³ Pa. Const. Art. !, § 1.

⁴ One such amendment had already occurred. See fn. I, above.

⁸ Even if there was an irreconcilable difference with Megan's Law IV, the Juvenile Act would be superseded since the later-enacted statute takes priority. . · 9 Claim Five partly relies on whether Megan's Law IV constitutes punishment. However, we do not rule on this issue as it is not necessary to our disposition on this claim. · The Petitioners claim that Megan's Law IV creates an irrebuttable presumption that violates due process (Claim Two). Furthermore, the Petitioners claim that Megan's Law IV infringes on their right to reputation without substantive due process (Claim Four). These issues are interrelated. The Petitioners' right to reputation receives the highest level of judicial scrutiny and will be analyzed first. · Building from that analysis, .we will briefly discuss the Petitioners' irrebuttable presumption claim. . Duly enacted legislation carries with it a strong presumption of constitutionality, Com. v. Swinehart, 664 A.2d 957, 961 (Pa. 1995). The presumption of constitutionality will not be overcome unless the legislation is clearly, palpably, and plainly in violation of the . constitution. Id. A party may contest the constitutionality of a statute on its face or as-applied. Com. v. Brown, 26 A.3d 485, 493 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2011). A facial attack tests a law's constitutionality based on its text alone and does not consider 'the facts or circumstances of a particular case. An as-applied attack, in contrast, does not contend that a law is unconstitutional· as written but that its application to a particular person under particular circumstances deprived that person.of a constitutional right. · Id. citing U:S. v. Marcavage, 609 F.3d 264, 273 (3d Cir. 2010). · "The touchstone of due process is protection of the individual against arbitrary action of'the government." Wolffv. McDonneU, 418 U.S. 539, 558 (1974). All men are born equally free and independent, and have certain inherent and . indefeasible rights, among which are those of enjoying and defending life and · liberty, of acquiring, possessing and protecting property and reputation, and of pursuing their own happiness. . Pa. Const. Art. I, § 1. All courts shall be open; and every man for an injury done him in his lands, goods, person or reputation shall have remedy by due course oflaw, and right and justice administered without sale, denial or delay. Suits may be brought against the Commonwealth in such manner, in such courts and in such cases as the Legislature may by law direct. · Pa. Const. Art. I, § 11. '"Character' and 'reputation' are not synonymous terms. The former is what a man is, the latter is what he is supposed to be." Hopkins v. Tate, 99A. 210, 212 (Pa. 1916) ( discussing the Rules of Evidence). Regarding reputation and character: A man may, with or without his fault, have a bad reputation for honesty in the . neighborhood in which he then resides; but removing therefrom he may, after · living in another and distant place for several years and leading an honest and upright life, acquire a good reputation in the latter community. His character may not undergo a change, but bis reputation in the two places is not the same. Hopkins, 99 A. at 212. . . Under the y.s. Constitution, reputation is not an interest which, standing alone, is sufficient to invoke the procedural protections of the Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause. Paul v. Davis. 424 U.S. 693 (1976); see also Com. v. Maldonado, 838 A.2d 710, 714 (Pa. 2003) (Megan's Law case, noting that reputation is not sufficient to trigger due process under Paul v. Davis); Com. v. Mountain, 711 A.2d 473, 478 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1998) (also citing Paulv. Davis and stating that reputation alone is insufficient to trigger due process claims). However, under the Pennsylvania Constitution, reputation is "a fundamental interest which cannot be abridged without compliance with constitutional standards of due process and equal protection." R. v. Com., Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 636 A.2d 142, 149 (Pa. 1994) citing Hatchard v. Westinghouse Broadcasting Co., 532 A.2d 346, 350 (Pa. 1987). Pennsylvania's Constitution requires the same due process analysis as the Federal Constitution. Pennsylvania Game Comm'n v. Marich, 666 A.2d 253, 255 fn, 6 (Pa. 1995). Like the due process clause in the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution, Article I · Section 1 of the Pennsylvania Constitution guarantees certain inalienable rights. Nixon v. Com., 839 A.2d 277, 286 (Pa. 2003). "While the General Assembly may, under its police power, limit those rights by enacting laws to protect the public health, safety, and welfare, any such laws are subject to judicial review and a constitutional analysis." Nixon, 839 A.2d at 286 (citations omitted). "The constitutional analysis applied to the laws that impede upon these inalienable. rights is a means-end review, legally referred to as a substantive due process analysis." Id. "Under that analysis, courts must weigh the rights infringed upon by the law against the interest . . sought to be achieved by it, and also scrutinize the relationship between the law (the means) and that interest (the end)." Id. at 286-87. Where an infringed right is considered fundamental, the means-end review is known as the 'strict scrutiny' test. Nixon, 839 A.2d at 287. A law may only satisfy strict scrutiny if it is narrowly tailored to a compelling state interest. Id. Because reputation is a fundamental right, infringements of reputation undergo strict scrutiny. Pennsylvania Bar Ass1n v. Com., 607 A.2d 850, 858 (Pa. Cmwlth. Ct. 1992). The existence of government records containing information that might subject a party to negative stigmatization is a threat to that party's reputation. Pennsylvania Bar Ass'n v. Com., 607 A.2d 850, 853 (Pa. Cmwlth. Ct. 1992) citing Wolfe v. Beal, 384 A.2d 1187, 1189 (Pa. 1978). An infringement on the right.to reputation necessarily implies that the stakeholder will have a remedy. Carlacci v. Mazaleski, 798 A.2d 186, 190 fn. 9 (Pa. 2002) ("Where. there is a right, there is a remedy"). For example, due process required a cause of action to stand for petitioners to pursue expungement of certain records, even where no statutory right to expungement existed. Carlacci v. Mazaleski, 798 A.2d 186, 190 (Pa. 2002) (PF A hearing); Wolfe v. Beal, 384 A.2d 1187, 1189 (Pa. 1978) (involuntary commitment); but see Com. v. Charnik, 921 A.2d 1214, 1220 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2007) (records of convictions and PFA hearings resulting in a finding of abuse do not require additional due process protections). In Pennsylvania Bar Ass'n v. Com., the Commonwealth Court applied strict scrutiny to examine reputational'harm done to certain attorneys. Pennsylvania Bar Ass'n v. Com., 607 A.2d 850, 857 (Pa. Crnwlth, Ct. 1992). In that case, the General Assembly had enacted legislation in an attempt to reduce the factors that contribute to higher vehicle insurance costs for consumers. Id. at 852. Part of this initiative included the establishment of a "Motor Vehicle Fraud Index Bureau" where insurers would submit all "suspected