have allowed him to "argue for [c]ancellation of Hemoval and avoid deportation."2 We disagree. ^[3] When reviewing the district court's resolution of an ineffective-assistance claim, we give deference to the court's factual findings if they are supported by substantial evidence and not clearly wrong but review the court's application of the law to those facts de novo. Lader v. Warden, 121 Nev. 682, 686, 120 P.3d 1164, 1166 (2005). Here, the district court conducted a hearing, heard arguments from counsel, and determined that Sierra's former counsel was not deficient and he failed to demonstrate prejudice. See Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58-59 (1985); Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88, 694 (1984); Kirksey v. State, 112 Nev. 980, 987-88, 923 P.2d 1102, 1107 (1996); see also Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. „ 131 S. Ct. 1388, 1408 (2011) ("We have recently reiterated that [s]urmounting Strickland's high bar is never an easy task." (quotation marks omitted) (alteration in original)). The district court also determined that "an evidentiary hearing was not necessary."

2This court has recognized that an ineffective assistance of counsel claim will lie only where the defendant has a constitutional or statutory right to the appointment of counsel. See McKague v. Warden, 112 Nev. 159, 164-65, 912 P.2d 255, 258 (1996). The district court did not address the matter but apparently conceded that Sierra was entitled to the effective assistance of counsel at the hearing in question and reviewed his claims on the merits. See Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 790 (1973).

(01 I94Th

See NRS 34.770(1); Nika v. State, 124 Nev. 1272, 1300-01, 198 P.3d 839, 858 (2008). We conclude that the district court's findings are supported by substantial evidence, see Riley v. State, 110 Nev. 638, 647, 878 P.2d 272, 278 (1994), and the district court did not err by rejecting Sierra's ineffective-assistance claim. Accordingly, we ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED. 4 (0) 1947A