul R. Jenen, of Wheeling, for appellee.
Miller.
Cited by 151 opinions  |  Published
1 passages pin-cited by 2 cases
Pinpoint authority: #40,807 of 633,719
Citer courts: Appellate Court of Illinois (2)
JUSTICE MILLER

delivered the opinion of the court:

Stephen G. Mitchell filed a petition for modification of visitation rights with his children. Vicky O. Mitchell then filed a petition for rule to show cause in the circuit court of Lake County against Stephen, contending that Stephen violated the child support provision of the settlement agreement incorporated into an earlier judgment dissolving their marriage. The circuit court held that the percentage portion of the child support provision was void and unenforceable under section 505(a)(5) of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act (Act) (750 ILCS 5/505(a)(5) (West 1994)). On appeal, the appellate court affirmed, holding that the plain language of section 505(a)(5) requires that child support orders state the amount of the child support in a specific dollar amount. No. 2 — 95—1594 (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23). We granted leave to appeal (155 Ill. 2d R. 315) and now reverse the judgment of the appellate court and remand the cause to the trial court.

I. BACKGROUND

Vicky and Stephen were married in 1979. During their marriage, the couple gave birth to two children. On January 4, 1989, the trial court entered a judgment for dissolution of marriage. The couple also entered into an agreement specifying child support levels. This agreement was incorporated into the divorce judgment. As part of the agreement, Stephen agreed to pay $450 per month in child support. This amount represented 25% of Stephen’s net income. The agreement stated that, after April 30, 1989, Stephen would pay Vicky a sum equal to 25% of his net income. A redetermination of this amount would be made each year on May 1. In no event would the child support exceed $1,000 per month or be less than $450 per month.

Stephen initiated this litigation by filing a petition for modification of visitation rights on December 16, 1994. On January 19, 1995, Vicky filed a petition for rule to show cause, claiming that Stephen had failed to comply with the 25% child support provision. Vicky claimed that in calculating his net income Stephen incorrectly included noncash losses of depreciation and failed to include income from dividends, interest, and stock and property sales.

Stephen filed a motion to strike Vicky’s petition, claiming that the petition lacked specificity as to the exact arrearage due. The trial court granted Vicky leave to file an amended petition. On March 2, 1995, Vicky filed an amended petition specifying the exact arrearage due. The case was set for trial.

During a pretrial conference on August 10, 1995, the trial judge, sua sponte, determined that precedent from the Appellate Court, Second District, rendered the percentage provision in the agreement void and unenforceable. On August 11, the trial judge allowed brief argument concerning the validity of the percentage provision. He then entered an order finding the child support order void except for the minimum $450 provision and dismissing Vicky’s amended petition. Asserting that neither party then resided in the Second District, Vicky filed a motion to vacate the August 11 order due to improper venue. On August 25, the trial judge found that Vicky failed to raise venue in a timely fashion.

Vicky appealed the August 11 and August 25 decisions of the trial judge. On appeal, Vicky asserted that the trial judge erred in (1) denying her request for a change of venue; and (2) finding the 25% provision of the agreement void and unenforceable.

The appellate court affirmed the judgment of the trial court. No. 2 — 95—1594 (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23). In affirming, the appellate court followed section 512(d) of the Act and found that venue was waived because it was not initially contested in Vicky’s answer. 750 ILCS 57512(d) (West 1994). That issue has not been appealed to this court. Further, the appellate court believed that the plain language of section 505(a)(5) of the Act mandated that child support provisions in final orders be stated in specific dollar amounts. Section 505(a)(5) states that “[t]he final order [for child support] in all cases shall state the support level in dollar amounts.” 750 ILCS 5/505(a)(5) (West 1994). Believing that entry of an order expressing child support as a percentage of income was beyond the court’s authority, the appellate court found the percentage order void and unenforceable and affirmed the trial court.