fraudulent claims" for listing in the Index. Id. The Index listed both the name of the claimant and the claimant's · attorney. Id. ·The Index was then disseminated to law enforcement officers, member-insurers, the Insurance Department, and similar fraud index bureaus. Id. at 853. The Pennsylvania Bar Association petitioned the Court for declaratory and injunctive relief, arguing that the law violated procedural and substantive due process in denying the attorneys their fundamental right to reputation. Id. The Commonwealth Court agreed. Id. at 857-58. In examining substantive due process, the Court applied the strict scrutiny test and noted that "while. some attorneys reported to the Index Bureau might actually be involved in submitting fraudulent claims, all of the attorneys reported will suffer an injury to their ri~t to protect their reputations without benefit of due process." Id. at 858. Furthermore, the Commonwealth "[made] no argument whichjustifie[d] the broad sweep of the attorney reporting requirements." Id. Consequently, the Court held that "the requirement that attorney names be reported on the basis of an undefined suspicion [ was J unconstitutional as a violation of substantive due process." Pennsylvania Bar Ass'n, 607 A.2d at 858.10. · Even employing the rational basis test, the Court has sometimes held that a conviction-based presuinption is unconstitutional. In Johnson v. Allegheny Intennediate Unit, the Commonwealth Court applied rational basis review to a disqualification from employmen~ based upon a criminal conviction. Johnson v. Allegheny Intermediate Unit, 59 A.3d _IO (Pa. Cmwlth, Ct. 2012). In that case, petitioner Johnson began employment for the Allegheny · Intermediate Unit in 2004. Id. at 13-1,5. ·Johnson was trained as a "Fatherhood Facilitator" and counseled juvenile fathers about child development and their role in child development. Id. In 2011, the General Assembly passed a law banning employment with school children for any person convicted of felony homicide. Id. As it tum~d out, the petitioner had been convicted of voluntary manslaughter twenty-eight years before. Id. The petitioner was fired in accordance with the law and subsequently he brought suit, arguing that the lifetime ban violated his due process rights. Id. at 15-16. As the law did not infringe on a fundamental right, the Court employed the rational basis test. Id. at_ 21. · Allegheny argued that the purpose of the law was to. regulate employment so that there would be a safe school environment for children. Id. at 22. However, Johnson's work was exemplary and Allegheny admitted that Johnson would not have been fired but for the law. Id. at 24-25. The Court considered the nature of the offending conduct and its remoteness in time; such circumstances "must be considered where an agency a seeks to revoke a professional license on the basis of conviction." Id. at 24. Considering the ' facts, the Court concluded "[because the law] creates a lifetime ban for a homicide offense that has no temporal proximity to Johnson's present ability to perform the duties of his position, and it JO The Court also examined procedural due process and likewise found that the law was unconstitutional. Pennsylvania Bar Ass'n. 607 A.2d at 857. The Court noted that there was no notice to the attorneys or opportunity for them to raise objections to the listing. Id. does not bear a real and substantial relationship to the Commonwealth's interest in protecting children, it is unreasonable, unduly oppressive and patently beyond the necessities of the . · offense." Id. at 25. Considering Johnson's diminishing risk over time as well as Johnson's actual and current danger to children, the lifetime ban on employment was not rationally related to a legitimate government interest. See id. (considering the facts and holding law unconstitutional). For Megan's Law, the Courts have already considered various due process claims, . including challenges to the sent~ncing enhancement provisions included in the statute. Compare Com . v. G. Williams, 832 A.2d 962, 986 (Pa. 2003) (striking down Megan's Law II sentence increase when it triggered after judge's finding that offender was a sexually violent predator) with Com. v. Killinger, 888 A.2d 592, 596-97 (Pa. 2005) (upholding Megan's Law II sentence increase when it only triggered after a criminal conviction afforded the protection of a jury trial). Harm to RieJ!)lufation Here, we must first determine whether the protections of due process trigger, i.e. whether the Petitioners suffer any harm to their reputations because of Megan's Law IY Focusing entirely on the trigger for strict scrutiny, the Commonwealth argues that Megan's Law IV does not harm a juvenile offender's reputation. Specifically, the statute employs language similar to common vocabulary and calls juveniles nothing worse than what their actions warrant. All registrable juveniles have been found delinquent of Rape, I.D,.S.L, Aggravated Indecent Assault, or an attempt, solicitation, or conspiracy to commit one of these crimes. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9799 .12 {defining 'juvenile offender'). One who rapes is a rapist, as the Commonwealth says, and being called a rapist is no more stigmatizing than being called a sexual offender. Furthermore, since registration is premised on what the juveniles have actually done, any l!'eputation~l harm is not the fault of the Commonwealth; thus, the Petitioners' right to reputation has not been threatened by Megan's Law IV. After careful consideration, we disagree. The Commonwealth essentially tells us that a juvenile offender has already . damaged his reputation by his own acts and the state should not be held accountable for its publication of these acts in pursuit of protecting· the community. While this argument has some persuasive force, Megan's Law IV goes too far. The primary focus of our inquiry will be the harm to reputation, but we must keep in mind the practical reasons that our commonwealth's constitution protects that reputation'. The. Juveniles will almost certainly be shunned wherever their registration is known. Presence on a sexual offender registry may impose limits on the Juveniles ability to obtain housing. [Juvs.' Exh. F, Letter of Ineligibility from Johnstown Housing Authority.] Schools may refuse to admit them. Businesses may refuse to employ them. At this point the precise effects of the law are . unknown, but its negative consequences are highly likely. Thus, while the Juveniles are not directly banned from a certain activity as per the plaintiff in Johnson, the informational effects of Megan's Law IV are likely to be similar, broader, and more severe. Recognizing this, we consider what Megan's Law IV says about the Juveniles. The term 'sexual offender' does not simply imply that the juvenile was adjudicated delinquent. Megan's Law IV, like prior versions, contains a section.outlining the legislature's findings which .state that 'sexual offenders' "pose a high risk of committing additional sexual offenses." 