The Pure Oil Co. v. C. J. Boyne, Brent Towing Co., Inc. v. The Pure Oil Co., Brent Towing Co., Inc., Etc. v. C. J. Boyne, D/B/A Caribbean Towing Co., Etc., 370 F.2d 121 (5th Cir. 1966). · Go Syfert
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The Pure Oil Co. v. C. J. Boyne, Brent Towing Co., Inc. v. The Pure Oil Co., Brent Towing Co., Inc., Etc. v. C. J. Boyne, D/B/A Caribbean Towing Co., Etc., 370 F.2d 121 (5th Cir. 1966). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
33 citation events (6 in the last 25 years) across 18 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Whitechurch v. Mulkey (alnd, 2025-02-04)
Treatment trajectory · 1966 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1966 1996 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 10 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Whitechurch v. Mulkey
N.D. Ala. · 2025 · confidence medium
Bank, 904 F.2d 627, 630 (11th Cir. 1990) (specifying that although the minute entry of a jury verdict is not a final judgment, the court’s entry of judgment is) (citing Pure Oil Co. v. Boyne, 370 F.2d 121, 122-23 (5th Cir. 1966)).
cited Cited as authority (rule) National Casualty Company v. Georgia School Board Association-Risk Management Fund
11th Cir. · 2022 · confidence medium
“Courts render judgments; clerks only enter them on court records.” Pure Oil Co. v. Boyne, 370 F.2d 121, 123 (5th Cir. 1966) (quoting Burke v. Comm’r, 301 F.2d 903, 903 (1st Cir. 1962)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In Re Application of Mgndichian
C.D. Cal. · 2003 · confidence medium
Therefore, it cannot be said that “nothing was done by the court ... which can be said to constitute entry of judgment.” Wood, supra, 779 F.2d at 1442 (quoting Pure Oil Co. v. Boyne, 370 F.2d 121, 122-23 (5th Cir.1966)). 4 Accordingly, the court finds that Judge Hupp’s order constituted a final judgment for purposes of the instant motion. 5 b.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Ellison v. Conoco, Inc.
5th Cir. · 1992 · confidence medium
We held that in these circumstances “[t]he minute entry of the clerk dated July 14, 1987, did not constitute a ‘final decision’ ” under section 1291, relying on language in Pure Oil Co. v. Boyne, 370 F.2d 121, 123 (5th Cir.1966), that “ ‘[e]ven prior to the added requirement of Rule 58’ ” a clerk’s “ ‘minute entry alone could not stand as a final judgment of the district court.’ ” Jones, at 275.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Brian Lee Ellison, Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., Intervenor-Appellant v. Conoco, Inc., Defendant-Appellee-Appellant v. Associated Oilfield Services, Inc.
5th Cir. · 1992 · confidence medium
We held that in these circumstances "[t]he minute entry of the clerk dated July 14, 1987, did not constitute a 'final decision' " under section 1291, relying on language in Pure Oil Co. v. Boyne, 370 F.2d 121, 123 (5th Cir.1966), that " '[e]ven prior to the added requirement of Rule 58' " a clerk's " 'minute entry alone could not stand as a final judgment of the district court.' " Jones, at 275.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Kohn v. Royall, Koegel & Wells
2d Cir. · 1974 · confidence medium
KAUFMAN, Chief Judge: Whether an order granting or denying class action status is an appealable “final” order, 28 U.S.C. § 1291 , is a question that has received an inordinate amount of scrutiny by circuit courts, 1 and may, we hope, soon be resolved with some measure of certainty by the Supreme Court. 2 Although such orders are interlocutory in nature, we have sustained the appealability of those denying confirmation of the class where that denial, because of the relatively small amount of the individual claim, would for all practical purposes be the “death knell of the action.” Eise…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) 7 Fair empl.prac.cas. 994, 7 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 9337 Margaret Kohn, Individually and on Behalf of All Persons Similarly Situated v. Royall, Koegel & Wells
2d Cir. · 1974 · confidence medium
KAUFMAN, Chief Judge: 1 Whether an order granting or denying class action status is an appealable 'final' order, 28 U.S.C. 1291, is a question that has received an inordinate amount of scrutiny by circuit courts, 1 and may, we hope, soon be resolved with some measure of certainty by the Supreme Court. 2 Although such orders are interlocutory in nature, we have sustained the appealability of those denying confirmation of the class where that denial, because of the relatively small amount of the individual claim, would for all practical purposes be the 'death knell of the action.' Eisen I, supra…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin
unknown court · 1968 · confidence medium
While this court has determined that dismissal of the class action “will for all practical purposes terminate the litigation,” 370 F.2d at 121, Rule 23 does not require or contemplate that courts will hear causes of action as class actions merely because they will not get to hear the case any other way.
discussed Cited "see" Waseem Daker v. Patrick Head
11th Cir. · 2025 · signal: see · confidence high
See Pure Oil Co. v. Boyne, 370 F.2d 121, 122 (5th Cir. 1966) (holding that the court clerk’s role is ministerial and that “[c]ourts render judgments; clerks only enter them on court records”).
discussed Cited "see" Sarah Formby v. Farmers and Merchants Bank
11th Cir. · 1990 · signal: see · confidence high
See Pure Oil Co. v. Boyne, 370 F.2d 121, 122-23 (5th Cir.1966). 2 See also Jones v. Celotex Corp., 857 F.2d 273, 275 (5th Cir.1988); Wood v. Coast Frame Supply, 779 F.2d 1441, 1442-43 (9th Cir.), as amended, 791 F.2d 802 (9th Cir.1986).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
The Pure Oil Company
v.
C. J. Boyne, Brent Towing Company, Inc. v. The Pure Oil Company, Brent Towing Company, Inc., Etc. v. C. J. Boyne, D/B/A Caribbean Towing Co., Etc.
22583_1.
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.
Dec 6, 1966.
370 F.2d 121
Cited by 2 opinions  |  Published

