People v. Johnson, 494 N.W.2d 873 (Mich. Ct. App. 1992). · Go Syfert
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People v. Johnson, 494 N.W.2d 873 (Mich. Ct. App. 1992). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
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cited 2× by 2 distinct cases, 2018–2021 · …he routine destruction of taped police broadcasts, where the purpose is not to destroy evidence for a forthcoming trial, does not mandate reversal. ✓
156 citation events (149 in the last 25 years) across 4 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: People of Michigan v. Patrick Terrell Sanford (michctapp, 2026-03-16)
Treatment trajectory · 1993 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1993 2009 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 19 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (verbatim quote) People of Michigan v. Patrick Terrell Sanford
Mich. Ct. App. · 2026 · signal: see · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
similarly, the routine destruction of taped police broadcasts, where the purpose is not to destroy evidence for a forthcoming trial, does not mandate reversal.
discussed Cited as authority (quoted) People of Michigan v. Mark Sherman Caplan
Mich. Ct. App. · 2021 · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence low
he routine destruction of taped police broadcasts, where the purpose is not to destroy evidence for a forthcoming trial, does not mandate reversal.
discussed Cited as authority (quoted) People of Michigan v. Farid Youssef Bazzi
Mich. Ct. App. · 2018 · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence low
he routine destruction of taped police broadcasts, where the purpose is not to destroy evidence for a forthcoming trial, does not mandate reversal.
cited Cited "see" People of Michigan v. Paul Thomas Gabriel
Mich. Ct. App. · 2024 · signal: see · confidence high
See Johnson, 197 Mich App at 365-366 .
cited Cited "see" People of Michigan v. Tabitha Anne Deryke
Mich. Ct. App. · 2020 · signal: see · confidence high
See Johnson, 197 Mich App at 365 . -5- IV.
discussed Cited "see" People of Michigan v. Howard Kermit Mead
Mich. Ct. App. · 2019 · signal: see · confidence high
See Johnson, 197 Mich App at 365-366 (holding that the defendant’s assertion that the police officers destroyed evidence regarding his arrest was not supported by anything other than the defendant’s own testimony and that defendant failed to show the police officers acted in bad faith).
cited Cited "see" People of Michigan v. Marvin Lamar Wilburn
Mich. Ct. App. · 2016 · signal: see · confidence high
See People v Johnson, 197 Mich App 362, 365 ; 494 NW2d 873 (1992).
discussed Cited "see" People of Michigan v. Mario Keeream Jackson (2×)
Mich. Ct. App. · 2016 · signal: see · confidence high
See Johnson, 197 Mich App at 365 .
cited Cited "see, e.g." People of Michigan v. Samuel Joseph Howe
Mich. Ct. App. · 2026 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also People v Johnson, 197 Mich App 362, 365 ; 494 NW2d 873 (1992).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." People of Michigan v. Antwan Tamon Mims
Mich. Ct. App. · 2020 · signal: see also · confidence low
See California v Trombetta, 467 US 479, 488 ; 104 S Ct 2528 ; 81 L Ed 2d 413 (1984) (stating that there is no due-process violation when officers act in good faith according to their normal practices); see also People v Johnson, 197 Mich App 362, 365 ; 494 NW2d 873 (1992) (stating that, in the absence of evidence of bad faith, the loss of evidence before a defense request for production does not violate due process).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Richards 641715 v. Taskila
W.D. Mich. · 2020 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also Johnson, 197 Mich.App. at 365, 494 N.W.2d 873 (explaining that “the routine destruction of taped police broadcasts, where the purpose is not to destroy evidence for a forthcoming trial, does not mandate reversal”).
cited Cited "see, e.g." Humphries v. Brewer
E.D. Mich. · 2019 · signal: see also · confidence medium
See Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 58; see also People v. Johnson, 197 Mich. App. 362, 365 (1992).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." People of Michigan v. Eric Dean Wodkowski
Mich. Ct. App. · 2018 · signal: see also · confidence medium
See also Johnson, 197 Mich App at 365 (the routine destruction of taped police broadcasts, where the purpose is not to destroy evidence for a forthcoming trial, does not mandate reversal).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." People of Michigan v. Robert Michael Bashara
Mich. Ct. App. · 2017 · signal: see also · confidence low
LATE DISCLOSURE OF EVIDENCE Defendant appears to argue that the police and prosecution’s delay in obtaining the report analyzing the leaves found on Jane’s sock and in the vehicle violated his rights because it 11 It is noteworthy that a showing that “evidence was destroyed in the course of implementing routine procedures militates against a finding of bad faith.” United States v Garza, 435 F3d 73, 76 (CA 1, 2006); see also People v Johnson, 197 Mich App 362, 365 ; 494 NW2d 873 (1992). -17- “denied the defense an opportunity to further research where these leaves were initially locat…
cited Cited "see, e.g." People of Michigan v. Hakeem Al-Hisnawi-Salman
Mich. Ct. App. · 2016 · signal: see also · confidence low
Youngblood, 488 US at 57-58 ; see also Johnson, 197 Mich App at 365 .
discussed Cited "see, e.g." People v. Richards
Mich. Ct. App. · 2016 · signal: see also · confidence medium
See also Johnson, 197 Mich App at 365 (explaining that “the routine destruction of taped police broadcasts, where the purpose is not to destroy evidence for a forthcoming trial, does not mandate reversal”).
cited Cited "see, e.g." People of Michigan v. Annie Marie Humphries
Mich. Ct. App. · 2015 · signal: see also · confidence low
See Youngblood, 488 US at 58 ; see also People v Johnson, 197 Mich App 362, 365 ; 494 NW2d 873 (1992).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." People of Michigan v. Jason Tyler Patterson
Mich. Ct. App. · 2015 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also, People v Johnson, 197 Mich App 362, 365 ; 494 NW2d 873 (1992)(“[T]he routine destruction of taped police broadcasts, where the purpose is not to destroy evidence for a forthcoming trial, does not mandate reversal.).
examined Cited "see, e.g." State v. Steffes (4×)
N.D. · 1993 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also, People v. Johnson, 197 Mich.App. 362 , 494 N.W.2d 873 (1992) [routine destruction of taped police broadcasts where the purpose is not to destroy evidence does not mandate a reversal]; State v. Dulaney, 493 N.W.2d 787 (Iowa 1992) [blood sample destroyed according to normal procedure after a set time interval not bad faith]; State v. Hulbert, 481 N.W.2d 329 (Iowa 1992) [negligent, as opposed to intentional, erasing of audio tape does not warrant adverse-inference instruction]; Barre v. State, 826 S.W.2d 722 (Tex.Ct.App.1992) [audio tape recorded over according to the normal practice of…
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
People
v.
Johnson
Docket 135504.
Michigan Court of Appeals.
Dec 8, 1992.
494 N.W.2d 873
Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General, Thomas L. Casey, Solicitor General, John D. O’Hair, Prosecuting Attorney, Timothy A. Baughman, Chief of Research, Training, and Appeals, and Jeffrey Caminsky, Assistant Prosecutor, for the people., Charles Burke and Ricardo L. Johnson, in propria persona, for the defendant.
Shepherd, P.J., and Weaver and Taylor.
Cited by 56 opinions  |  Published
1 passages pin-cited by 2 cases
Pinpoint authority: bottom 76%
Citer courts: Michigan Court of Appeals (2)
Per Curiam.

Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted of larceny from a motor vehicle, MCL 750.356a; MSA 28.588(1), and of being an habitual offender, fourth offense, MCL 769.12; MSA 28.1084. Defendant was sentenced to a prison term of ten to twenty years. Defendant now appeals as of right. We affirm.

i

Defendant first contests the validity of the information charging him as an habitual offender. On March 6, 1990, defendant was arraigned on the larceny charge and pleaded guilty to that charge. As part of the plea agreement, the prosecutor agreed not to charge the defendant with being an habitual offender.

On April 10, 1990, defendant withdrew his guilty plea. The prosecutor filed the supplemental information on April 11, 1990. Defendant was given notice of it some time in April.

The prosecutor must file the supplemental infor[*364] mation promptly, at an early stage in the proceedings, to provide the accused with notice of the potential consequences should the accused be convicted of the underlying offense. MCL 769.13; MSA 28.1085. An information has been filed promptly if it is filed not more than fourteen days after the defendant is arraigned. People v Shelton, 412 Mich 565; 315 NW2d 537 (1982).

Defendant asserts that because the supplemental information charging him as an habitual offender was filed more than fourteen days after the filing of the original information, his conviction as an habitual offender should be vacated. We disagree.

When defendant withdrew his guilty plea, he reopened this matter to any of the charges that had been brought or could have been brought against him at the time his plea of guilty was entered. MCR 6.312. The prosecution promptly filed the supplemental information and gave the defendant notice of the new charge. Defendant was aware of the supplemental information at all stages of this proceeding, which enabled him to participate in a new, but unsuccessful, plea bargaining process. We find no error.

ii

Defendant also complains that the prosecutor violated a discovery order and that the Detroit police suppressed and withheld evidence.

In his demand for discovery, defendant had requested the recordings of radio traffic relating to his arrest. In response, he received a tape that was substantially blank. Before trial, defendant sought to compel the production of the tape, which he asserted existed. The trial court, noting that defendant had not produced any proof of the tape’s[*365] existence, denied his request. Defendant now argues that the Detroit police, in bad faith, deliberately suppressed the tape because its contents supported his version of the evening’s events.

Absent the intentional suppression of evidence or a showing of bad faith, a loss of evidence that occurs before a defense request for its production does not require reversal. People v Albert, 89 Mich App 350, 352; 280 NW2d 523 (1979). Similarly, the routine destruction of taped police broadcasts, where the purpose is not to destroy evidence for a forthcoming trial, does not mandate reversal. Id.; People v Hardaway, 67 Mich App 82, 86; 240 NW2d 276 (1976). Defendant bears the burden of showing that the evidence was exculpatory or that the police acted in bad faith. People v Leo, 188 Mich App 417, 427; 470 NW2d 423 (1991).

The trial court’s order directing the Detroit police to retain any tapes from the night of defendant’s arrest specified that anything relating to defendant be retained. The Detroit police then turned over to defense counsel a tape that was substantially blank. Defendant failed to provide any evidence, other than his own account of the events of the evening he was arrested, to support his assertion that the radio traffic would have been exculpatory. As noted by the trial court, defendant even failed to produce the individual who was with him and who was allegedly released by the police. Accordingly, we conclude that defendant has failed to show the existence of any evidence that would have been exculpatory and accordingly is not entitled to reversal.

Similarly, defendant’s bald assertion that the Detroit police deliberately destroyed the tapes relating to his arrest is unsupported by anything other than his own testimony. Absent any other evidence, even circumstantial, we conclude that[*366] the Detroit police did not deliberately destroy evidence. Defendant has not made the second showing required for reversal.

Absent any showing that the Detroit police deliberately destroyed evidence, the trial court did not err in denying defendant’s motion to compel discovery.

We affirm defendant’s convictions.