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9799.1 l(a)(4). To accomplish its legislative goal, Megan's Law IV requires registration for someone adjudicated delinquent of a certain sexual offense. The law then designates the juvenile delinquent a 'sexual offender,' 11 i.e. someone at a high risk for re-offense, and disseminates this information to various entities, 12 Megan's Law is essentially a state-endorsed reputation rating. The premise that the 'sexual offender' is at a 'high risk of re-offense' is essential to the statute's purpose. The dissemination of information about these dangerous individuals is intended to allow government entities and communities to prepare for them. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9799. l l(a)(6)-(8) (discussing same). Furthermore, that a juvenile who has been adjudicated delinquent of a certain crime is at a "high risk of re-offense" is more than you could reasonably infer based on the adjudication alone. The Commonwealth cites federal precedent in response. Considering Connecticut's Megan's Law statute, the U.S. Supreme Court has held that due process did not require a hearing to determine if the adult registrants were "currently dangerous." Connecticut Dep1t of Pub. Safety v: Doe, 538 U.S. 1, 4 (2003). Rather than creating a broad rule for due process in Megan's Law cases, the Court's holding was limited to the particular statute. The precise holding was that due process "does not require the opportunity to prove a fact that is not material to the State's statutory scheme.". Id. Since the adult registrant's current dangerousness 11 a An adult registrant is designated as a 'sexual offender,' while juvenile registrant is both a 'juvenile offender' and a 'sexual offender.' See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9799.12 (defining sexual offender as "[a]n individual required to register under this subchapter"). · 12 Megan's Law IV provides that the Pennsylvania State Police shall make a sexual offender's information available to the following state, federal, and local entities: : !) a "jurisdiction" such as a state, where the offender: e . is required to register; or Ill has terminated his residence, employment or enrollment as a student 2) the United States Attorney General, theDepartment of Justice, and theUnited States Marshals Service, 3) the county's district attorney, the county's chief probation officer, and the municipalities' chieflaw enforcement officer; wherever the registrant: e establishes or terminates a residence, or is a transient; or 0 commences or terminates employment; or a enrolls or terminates enrollment as a student 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9799.18(a). Furthermore, the federal authorities will include the registrant's infonnation-"in the National Sex Offender Registry, NCIC and any other database established by such Federal agencies." 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9799.18(a)(3); see also 42 U.S.C.A. § 16919 (establishing National Sex Offender Registry) -, was immaterial to Connecticut's statute, no hearing was required. Id. However, the instant case is distinguishable. Similar to Connecticut' s statute, Pennsylvania registration is triggered by certain adjudications. However, Pennsylvania's statute makes clear that registration follows from these adjudications because the registrant is currently dangerous. Even if Megan's Law registration was only concerned with promulgating adjudication information, our State's enhanced protection for reputation has unique implications for· due process in these circumstances. Here, the reputation interests at stake are the actual focus of Megan's Law IV. The law is intended to reduce the juvenile's reputation in the eyes of the public in order to ensure protection. Our State's enhanced protection ofreputation requires limits on any interpretation which blurs the line between adjudications and more fact-based inferences about those adjudications. For these reasons, we find Connecticut Dep't of Pub. Safety to be distinguishable.f Our conclusion about the effect on the juveniles} reputations is not based only on the legislative findings. It is probable that most laymen and government agents will not even be aware of the provisions of Megan's Law IV which discuss how sexual offenders are dangerous. However, we do not believe that this lessens the intended effect of the law. Common sense, as well as our society's perception of Megan's Law registrants, would lead an average person of reasonable intelligence to conclude that there is something dangerous about the registrant. Once the public is aware of the juvenile's registration, the clear implication is that the Commonwealth . thought it necessary to inform them that this person is a sexual offender and therefore dangerous. Th.is is exactly the purpose of the law and we believe the law will be effective. A similar view 13 Since the dispositive issue in Connecticut Dep't of Pub. Safety was whether due process was even triggered, the Court's reasoning is largely unnecessary. Connecticut Dep't of Pub. Safety. 538 U.S. at 7 (conducting inquiry "assuming, arguendo, that respondent has been deprived of a liberty interest"). As we have said, federal Jaw does not protect reputation alone. See Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 7 J 2 (] 976) (injury to reputation is not a liberty or property interest triggering due process protections). will be held by persons informed of the juvenile's registration for the rest of the juvenile's life, despite the fact that a particular juvenile's character might be altered after a successful rehabilitation, or simply after he matures and develops. Unlike adult registrants, the registrants here committed these acts while they were children and this forms the most weighty consideration in finding reputational harm. Being a child implies a unique reputation in our society. For an adult sex offender, there is debatable harm to reputation considering that adults are entirely culpable for their own actions and do not readily alter their characters, if at all. But as a society we recognize that children's characters are not fully-formed, that children are often subject to perverse influences for which they do not yet have an escape, and that children generally bear less culpability than adults owing to their age and circumstances. See Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. . 2455, 2464 (2012) (outlining scientific research supporting common sense regarding children). Through its various iterations over one hundred years, Pennsylvania is juvenile justice system has expressed society's differing perceptions of adults and children. The longstanding presence and purpose of the Juvenile Act shows the general recognition by our society that juveniles are. different. Juveniles are separated from adults because they are believed to be more capable of rehabilitation and often more deserving of leniency due to a lesser degree of culpability. See In re Holmes, 109 A.2d at 525 ("The State is not seeking to punish an off ender but to salvage a boy who may be in danger of becoming one, and to safeguard his adolescent life"). Children's habits are not solidified and this is contemplated in the law. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 630l(b), (rehabilitation). Thus, they often will not need to be deterred or incapacitated as an adult· offender would under the criminal justice system. In 1954, our Supreme Court stated that "[n]o suggestion or taint of criminality attaches to any finding of delinquency by a Juvenile Court." In · re Holmes, 109 A.2d at 525. While such an absolute remark may not be true today, it is certainly true that children who commit heinous crimes are perceived indulgently in comparison with adults. Megan's Law IV effectively replaces these considerations which usually soften the judgments of society. Where a child's serious transgressions might have been looked on with a more lenient eye, especially as time passed and wounds were healed, Megan's Law IV will remind us that this person is a sexual offender and this reminder will persist for the rest of the juvenile's life. When considering reputation, this kind of reminder is the exact interest at stake. Furthermore, one of the most essential qualities of reputation is that it may be improved. This situation is even more significant for juveniles because their character is often not firmly set. Thus, a truly rehabilitated juvenile might eventually gain a good reputation to match a good character. However, under Megan's Law IV, lifetime registration will hold the juvenile's reputation in stasis. The law will imbue the juvenile with the reputation of a sexual offender through formative stages of his life and continuing into old age. A juvenile who was adjudicated delinquent when he was fourteen will continue to be known as a sexual offender when he is seventy. While Pennsylvania Bar Ass'n does notdeal with a situation as grave as sexual crime, it still has obvious similarities to the current facts. In Pennsylvania Bar Ass'n, the Court considered how some lawyers would justifiably be put on the list because they filed a fraudulent claim, whereas other lawyers on the list did nothing blameworthy. Despite this variation, the Court found a harm to reputation which triggered constitutional protections. Like Pennsylvania Bar Ass'n, the juvenile offenders are placed on a list which bears a negative connotation for their reputation and the list is then distributed. Some juveniles will deserve to be put on the Megan's Law registry because they are at high-risk to re-offend, whe~eas others will be mislabeled. Extending the Commonw~alth Court's reasoning to its logical conclusion, the inclusion of some dangerous individuals on theMegan's Law registry does not lessen the harm to reputation for the individuals who are not dangerous. Furthermore, an even greater burden to reputation occurs here insofar as sexual offender registration will generally persist for life. The instant facts have differences to those in Pennsylvania Bar·Ass1n, but these differences are not significant enough to distinguish that case. Unlike Pennsylvania Bar Ass'n, the Juveniles' injury to reputation is not grounded on a mere undefined suspicion, but results after an adjudicatory hearing or admission where it is determined that the juvenile has committed an offense. While the adjudicatory hearing undoubtedly provides a procedural protection, this does not lead us to conclude that no reputational harm has occurred. The adjudication and disposition itself is largely irrelevant because it does not consider the appropriateness of the juvenile's presence on the Megan's Law registry. Pennsylvania Bar Ass'n does not imply that there would be a contrary result if there were some grounds for the suspicion. As the Court said, "while some attorneys reported to the Index Bureau might actually be involved in submitting :fraudulent claims, all of the attorneys reported will suffer an injury to their right to protect their reputations without benefit of due process." Pennsylvania Bar Ass'n, 607 A.2d at 858. Neither does Pennsylvania Bar Ass'n deal with the distinct and heightened reputational concerns present here, i.e. the high risk of re-offense designation and the peculiar situation of juveniles. In sum, we hold that Megan's Law IV damages the juveniles' reputations and has triggered strict scrutiny. NurowHy Tanforedl to a Comn:pelHhng §tall:e foll:ieiresll: Megan's Law IV is concerned with protecting the public from the recidivism of persons who have committed sexual offenses and are at a high risk to re-offend. As the law states, "protection of the public from this type of offender is a paramount governmental interest." 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9799.1 l(a)( 4). Safety or protection is a classic example of a compelling state interest. See Denver Area Educ. Telecommunications Consortium, Inc. v. F.C.C., 518 U.S. 727, · 754-55 (1996) (protecting physical and psychological well-being of minors was a compelling state interest). Accordingly, we hold that Megan's Law IV clearly has a compelling state interest. The second step in strict scrutiny review ismore difficult and places the burden of proof on the government to show that the law is narrowly-tailored to the compelling state interest. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. 310, 340 (2010) (state's burden of proof). A statute is not narrowly tailored when a "less restrictive alternative [to accomplish the legislative goal] is readily available." Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 329 (1988) ( existence of a less restrictive statute suggested that a challenged ordinance, aimed at the same problem, was overly restrictive). Neither is a statute narrowly tailored if it is over-inclusive, covering situations which are not pertinent to the legislative goal. See Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of New York State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 118 (1991) (to compensate victims, statute controlling literary endeavors of authors admitting to crime was over-inclusive, as it also applied to authors never actually accused or convicted). As we have already noted, the Commonwealth did not present evidence or argument on how Megan's Law IV is narrowly-tailored, The Commonwealth elected to focus on whether the Petitioners' reputations were harmed. Thus, we are forced to rely primarily on the Petitioner's evidence in assessing this prong. In examining the narrowly tailored requirement, we first acknowledge the General Assembly's difficulty in attempting to craft appropriate regulation for sex offenders. On the one hand, both adult and juvenile sexual offenders might posea future danger to the public. Megan's Law attempts to deal with this danger by essentially creating a government-managed reputation system. However, among adults and juveniles the risk of re-offense is by no means the same. The recidivism rate for adult sexual offenders has been estimated at 13% or higher, while the · most extensive study of juvenile sexual recidivism rates (collecting 63 studies and surveying 11,200 juveniles) concludes that juvenile offenders recidivate in 7.09% of cases. [Juvs.' Exh. J, Aff. of Michael F. Caldwell, Psy.D.; Exh. I, Aff. of Dr .. Elena del Busto, M.D.] The real. recidivism rate over a sexual offender's lifetime may be higher than these statistics reveal. Of course, any study will be practically constrained to pick some point in time to stop research (on average, the juvenile studies stopped collecting data 5 years after the initial adjudication). Thus, any recidivism that occurred after that time is not accounted for. Furthermore, not all sexual re- offenses are