370 F.2d 121

The PURE OIL COMPANY, Appellant,
v.
C. J. BOYNE et al., Appellees.
BRENT TOWING COMPANY, Inc., Appellant,
v.
The PURE OIL COMPANY, Appellee.
BRENT TOWING COMPANY, Inc., Claimant, etc., Appellant,
v.
C. J. BOYNE et al., d/b/a Caribbean Towing Co., Claimants, etc., Appellees.

No. 22522.

No. 22583.

United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit.

December 6, 1966.

H. Barton Williams, Deutsch, Kerrigan & Stiles, New Orleans, La., for Pure Oil Co., W. Gerald Gaudet, New Orleans, La., of counsel.

J. Y. Gilmore, Jr., Faris, Ellis, Cutrone, Gilmore & Lautenschlaeger, New Orleans, La., for C. J. Boyne and others.

George A. Frilot, III, Lemle & Kelleher, Eldon T. Harvey, III, New Orleans, La., for Brent Towing Co., Inc.

Before THORNBERRY and COLEMAN, Circuit Judges, and YOUNG, District Judge.

THORNBERRY, Circuit Judge.

[*~121]1

This litigation arose out of a barge collision which caused the loss of gasoline owned by Pure Oil Company worth $8,900. A barge towed by a tug owned and operated by Caribbean Towing Co. rammed the barge carrying gasoline and towed by the m/v Diana Brent, a tug of the Brent Towing Co. Pure Oil instituted a libel action against Caribbean, which in turn impleaded Brent under Admiralty Rule 56. Thereafter, Brent filed a cross-libel against Pure Oil. The entire matter was tried before the court on June 14 and 15, 1964. On November 3, 1964, the court filed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law to the effect that there was negligence in the operation of both tugs and that damages should be equally divided. However, the court, construing the contractual relationship existing between the various parties involved in the shipment, concluded that Brent was entitled to be relieved of responsibility for its one-half share of the cargo damage. Therefore, Pure Oil could recover only one-half of its damages, those assessed to Caribbean.

