A.G. Ex Rel. C.G. v. Paso Robles Jt. Unified Sch. Dist., 561 F. App'x 642 (9th Cir. 2014). · Go Syfert
A.G. Ex Rel. C.G. v. Paso Robles Jt. Unified Sch. Dist., 561 F. App'x 642 (9th Cir. 2014). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
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discussed Cited as authority (rule) Alberto Diaz v. Nissan North America, Inc.
C.D. Cal. · 2025 · confidence medium
Cal. Apr. 28, 2025) (“The Ninth 4 Circuit routinely considers civil penalties when deciding whether 5 the amount-in-controversy requirement has been satisfied, 6 including in Song-Beverly cases.” (citing Babasa v. LensCrafters, 7 Inc., 498 F.3d 972, 974 (9th Cir. 2007), & Morey v. Louis Vuitton 8 North Am., Inc., 561 F. App’x 642, 643 (9th Cir. 2011))).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Arlene Larios v. Nissan North America, Inc.
C.D. Cal. · 2025 · confidence medium
Cal. Apr. 28, 2025) (citing 19 Babasa v. LensCrafters, Inc., 498 F.3d 972, 974 (9th Cir. 2007); Morey v. Louis 20 Vuitton North Am., Inc., 561 F. App’x 642, 643 (9th Cir. 2011)).
cited Cited as authority (rule) R.B. v. DOWNINGTOWN AREA SCHOOL DISTRICT
E.D. Pa. · 2020 · confidence medium
Dist., 561 F. App’x 642, 644 (9th Cir. 2014) (“Although the IDEA requires ‘a statement of measurable annual goals,’ it does not requires [sic] a statement of quantifiable baselines.
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discussed Cited "see, e.g." Kristen Sadlon v. FCA US LLC
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See, e.g., 4 Babasa v. LensCrafters, Inc., 498 F.3d 972, 974 (9th Cir. 2007); see also Morey v. 5 Louis Vuitton North Am., Inc., 561 F. App’x 642, 643 (9th Cir. 2011) (including 6 Song-Beverly civil penalties in an amount-in-controversy calculation).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
A.G., a Minor by and Through His Parent and Guardian Ad Litem C.G., Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
PASO ROBLES JOINT UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT, Defendant-Appellee
12-56516.
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
Mar 12, 2014.
561 F. App'x 642
Andrea Moore Marcus, Law Offices of Andrea Marcus, Santa Barbara, CA, for Plaintiff-Appellant., Marsha A. Bedwell, General Counsel, Kroniek Moskovitz Tiedemann & Girard PC, Sacramento, CA, for Defendant-Ap-pellee.
Bybee, Bea, Ikuta.
Cited by 5 opinions  |  Unpublished  |  Civil

MEMORANDUM **

A.G., a minor with learning and developmental disabilities and behavioral problems, [1] and his parents (cumulatively, A.G.) filed this action challenging the education programs that the Paso Robles Joint Unified School District (school district) offered to A.G. Affirming an administrative law judge’s (ALJ) decision, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of the school district. A.G. appeals, arguing that the school district denied him a Fair and Appropriate Public Education (FAPE). Our review is de novo, M.L. v. Fed. Way Sch. Dist., 394 F.3d 634, 642 (9th Cir.2005), and we affirm. [2]

The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) and California law provide that disabled students shall receive a FAPE through Individualized Education Programs (IEP). 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400(d)(1)(A), 1414(d)(1)(A)(i)(I-IV); Cal. Educ.Code § 56000(a). Under the IDEA, a FAPE is guaranteed, in part, by certain procedural safeguards for the disabled child and his parents. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(a). However, “[procedural flaws in the IEP process do not always amount to the denial of a FAPE.” L.M. v. Capistrano Unified Sch. Dist., 556 F.3d 900, 909 (9th Cir.2009). Rather, once a court finds a procedural violation of the IDEA, it “must determine whether that violation affected the substantive rights of the parent or child.” Id.

First, A.G. argues that the June 2010 IEP meeting did not provide him a FAPE because a general education teacher did not attend the meeting.

We agree that a general education teacher should have attended the meeting because “TEP Team’ means a group of individuals” that includes “not less than 1 regular education teacher of such child (if the child is, or may be, participating in the regular education environment).” 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(B)(ii). Nevertheless, this error was harmless because the procedural violation did not “result [ ] in the loss of an educational opportunity, seriously infringe [] the parents’ opportunity to participate in the IEP formulation process or cause a deprivation of educational benefits.” J.L. v. Mercer Island Sch. Dist., 592 F.3d 938, 953 (9th Cir.2010).

[*644] Next, A.G. argues that the school district denied him a FAPE because it did not comply with sections 3001 and 8052 of Title 5 of the California Code of Regulations, which require local education agencies to conduct an functional analysis assessment (FAA) and provide a behavior intervention plan (BIP). We disagree.

A.G.’s claim fails because the FAA and BIP requirements apply only to students with severe behavior problems. Before July 1, 2013, [3] Cal.Code Regs. tit. 5 §§ 3001(ab) & (g), 3052(b), defined a serious behavior problem as a pervasive behavior that is “self-injurious, assaultive, or seriously damaging” to property that the student’s IEP has proven ineffective in treating. Here, A.G. does not have a serious behavior problem because he does not seriously damage property, and, more importantly, he does not pose a threat to himself or the safety of others. [4] Furthermore, A.G.’s IEPs were effective because he made progress toward his goals. Accordingly, the school district did not deny A.G. a FAPE by not conducting an FAA or developing a BIP.

Last, A.G. contends that his parents and the IEP team had no way of measuring his progress or determining whether he received a FAPE because the school district did not identify a measurable baseline of his abilities. For example, one IEP stated that A.G. has “some difficulty forming age appropriate sentences,” and another IEP stated that A.G. “often” shouted out off-topic answers without waiting for the teacher to call on him, but neither IEP defined “some” or “often.”

Although the IDEA requires “a statement of measurable annual goals,” 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(i)(II), it does not requires a statement of quantifiable baselines. Rather, the IDEA requires baselines to contain “a statement of the child’s present levels of academic achievement and functional performance.” Id. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(i)(I). Because A.G. has not demonstrated that the statements of his baseline achievement and performance levels were inaccurate, he has not carried his burden to demonstrate that the school district denied him a FAPE.

AFFIRMED.

**

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

1

. In March 2011, A.G. was diagnosed with autism.

2

. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

3

. Assembly Bill 86, which went into effect on July 1, 2013, repealed the FAA and BIP requirements. See Assem. Bill 86, 2013-2014 Reg. Sess. (Cal.2013); Cal. Educ.Code § 56523(a). However, the relevant conduct here occurred prior to July 1, 2013, when the FAA and BIP requirements remained in effect.

4

. We acknowledge the seriousness of the April 2010 suicide attempt incident, even though A.G.’s mother described it as a "misunderstanding.” Nevertheless, because this was a single occurrence, it is not evidence of a pervasive behavior issue. Further, the incident was not a serious behavior problem under California law because there is no evidence that A.G.’s IEPs could not effectively remedy the situation.