reported. This means that the actual recidivism rate for juveniles could be higher than assessed and falls short of total accuracy. Predictions for juvenile sexual offenders pose additional problems. For juvenile sexual offenders, "it is extremely difficult to identify the small subgroup of offenders who pose a . high risk of sexual re-offense." [Juvs.' Exh. J, Caldwell, Psy.D.J This is because juvenile sexual recidivism is relatively low, for scientific purposes, and this makes identifying risk-increasing elements more difficult. [Juvs.' Exh. J, Caldwell, Psy.D.J Nevertheless, Megan's Law IV uses the fact of an adjudication alone to determine 1f a particular individual should be put on the registry. We are unaware, and the parties do not suggest, What factual background or research the legislature considered before enacting Megan's Law IV. But even if the legislature were to preface its legislation with very extensive research it is hard to see how it would be possible to create an adjudication-based registry to cover only those juveniles who are, in fact, dangerous. Megan's Law IV does differentiate between adult and juvenile sexual offenders. Adults and juveniles are subject to registration for different offenses and, unlike adults, juveniles will not be registrable unless they are at least fourteen years of age at the time of the offense. For a juvenile to be registrable he must: (1) be adjudicated delinquent of Rape, I.D.S.I., Aggravated Indecent Assault, or an attempt, solicitation, or conspiracy to commit the same; and (2) be 14 years old or older when he engaged in the registrable conduct. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9799.12. On the other hand, Megan's Law IV makes adult offenders registrable for approximately forty- eight (48) different crimes. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9799.14. This tally does not account for similar crimes in foreign jurisdictions, inchoate crimes, or repealed registrable offenses in this Commonwealth. Presumably, the offenses which make a juvenile registrable imply a higher risk ofre-offense. Megan's Law IV does not place a juvenile's information on the in-state public website. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9799.28. t4 While Megan's Law IV provides no confidentiality protections and disseminates the registrant's information to various parties, 15 public dissemination of a juvenile's information will not necessarily occur. By these distinctions the legislature has tried to balance the need to rehabilitate juvenile offenders, while also protecting the community through registration. 14 Petitioners contend that, nevertheless, Megan's Law IV requires the juveniles' information to be disseminated to state and federal agencies that will include their registration information on line. Thus, argue the Petitioners, Megan's Law IV effectively places their information online. 15 See fn, 12, above, discussing who receives a registrant's information. Nevertheless, while Megan's Law implies an effort to limit juvenile registration, it fails to be narrowly tailored. Megan's Law IV ismost problematic in that it is over-inclusive; the Jaw requires registration by juveniles who are not at a high risk of re-offense. A juvenile offender's circumstances may vary, even for the heinous crimes involved. The law's lack of any individualized inquiry leaves significant questions unanswered pertaining to the juvenile's risk of recidivism. For instance, what is thejuvenile's background? Was the initial adjudication born of a momentary lapse or was it a continuing pattern of behavior? Were there significant contributing factors in the juvenile's crime, such as peer pressure or a poisonous home environment? . Was the juvenile previously subject to sexual or physical abuse? For howlong? Has he now moved to a new and stable environment? Has he re-offended or been tempted to re- offend? Has the juvenile shown signs of rehabilitation or recovery? Is he now married, employed, in school, involved in his community, or engaged in other productive and supportive roles which would diminish the risk of re-offense? Consideration of such questions is .analogous to the murder sentencing factors. See 18 Pa. C.S.A; § 1102. l (for murder sentence, considering particular circumstances of a juvenile before deciding eligibility for pa,role).16 · By spelling out these considerations we do not mean to imply that the legislature must require some particular set of questions or questionnaire before it could require registration. However, Megan's Law IV is over-inclusive by not accounting for individualized circumstances, thereby ignoring a means to avoid including non-dangerous persons on the registry. It would be no answer to say that the . . . future dangerousness of sexual offenders is = speculative and unknowable for determination at the time of adjudication, for this is simply to acknowledge that the law will sweep up those who are not dangerous. 16 This statute was passed in response Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct 2455 (2012). Furthennore, other statutory provisions suggest that the adjudication-based system for registration is not the least restrictive means that could have been chosen. l 7 The legislature has tasked the court with judging whether a particular sexual offender should be classified as a sexually violent predator "due to a mental abnormality or personality disorder that makes the individual likely to engage in predatory sexually violent offenses." 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9799.12 (definitions); 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9799.24(e) (hearing for assessment). The Sexual Offender Assessment Board is tasked with assisting the Court in examining whether the sexual offender is a sexually violent predator. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9799.24(b). After a court order, the Board will gather the following irtfonnation for the Court's review: (1) Facts of the current offense, including: (i) Whether the offense involved multiple victims. (ii) Whether the individual exceeded the means necessary to achieve the offense. (iii) The nature of the sexual contact with the victim. · · (iv) Relationship of the individual to the victim. · (v) Age of the victim. (vi) Whether the offense included a display of unusual cruelty by the individual during the commission of the crime. · (vii) The mental capacity of the victim. (2) Prior offense history, including: (i) The individual's prior criminal record. (ii) Whether the individual completed any prior sentences. (iii)Whether the individual participated in available programs for sexual offenders. (3) Characteristics of the individual, including: (i) Age. (ii) Use of illegal drugs . (iii) Any mental illness, mental disability or mental abnormality. (iv) Behavioral characteristics that contribute to the individual's conduct. (4) Factors that are supported in a sexual offender assessment field as criteria reasonably relatedto the risk of reoffense. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9799.24(b). 