Sanders v. Malik, 711 A.2d 32 (Del. 1998). · Go Syfert
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Sanders v. Malik, 711 A.2d 32 (Del. 1998). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
“the standards for proving ineffective assistance of counsel in a criminal proceeding are equivalent to the standards for proving legal malpractice in a civil proceeding.”
31 citation events (28 in the last 25 years) across 11 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Desetti v. Chester (va, 2015-06-04)
Treatment trajectory · 1999 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1999 2012 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 16 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (verbatim quote) Desetti v. Chester
Va. · 2015 · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
the standards for proving ineffective assistance of counsel in a criminal proceeding are equivalent to the standards for proving legal malpractice in a civil proceeding.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Centerview Partners Holdings LP v. David A. Handler
Del. Ch. · 2025 · confidence medium
Sanders v. Malik, 711 A.2d 32, 34 (Del. 1998).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Donald Clark v. State of Iowa
Iowa · 2021 · confidence medium
See, e.g., Shaw v. State, 816 P.2d 1358, 1361 (Alaska 1991) (“If the defendant was denied post-conviction relief, the legal principle of collateral estoppel would serve to eliminate any frivolous malpractice claim.”); Sanders v. Malik, 711 A.2d 32, 34 (Del. 1998) (“It . . . was appropriate in this case for the Superior Court to have applied the doctrine of collateral estoppel if the issue of [the defense attorney’s] competency actually was litigated and decided in [the defendant’s] criminal proceedings. . . .
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Donald Clark v. State of Iowa
Iowa · 2021 · confidence medium
See, e.g., Shaw v. State, 816 P.2d 1358, 1361 (Alaska 1991) (“If the defendant was denied post-conviction relief, the legal principle of collateral estoppel would serve to eliminate any frivolous malpractice claim.”); Sanders v. Malik, 711 A.2d 32, 34 (Del. 1998) (“It . . . was appropriate in this case for the Superior Court to have applied the doctrine of collateral estoppel if the issue of [the defense attorney’s] competency actually was litigated and decided in [the defendant’s] criminal proceedings. . . .
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Paskins v. Creative Concepts, Inc.
Del. Super. Ct. · 2020 · confidence medium
Ct. Aug. 8, 2017) (citing LaPoint v. AmerisourceBergen Corp., 970 A.2d 185, 192 (Del. 2009)). 7 Proctor v. State, 931 A.2d 437 (Del. 2007) (citing Sanders v. Malik, 711 A.2d 32, 33-34 (Del.1998)). 8 Proctor v. State, 931 A.2d 437 (Del. 2007) (citing Dowling v. United States, 493 U.S. 342, 350 , 110 S.Ct. 668 , 107 L.Ed.2d 708 (1990)). ?19 Del.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Hastings v. Watson
Del. Super. Ct. · 2019 · confidence medium
Plaintiff is attempting to relitigate the same 3° Proctor v. State, 931 A.2d 437 (Del. 2007) (citing Sanders v. Malik, 711 A.2d 32, 33-34 (Del.1998)). 4 Proctor v. State, 931 A.2d 437 (Del. 2007) (citing Dowling v. United States, 493 U.S. 342, 350 , 110 S.Ct. 668 , 107 L.Ed.2d 708 (1990)). 13 issues that the EAB considered in issuing its decision, therefore, Plaintiffs claims for fraud and malfeasance are further barred by collateral estoppel.*!
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State of Delaware, ex. rel. French v. CVS Health Corporation
Del. Super. Ct. · 2019 · confidence medium
It appears to be of little moment to French when making these arguments that: (1) he filed this suit under seal and CVS wasn’t even made aware of it until July 2018—about seven months after the VDA (D.I. 1, 10, and 15); or (2) the only trial resulting in an adverse “final judgment” in the Card Compliant case occurred three months later in October 2018. 67 Sanders v. Malik, 711 A.2d 32, 33 (Del. 1998). 68 Id. at 33-34 . ° Id. at 34 . = | Fe So may Defendants here properly assert collateral estoppel to prevent French from litigating the issue of whether either a State Escheator’s exam…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Meredith L. Lawrence v. Bingham Greenebaum Doll, L.L.P.
Ky. · 2019 · confidence medium
But Lawrence’s attorney-fee obligation to Bingham has already been established in the judgment rendered in the Kenton Circuit Court for purposes of claim preclusion: “The fact that no defense was offered in the suit against the contentions of the [plaintiff] cannot make any difference, for the rule as to the conclusiveness of judgments applies to a judgment by default or decree pro 28 Sanders v. Malik, 711 A.2d 32, 33 (Del. 1998) (citations omitted); see also Zeidwig v. Ward, 548 So.2d 209, 213-15 (Fla. 1989). 29 Id. 13 confesso.”30 The default judgment effectively rendered valid Lawrenc…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Israel Discount Bank of New York v. Higgins
Del. Ch. · 2015 · confidence medium
Aug. 26, 2015). 32 Sanders v. Malik, 711 A.2d 32, 34 (Del. 1998). 33 T-P Pls.‟ Answering Br. 15. 34 Id. (quoting IDB at *20). 35 IDB at *20. 15 “Republic authorized CAMI‟s use of the Collateral” and that its authorization constituted a defense to IDB‟s conversion claim.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Zutrau v. Jansing and ICE Systems, Inc. (2×) also: Cited "see"
Del. Ch. · 2014 · confidence medium
Accordingly, the court finds 375 Sanders v. Malik, 711 A.2d 32, 33 (Del. 1998) 376 Id. at 33-34 . 109 that the plaintiff is entitled to a judgment in the amount of $60,307.377 In other words, the Court held that Jansing had failed to meet his burden of proof to show that the amount tendered to Zutrau in connection with the Reverse Stock Split included the amount remaining in her capital account and decided that factual issue adversely to him.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Willey v. Bugden
Utah Ct. App. · 2013 · confidence medium
Dec. 22, 2004) (holding that the issues of deficient performance in habeas cases asserting ineffective assistance and negligent representation in legal malpractice cases "are functionally identical"), aff'd, 110 Conn.App. 763 , 955 A.2d 1246 (2008); Sanders v. Malik, 711 A.2d 32, 34 (Del.1998) (holding that the denial of an ineffective assistance claim collaterally es-topped a malpractice claim); Cornwell v. Kirwan, 270 Ga.App. 147 , 606 S.E.2d 1, 4-5 (2004) (im posing sanctions on an attorney and his client jointly for filing a malpractice claim because his client's habeas petition that raise…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Smith v. Guest
Del. · 2011 · confidence medium
Sanders v. Malik, 711 A.2d 32, 33-34 (Del.1998); see also Messick v. Star Enter., 655 A.2d 1209, 1211 (Del.1995) ("The test for applying collateral estoppel requires that (1) a question of fact essential to the judgment, (2) be litigated and (3) determined (4) by a valid and final judgment." (quotation marks and citation omitted)). 84 .
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Gibson v. Trant (2×)
Tenn. · 2001 · confidence medium
See Shaw I, 816 P.2d at 1361 (“The requirement of post-conviction relief promotes judicial economy because many issues litigated in the quest for post-conviction relief will be duplicated in the legal malpractice claim.”); Sanders v. Malik, 711 A.2d 32, 33-34 (Del.1998); Levine, 123 F.3d at 583 (“[B]y operation of the doctrine of collateral estoppel, a valid criminal conviction acts as a bar to overturning that conviction in a civil damages suit.”); Brewer v. Hagemann, 771 A.2d 1030, 1033 (Me. 2001) (“When the malpractice plaintiff has every incentive in his post-conviction petition …
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Johnie N. Gibson v. Douglas Trant
Tenn. · 2001 · confidence medium
See Shaw I, 816 P.2d at 1361 (“The requirement of post-conviction relief promotes judicial economy because many issues litigated in the quest for post-conviction relief will be duplicated in the legal malpractice claim.”); Sanders v. Malik, 711 A.2d 32, 33-34 (Del. 1998); Levine, 123 F.3d at 583 (“[B]y operation of the doctrine of collateral estoppel, a valid criminal conviction acts as a bar to overturning that conviction in a civil damages suit.”); Brewer v. Hagemann, 771 A.2d 1030, 1033 (Me. 2001) (“When the malpractice plaintiff has every incentive in his post-conviction petition…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) H. Frederick Johnston Sandra Spillane v. Arbitrium (Cayman Islands) Handels Ag Miklos Vendel (2×)
2d Cir. · 1999 · confidence medium
Whether Factual Findings Made in an In Rem Proceeding Can Be Given Preclusive Effect in an In Personam Action A. Delaware Law 23 Delaware law provides that "[a] claim will be collaterally estopped only if the same issue was presented in both cases, the issue was litigated and decided in the first suit, and the determination was essential to the prior judgment." Sanders v. Malik, 711 A.2d 32, 33-34 (Del. 1998).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Rantz v. Kaufman
Colo. · 2005 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence medium
See, e.g., Sanders v. Malik, 711 A.2d 32, 34 (Del.1998); Barrow v. Pritchard, 235 Mich.App. 478 , 597 N.W.2d 853, 857 (1999), cert. denied, 461 Mich. 966 , 607 N.W.2d 728 (2000); Krahn, 538 N.E.2d at 1062, n. 8 .
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Charles B. SANDERS, Jr. Plaintiff Below-Appellant,
v.
John S. MALIK, Esq., Defendant Below-Appellee
539, 1997.
Supreme Court of Delaware.
Jun 9, 1998.
711 A.2d 32
Charles B. Sanders, Jr., Georgetown, for appellant (pro se)., John S. Malik, Wilmington, for appellee (pro se).
Holland, Hartnett, Berger.
Cited by 21 opinions  |  Published
HARTNETT, Justice:

Charles B. Sanders, Jr. appeals from an Order of the Superior Court that dismissed under the doctrine of collateral estoppel his legal malpractice lawsuit against the attorney who represented him in a criminal case. The appeal is without merit and we AFFIRM.

Facts

In 1994, a Superior Court jury convicted Sanders of first degree robbery, first degree burglary, second degree assault, attempted sexual extortion, and second degree kidnap-ing. The Superior Court sentenced Sanders to 40 years in jail. Appellee, John S. Malik, Esquire, represented Sanders at his trial but was permitted by this Court after trial to withdraw as Sanders’ counsel and a different attorney represented Sanders in his direct appeal. This Court affirmed Sanders’ convictions. [1]

In 1995 Sanders filed a motion for postcon-vietion relief and a motion for a new trial that, together, alleged 15 claims for relief, although many of the claims overlapped. Those motions were referred to a Superior Court Commissioner for proposed findings and recommendations. [2] The Commissioner recommended that all of the claims in Sanders’ postconviction motion be denied because the claims either were procedurally barred or were without merit. The Commissioner further recommended that the motion for new trial be denied because it failed to set forth newly discovered evidence to warrant a new trial. The Superior Court adopted the Commissioner’s findings and recommendations and denied Sanders’ motions. This Court affirmed the Superior Court’s decision on appeal. [3]

On October 22, 1997, Sanders filed a civil complaint in the Superior Court alleging that he had been wrongly convicted as a result of Malik’s legal malpractice. Specifically, Sanders asserted that Malik conducted an inadequate pretrial investigation and that Malik failed to move for suppression of a second, post-indictment photographic lineup at which Malik was not, but should have been, present. The Superior Court found that these same issues had been presented by Sanders and rejected by the Superior Court in Sanders’ postconviction proceedings. The Superi- or Court, therefore, concluded that Sanders was collaterally estopped from raising the issues again in his malpractice action. [4] This appeal followed.

Collateral Estoppel

The doctrine of collateral estoppel essentially prohibits a party who has litigated one cause of action from, relitigating in a second cause of action matters of fact that were, or necessarily must have been, determined in the first action. [5] A claim will be collaterally estopped only if the same issue was presented in both cases, the issue was litigated and decided in the first suit, and the determination was essential to the prior[*34] judgment. [6] The defendant in the second lawsuit may properly assert the defense of collateral estoppel to prevent the plaintiff from litigating issues that the plaintiff previously litigated and lost, even though the defendant himself was not a party to the first proceeding. [7]

Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Legal Malpractice

The standards for proving ineffective assistance of counsel in a criminal proceeding are equivalent to the standards for proving legal malpractice in a civil proceeding. [8] It therefore was appropriate in this case for the Superior Court to have applied the doctrine of collateral estoppel if the issue of Malik’s competency actually was litigated and decided in Sanders’ criminal proceedings. [9] In Sanders’ case, his present allegations, in all material respects, encompass the allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel that were raised and rejected by the Superi- or Court in his posteonviction proceedings. It does not matter that Sanders raised only some, but not all, of these issues when he appealed to this Court from the Superior Court’s posteonviction ruling. The Superior Court’s posteonviction ruling was a valid, final judgment on the issues he now raises. He raises no new material contentions. Under the circumstances, we agree with the Superior Court’s holding that Sanders’ civil lawsuit was barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel.

The judgment of the Superior Court is therefore AFFIRMED.

1

. Sanders v. State, Del.Supr., No. 256, 1994, Berger, J„ 1995 WL 264532 (May 1, 1995) (ORDER).

3

. Sanders v. State, Del.Supr., No. 76, 1996, Walsh, J„ 1996 WL 209901 (Apr. 24, 1996) (ORDER).

4

. Sanders v. Malik, Del.Super., C.A. No. 97C-10-231, 1997 WL 817854 (Nov. 21, 1997).

5

. Ademo v. New Castle County, Del.Supr., 679 A.2d 455, 459 (1996).

6

.Id.

7

.Parklane Hosiery v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 328, 99 S.Ct. 645, 650, 58 L.Ed.2d 552 (1979).

8

. McCord v. Bailey, D.C.Cir., 636 F.2d 606, 609 (1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 983, 101 S.Ct. 2314, 68 L.Ed.2d 839 (1981).

9

. Id.