Balsavich v. Local 170, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 356 N.E.2d 1217 (Mass. 1976). · Go Syfert
Search
Balsavich v. Local 170, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 356 N.E.2d 1217 (Mass. 1976). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
G Cite
cited 2× by 2 distinct cases, last quoted 2007 · 2 courts · …employees may not simply disregard the grievance procedures set out in a collective labor contract and go direct to court for redress against the employer at p. 286 ✓
76 citation events (23 in the last 25 years) across 8 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Cioch v. Treasurer of Ludlow (mass, 2007-08-10)
Treatment trajectory · 1976 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1976 2001 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 23 distinct citers. How cited ↗
examined Cited as authority (verbatim quote) Cioch v. Treasurer of Ludlow
Mass. · 2007 · signal: see · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
employees may not simply disregard the grievance procedures set out in a collective labor contract and go direct to the court for redress against the employer. . . . they must initiate the grievance procedures as the contract provides . . .
discussed Cited as authority (verbatim quote) O'Brien v. New England Telephone & Telegraph Co.
Mass. · 1996 · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
employees may not simply disregard the grievance procedures set out in a collective labor contract and go direct to court for redress against the employer
discussed Cited as authority (quoted) Sabinson v. Dartmouth College Trustee
D.N.H. · 2007 · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence low
employees may not simply disregard the grievance procedures set out in a collective labor contract and go direct to court for redress against the employer
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Etedali v. Town of Danvers
Mass. Dist. Ct., App. Div. · 2009 · confidence medium
“Employees may not simply disregard the grievance procedures set out in a collective labor contract and go direct to court for redress against the employer.” Balsavich v. Local Union 170, Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 371 Mass. 283, 296 (1976), citing Norton v. Massachusetts Bay Transp.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Local 762, International Ass'n of Fire Fighters v. Kirk
Mass. Super. Ct. · 2009 · confidence medium
Balsavich v. Local 170, Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 371 Mass. 283, 286 (1976).
cited Cited as authority (rule) St. Luke's Nursing Home, Inc. v. Rebeiro
Mass. Dist. Ct., App. Div. · 2003 · confidence medium
Balsavich v. Local 170, Int’l Bhd of Teamsters, 371 Mass. 283, 287 (1976).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Coffey v. County of Plymouth
Mass. App. Ct. · 2000 · confidence medium
Bhd. of Teamsters, 371 Mass. 283, 286 (1976).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Frontera v. City of Somerville (2×)
Mass. Dist. Ct., App. Div. · 1998 · confidence medium
Co., 422 Mass. 686, 695-696 (1996); Balsavich v. Local Union 170, Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 371 Mass. 283, 286 (1976).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Kirkland Construction Co. v. James
Mass. App. Ct. · 1995 · confidence medium
Bhd. of Teamsters, 371 Mass. 283, 288 (1976).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Gormely v. Roman Catholic Diocese
Mass. Super. Ct. · 1995 · confidence medium
Brotherhood of Teamsters, 371 Mass. 283, 286 (1976), unless the employee alleges and shows the union has failed in its duty to represent her fairly, or her employee repudiated or otherwise nullified the grievance procedures.
cited Cited as authority (rule) St. Pierre v. Town of Dartmouth
Mass. Super. Ct. · 1993 · confidence medium
Balsavich v. Local 170 International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 371 Mass. 283, 286 (1976).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Cosby v. Department of Social Services
Mass. App. Ct. · 1992 · confidence medium
Bhd. of Teamsters, 371 Mass. at 286.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Eyal v. Helen Broadcasting Corp.
Mass. · 1991 · confidence medium