17 We employ the U.S. Supreme Court's suggestion of considering similar provisions to determine if there is a less restrictive means available. Boos v. Barry, 4&5 U.S. 312, 329 ( 1988) (existence of a less restrictive statute suggested that a challenged ordinance, aimed at the same problem, was overly restrictive). The Court then uses this information, in part, to determine whether the sexual offender is a sexually violent predator. The legislature considered this level of individual analysis appropriate, at least in these circumstances. While the legislature concluded that Megan's Law IV needed to be "strengthened," strengthening the law did not mean excluding a sexually violent predator assessment, which was already present in prior versions.18 Similarly, the legislature also required a court hearing for "sexually violent delinquent children." 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9799.12 (referring to § 6402 for definition of sexually violent delinquent child); 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6402 (defining sexually violent delinquent child as one involuntarily committed under § 6403). The . standard employed is deferential to the juvenile; it must be shown by "clear and convincing evidence" that the juvenile "has a merital abnormality or personality disorder which results in serious difficulty in controlling sexually violent behavior that makes the person likely to engage in an act of sexual violence." 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6403(d). Thus, the legislature has already indicated that it believes the individualized consideration of circumstances is a reasonable means . . of carrying out the law's purpose; this supports the notion that adjudication-based registration is over-inclusive. Similar to Pennsylvania Bar Ass'n, the statute will include persons both relevant . and irrelevant to the legislative aim. However, an unchallengeable, per se conclusion that all · juvenile offenders require Megan's Law registration for at least twenty-five years discards reasonable, alternative protections which could be put in place, such as an individualized inquiry into the risks of a particular juvenile. We also consider the holding in Johnson. While Johnson only applied the rational basis test, a considerably more deferential standard of review, the Court nevertheless struck 18 Specifically, the Court already conducted sexually violent predator assessments for adults pursuant to Megan's Law III. As we have said, this is the first time that juveniles have been required to register and, thus, no individual juvenile assessments occurred in prior versions of Megan's Law. down a law which presumed dangerousness based upon a criminal conviction. Here, Megan's Law IV infringes on a fundamental right and presumes that the juvenile is dangerous throughout . his life based upon an adjudication alone. But if a conviction-based presumption of · dangerousness is not rationally related. to protection because it fails to account for individual circumstances, it follows that neither is such a presumption narrowly tailored. The infringement of a fundamental right must be more carefully justified to survive scrutiny. 19 Additionally, the legislature has historically selected certain crimes considered heinous in nature for direct filing in the criminal division when committed by juveniles fifteen years of age and over, thus, at a minimum, invoking constitutional protections when the potential consequences are the same or similar to adult defendants. 42 Pa:C.S.A. § 6302 (defining "delinquent act"); see also Com. v. Ramos, 920 A.2d 1253, 1257 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2007). We note that the adjudicatory hearing does not encompass the full panoply of criminal protections. Such hearings are conducted "in an informal but orderly manner"20 and the parties. often adopt a less adversarial attitude than in the criminal setting. Thus, adjudications of delinquency enjoy less procedural protections than adult registrants. Where the fundamental right to reputation is at stake, however, the determination is of constitutional magnitude and should enjoy some appropriate, heightened protection. We do not hold or imply that a jury trial, or other specific criminal protections, are constitutionally required in juvenile proceedings: Neither do we hold that criminal protections are required prior to ajuvenile's sexual offender registration. Rather, . the lack of these constitutional protections is merely suggestive of how Megan's Law IV fails to consider that the registration issues at stake are of constitutional magnitude for the Juveniles. 19 In assessing harm, we have noted how Johnson banned employment based upon the criminal proceeding, whereas Megan's Law N disseminates information after the adjudication. However, thisdissemination of information is likely to have similar practical effects on the Juveniles' employment, housing, and education. 20 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6336(a) (Conduct of Hearings under Juvenile Act). ., Before concluding, we also note that we have reviewed both the state and federal legislative histories for reasoning or evidence which supports the premise that the adjudication- based registration is closely tied to juveniles at a high risk of re-offense, We have found none. As far as Pennsylvania's legislative record is concerned, we have found no helpful discussion. Pennsylvania legislators indicated that Megan's Law IV extended registration to transient offenders/I allowed for increased information sharing on national registries,22 and brought Pennsylvania in compliance with the federal Adam Walsh Act of 2006. Compliance with the AdamWalsh Act was necessary to avoid a $1.6 million reduction in a federal grant,23 and also to make Pennsylvania less attractive to sexual offenders from foreign jurisdictions who might otherwise elect to move to the state if Pennsylvania maintained lesser reporting requirements. We have found no discussion of the appropriateness of juvenile registration on the available record.24 Since Megan's Law IV was partly designed to comply with the Adam Walsh Act, we have also reviewed the federal legislative record. The Adam Walsh Act of 2006 was broad· ranging and addressed multiple issues for both adult and juvenile sexual offenders. In part, the federal legislation sought to eliminate the disparity between registration for adult and juvenile 21 S.B. 1183, Legislative Journal-Senate, pg. 1203-04, November 15, 2011 (statement of Senator Orie). Available online at: http://www.legis.sMe.pa.us/WUOJ/LI/SJ/201l!O/Sj2011 I I 5.pclf#page==5. 22 S.B. 1183, Legislative Journal-House, pg. 255 I, December 13, 2011 (statement submitted by Representative Caltagirone). Available online at: http://www.legis.state.pa.us/WUO J/LJ/HJ/20 l li0/20 l l 1213.pdfflpage=l 5. · 23 S.B. 1183, Legislative Journal-House, pg. 2552, December 13, 201 I (statement submitted by Representative Marsico). 