People v. Green, 497 N.E.2d 665 (NY 1986). · Go Syfert
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People v. Green, 497 N.E.2d 665 (NY 1986). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
48 citation events (32 in the last 25 years) across 7 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: de Blasio v. New York City Conflict of Interest Bd. (nysupctnewyork, 2025-01-13)
Treatment trajectory · 1986 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1986 2006 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 18 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (rule) de Blasio v. New York City Conflict of Interest Bd.
N.Y. Sup. Ct., New York Cty. · 2025 · confidence medium
See People v. Badji , 36 NY3d 393 , 404 (2021) (discussing rule of lenity's application to interpretation of ambiguous criminal statutes); People v. Green , 68 NY2d 151, 153 (1986) ("[I]f two constructions of a criminal statute are plausible, the one more favorable to the defendant should be adopted in accordance with the rule of lenity." (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). ( See generally Pet'r's Mem.) 4.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) de Blasio v. New York City Conflict of Interest Bd.
N.Y. Sup. Ct., New York Cty. · 2025 · confidence medium
See People v. Badji , 36 NY3d 393 , 404 (2021) (discussing rule of lenity's application to interpretation of ambiguous criminal statutes); People v. Green , 68 NY2d 151, 153 (1986) ("[I]f two constructions of a criminal statute are plausible, the one more favorable to the defendant should be adopted in accordance with the rule of lenity." (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). ( See generally Pet'r's Mem.) 4.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) de Blasio v. New York City Conflict of Interest Bd.
N.Y. Sup. Ct., New York Cty. · 2025 · confidence medium
See People v. Badji , 36 NY3d 393 , 404 (2021) (discussing rule of lenity's application to interpretation of ambiguous criminal statutes); People v. Green , 68 NY2d 151, 153 (1986) ("[I]f two constructions of a criminal statute are plausible, the one more favorable to the defendant should be adopted in accordance with the rule of lenity." (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). ( See generally Pet'r's Mem.) 4.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) The People v. Frederic Badji (2×)
NY · 2021 · confidence medium
Finally, defendant seeks to invoke the rule of lenity, asserting that, whenever there are two “plausible” readings of a criminal statute, a reading more favorable to the defendant - 13 - - 14 - No. 7 must be adopted (see People v Green, 68 NY2d 151, 153 [1986]).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. Roberts
NY · 2018 · confidence medium
However, because "assumes the identity" is the only language in the statute that could take account of the audience's reaction (the manager, the cashier, a credit card company, a loan officer), the majority's interpretation{**31 NY3d at 436} treats what should be reduced to attempted identity theft as a completed crime. [FN8] D. [*16]Fourth and finally, even were the majority's broad interpretation equally well-supported, the rule of lenity would require us to endorse the narrow reading that I suggest. "[I]f two constructions of a criminal statute are plausible, the one more favorable to the d…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) The People v. John Andujar (2×)
NY · 2017 · confidence medium
Regardless, while a criminal statute should be interpreted in defendant's favor where there are two plausible constructions, "the core question always remains legislative intent" (People v Ocasio, 28 NY3d 178, 184 [2016], quoting People v Green, 68 NY2d 151, 153 [1986]), and for the - 8 - - 9 - No. 91 Given the purpose of the legislation -- to reduce access inside motor vehicles to police radio signals -- it is irrelevant whether the device is mounted, lying on the seat, or in a defendant's pocket so long as the device is readily accessible for immediate use in the vehicle.5 If not, and in dir…
examined Cited as authority (rule) The People v. Alexis Ocasio (4×)
NY · 2016 · confidence medium
In our view, the foregoing leads to the conclusion that the only plausible interpretation of the term “billy” encompasses a collapsible metal baton (see People v Green, 68 NY2d 151, 153 [1986] [noting that, while the interpretation of a criminal statute that is more favorable to defendant should be adopted where there are two plausible constructions, “the core question always remains that of legislative intent”]).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. Aleynikov
N.Y. Sup. Ct. · 2015 · confidence medium
Under that rule: “[I]f two constructions of a criminal statute are plausible, the one more favorable to the defendant should be adopted” (People v Golb, 23 NY3d 455, 468 [2014], quoting People v Green, 68 NY2d 151, 153 [1986]).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. Golb
NY · 2014 · confidence medium
However, the definitions and wording of the statute and the legislative history indicate that the statute is intended to reach a person who accesses a computer system without permission (i.e., a hacker) and the language does not appear to encompass defendant’s conduct here. “[I]f two constructions of a criminal statute are plausible, the one more favorable to the defendant should be adopted in accordance with the rule of lenity” (People v Green, 68 NY2d 151, 153 [1986] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. Barden
N.Y. App. Div. · 2014 · confidence medium
On the other hand, “if two constructions of a criminal statute are plausible, the one more favorable to the defendant should be adopted in accordance with the rule of lenity” (P eople v Green, 68 NY2d 151, 153 [1986] [internal quotation marks omitted]).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. Barden
N.Y. App. Div. · 2014 · confidence medium
On the other hand, “if two constructions of a criminal statute are plausible, the one more favorable to the defendant should be adopted in accordance with the rule of lenity” (P eople v Green, 68 NY2d 151, 153 [1986] [internal quotation marks omitted]).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. Vidaurrazaga
N.Y. App. Div. · 2012 · confidence medium
Furthermore, interpreting Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1193 (1) (c) (iii) in such a manner is consistent with the “rule of lenity,” which provides that when a statute prescribing the punishment for a criminal offense is capable of more than one reasonable construction, the construction more favorable to defendants should be adopted (People v Green, 68 NY2d 151, 153 [1986] [internal quotation marks omitted]; see People v Jackson, 106 AD2d 93, 96 [1984]).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. Vidaurrazaga
N.Y. App. Div. · 2012 · confidence medium
Furthermore, interpreting Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1193 (1) (c) (iii) in such a manner is consistent with the “rule of lenity,” which provides that when a statute prescribing the punishment for a criminal offense is capable of more than one reasonable construction, the construction more favorable to defendants should be adopted (People v Green, 68 NY2d 151, 153 [1986] [internal quotation marks omitted]; see People v Jackson, 106 AD2d 93, 96 [1984]).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. Watford
nycountyct · 2012 · confidence medium
“The dramatic and comprehensive reforms proposed by this legislation, if fully enacted, would over time significantly reduce the number of New Yorkers abusing and addicted to controlled substances and the incidence of drug-related crimes.” {Id. at 6-7.) As held by the Court of Appeals, “if two constructions of a criminal statute are plausible, the one more favorable to the defendant should be adopted in accordance with the rule of lenity . . . the core question always remains that of legislative intent” (People v Green, 68 NY2d 151, 153 [1986], quoting People v Jackson, 106 AD2d 93, 96…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. LaPage
nycountyct · 2009 · confidence medium
(See discussion in Sash v Zenk, 439 F3d 61, 64 [2d Cir 2006]; Matter of Kimberly H., 196 AD2d 192, 195 [1994]; People v Green, 68 NY2d 151, 153 [1986]; People v Jackson, 106 AD2d 93, 96 [1984].) See also United States v Rodgers ( 466 US 475 [1984]), cited in Jackson , for the view that when asked to apply the rule of lenity the court should focus on its perception of legislative intent in the statutes under review.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. Hill
N.Y. App. Div. · 2007 · confidence medium
On this score, finally, the rule of lenity also counsels in favor of not construing Penal Law § 70.45 (2) as providing for such a default rule (see People v Green, 68 NY2d 151, 153 [1986]; Huddleston v United States, 415 US 814, 830-831 [1974]). 8 In short, the better conclusion is that no period of postrelease supervision is imposed by operation of law when a sentencing court does not specify a period upon sentencing a defendant for a violent felony offense pursuant to Penal Law § 70.02.
cited Cited as authority (rule) People v. Maldonado
N.Y. Sup. Ct. · 1997 · confidence medium
(People v Green, 68 NY2d 151, 153 [1986].) However, " 'the core question always remains that of legislative intent’ ”.
discussed Cited "see, e.g." People v. Danton
N.Y. Sup. Ct. · 2010 · signal: see also · confidence medium
See also People v Green, 68 NY2d 151, 153 (1986) (“the substantive power to prescribe . . . punishment for a criminal offense is exclusively legislative . . . and, if two constructions of a criminal statute are plausible, the one more favorable to the defendant should be adopted in accordance with the rule of lenity . . . .” [citation omitted]). .
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
The People of the State of New York, Respondent,
v.
Anton Green, Appellant
New York Court of Appeals.
Jul 8, 1986.
497 N.E.2d 665
APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL, David P. Friedman and Philip L. Weinstein for appellant., Mario Merola, District Attorney (Michael J. Eng of counsel), for respondent.
Wachtler and Judges Meyer, Simons, Kaye, Alexander, Titone and Hancock, Jr., Concur in Per Curiam Opinion.
Cited by 34 opinions  |  Published

OPINION OF THE COURT

Per Curiam.

At issue on this appeal is the minimum term of imprison[*152] ment that may be imposed on a persistent violent felony offender whose latest conviction is for a class E violent felony. We conclude that Criminal Term correctly set the minimum at two years.

Pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement, defendant pleaded guilty to attempted criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree, a class E felony, in complete satisfaction of an indictment which had charged actual possession of a .357 Magnum, and in exchange for a persistent violent felony offender sentence of two years to life imprisonment. Criminal Term noted, however, that the persistent violent felony offender statute was unclear as to whether a minimum of two years could be imposed and because of that lack of clarity, questioned whether a persistent violent felony offender sentence was legal. Since other Judges had similarly found the statutory language obscure (see, e.g., People v Graham, NYLJ, Dec. 18, 1981, p 7, col 1), Criminal Term urged clarification by the Appellate Division: "I would recommend the appeals bureau of the Legal Aid Society take an appeal so that they can have a definite ruling from the Appellate Division with respect to this most troublesome problem”.

Rather than provide the needed and requested guidance, however, the Appellate Division, First Department, simply affirmed, without opinion. Leave to appeal was granted by a Judge of this court.

Penal Law § 70.08, the statute under which the defendant was sentenced, authorizes persistent violent felony offender treatment where a defendant’s third conviction is for a class E felony. The statute defines a "persistent violent felony offender” as "a person who stands convicted of a violent felony offense as defined in subdivision one of section 70.02 after having previously been subjected to two or more predicate violent felony convictions” (Penal Law § 70.08 [1] [a]). Penal Law § 70.02, which enumerates the violent felony offenses, designates the crime of attempted criminal possession of a weapon as a class E violent felony offense (Penal Law § 70.02 [1] [d]X

A persistent violent felony offender must be sentenced to an indeterminate sentence having a maximum term of life imprisonment (Penal Law § 70.08 [2]). Although the statute sets forth minimum terms of imprisonment for defendants convicted of a class B, C, or D violent felony, it is silent as to the minimum term for a persistent violent felony offender convicted of a class E violent felony offense.

[*153] Defendant contends that there is thus a gap in the sentencing scheme, that the judiciary cannot fill the gap because it would usurp the legislative power to prescribe the punishment for crime, and that, therefore, he cannot be sentenced as a persistent violent felon. We disagree.

As observed in People v Jackson (106 AD2d 93, 96 [Titane, J. P.]), "[w]hile the substantive power to prescribe the punishment for a criminal offense is exclusively legislative * * * and, if two constructions of a criminal statute are plausible, the one more favorable to the defendant should be adopted in accordance with the rule of lenity * * * the core question always remains that of legislative intent”. Examination of that intent leaves no question that the sentence imposed was proper.

The second violent felony offender statute (Penal Law § 70.04) provides a mandatory maximum sentence of four years and a mandatory minimum sentence of two years for predicate felons convicted of a class E violent felony (Penal Law § 70.04 [3] [d]; [4]). The minimum set forth in Penal Law § 70.04 should logically apply to persistent offenders, as Criminal Term held. Any other construction would impede the legislative intent to permit enhanced sentencing for defendants who persist in committing serious crimes (see, People v Morse, 62 NY2d 205, 221).

Utilization of the minimum contained in Penal Law § 70.04 is plainly fair to defendants. Such a minimum sentence would be imposed if a defendant was sentenced as a second violent felony offender. * But a defendant is given fair warning that the maximum sentence for a persistent violent felony offender, that of life imprisonment, is to be found in Penal Law § 70.08.

Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division should be affirmed.

Chief Judge Wachtler and Judges Meyer, Simons, Kaye, Alexander, Titone and Hancock, Jr., concur in Per Curiam opinion.

On review of submissions pursuant to section 500.4 of the Rules of the Court of Appeals (22 NYCRR 500.4), order affirmed.

*

Indeed, defendant requests such a resentencing here, which would mean a sentence of two to four years’ imprisonment.