McMahon and WEEI “on or about April 29, 1988, . . . maliciously and negligently composed, wrote and transmitted *428 via broadcasts ... the following false and defamatory statement of and concerning [the] [p] lain tiffs: ‘The owner of a Brookline [d]elicatessen and seven other people are arrested in connection with an international cocaine ring.’ ” The broadcasts were “numerous,” and were aired in the context of “extreme media attention to the story” some of which the amended complaint describes as noted below. 5 Had WEEI and McMahon, at the time of composing, writing, and tran…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Johnston v. School Committee of Watertown
Mass. · 1989 · confidence medium
They must initiate the grievance procedures as the contract provides and it is only when the union fails in its duty to represent them fairly in pressing the grievance . . . that the employees are free to try judicial remedies.” (Citations omitted.) Balsavich v. Local Union 170, Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 371 Mass. 283, 286 (1976).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Leahy v. L. 1526, AM. FED. OF ST., COUNTY, & MUN. EMP.
Mass. · 1987 · confidence medium
See, e.g., Vaca v. Sipes, supra ; Balsavich v. Local Union 170 of the Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 371 Mass. 283, 286-287 (1976); Norton v. Massachusetts Bay Transp.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Furno v. Pignona
Vt. · 1986 · confidence medium
Louis-San Francisco Railway, 393 U.S. 324, 329-31 (1969); Kaylor v. Crown Zellerbach, Inc., 643 F.2d 1362, 1366 (9th Cir. 1981); Balsavich v. Local 170 of International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 371 Mass. 283, 286 , 356 N.E.2d 1217, 1220 (1976). 3 The evidence at trial clearly supports the conclusion that before plaintiff filed this action, defendant Pignona at all times maintained that the City’s Personnel *542 Rules and Regulations did not apply to plaintiff because of his status as a department head.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Reilly v. Local 589, Amalgamated Transit Union
Mass. App. Ct. · 1986 · confidence medium
Bhd. of Teamsters, 371 Mass. 283, 286-287 (1976); Berman v. Drake Motor Lines, Inc., 6 Mass. App. Ct. 438, 445-446 (1978); Trinque v. Mount Wachusett Community College Faculty Assn., 14 Mass. App. Ct. 191, 197-199 (1982), all decided before the Bowen case was announced in January, 1983.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Levine v. E. F. Hutton & Co.
Mass. App. Ct. · 1983 · confidence medium
Bhd. of Teamsters, 371 Mass. 283, 287-288 (1976), the judgment appealed from will be modified so that the plaintiffs will have leave, within forty days of the date of the rescript, to file an amended complaint with definite averments invoking more explicitly the theory or theories on which they intend finally to rely.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Fortune v. National Cash Register Co.
Mass. · 1977 · confidence medium
Balsavich v. Local 170, International Bhd. of Teamsters, 371 Mass. 283, 286 (1976).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Senay v. Meehan
Mass. App. Ct. · 1977 · confidence medium
See Charbonnier v. Amico, 367 Mass. 146, 152-153 , 154 n.14; Balsavich v. Local 170, International Bhd. of Teamsters, 371 Mass. 283, 287-288 (1976); Wright & Miller, supra § 1377, at 755-756.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Nantucket Land Coun. v. Planning Bd., Nantucket
Mass. App. Ct. · 1977 · confidence medium
Any amendment of the complaint in order to set out facts from which the Superior Court might be able to determine the existence of jurisdiction under § 7A is within the discretion of that court. 15 See Charbonnier v. Amico, 367 Mass. 146, 153-154 (1975); Caine v. Commonwealth, 368 Mass. 815, 816 (1975); Balsavich v. Local 170, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 371 Mass. 283, 287-288 (1976).
discussed Cited "see" Tortolano v. Lemuel Shattuck Hosp. (2×)
Mass. App. Ct. · 2018 · signal: see · confidence high
See Balsavich , 371 Mass. at 286 , 356 N.E.2d 1217 ; Azzi v. Western Elec.
discussed Cited "see" Marcoux v. Town of Bellingham
Mass. Super. Ct. · 1996 · signal: see · confidence high
See Balsavich v. Local 170, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 371 Mass. 283, 286-87 (1976) (employees free to seek judicial remedies when the union fails in its duty to represent them fairly).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
BRONISLAW BALSAVICH & others vs. LOCAL UNION 170 OF THE INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS, CHAUFFEURS, WAREHOUSEMEN AND HELPERS OF AMERICA & others.[1]
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court.
Nov 3, 1976.
356 N.E.2d 1217
Kaplan.
Cited by 12 opinions  |  Published
1 passage pin-cited by 1 case
Pinpoint authority: bottom 68%
Citer courts: D. New Hampshire (1)