24 At most, the record reveals that two senators objected to the juvenile provisions before the final vote. S.B. I 183, Legislative Journal-Senate, pg. l3 73- 74, December 14, 2011 (statements of Senators White and Ferlo). Available online: at http:/iwww.legis.state.pa.us/WUO 1/LJ/SJ/20 I l/O/Sj20111214.pdfripage= I J. offenders.25 It also was intended to create a uniform system ofregistration among the states in order to enhance the accuracy and usefulness of Megan's Law registries." After reviewing the congressional record, the limited registration of juvenile offenders appears to have been part of a pragmatic compromise on the part of Congress, rather than an attempt to limit juvenile registration to those who were at a high risk for re-offense, One senator opined that: [I]n order for the registry to be effective, it should be targeted toward those who represent the highest risk to our communities. The current version takes a more sweeping approach toward juvenile offenders by expanding their registration requirements. The Senate bill allowed each State to determine whether a juvenile should be included on the registry. This compromise allows some offenders over 14 to be included on registries, but only if they have been convicted of very serious offenses. For juveniles, the public notification provision in this bill is harsh given their low rate of recidivism, which is less than 8 percent according to the most recent studies. For this reason, it is especially important that the bill includes funding for treatment of juvenile offenders. These provisions recognize that juvenile offenders, who have much lower rates of recidivism and have been shown to be much more amenable to treatment than their adult counterparts, shouldn't be lumped together with adult offenders.27 The federal legislative record does not provide any indication that Pennsylvania's registrable adjudications are tied to a high-risk of re-offense. As the Senator said, the Adam Walsh Act was a compromise which included more juveniles than those who were high-risk. The federal legislature was aware, however, that compliance with the Adam Walsh Act might very well conflict with state constitutional protections. Recognizing this, they provided an accompanying exception to the Adam Walsh Act in order to allow states the necessary leeway to abide by their own governing documents without suffering a penalty in funding. 25 29 Cong. Rec. 677-.78 (March 8, 2006) (statement of Rep. Green). Available online at: l~ttp://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/C REC-2006-03-08/pdt!CREC-2006-03-08-pr I-PgH657 -2. pdf#page=2 l. 2 96 Cong. Rec. 8023 (July 20, 2006) (statement of Sen. Kennedy). Available online at: Ntp://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CREC-2006-0 7-20/pdf'CREC-2006-07-20-pt l-PgSSO 12-2.pdf.iJ'page=l 2. 96 Cong. Rec. 8023 (July 20, 2006) (statement of Sen. Kennedy). Available online at: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CREC-2006-07-20/pdf!CREC-2006-0 7: 20-pl I -PgS80 12-2 .pd f#puge= 12. Considering the legislative record, we can find no grounds on which to conclude the juvenile's adjudication-based registration is narrowly tailored. Megan's Law IV juvenile registration was simply not designed to only apply to those at a high risk of re-offense. Accordingly, as applied to the Petitioners and for the reasons discussed above, we hold that Megan's Law IV is not narrowly tailored to its legislative goal and is unconstitutional under the Pennsylvania Constitution and in light of the protections in Art. I, § I. Irrebutrable Priesumpfo:m · Considering our disposition of the Petitioner's reputation claim, we will briefly analyze the related claim that Megan's Law IV creates an irrebuttable presumption. While procedural due process is a flexible notion which calls for such protections as demanded by the individual situation, the essential requirements are notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard. Soja v. Pennsylvania State Police, 455 A.2d 613, 615 (Pa. 1982) ("the essential elements of due process are notice and opportunity to be heard and to defend in an orderly proceeding adapted to the nature of the case before a tribunal having jurisdiction of the cause"). Due process requires not just "any" hearing, but rnther an "appropriate" hearing. Fiore v. Com. of Pa., Board of Finance and Revenue, 633 A.2d 1111, 1114 (Pa. 1993). With respect to procedural due process, the U.S. Supreme Court has stated: The hearing required by the Due Process Clause must be 'meaningful,' and 'appropriate to the nature of the case.' It is a proposition which hardly seems to need explication that a hearing which excludes consideration of an element essential to the decision whether licenses of the nature here involved shall be suspended does not meet this standard. Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 541-42 (1971) (citations omitted). Sometimes, a legislative choice based on a categorical determination from a criminal conviction is permissible. Compare De Veau v. Braisted, 363 U.S. 144, 157 (1960) (in employment context, holding that law barring felony convicts from waterfront union office, if they did not have a pardon or good conduct certificate, was reasonable, based on legislative findings of corruption, and not an ex post facto law); with Johnson v: Alle.gheny Intennediate Unit, 59 A.3d 10, 25 (Pa. Cmwlth. Ct. 2012) {lifetime ban on employment working with children based on voluntary manslaughter conviction was not punishment under ex post facto clause; however, applying the rational basis test, law violated due process because it did not account for individual circumstances). However, a statute may be unconstitutional if it is conditioned on an irrebuttable presumption of some pertinent fact: See Com. Dep't ofTransp., Bureau of Driver Licensing v. Clayton, 684 A.2d 1060, .1063 (Pa. 1996). "[Ijrrebuttable presumptions are violative of due process where the presumption is deemed not universally true and a reasonable alternative means of ascertaining that presumed fact [js] available."· Clayton, 684 A.2d at 1063 (holding statute unconstitutional that rescinded license, without a pertinent hearing, following an epileptic seizure which may or may not indicate dangerousness of driver). Regarding the irrebuttable presumption doctrine, our court has observed that it is "[un]wise to pigeonhole whether an analysis of an irrebuttable presumption is solely one of substantive or procedural due process." Id. at 1064. This is because an irrebuttable presumption · claim generally challenges both the statute, i.e. the substance, and the procedure employed by the statute. Id. In D.C. v. School Dist. of Philadelphi;;, the Commonwealth Court considered whether it was an irrebuttable presumption for a statute to automatically exclude certain juvenile delinquents from a school's regular classrooms. D.C. v. School Dist. of Philadelphia, 879 A.2d 4.08, 410 (Pa. Cmwlth, Ct. 2005). In that case, the General Assembly enacted legislation to manage students who were adjudicated delinquent. Id. at 409. Any student adjudicated delinquent would not be allowed in a regular classroom, but would be placed in a transition center for one month. Id. 409- I 0. In accordance with the statute, the transition center would then assign the juvenile to one of four various programs designed for disruptive students. Id. at 410. The four programs had no interscholastic sports and limited scholastic opportunities: Id. Three students brought suit, challenging the statute on the basis of the irrebuttable presumption doctrine. Id. at 416. The students were all adjudicated delinquent of non-violent crimes, but behaved themselves in the rehabilitation program and when working with others. Id. at 