2

Motions by Pure Oil for rehearing and to amend the court's findings were denied in open court on December 18, 1964, such denial being noted by the clerk with a minute entry in the court docket. On February 3, 1965, Pure Oil filed a notice of appeal from the December 18 action of the court. On February 11, the court entered a formal decree embodying the minute entry of December 18. Brent appealed from this formal decree on April 22 and Caribbean filed cross-assignments of error on April 29.

3

Pure Oil seeks dismissal of the appeals of Brent and Caribbean, arguing that the December 18 minute entry, not the February 11 formal decree, was final judgment for purposes of appeal. We disagree. 28 U.S.C. § 2107 allows appeal within 90 days from entry of final judgment in admiralty cases. However, neither Section 2107 nor the Admiralty Rules seeks to set out the requirements of an appealable final judgment or order. Logic and common sense require that the law as to what constitutes "final judgment" for purposes of appeal be uniform in all types of civil litigation. Although the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were not applicable as such to suits in admiralty prior to July 1, 1966,[1] when a matter was not expressly covered by the Admiralty Rules it was not uncommon for a federal court sitting in admiralty to apply by analogy the requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the cases which interpret those requirements. See, e. g., Papanikolaou v. Atlantic Freighters, Ltd., 4th Cir. 1956, 232 F.2d 663; United States v. Cia Luz Stearica, 9th Cir. 1950, 181 F.2d 695. Indeed, the Rules of this Circuit may be viewed as lending support to this practice. See Fifth Circuit Rules 12, 16.

4

Since July 1, 1963, Rule 58, Fed.R. Civ.P. has required that "[e]very judgment shall be set forth on a separate document." All of the cases cited by Pure Oil in support of its motion to dismiss were decided prior to this addition to Rule 58. Indeed, several of those cases indicate that their rationale would have differed had the rules required entry of a judgment on a separate document. United States v. F & M Schaefer Brewing Co., 1958, 356 U.S. 227, 232, 78 S.Ct. 674, 677, 2 L.Ed.2d 721; Associated Press v. Taft-Ingalls Corp., 6th Cir. 1963, 323 F.2d 114, 115.[2]

5

Clearly, nothing was done by the court on December 18 which can be said to constitute entry of judgment. The only act on the part of the court was oral, and the only written evidence of such action was the minute entry of the clerk. Even prior to the added requirement of Rule 58, this minute entry alone could not stand as a final judgment of the district court. "Courts render judgments; clerks only enter them on court records." Burke v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 1st Cir. 1962, 301 F.2d 903. The only document which can constitute final judgment for purposes of appeal is the formal decree of February 11, 1965. Consequently, the appeals of Brent and Caribbean were timely filed.

[*~122]6

After careful consideration of the appeals of all parties on the merits, we are unable to find that the district court was clearly erroneous in its findings of fact. Furthermore, agreeing with the district court's application of the law in its excellent memorandum opinion, Pure Oil Co. v. M/V Carribbean, D.C., 235 F.Supp. 299, we affirm.

Notes:

1

Rule 81(a) (1), Fed.R.Civ.P. E. g., Firemen's Fund Ins. Co. v. Standard Oil Co., 9th Cir. 1964, 339 F.2d 148; Theodorakis v. Xilas, 4th Cir. 1952, 200 F.2d 107. This suit was begun prior to July 1, 1966, and thus new Rule 1, Fed.R.Civ.P. (which expressly provides that these rules shall govern suits in admiralty) is not applicable

2

The effect of new Rule 58 upon the cases cited by Pure Oil is made clear by the Notes of the Advisory Committee on the Rules which accompany the amended rule. 28 U.S.C.A. at 157 (Cum.Supp. 1965)