In Re Boland, 155 S.W.3d 65 (Mo. 2005). · Go Syfert
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In Re Boland, 155 S.W.3d 65 (Mo. 2005). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
43 citation events (43 in the last 25 years) across 5 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: In re: The Matter of J.R.K. v. Juvenile Officer (moctapp, 2023-03-28)
Treatment trajectory · 2005 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
2005 2015 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 29 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In re: The Matter of J.R.K. v. Juvenile Officer
Mo. Ct. App. · 2023 · confidence medium
“The primary rule of statutory interpretation is to ascertain the intent of the legislature from the language used, to give effect to that intent if possible, and to consider the words in their plain and ordinary meaning.” In re Boland, 155 S.W.3d 65, 67 (Mo. banc 2005).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) JEANNIE E. HARPER, Claimant-Respondent v. SPRINGFIELD REHAB AND HEALTH CARE CENTER/NHC HEALTH, Employer-Appellant PREMIER GROUP INSURANCE COMPANY CORVEL ENTERPRISE COMPANY, INC. (TPA), Insurer-Appellant and TREASURER OF MISSOURI AS CUSTODIAN OF THE SECOND INJURY FUND, Additional Party-Respondent
Mo. Ct. App. · 2023 · confidence medium
As a result, in what we believe is a question of first impression, we must interpret the statutory phrase “producing at the time objective symptoms of an injury.” The “primary rule of statutory interpretation is to ascertain the intent of the legislature from the language used, to give effect to that intent if possible, and to consider the words in their plain and ordinary meaning.” In re Boland, 155 S.W.3d 65, 67 (Mo. banc 2005) (citation omitted).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Mustafa Q. Alamin v. Likita N. Alamin
Mo. Ct. App. · 2022 · confidence medium
In re Boland, 155 S.W.3d 65, 67 (Mo. banc 2005); see also Hanff v. Hanff, 987 S.W.2d 352, 356 (Mo. App. E.D. 1998) (“Absent timely revival, section 516.350 plainly forbids the enforcement of judgments over ten years old by conclusively presuming the judgments have been paid”).
cited Cited as authority (rule) State of Missouri ex rel Sheriff Paul Vescovo III v. Clay County, Missouri
Mo. Ct. App. · 2019 · confidence medium
Coop., 462 S.W.3d 783, 791 (Mo. App. 2015) (quoting In re Boland, 155 S.W.3d 65, 67 (Mo. banc 2005)).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Amelia Fay Hanger v. Dillon Michael James Dawson
Mo. Ct. App. · 2019 · confidence medium
Coop., 462 S.W.3d 783, 791 (Mo. App. W.D. 2015) (quoting In re Boland, 155 S.W.3d 65, 67 (Mo. banc 2005)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) City of Kansas City, Missouri v. Kevin Garnett
Mo. Ct. App. · 2016 · confidence medium
Id. (citing In re Boland, 155 S.W.3d 65, 67 (Mo. banc 2005)), “Where the language of a statute is clear, courts must give effect to the language as written.” Kearney Special Road Dist. v. County of Clay, 863 S.W.2d 841, 842 (Mo. banc 1993).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Milton Young v. Boone Electric Cooperative (2×)
Mo. Ct. App. · 2015 · confidence medium
Randolph Co. v. Moore-Ransdell, 446 S.W. 3d 699 , 704 n.3 (Mo. App. W.D. 2014). 10 General Principles of Statutory Interpretation The "primary rule of statutory interpretation is to ascertain the intent of the legislature from the language used, to give effect to that intent if possible, and to consider the words in their plain and ordinary meaning." In re Boland, 155 S.W.3d 65, 67 (Mo. banc 2005) (citation omitted).
cited Cited as authority (rule) State of Missouri v. Nicholas A. Evans
Mo. Ct. App. · 2014 · confidence medium
In re *458 Boland, 155 S.W.3d 65, 67 (Mo. banc 2005); State v. Graham, 149 S.W.3d 465, 467 (Mo.App.E.D.2004).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In the Interest of K.H. v. State
Mo. Ct. App. · 2013 · confidence medium
“The primary rule of statutory interpretation is to ascertain the intent of the legislature from the language used, to give effect to that intent if possible, and to consider the words in their plain and ordinary meaning.” In re Boland, 155 S.W.3d 65, 67 (Mo. banc 2005).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Allen v. Martin
Mo. Ct. App. · 2013 · confidence medium
“The primary rule of statutory interpretation is to ascertain the intent of the legislature from the language used, to give effect to that intent if possible, and to consider the words in their plain and ordinary meaning.” In re Boland, 155 S.W.3d 65, 67 (Mo. banc 2005).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) McCoy v. THE HERSHEWE LAW FIRM, PC
Mo. Ct. App. · 2012 · confidence medium
The “cardinal rule” of statutory interpretation is “to ascertain the intent of the legislature from the language used, to give effect to that intent if possible, and to consider the words in their plain and ordinary meaning.” In re Boland, 155 S.W.3d 65, 67 (Mo. banc 2005).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Johnson v. Missouri Board of Probation & Parole
Mo. Ct. App. · 2012 · confidence medium
“The primary rule of statutory interpretation is to ascertain the intent of the legislature from the language used, to give effect to that intent if possible, and to consider the words in their plain and ordinary meaning.” In re Boland, 155 S.W.3d 65, 67 (Mo. banc 2005).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Horning v. White
Mo. Ct. App. · 2010 · confidence medium
“The primary rule of statutory interpretation is to ascertain the intent of the legislature from the language used, to give effect to that intent if possible, and to consider the words in their plain and ordinary meaning.” In re Boland, 155 S.W.3d 65, 67 (Mo. banc 2005).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Snyder v. Consolidated Library District No. 3
Mo. Ct. App. · 2010 · confidence medium
“The primary rule of statutory interpretation is to ascertain the intent of the legislature from the language used, to give effect to that intent if possible, and to consider the words in their plain and ordinary meaning.” In re Boland, 155 S.W.3d 65, 67 (Mo. banc 2005).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Hecht v. Hecht
Mo. Ct. App. · 2009 · confidence medium
In re Boland, 155 S.W.3d 65, 67 (Mo. banc 2005).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Baxter
Mo. Ct. App. · 2009 · confidence medium
In the absence of guiding case law or other authority, the primary rule of statutory construction is “to ascertain the intent of the legislature from the language used, to give effect to that intent if possible, and to consider the words in their plain and ordinary meaning.” In re Boland, 155 S.W.3d 65, 67 (Mo. banc 2005).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. McLaughlin
Mo. · 2008 · confidence medium
This Court has recently held: ‘The primary rule of statutory interpretation is to ascertain the intent of the legislature from the language used, to give effect to that intent if possible, and to consider the words in their plain and ordinary meaning.’ In re Boland, 155 S.W.3d 65, 67 (Mo. banc 2005).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State Ex Rel. Evans v. Brown Builders Electrical Co.
Mo. · 2008 · confidence medium
“The primary rule of statutory interpretation is to ascertain the intent of the legislature from the language used, to give effect to that intent if possible, and to consider the words in their plain and ordinary meaning.” In re Boland, 155 S.W.3d 65, 67 (Mo. banc 2005).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Crum v. Vincent
8th Cir. · 2007 · confidence medium
When doing so, courts are not to interpret statutes in a “hyper-technical” manner, but rather in a manner that is “reasonable, logical, and ... give[s] meaning to the statutes.” See In re Boland, 155 S.W.3d 65, 67 (Mo.2005).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Jerry D. Crum v. Trish Vincent
8th Cir. · 2007 · confidence medium
When doing so, courts are not to interpret statutes in a “hyper- technical” manner, but rather in a manner that is “reasonable, logical, and . . . give[s] meaning to the statutes.” See In re Boland, 155 S.W.3d 65, 67 (Mo. 2005).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Chad v. City of Lake Ozark
Mo. Ct. App. · 2007 · confidence medium
In re Boland, 155 S.W.3d 65, 67 (Mo. banc 2005).
cited Cited as authority (rule) KRP Ex Rel. Brown v. Penyweit
Mo. Ct. App. · 2007 · confidence medium
In re Boland, 155 S.W.3d 65, 67 (Mo. banc 2005).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Miller v. Miller
Mo. Ct. App. · 2007 · confidence medium
In re Boland, 155 S.W.3d 65, 67 (Mo.banc 2005).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United Pharmacal Co. of Missouri, Inc. v. Missouri Board of Pharmacy (2×)
Mo. · 2006 · confidence medium
"Statutory construction should not be hyper technical but instead should be reasonable, logical, and should give meaning to the statutes." In re Boland, 155 S.W.3d 65, 67 (Mo. banc 2005).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Crum v. Missouri Director of Revenue
W.D. Mo. · 2006 · confidence medium
This Court is under an obligation to interpret Missouri’s statutes so as not to be “hyper technical.” In re Boland, 155 S.W.3d 65, 67 (Mo.2005) (en banc) (citation omitted).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Hawkins v. Lemasters
Mo. Ct. App. · 2006 · confidence medium
“The primary rule of statutory interpretation is to ascertain the intent of the legislature from the language used, to give effect to that intent if possible, and to consider the words in their plain and ordinary meaning.” In re Boland, 155 S.W.3d 65, 67 (Mo. banc 2005) (citing Landman v. Ice Cream Specialties, Inc., 107 S.W.3d 240, 251 (Mo. banc 2003)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State Ex Rel. Nixon v. Overmyer
Mo. Ct. App. · 2006 · confidence medium
“The primary rule of statutory interpretation is to ascertain the intent of the legislature from the language used, to give effect to that intent if possible, and to consider the words in their plain and ordinary meaning.” In re Boland, 155 S.W.3d 65, 67 (Mo. banc 2005) (citing Landman v. Ice Cream Specialties, Inc., 107 S.W.3d 240, 251 (Mo. banc 2003)).
cited Cited as authority (rule) State v. Prosser
Mo. Ct. App. · 2005 · confidence medium
In re Boland, 155 S.W.3d 65, 67 (Mo. banc 2005).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In Re Scott
Bankr. E.D. Mo. · 2005 · confidence medium
The Court’s role in interpreting statutes “is to ascertain the intent of the legislature from the language used, to give effect to that intent if possible, and to consider the words in their plain and ordinary meaning.” In re Boland, 155 S.W.3d 65, 67 (Mo.2005) (citing Landman v. Ice Cream Specialties, Inc., 107 S.W.3d 240, 251 (Mo.2003) (en banc)).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
In the Matter of John J. BOLAND, Sr., Deceased
SC 85902.
Supreme Court of Missouri.
Feb 15, 2005.
155 S.W.3d 65
James E. Hullverson, Jr., St. Louis, for appellant., Michael E. Doyel, Edward C. Vancil, St. Louis, for respondent.
Price.
Cited by 31 opinions  |  Published
WILLIAM RAY PRICE, JR., Judge.

I.

Mary Frances Halliday and John J. Bo-land, Sr., were divorced in 1981. The decree of dissolution required Mr. Boland to “keep in full force and effect life insurance” on himself for an amount no less than $50,000 and to designate Ms. Halliday irrevocably as the beneficiary during her lifetime. After Mr. Boland died, Ms. Hal-liday demanded the insurance proceeds but did not receive payment. She filed a claim against Mr. Boland’s estate. The court denied the claim and Ms. Halliday appealed. The judgment is reversed and remanded. [1]

II.

Mr. Boland and Ms. Halliday were married on April 22, 1975, and were divorced on July 9, 1981. Two days prior to their divorce they signed a separation agreement that was incorporated into them dissolution decree. Under the heading “Maintenance,” the separation agreement provided in pertinent part:

Additionally, Husband shall keep in full force and effect life insurance covering his life in the principal sum of not less than $50,000, upon which Wife is irrevocably designated as the beneficiary during her lifetime. Such life insurance shall not be payable to Wife in the event of her remarriage, prior to Husband’s death. Husband shall exhibit to Wife, upon her reasonable request, at reasonable intervals, evidence that she continues to be designated irrevocably as the beneficiary on such policy of insurance.

Mr. Boland later unsuccessfully tried to modify the dissolution decree. Halliday v. Boland, 813 S.W.2d 34 (Mo.App.1991). He paid maintenance to Ms. Halliday until his death.

Mr. Boland died on February 15, 2003, and Ms. Halliday, who had not remarried, demanded the $50,000 insurance proceeds in accordance with the dissolution decree. The estate responded that, “due to the fact that the 1981 Divorce Decree has not been revived in accordance with Section 516.350, the provisions of the decree referencing the life insurance [are] not enforceable.” Ms. Halliday prematurely filed a claim against Mr. Boland’s estate in August 2003 for $50,000 plus interest, costs, and attorneys fees. His estate had not yet been opened, so her claim was refiled on September 25, 2003.

The estate argued that Ms. Halliday’s exclusive remedy was through enforcement of the judgment. It claimed that the judgment was not timely revived pursuant[*67] to section 516.350, RSMo Cum.Supp.2003, [2] which establishes a rebuttable presumption that judgments are paid, in certain circumstances, after 10 years from them date of entry.

The court denied her claim against Mr. Boland’s estate and Ms. Halliday appealed. She raised a constitutional challenge by alleging that the trial court retroactively applied section 516.350. Mo. Const, art. V, sec. 3. Her claim is otherwise resolved, and the constitutional question is not reached. See Rodriguez v. Suzuki Motor Corp., 996 S.W.2d 47, 53 (Mo. banc 1999).

III.

Ms. HaUiday’s claim can be resolved by focusing on the language of section 516.350 and construing it in accordance with the principles of statutory interpretation. The primary rule of statutory interpretation is to ascertain the intent of the legislature from the language used, to give effect to that intent if possible, and to consider the words in their plain and ordinary meaning. Land-man v. Ice Cream Specialties, Inc., 107 S.W.3d 240, 251 (Mo. banc 2003). Statutory construction should not be hyper technical but instead should be reasonable, logical, and should give meaning to the statutes. Id.

In its first subsection, section 516.350 creates a presumption of payment of judgments, with certain exceptions:

1.Every judgment, order or decree of any court of record ..., except for any judgment, order, or decree awarding child support or maintenance or dividing pension, retirement, life insurance, or other employee benefits in connection with a dissolution of mamage, legal separation or annulment which mandates the making of payments over a period of time or payments in the future, shall be presumed to be paid and satisfied after the expiration of ten years from the date of the original rendition thereof, or if the same has been revived upon personal service duly had upon the defendant or defendants therein, then after ten years from and after such revival, or in case a payment has been made on such judgment, order or decree, and duly entered upon the record thereof, after the expiration of ten years from the last payment so made, and after the expiration of ten years from the date of the original rendition or revival upon personal service, or from the date of the last payment, such judgment shall be conclusively presumed to be paid....

(emphasis added). The next two subsections of 516.350 attempt to complete the scheme by providing the presumptions of payment applicable for the exceptions created in subsection 516.350.1:

2. In any judgment, order, or decree awarding child support or maintenance, each periodic payment shall be presumed paid and satisfied after the expiration of ten years from the date that periodic payment is due, unless the judgment has been otherwise revived as set out in subsection 1 of this section. This subsection shall take effect as to all such judgments, orders, or decrees which have not been presumed paid pursuant to subsection 1 of this section as of August 31,1982.
3. In any judgment, order, or decree dividing pension, retirement, life insurance, or other employee benefits in connection with a dissolution of marriage, legal separation or annulment, each periodic payment shall be presumed paid and satisfied after the expiration of ten years from the date that periodic payment is due, unless the judgment has been otherwise revived as set out in subsection 1 of this section. This sub[*68] section shall take effect as to all such judgments, orders, or decrees which have not been presumed paid pursuant to subsection 1 of this section as of August 28, 2001.

(emphasis added).

IV.

The decree at issue was rendered in connection with a dissolution of marriage, awarded maintenance, and “mandate[d] the making of payments over a period of time or payments in the future.” Sec. 516.350.1. [3] Mr. Boland’s obligation to “keep in full force and effect life insurance covering his life in the principal sum of not less than $50,000” was listed by the parties under the heading “Maintenance” in their separation agreement and in the decree. Accordingly, the explicit exception of section 516.350.1 applies.

Subsection 1 excepts “any judgment, order, or decree awarding child support or maintenance ... in connection with a dissolution of marriage, ... which mandates the making of payments over a period of time or payments in-the future” from the presumptive 10-year satisfaction period. In contrast, subsection 2 only applies to periodic payments, and it creates a new 10-year satisfaction period for “each periodic payment.” Neither subsection 1 nor 2 provides a presumption for future child support or maintenance payments that are not periodic.

y.

The requirement in the decree that Mr. Boland “shall keep in full force and effect life insurance covering his life” is clearly a continuing future obligation. Mr. Boland’s failure to comply with the agreement or the decree at any time from the date of the agreement until his death is irrelevant to determining the applicable presumption of payment. What is relevant is that, on the date of his death, he had no insurance policy and was noncompliant. His last opportunity to bring himself into compliance would have been the date of his death.

If this is treated as the failure to make a single payment due on that date, subsection 1 exempts such a payment from the 10-year presumption, subsection 2 does not create a substitute presumption, and the claim is not barred. Alternatively, if this is treated as the failure to make the last of a series of periodic payments, subsection 2 applies, 10 years has not run from the due date, and the claim is not barred. [4]

VI.

The judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded.

All concur.
1

. For a full discussion of issues related to this type of dispute, see Kelvin H. Dickinson, Divorce and Life Insurance: Post Mortem Remedies for Breach of a Duty to Maintain a Policy for a Designated Beneficiary, 61 Mo. L.Rev. 533 (1996).

2

. All further references to section 516.350 refer to RSMo Cum.Supp.2003.

3

. For purposes of statutory interpretation:

1. Whenever, in any statute, words importing the plural number are used in describing or referring to any matter, parties or persons, any single matter, party or person is included, although distributive words are not used.
2. When any subject matter, party or person is described or referred to by words importing the singular number or the masculine gender, several matters and persons, and females as well as males, and bodies corporate as well as individuals, are included.

Sec. 1.030, RSMo 2000. Thus, section 516.350.1 applies to “payment” or “payments” over a period of time or in the future.

4

. Because subsections 2 and 3 include an identical presumption of payment, it is unnecessary to determine whether the obligation falls within subsection 3 of section 516.350, which applies to “any judgment, order, or decree dividing pension, retirement, life insurance, or other employee benefits in connection with a dissolution of marriage.”