State v. Nugent, 2002 ME 111 (Me. 2002). · Go Syfert
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State v. Nugent, 2002 ME 111 (Me. 2002). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
14 citation events (14 in the last 25 years) across 2 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: State v. Hughes (me, 2004-11-15)
Top citers, strongest first. 2 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Hughes
Me. · 2004 · confidence medium
“When the record on appeal does not include a transcript of the proceedings below, we must assume that the transcript would support the trial court’s findings of fact and its rulings on evidence and procedure.” State v. Nugent, 2002 ME 111, ¶ 2 , 801 A.2d 1001, 1002 (citing Putnam v. Albee, 1999 ME 44, ¶ 10 , 726 A.2d 217, 220 ). [¶ 8] Hughes argues there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction for assault.
examined Cited "see" Jefts v. Dennis (4×)
Me. · 2007 · signal: see · confidence high
See State v. Nugent, 2002 ME 111, ¶ 2 , 801 A.2d 1001, 1002 . [¶ 8] We are also unpersuaded by Dennis’s further argument that the court misconstrued the statutory definition of “harassment.” On the limited record before us, the court did not err in concluding that Dennis’s repeated e-mail messages and embarrassing facsimile messages, sent to a machine in a central location in Jefts’s office, constituted three or more acts of intimidation directed against Jefts, that the messages were sent with the intention of causing him fear or intimidation, and that they did in fact cause him fe…
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
STATE of Maine
v.
Joseph J. NUGENT III
Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.
Jul 10, 2002.
2002 ME 111
E. Christopher Almy, District Attorney, C. Daniel Wood, Asst. Dist. Atty., Bangor, for State., Joseph J. Nugent III, Millinoeket, for defendant.
Saufley, Clifford, Rudman, Dana, Alexander, Calkins, Levy.
Cited by 6 opinions  |  Published
ALEXANDER, J.

[¶ 1] Joseph J. Nugent III appeals from a judgment by the District Court (Dover-Foxcroft, Stitham, J.) finding him to have committed the traffic infraction of speeding fifty miles per hour in a twenty-five mile-per-hour zone. See 29-A M.R.S.A. § 2074 (1996 & Supp.2001). Nugent asserts that (1) he was not allowed to make a statement to the court but instead was required to proceed by questions and answers, and (2) he was improperly deprived of his right to a jury trial. We affirm.

[¶ 2] No transcript or statement in lieu of a transcript of the court hearing has been provided. See M.R.App. P. 5(b)(2), (d), (f). Thus, it is impossible to assess the validity of Nugent’s first point of appeal. When the record on appeal does not include a transcript of the proceedings below, we must assume that the transcript would support the trial court’s findings of fact and its rulings on evidence and procedure. Putnam v. Albee, 1999 ME 44, ¶ 10, 726 A.2d 217, 220.

[¶ 3] Nugent’s second point on appeal, that he had a right to a jury trial in this speeding infraction case, is resolved by our ruling in State v. Anton, 463 A.2d 703 (Me.1983). In Anton a right to a jury trial in a speeding infraction case was asserted, based on the Maine Constitution. We held that (1) “traffic infraction proceedings are not ‘criminal prosecutions’ for which the right to trial by jury is guaranteed by article I, section 6 of the Maine Constitution,” id. at 708, and (2) there is no civil jury trial right for traffic infraction proceedings afforded by article I, section 20 of the Maine Constitution, id. at 708-09. The scholarly review of the law undertaken by Justice Godfrey in Anton remains good law today. There is no right to a jury trial in traffic infraction cases.

The entry is:

Judgment affirmed.