Present: HENNESSEY, C.J., REARDON, QUIRICO, KAPLAN, & WILKINS, JJ.

Kendall Burford for the plaintiffs.

Robert Glass for United Parcel Service, Inc.

Karl E. Klare for William Miley & others.

Christy A. Pano for James J. Millet & another.

KAPLAN, J.

The plaintiffs appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court dismissing their amended complaint for failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted. Mass. R. Civ. P. 12 (b) (6), 365 Mass. 754 (1974). Under the same rule their original complaint had been previously dismissed, but with leave to amend. The action was commenced in April, 1974.

Balsavich and other named members of Local Union 170 of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America ("plaintiff employees") are suing their employer United Parcel Service, Inc. ("employer"), Local Union 170 (through Millett and Berry as officer-representatives), and Miley and other named persons, formerly members of Local Union 25 of the International Brotherhood employed by the same employer ("defendant employees"). The claim which the plaintiff employees struggle to assert is roughly as follows. In early 1969 the employer expanded its activities in the Worcester area by opening an "operating center" in Shrewsbury, within the jurisdiction of Local 170. At that time the defendant employees, employed at a Watertown center, within the jurisdiction of Local 25, were drawn into the work at Shrewsbury, becoming members of Local 170.[*285] The gravamen appears to be that the defendant employees were given status for purposes of seniority at Shrewsbury on a company basis, resulting in the outranking of some or all of the plaintiff employees, whereas, according to the amended complaint, the defendant employees should have been treated as junior to all the plaintiff employees.

Although the amended complaint does not refer to the statute,[2] the action may be taken to be a conventional one grounded on § 301 (a) of the Labor Management Relations Act (29 U.S.C. § 185[a] [1970]) of which the State courts have concurrent jurisdiction. Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335, 343-344 (1964). The requisites of such an action by an employee against his employer (in which the union is often joined as defendant) are, first, that the employer has committed a breach of a substantive provision of the collective bargaining contract, and, second, that the employee has used the grievance procedures under the contract, except as such prior resort may be excused. See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 185-186 (1967).

In the amended complaint, the plaintiff employees allege broadly and vaguely a breach of the contract by the employer (the parties to the contract with the employer were the local unions in the New England area including local unions 170 and 25), but they do not point to any particular provision in the rather lengthy and intricate document annexed as an exhibit. Cf. Abrams v. Carrier Corp., 434 F.2d 1234, 1241-1242, 1245-1247 (2d Cir.1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1009 (1971); Brown v. Truck Drivers Local 355, 264 F. Supp. 776, 778 (D. Md. 1967). To the contrary, the employer refers in its brief to a contract provision,[3][*286] possibly relevant, which may suggest that the defendant employees were treated correctly for seniority purposes and that the plaintiff employees are making claims beyond the reach of the contract or in contradiction of it. If the point is left in doubt by the amended complaint, it may be because the nature of the changes made in the Watertown and Worcester areas are not plainly stated in the amended complaint. As if to anticipate objection to the omission to allege forthrightly the violation of a contract provision, the amended complaint alleges that all the defendants made representations that the defendant employees would be considered junior to the plaintiff employees, but the allegations do not go so far as to assert an amendment of the contract or an estoppel and appear rather as intended to lend color to the claim of contract violation.

Coming to the second point: Employees may not simply disregard the grievance procedures set out in a collective labor contract and go direct to court for redress against the employer. Norton v. Massachusetts Bay Transp. Authority, 369 Mass. 1, 2 (1975). Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650 (1965). They must initiate the grievance procedures as the contract provides and it is only when the union fails in its duty to represent them fairly in pressing the grievance, or the employer repudiates or otherwise nullifies the grievance machinery, or the union and the employer contrive together to subvert it, that the employees are free to try judicial remedies. See Vaca v. Sipes, supra at 184-186; Abrams v. Carrier Corp., supra at 1245-1246; DeArroyo v. Sindicato de Trabajadores Packinghouse, 425 F.2d 281, 283-284 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 877 (1970). The amended complaint asseverates in one or another broad form of words that the plaintiff employees have exhausted the grievance procedure but there is no definite statement indicating that the contract provisions regarding the initiation and forwarding of grievances were complied with;[4] indeed, the[*287] averments that do appear in the amended complaint are somewhat self-contradictory and leave an impression that a failure seasonably to present and press any grievances is being glossed over.[5] Again in possible anticipation that the allegations to this point would be held inadequate, the amended complaint adds a charge of "conspiracy" against all the defendants, intended, presumably, to suggest that resort to the grievance machinery would have been futile and therefore need not have been attempted; but the elements of the alleged conspiracy remain unstated except for intimation. Cf. Abrams v. Carrier Corp., supra at 1253-1254; Desrosiers v. American Cyanamid Co., 377 F.2d 864, 870-871 (2d Cir.1967); Balowski v. International Union, UAW, 372 F.2d 829, 835 (6th Cir.1967).

