Schuele v. Schuele, 119 S.W.3d 822 (Tex. App. 2003). · Go Syfert
Schuele v. Schuele, 119 S.W.3d 822 (Tex. App. 2003). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
29 citation events (29 in the last 25 years) across 2 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Cesar Lomeli, Individually, Nereyda Calderon, A/N/F of Z.I., a Minor and Elida Lomeli, A/N/F A.C., a Minor v. Mario Giobanny Torres (texapp, 2025-02-06)
Treatment trajectory · 2006 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
2006 2016 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 17 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Cesar Lomeli, Individually, Nereyda Calderon, A/N/F of Z.I., a Minor and Elida Lomeli, A/N/F A.C., a Minor v. Mario Giobanny Torres
Tex. App. · 2025 · confidence medium
When a court lacks jurisdiction to act in the first-filed suit, “the doctrine [of dominant jurisdiction] has no application.” See Schuele v. Schuele, 119 S.W.3d 822, 824 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2003, no pet.).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Cesar Lomeli, Individually, Nereyda Calderon, A/N/F of Z.I., a Minor and Elida Lomeli, A/N/F A.C., a Minor v. Mario Giobanny Torres
Tex. App. · 2025 · confidence medium
When a court lacks jurisdiction to act in the first-filed suit, “the doctrine [of dominant jurisdiction] has no application.” See Schuele v. Schuele, 119 S.W.3d 822, 824 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2003, no pet.).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) in the Estate of Mario Gonzalez Lira
Tex. App. · 2015 · confidence medium
"Statutory county courts exercising probate jurisdiction are not statutory probate courts under the [Probate] Code[ ] unless their statutorily designated name includes the term probate.” Schuele v. Schuele, 119 S.W.3d 822, 824 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2003, no pet.) (citation omitted); Green v. Watson, 860 S.W.2d 238, 242 (Tex.App.-Austin 1993, no writ) (citation omitted).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) in the Estate of Mario Gonzalez Lira
Tex. App. · 2015 · confidence medium
“Statutory county courts exercising probate jurisdiction are not statutory probate courts under the [Probate] Code[] unless their statutorily designated name includes the term probate.” Schuele v. Schuele, 119 S.W.3d 822, 824 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2003, no pet.) (citation omitted); Green v. Watson, 860 S.W.2d 238, 242 (Tex. App.—Austin 1993, no writ) (citation omitted).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Josefina Alexander Gonzalez v. Raymond De Leon (2×)
Tex. App. · 2015 · confidence medium
Schuele v. Schuele, 119 S.W.3d 822, 824 (Tex. App.─San Antonio 2003, no pet.).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Joel M. Hailey v. Joseph Paduh III, Temporary Administrator of the Estate of Joe Perry Corzine, and Stephen P. Takas Jr., Trustee of the Joe Perry Corzine Trust, and Successor Independent of the Estate of James L. Corzine (2×) also: Cited "see"
Tex. App. · 2014 · confidence medium
Appraisal Dist., 862 S.W.2d 581, 586 (Tex. 1993)); Schuele v. Schuele, 119 S.W.3d 822, 824 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2003, no pet.) (citing Curtis v. Gibbs, 511 S.W.2d 263, 267 (Tex. 1974)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Frost National Bank v. Fernandez
Tex. · 2010 · confidence medium
We need not decide whether the general rule of dominant jurisdiction applies in this case, or in cases involving later-filed direct attacks that are exclusively within the jurisdiction of another court, because here Fernandez’s claims are not within the jurisdiction of the probate court. 26 See Gonzalez v. Reliant Energy, Inc., 159 S.W.3d 615, 622 (Tex.2005) (holding that a dominant-servient inquiry was not implicated where the pleadings in the second-filed case could not be equally maintained in the first); Schuele v. Schuele, 119 S.W.3d 822, 824 (Tex.App.San Antonio 2003, no pet.) (holding…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In Re Frost National Bank, Former of the Estate of Elena Suess Kenedy, Frost National Bank and Pablo Suess, Trustees of the John G. Kenedy, Jr. Charitable Trust And the Missionary Oblate Fathers of Texas
Tex. · 2010 · confidence medium
We need not decide whether the general rule of dominant jurisdiction applies in this case, or in cases involving later-filed direct attacks that are exclusively within the jurisdiction of another court, because here Fernandez’s claims are not within the jurisdiction of the probate court. 2 6 See Gonzalez v. Reliant Energy, Inc. , 159 S.W.3d 615, 622 (Tex. 2005) (holding that a dominant- servient inquiry was not implicated where the pleadings in the second-filed case could not be equally maintained in the first); Schuele v. Schuele , 119 S.W.3d 822, 824 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2003, no pet.)…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Marvin Jauer Soefje, Jr. v. Peggy Christine Soefje Jones, as Trustee of E. Susan Soefje
Tex. App. · 2008 · confidence medium
Because collateral 2 See Schuele v. Schuele, 119 S.W.3d 822, 825 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2003, no pet.) (holding that a county court at law exercising probate jurisdiction does not have jurisdiction to consider issues in a trust proceeding seeking an accounting as a matter incident to an estate). - 13 - 04-07-00347-CV estoppel bars Marvin from re-litigating the alleged misconduct, the district court did not err in approving the final accounting.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Marvin Jauer Soefje, Jr. v. Peggy Christine Soefje Jones, as Trustee of E. Susan Soefje
Tex. App. · 2008 · confidence medium
Because collateral 2 See Schuele v. Schuele, 119 S.W.3d 822, 825 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2003, no pet.) (holding that a county court at law exercising probate jurisdiction does not have jurisdiction to consider issues in a trust proceeding seeking an accounting as a matter incident to an estate). -13- 04-07-00347-CV estoppel bars Marvin from re-litigating the alleged misconduct, the district court did not err in approving the final accounting.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Brenda C. Kirby v. William Tjarks, Gayle Rankin and June Wendy Johnson, Individually, as Heirs of the Estate of June Bruckmiller, and as Beneficiaries of the Bruckmiller Trust
Tex. App. · 2006 · confidence medium
Wyatt v. Shaw Plumbing Co. , 760 S.W.2d 245, 248 (Tex. 1988); Schuele v. Schuele , 119 S.W.3d 822, 824 (Tex. App.--San Antonio 2003, no pet.).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Brenda C. Kirby v. William Tjarks, Gayle Rankin and June Wendy Johnson, Individually, as Heirs of the Estate of June Bruckmiller, and as Beneficiaries of the Bruckmiller Trust
Tex. App. · 2006 · confidence medium
Wyatt v. Shaw Plumbing Co., 760 S.W.2d 245, 248 (Tex. 1988); Schuele v. Schuele, 119 S.W.3d 822, 824 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2003, no pet.).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In Re the Estate of Alexander (2×)
Tex. App. · 2006 · confidence medium
See In re Stark, 126 S.W.3d 635, 639-40 (Tex.App.-Beaumont 2004, orig. proceeding); Schuele v. Schuele, 119 S.W.3d 822, 825 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2003, no pet.); Enax v. Noack, 12 S.W.3d 609, 611-12 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, no pet.); Ragland v. Ragland, 743 S.W.2d 758, 759 (Tex.App.-Waco 1987, no writ).
cited Cited "see" Doan v. Transcanada Keystone Pipeline, LP
Tex. App. · 2018 · signal: see · confidence high
See Schuele v. Schuele , 119 S.W.3d 822 , 824 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2003, no pet.).
discussed Cited "see" Soefje v. Jones
Tex. App. · 2008 · signal: see · confidence high
See Schuele v. Schuele, 119 S.W.3d 822, 825 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2003, no pet.) (holding that a county court at law exercising probate jurisdiction does not have jurisdiction to consider issues in a trust proceeding seeking an accounting as a matter incident to an estate). 3 .
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Damon Lee Wood v. Marcus P. Boldt, Independent of the Estate of Judy Gail Wood, and John Carroll Osborne
Tex. App. · 2009 · signal: see also · confidence medium
Code Ann. § 115.001 (a)(8); see also Schuele v. Schuele, 119 S.W.3d 822, 825 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2003, no pet.) (holding that county court at law did not have jurisdiction over case involving a testamentary trust when pleadings requested an accounting of the testamentary trust).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Damon Lee Wood v. Marcus P. Boldt, Independent of the Estate of Judy Gail Wood, and John Carroll Osborne
Tex. App. · 2009 · signal: see also · confidence medium
Code Ann. § 115.001 (a)(8); see also Schuele v. Schuele , 119 S.W.3d 822, 825 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2003, no pet.) (holding that county court at law did not have jurisdiction over case involving a testamentary trust when pleadings requested an accounting of the testamentary trust).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
John R. SCHUELE, Appellant,
v.
Hunter SCHUELE, Trustee of the Roselyn Schuele Residuary Trust, Trustee of the Hunter Schuele Trust, and Trustee of the Judy Buescher Trust, and Judy Buescher, an Interested Party, Appellees
04-02-00496-CV.
Court of Appeals of Texas.
Aug 13, 2003.
119 S.W.3d 822
Stephen R. Turkett, Robt. L. Kelly, Kelly & Nevins, L.L.P., Kerrville, for appellant., John C. Chunn, John C. Chunn, P.C., New Braunfels, Jonathan B. Cluck, Nun-ley, Davis, Jolley & Hill, L.L.P., Boeme, Thomas J. Rothe, Law Offices of Thomas J. Rothe, P.C., Hondo, for appellees., Hunter Schuehle, Medina, pro se.
Sitting: Alma L. Lã“pez.
Cited by 20 opinions  |  Published

OPINION

Opinion by:

PAUL W. GREEN, Justice.

This case arises from a suit for accounting, damages, and surcharge of the trustee of a testamentary trust. Appellant John R. Schuele (John) filed suit in District Court against Appellee Hunter Schuele (Hunter), who was serving as the trustee of a testamentary trust created by their mother Roselyn’s will. Hunter filed a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. Following a hearing, the trial court dismissed the case, finding the Medina County Court at Law to have dominant jurisdiction over the suit and that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. John now appeals in a single issue, claiming the district court erred in granting the motion to dismiss because that court has original and exclusive jurisdiction over the trust actions.

BACKGROUND

Appellant John R. Schuele, Appellee Hunter Schuele, and Judy Buescher are[*824] the children of Roselyn and Jake Schuele. Roselyn died in April of 1999. Her will established a trust, naming Hunter as trustee and mandating the income of the trust to be paid to Jake for the duration of his life. On Jake’s death, the trust corpus was to be distributed to the remainder beneficiaries, John, Hunter, and Judy. Jake died in early 2001, and his will was admitted to probate in the Medina County Court at Law.

In April of 2002, John filed suit against Hunter, both in his individual capacity and in his capacity as trustee. John sought an accounting of the trust, damages, and surcharge from Hunter. Hunter filed an answer, as an individual and as trustee, moving to dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction. The District Court granted Hunter’s motion, finding the Medina County Court at Law to have jurisdiction over the case. John now appeals the District Court’s decision in a single issue.

Standard of Review

Subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law to be reviewed de novo by an appellate court. Mayhew v. Town of Sunnyvale, 964 S.W.2d 922, 928 (Tex.1998); Garza v. Rodriguez, 18 S.W.3d 694, 696 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2000, no pet.). In conducting our review, we take as true the facts plead in appellants’ petition and determine whether the petition supports jurisdiction in the trial court. Garza, 18 S.W.3d at 696.

Discussion

In his sole issue, John claims the district court erred in finding the Medina County Court at Law to have jurisdiction over his claim. John claims district courts and statutory probate courts have original and exclusive jurisdiction to require an accounting from a trustee, surcharge a trustee, and determine the liability of a trustee. Hunter argues the district court properly dismissed John’s suit because the court where the estates of Jake and Rose-lyn are pending, the Medina County Court at Law, has dominant jurisdiction of all matters “appertaining to and incident to” the estates, including John’s claims.

As a general rule, the court in which a suit is first filed acquires dominant jurisdiction to the exclusion of other coordinating courts. Curtis v. Gibbs, 511 S.W.2d 263, 267 (Tex.1974). Dominant jurisdiction, however, is a concept that applies when separate suits are filed in courts with concurrent jurisdiction. Green v. Watson, 860 S.W.2d 238, 242 (Tex.App.Austin 1993, no -writ). Where one court lacks the jurisdiction to hear a case, the doctrine has no application. In order to determine whether the Medina County Court at Law has dominant jurisdiction to hear the case at hand, we must first analyze whether that court has the authority to hear the case at all.

Initially, we note the distinction between statutory county courts and statutory probate courts. Under the Texas Government Code, a statutory county court is vested with general jurisdiction over all civil and criminal matters and with probate jurisdiction as provided by general law for county courts. Tex. Govt.Code Ann. § 25.0003(d) (Vernon Supp.2003); Green, 860 S.W.2d at 242. Statutory probate courts, on the other hand, are courts with jurisdiction limited to the general jurisdiction of a probate court as set forth in the Probate Code. Tex. PRObate Code Ann. § 3(ii) (Vernon 2003). Statutory county courts exercising probate jurisdiction are not statutory probate courts under the Code unless their statutorily designated name includes the term “probate.” Id.; Green, 860 S.W.2d at 242.

[*825] Section 5(d) of the Texas Probate Code gives county courts, including statutory county courts, the power to hear all matters “incident to an estate.” Section 5A(a) of the Texas Probate Code goes on to define what is included in the phrase “incident to an estate” in proceedings in the constitutional and statutory county courts, while section 5A(b) defines what matters are “incident to an estate” in statutory probate courts and district courts. Qualia v. Qualia, 878 S.W.2d 339, 341 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1994, writ denied). It is apparent from the language used in section 5A that “the interpretation and administration of testamentary trusts and the applying of constructive trusts” applies only to statutory probate courts and district courts, not to county courts. Id.

In addition, the Texas Property Code gives district courts and certain statutory probate courts exclusive jurisdiction in suits involving trusts. Section 115.001 provides:

(a) Except as provided by subsection (d) of this section, a district court has original and exclusive jurisdiction over all proceedings concerning trusts, including proceedings to: ...
(4) determine the powers, responsibilities, duties, and liability of a trustee;
(9) require an accounting by a trustee, review trustee fees, and settle interim or final accounts, and
(10) surcharge a trustee....
(d) the jurisdiction of the district court over proceedings concerning trusts is exclusive except for jurisdiction conferred by law on a statutory probate court.

Tex. PROp.Code Ann. § 115.001 (Vernon Supp.2003); Qualia, 878 S.W.2d at 341-42.

In the case at hand, the pleadings deal with a request for an accounting of a testamentary trust, as well as a request for a surcharge on and damages from the trustee. Although the trust was created by a will now in probate in the Medina County Court at Law, the Texas Probate and Property Codes clearly mandate any issues involving trusts be dealt with in the district court. See Tex. PRobate Code Ann. §§ 5, 5A (Vernon 2003); Tex PROp.Code Ann. § 115.001 (Vernon Supp.2003). The county court at law, then, does not have jurisdiction over this case. We, therefore, reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand this case for further proceedings.