410. Finding that due process triggered, the Court considered that the adjudicatory hearing did not · decide whether the student should be excluded from the regular classroom. Id. at 418. Instead, the statute simply presumed a student must be excluded "regardless of whether the student performed in an exemplary manner during juvenile placement or otherwise does not pose a threat to the regular classroom setting." Id., 879 A.2d at 418. The statute provided no hearing for students to challenge the classroom exclusion. Id. at 419. Accordingly, the statute created an irrebuttable presumption and was stricken. Id.28 Reputational harm is enough to trigger the Pennsylvania Constitution's due process protections. Compare R. v. Com., Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 636 A.2d at 149 (under Pennsylvania Constitution, reputation is "a fundamental interest which cannot be abridged without compliance with constitutional standards of due process and equal protection") with Com. v. Mountain, 711 A.2d at 478 (citing federal precedent and stating "reputational damage alone has been held to be insufficient to trigger a procedural due process claim"). As we discussed above, Megan's Law IV harms the Juveniles' reputation and has triggered due process 28 The students also challenged the statute on the basis that it violated their fundamental right to reputation. The Court declined to address this claim because it had already granted relief on separate due process grounds. D.C. v. Sch. Dist. of Philadelphia, 879 A.2d 408, 419 (Pa. Cmwlth. Ct. 2005). protections. Thus, we will go on to determine if the law creates an irrebuttable presumption as the Petitioners claim. Megan's Law IV creates a presumption that the Petitioners are dangerous and pose a high risk of re-offending, thus necessitating their placement on the sex offender registry. This presumption is employed after an adjudicatory hearing where the Petitioners were adjudicated delinquent of certain offenses. However, the Petitioners' registry and dangerousness are not at issue in the hearing: Apparently recognizing that Megan's Law IV will cover juvenile delinquents who are not high risk, the legislature provides an opportunity for juvenile offenders to petition the Court to withdraw from the registry. However, a juvenile's challenge to registration may only occur after they have been subject to registration for 25,years. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9799.17(a)(l). This challenge will be precluded if the juvenile has been convicted for any second degree misdemeanor punishable by more than one year in prison, whether or not this conviction bears any relationship to dangerousness, sexual offenses, or the requirements ofregistration. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9799.17(a)(2).29 The juvenile will also be on the registry for life if his court-ordered supervision is not successfully completed without revocation, regardless of the reasons or the number of years ago that occurred. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9799.17(a)(3). Considering the timing of this hearing and the possibly irrelevant considerations involved, we do not believe that this hearing provides a meaningful opportunity to challenge registration. Neither does Megan's Law IV provide any notice prior to the requirement to register. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9799.23(a)-(d) 29 For example, perhaps the juvenile, in the course of his employment, commits two violations of the Sewage System Cleaner Control Act within a two year period. The second violation will be a misdemeanor of the second degree and will preclude him from ever challenging his Megan's Law registry. 35 Pa.C.S.A. § 770.12(c). (requiring notice at the time of adjudicatory hearing's disposition and also stating that failure to notify "shall not relieve the sexual offender. from the requirements of this subchapter"). For these reasons, we hold that Megan's Law IV creates an irrebuttable presumption in violation of the Pennsylvania Constitution's guarantee of due process. ret.itiolfllern' Cfaims 0.nlle & Three: Ex-Post Faclto Cla1!llsie, Cruell aill.irll UKllusual JPamisllnment Considering our disposition with respect to Claims Two and Four, we will not address the additional constitutional grounds on which the Petitioners challenge Megan's Law IV. The Petitioners' arguments regarding the ex post facto clause and the gth Amendment are dismissed as moot. SeverabiU.ty. . Once a court declares part of a statute unconstitutional, it must determine whether the statute should be struck in its entirety or whether some portion of the statute may be saved by severing it. The Statutory Construction Act provides that: The provisions of every statute shall be severable. If any provision of any statute or the application thereof to any person or circumstance is held invalid, the remainder of the statute, and the application of such provision to other persons or circumstances, shall not be affected thereby, unless the court finds that the valid provisions of the statute are so essentially and inseparably connected with, and so depend upon, the void provision or application, that it cannot be presumed the General Assembly would have enacted the remaining valid provisions without the void one; or unless the court finds that the remaining valid provisions, standing alone, are incomplete and are incapable of being executed in accordance with the legislative intent. 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1925. The court must find provisions severable unless "[the} valid provisions of [the statute] are so dependent upon the [invalid] provisions that the General Assembly would not have enacted the former without the latter." Com. v. G. Williams, 832 A.2d 962, 986 (Pa. 2003) (severing unconstitutional penalty provisions from Megan's Law II). However, "[w]here a legislative scheme is determined to have run afoul of constitutional mandate, it is not the role of this Court to design an alternative scheme which may pass constitutional muster." Heller v. Frankston, 475 A.2d 1291, 1296 (Pa. 1984) (going on to find inseparable link making provision not severable). Here, we have found Megan's Law IV unconstitutional insofar as it applies to juvenile offenders who are not assessed to be sexually violent delinquent children. 'Megan's Law IV primarily pertains to adult sexual offenders. Ruling that the law does not apply to select juvenile offenders does not render the other provisions incomplete or incapable of being executed in accordance with the legislature's intent. As such, the provisions are severable and Megan's Law IV is not struck down in its entirety, but only insofar as it applies to juvenile offenders who are not assessed to be sexually violent delinquent children. CONCJLUSliON In sum, as applied to the Petitioners, Megan's Law IV unconstitutionally infringes on the fundamental right to reputation and creates an irrebuttable presumption in violation of the Pennsylvania Constitution's guarantee of due process. Insofar as Megan's Law IV applies to these juvenile offenders, the law is unconstitutional and cannot stand. We will, therefore, release the Petitioners from Megan's Law registration.' Accordingly, we enter the following order: