Gulf Oil Corp. & Tidewater Oil Co. v. Fed. Power Comm'n, 330 F.2d 824 (5th Cir. 1964). · Go Syfert
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Gulf Oil Corp. & Tidewater Oil Co. v. Fed. Power Comm'n, 330 F.2d 824 (5th Cir. 1964). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
“at common law an objection as to venue goes in abatement”
14 citation events (1 in the last 25 years) across 6 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Elfido Gonzalez Castillo v. Attorney General United States of America (ca3, 2024-07-24) · Strongest negative: Eastern Air Lines, Inc., and National Airlines, Inc. v. Civil Aeronautics Board (cadc, 1965-11-29)
Top citers, strongest first. 3 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited "but see" Eastern Air Lines, Inc., and National Airlines, Inc. v. Civil Aeronautics Board
D.C. Cir. · 1965 · signal: but see · confidence high
Without regard to the authority provided by 28 U.S.C. § 2112 , a court of appeals having venue may exercise an inherent discretionary power to transfer the proceeding to another circuit in the interest of justice and sound judicial administration, Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. FPC, 106 U.S.App.D.C. 281, 282 , 272 F.2d 510, 511 (1958); Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co. v. FPC, 337 F.2d 249, 252 (10th Cir. 1964); Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co. v. FPC, 343 F.2d 905, 909 (8th Cir. 1965); but see Gulf Oil Corp. v. FPC, 330 F.2d 824 (5th Cir. 1964).
discussed Cited as authority (verbatim quote) Elfido Gonzalez Castillo v. Attorney General United States of America
3rd Cir. · 2024 · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
at common law an objection as to venue goes in abatement
discussed Cited "see" Pan American World Airways, Inc., Trans World Airlines, Inc., American Airlines, Inc. v. Civil Aeronautics Board, World Airways, Inc., Intervenors
2d Cir. · 1967 · signal: see · confidence high
See Far East Conference v. Federal Maritime Comm’n, 119 U.S.App.D.C. 110 , 337 F.2d 146 , 148 n. 1 (1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 991 , 85 S.Ct. 704 , 13 L.Ed.2d 611 (1965). *775 Even assuming that this court has inherent discretionary power to transfer a case to another court of appeals in the interests of orderly judicial administration (but see Gulf Oil Corp. v. Federal Power Comm’n, 330 F.2d 824 (5th Cir. 1964)), we find nothing in the decided cases that would justify us in transferring this case to the District of Columbia Circuit.
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
GULF OIL CORPORATION and Tidewater Oil Company, Petitioners,
v.
FEDERAL POWER COMMISSION, Respondent
21151.
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.
Apr 15, 1964.
330 F.2d 824
Jesse P. Luton, Jr., Pittsburgh, Pa., John E. Thomason, Anthony G. Riddlesperger, J. Evans Attwell, William H. Drushel, Jr., Houston, Tex., for petitioners., Howard E. Wahrenbrock, Solicitor, F. P. C., Richard A. Solomon, Gen. Counsel, F. P. C., Washington, D. C., Kent H. Brown, Counsel, State of N. Y. Public Service Commission, Albany, N. Y., for respondent.
Tuttle, Rives, Wisdom.
Cited by 14 opinions  |  Published
PER CURIAM:

The petitioners express surprise that this Court did not write an opinion in granting the respondent’s motion to dismiss for want of proper venue, particularly in view of the Tenth Circuit’s recent decision in Texaco, Inc. v. F. P. C., 1963, 317 F.2d 796, 800-802. We gave careful consideration to the opinion[*825] in that case, but found ourselves in substantial agreement with the respondent’s argument, covering some twelve pages of its brief, in support of its position that the words “is located” in section 19 (b) of the Natural Gas Act [15 U.S.C.A. 717r.(b)] [1] have reference only to the state of incorporation. The Supreme Court had, on November 12, 1963, granted certiorari in the Texaco case. 375 U.S. 902, 84 S.Ct. 193, 11 L.Ed.2d 142. Anticipating the possibility that the Supreme Court might itself write on the question of venue, we refrained from writing an opinion. [2] It may be appropriate for us to state that, in the event the Supreme Court should approve the Tenth Circuit’s views on that question, we will give consideration to a second petition for rehearing in this case.

Petitioners further argue that, if venue does not exist in the Fifth Circuit, the petition should be transferred to a court with proper venue instead of being dismissed. There is no statutory authority for such transfer similar to the power vested in district courts by 28 U.S.C.A. § 1406(a). [3] The only case authority cited by petitioners to sustain their contention that a court has “inherent power” to transfer the petition to a court with proper venue is Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. Federal Power Commission, 1958, 106 U.S.App.D.C. 281, 272 F.2d 510. In that case venue could have been properly laid in either the Ninth Circuit, where the case was initiated, or in the District of Columbia Circuit, to which it was transferred. At common law an objection as to venue goes in abatement rather than in bar of the action. [4] If transfer is an appropriate remedy within the inherent power of a court, it is certain that among the many cases sustaining an objection as to venue there would be more direct decisions so holding. It is further persuasive that Congress provided statutory authority to the district courts by 28 U.S.C.A. § 1406 (a), n. 3, supra.

The petition for rehearing is

Denied.

1

. Under that section, venue of proceedings to review Commission orders may be laid in the court of appeals “ * * * for any circuit wherein the natural-gas company to which the order relates is located or has its principal place of business, or in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia [Circuit] * *

2

. We now note from the arguments before the Supreme Court, as reported in 32 L.W. 3338 and 3339, that the venue question was discussed in oral argument.

3

. “(a) The district court of a district in which is filed a case laying venue in the wrong division or district shall dismiss, or if it be in the interest of justice, transfer such case to any district or division in which it could have been brought.”

See Goldlawr, Inc. v. Heiman, 1962, 369 U.S. 463, 82 S.Ct. 913, 8 L.Ed.2d 39; 1 Moore’s Federal Practice (2d ed.) pp. 1902, 1903.

4

. See 92 C.J.S. Venue § 73.