v.
State
Cite as 2014 Ark. App. 244
ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS DIVISION IV No. CR-13-772
Opinion Delivered April 23, 2014
APPEAL FROM THE SEBASTIAN TRACY G. COLLIER COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT, APPELLANT FORT SMITH DISTRICT [NO. CR-2012-597(b)] V. HONORABLE J. MICHAEL FITZHUGH, JUDGE STATE OF ARKANSAS APPELLEE AFFIRMED
ROBIN F. WYNNE, Judge Tracy Collier appeals from his conviction for possession of drug paraphernalia under Arkansas Code Annotated section 5-64-443(b) (Supp. 2013).1 On appeal, he challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction. We affirm. Collier was tried by a Sebastian County jury in July 2013. The evidence at trial included the following. On May 3, 2012, Corporal Randy Patterson of the Fort Smith Police Department responded to a report of people burning something during a burn ban, and possibly stripping copper. When Patterson arrived, Collier and his girlfriend, Clara Cite as 2014 Ark. App. 244 bring them back. Detective Darrell Craghead testified that he interviewed Collier later that day at the jail. Collier stated that he and Ms. Gilley had been together since November (roughly seven months); that she was the one who knew how to cook methamphetamine; that he had watched her cook methamphetamine at that location approximately three or four times; that she had taught him to strip lithium batteries; and that he had done so on one occasion but did not care for it because it made him nervous.
[*2]At the close of the evidence, appellant made a motion for a directed verdict, arguing that Clara Gilley was the one who was intent on making methamphetamine. The court denied the motion. Collier was found guilty of possession of drug paraphernalia and sentenced as a habitual offender to eighteen years in the Arkansas Department of Correction. He filed a timely notice of appeal on August 5, 2013.
On appeal, Collier argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction. Specifically, he argues that his girlfriend was the owner of the property, while he was merely present at the scene, and that there was “no evidence presented to show [that he] exercised dominion and control over the contraband.”
We treat a motion for a directed verdict as a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence. Coggin v. State, 356 Ark. 424, 431, 156 S.W.3d 712, 716 (2004). Our supreme court has repeatedly held that in reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we view the evidence in a light most favorable to the State and consider only the evidence that supports the verdict. See id. We affirm a conviction if substantial evidence exists to support it. Id. Substantial evidence is that which is of sufficient force and character that it will, with Cite as 2014 Ark. App. 244 reasonable certainty, compel a conclusion one way or the other, without resorting to speculation or conjecture. Id.
[*3]Regarding the issue of possession, our supreme court has written:
It is not necessary for the State to prove that an accused physically held the contraband, as possession of contraband can be proven by constructive possession, which is the control or right to control the contraband. Constructive possession can be implied where the contraband is found in a place immediately and exclusively accessible to the defendant and subject to his control. Where there is joint occupancy of the premises where contraband is found, some additional factors must be present linking the accused to the contraband. Those additional factors include (1) that the accused exercised care, control, or management over the contraband; and (2) that the accused knew the matter possessed was contraband. This control and knowledge can be inferred from the circumstances, such as the proximity of the contraband to the accused, the fact that it is in plain view, and the ownership of the property where the contraband is found. In addition, an accused’s suspicious behavior coupled with proximity to the contraband is clearly indicative of possession. Loggins v. State, 2010 Ark. 414, at 4–5, 372 S.W.3d 785, 789–90 (internal citations omitted). Here, additional factors linked Collier to the drug paraphernalia. He was present at the scene where the drug paraphernalia was in plain view. Furthermore, he admitted to being aware of what was going on and in fact admitted that he planned to help with the manufacture of methamphetamine by getting lithium batteries. Under these circumstances, we hold that the evidence was sufficient to support Collier’s conviction for possession of drug paraphernalia.
Affirmed.
WHITEAKER and VAUGHT, JJ., agree.
David L. Dunagin, for appellant.
Dustin McDaniel, Att’y Gen., by: Kathryn Henry, Ass’t Att’y Gen., for appellee.
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