II. ANALYSIS

In construing section 505(a)(5), we must ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislature. Varelis v. Northwestern Memorial Hospital, 167 Ill. 2d 449, 454 (1995). Courts should first look to the language of the statute to determine the intent of the drafters. Nottage v. Jeka, 172 Ill. 2d 386, 392 (1996). When the statutory language is clear, no resort is necessary to other aids of construction. Henry v. St. John’s Hospital, 138 Ill. 2d 533, 541 (1990). We must first determine in this case whether section 505(a)(5) of the Act mandates that child support payments must be stated entirely as a specific dollar amount or whether these payments may be expressed partly as a percentage of net income, as was done in this case.

As we have noted, section 505(a)(5) provides that “[t]he final order [for child support] in all cases shall state the support level in dollar amounts.” 750 ILCS 5/505(a)(5) (West 1994). We believe that the plain language of the statute requires that the final order state the support level solely in dollar amounts. The legislature used the mandatory word “shall” to provide that in “all cases” child support “shall” be stated in dollar amounts and made no reference to the inclusion of payments as a percentage. To allow settlement agreements to be expressed in part as a percentage, as was done here, would require us to read into the statute payment options that the legislature did not include.

Although our decision is based on the plain language of the statute, we note that our interpretation of the provision is also consistent with its legislative history. During debate on section 505(a)(5), which was amended to its current form in 1985, Representative Olson stated: “Final orders shall be in a dollar amount. This [is] intended to help the clerk responsible for collecting payments not to be dealing in percentages and specific dollar amounts.” 84th Ill. Gen. Assem., House Proceedings, May 20, 1985, at 35 (statements of Representative Olson). We believe that the plain language and the legislative history of the statute thus preclude child support orders from expressing child support payments as a percentage of net income.

Having determined that section 505(a)(5) does not allow child support orders to express payments as a percentage of income, we must next determine whether judgments entered after the passage of section 505(a)(5) containing such orders are void or voidable. The question whether a judgment is void or voidable depends on whether the court entering the challenged order possessed jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter. See People v. Davis, 156 Ill. 2d 149, 155 (1993). If jurisdiction is lacking, any subsequent judgment of the court is rendered void and may be attacked collaterally. Davis, 156 Ill. 2d at 155. “Judgments entered in a civil proceeding may be collaterally attacked as void, only where there is a total want of jurisdiction in the court which entered the judgment, either as to the subject matter or as to the parties.” Johnston v. City of Bloomington, 77 Ill. 2d 108, 112 (1979). A voidable judgment, however, is one entered erroneously by a court having jurisdiction and is not subject to collateral attack. Davis, 156 Ill. 2d at 155-56. Once a court has acquired jurisdiction, an order will not be rendered void merely because of an error or impropriety in the issuing court’s determination of the law. Vulcan Materials Co. v. Bee Construction, 96 Ill. 2d 159, 165 (1983); see 49 C.J.S. Judgments § 18(a) (1997). “Accordingly, a court may not lose jurisdiction because it makes a mistake in determining either the facts, the law or both.” Davis, 156 Ill. 2d at 156.

Here, the trial court had jurisdiction over the parties and over the dissolution proceeding in general. Further, the court had jurisdiction over the award of child support. In exercising this jurisdiction, however, the trial court judge entered a judgment that was contrary to the statute. We find that the trial court’s original judgment of dissolution allowing child support paid by Stephen to be expressed as a percentage of net income with fixed dollar limitations was an erroneous judgment. The error in the judgment, however, is not enough to divest the court of jurisdiction to enter the order. The judge had jurisdiction of the parties and the subject matter, and, although the judgment was erroneous, the judge had authority to enter the child support order.

We reverse the decision of the appellate court finding the percentage portion of the child support order void. The original dissolution judgment of the trial court awarding child support to be paid as a percentage of net income with fixed dollar limitations is voidable, not void, and is not subject to collateral attack. Davis, 156 Ill. 2d at 155-56. Thus, the trial court is therefore directed to reinstate the original child support order.