This amended complaint goes on a recognizable legal theory (contrast Charbonnier v. Amico, 367 Mass. 146 [1975]) and, if all intendments are generously made in its favor, can be said to state a claim (cf. Abrams v. Carrier Corp., supra at 1241-1242); but it is nevertheless a quite unsatisfactory pleading, especially unpromising as the pleader has had previous warning through the dismissal (but without opinion) of the original complaint. Cf. Feinberg v. Leach, 243 F.2d 64, 68 (5th Cir.1957). It is hard to tell whether the deficiencies are due to inattention of the pleader or to a real shortage of relevant provable facts. In the circumstances the alternatives that present themselves are to give the plaintiff employees yet another chance to produce a[*288] pleading that will help to shape the litigation, or to abandon that hope and rely on the processes of discovery or trial to reveal the actual strength of the case. Cf. Austin v. House of Vision, Inc., 385 F.2d 171, 172-173 (7th Cir.1967); Sedlarik v. General Motors Corp., 54 F.R.D. 230, 233 (W.D. Mich. 1971); Thrift v. Bell Lines, Inc., 256 F. Supp. 475, 476, 479 (D.S.C. 1966). As an exceptional measure,[6] and without enthusiasm, we shall take the first course and modify the judgment appealed from to provide that the plaintiff employees shall, within forty days of the date of the rescript, file a second amended complaint providing more definite statements of the matters above referred to. See Mass. R. Civ. P. 12 (e), 365 Mass. 754 (1974). We think it appropriate to refer here to counsel's obligation under Mass. R. Civ. P. 11 (a), 365 Mass. 753 (1974).[7]

The defendants suggest that the amended complaint reveals on its face that any claim against Local Union 170 is time barred, because breach of a union's duty of fair representation toward its members is a tort, to which our short statute of limitations applies. The claim is to be characterized by reference to Federal law (see Butler v. Teamsters Local 823, 514 F.2d 442, 446-447 [8th Cir.], cert. denied, 423 U.S. 924 [1975]), and the characterization then points to the State statute of limitations properly applicable (there being no pertinent Federal limitations statute). But characterization is beset by doubts under the Federal decisions and may indeed depend on the particular elements of the given breach of duty. See Butler v. Teamsters Local 823, supra at 447-448; Abrams v. Carrier Corp., supra at 1251-1252; DeArroyo v. Sindicato de Trabajadores Packinghouse,[*289] supra at 285-287. Thus the matter is better left to a later stage of the case.[8]

The judgment should be modified as indicated in this opinion.

So ordered.

1 The parties are described in the text below.
2 It is, however, referred to in the plaintiff employees' brief.
3 The contract at art. 5, § 6-B (2), provides: "When an Operating Center or Subcenter is closed or partially closed and the work of the Operating Center or Subcenter is transferred to another Operating Center or Subcenter in whole or in part, an employee at the closed or partially closed down Operating Center or Subcenter shall have the right to transfer to the Operating Center or Subcenter into which the work was transferred if regular work is available and shall exercise his seniority on a Company basis in the affected Operating Centers or Subcenters."
4 Article 7 of the contract sets out an "Arbitration and Grievance Machinery" which in the case of an employee's grievance against the employer requires the employee to submit it to the union in writing within five days, whereupon a process of attempted agreement is to begin with final recourse to arbitration.
5 There is an allegation that the employer's breach of seniority was concealed from the plaintiff employees for a year, which would bring us into 1970, but it is asserted, curiously, that grievances were filed in 1969 as well as 1970. "Then," says the amended complaint, complaints were filed with the National Labor Relations Board, but were rejected as coming too late (see the six-month provision of 29 U.S.C. § 160[b] [1970]). There are also references to appeals to an international council and finally an alleged statement by Millett, an officer of Local Union 170, that the defendant employees should be junior but nothing would be done about it. The total picture remains obscure.
6 See Charbonnier v. Amico, 367 Mass. 146, 153-154 & n. 14 (1975); Reporters' Notes to Mass. R. Civ. P. 12 (e), Mass. Ann. Laws, Rules of Civil and Appellate Procedure at 153-154 (1974).
7 Rule 11 (a) states in part: "The signature of an attorney to a pleading constitutes a certificate by him that ... to the best of his knowledge, information, and belief there is a good ground to support it;...."
8 We note that counsel for the plaintiff employees disclaimed at the argument any intention to seek money damages against the defendant employees; they are joined, perhaps unnecessarily, to facilitate the revision of seniority rights, should the plaintiff employees ultimately succeed. Cf. Butler v. Teamsters Local 823, supra at 454-456.