We note that our result in this case is consistent with the trend of modern authority on the closely related question of defects in subject matter jurisdiction. The contemporary view in that area, as exemplified by the Restatement (Second) of Judgments, is to prefer finality of an earlier judgment over alleged defects in its validity. Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 12, Reporter’s Note, at 125 (1982); see also G. Hazard, Revisiting the Second Restatement of Judgments: Issue Preclusion and Related Problems, 66 Cornell L. Rev. 564, 586-91 (1981). Regarding the res judicata effect of a judgment on an alleged defect in the subject matter jurisdiction of the court rendering the judgment, section 12 of the Restatement (Second) of Judgments provides:

“When a court has rendered a judgment in a contested action, the judgment precludes the parties from litigating the question of the court’s subject matter jurisdiction in subsequent litigation except if:
(1) The subject matter of the action was so plainly beyond the court’s jurisdiction that its entertaining the action was manifest abuse of authority; or
(2) Allowing the judgment to stand would substantially infringe the authority of another tribunal or agency of government; or
(3) The judgment was rendered by a court lacking capability to make an adequately informed determination of a question concerning its own jurisdiction and as a matter of procedural fairness the party seeking to avoid the judgment should have opportunity belatedly to attack the court’s subject matter jurisdiction.” Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 12 (1982).

If these criteria were applied to the present case, one would readily conclude that the order challenged here is not subject to collateral attack, and hence is voidable rather than void. First, the trial court had the authority to enter an order for support; the court simply erred in the manner in which the amount was to be calculated, using a percentage of income rather than a fixed dollar amount. Thus, the order entered by the court does not appear to be a manifest abuse of its authority or an indication that the court exceeded its inherent authority. The trial court’s earlier judgment does not implicate the authority of another tribunal or government agency, nor was it rendered by a court lacking the capability to consider its own jurisdiction. Thus, even if the defect in the present order could be characterized as pertaining to subject matter jurisdiction, the Restatement would preclude collateral attack on the order.

Adoption of the view expressed in the Restatement would, of course, require us to reexamine the analysis offered by cases such as In re Estate of Steinfeld, 158 Ill. 2d 1 (1994). Expressing the traditional view regarding defects in jurisdiction, Steinfeld stated, “A void order or judgment is one entered by a court without jurisdiction of the subject matter or the parties, or by a court that lacks the inherent power to make or enter the order involved. [Citations.] A void order may be attacked, either directly or collaterally, at any time.” Steinfeld, 158 Ill. 2d at 12. The parties do not ask us to adopt the rule expressed in the Restatement, however, and therefore we need not decide in this case whether to take that step. It is enough to conclude here that the present order was voidable and not void under either our traditional mode of analysis or the view expressed in the Restatement. In this case, the parties had the opportunity to fully litigate this question when the support order was entered, and they had as well the opportunity to bargain for, and benefit from, the terms of the settlement agreement. Moreover, numerous other support orders could be subject to collateral attack if the present decree were found void. These considerations, as well as the others cited above, lead us to conclude that the trial court’s order is not subject to collateral attack.

Stephen also raises here his claims that Vicky’s “Amended Petition For Rule To Show Cause” did not state a cause of action and that Vicky is seeking an order from the court that would improperly modify child support retroactively. Vicky further argues that she is entitled to arrears for insufficient payments by Stephen in the past and that the child support payments can exceed the $1,000 maximum provided for in the original child support order. Because the trial court found the original child support order void, the trial court did not address these issues. We therefore remand this cause to the circuit court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we find that section 505(a)(5) of the Act mandates that child support payments be expressed solely as a fixed dollar amount. Further, we find that the portion of the trial court’s judgment which expressed child support payments as a percentage of appellee’s net income was erroneous but that it did not affect the court’s jurisdiction of the parties and the subject matter. Thus, the judgment is voidable, but not void, and is subject only to direct attack. We therefore reverse the judgments of the appellate court and the trial court and remand the cause to the trial court for disposition of all remaining issues.

Appellate court judgment reversed; circuit court judgment reversed; cause remanded.